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The European Neutrals and NATO

Non-alignment, Partnership, Membership?

Edited by Andrew Cottey

New Security Challenges

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The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

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Andrew Cottey

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
BI	Building Integrity
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSBMs	Confidence and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEEPs	Defence Education Enhancement Programmes
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EfR	Education and Training for Defence Reform
EOP	Enhanced Opportunities Partnership
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IPCP	Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MTEP	Military Training and Exercise Programme
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
NUC	NATO-Ukraine Commission
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PAP-T	Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PCSC	Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PII	Partnership Interoperability Initiative
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEEP	Training and Education Enhancement Programme
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
WEP-5	Western European Partners - 5
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The European Neutral States

Andrew Cottey

The European neutral countries—of which Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland are the most prominent cases—are a distinctive group in European international politics. During the Cold War, most European states were members of one of the two military alliances which emerged in the context of the East-West division of the continent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded its membership to include most of the Central and Eastern European states stretching from the Baltic region in the north to the Black Sea in the south, reinforcing the idea of NATO membership as the norm for most European democracies.

The status of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland as long-established European democracies but outside NATO is thus unusual in the larger context of European international politics. In the late 1980s and 1990s the winding down of the Cold War raised questions about the meaning and continued relevance of neutrality: to the extent that neutrality had been about being neutral in the context of the East-West conflict, did neutrality make sense or have utility in a world moving beyond that conflict? In the early 1990s Austria, Finland and Sweden decided to join what was about to become the European Union (EU), a process completed when

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they formally became EU members in January 1995 (Ireland had joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, whereas Switzerland remains outside the EU). Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the EU was an important turning point in these countries' foreign policies, reflecting their moving beyond the Cold War and joining the mainstream of Western European international politics. This was particularly the case for Austria and Finland—although also true for Sweden—because guarantees given to the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War had precluded them from joining the EU's predecessors. Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the EU, further, coincided with the Union's development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s, followed by a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the 2000s. As EU members Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have all actively participated in both the CFSP and the CSDP and argued that involvement in the CFSP and CSDP is compatible with policies of neutrality. The end of the Cold War, membership of the EU and participation in the CFSP and CSDP nonetheless involved some re-calibration of these states' policies of neutrality. To varying degrees Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have redefined their national neutrality policies, with governments and officials often instead using terms such as military neutrality, military non-alignment or simply non-membership of military alliances. Switzerland, remaining outside the EU, has maintained a stricter or narrower interpretation of neutrality, although it too has modified its policies, in particular by joining the United Nations in 1992 and beginning to contribute to peacekeeping and conflict management operations (albeit within certain limits). All five states, however, have clearly maintained their neutrality in the sense of remaining outside military alliances and, in particular, NATO (as the only such alliance that they might realistically join). Although the maintenance of neutrality has in large part been an example of policy continuity on the basis of long-standing policies of neutrality, it has nonetheless also been an active political choice. The end of the Cold War and NATO's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe put the issue of NATO membership on the political agenda in a way that was not the case during the Cold War. The European neutral states could have opted to pursue NATO membership but have (so far) chosen not to do so, even if that choice has been one of quiet continuity rather than prominent debate.

The end of the Cold War also triggered changes within NATO, in particular the development of partnerships with states outside the Alliance, which have resulted in what may be viewed as a quiet revolution in relations

between the European neutral states and NATO and are the focus of this book. Historically, non-membership of military alliances has been the defining element of policies of peacetime neutrality. Since engaging with an alliance, even short of joining it, might be viewed as an infringement of neutrality, neutral states have largely not sought cooperation with alliances (although to varying degrees, the five countries which are the focus of this book also 'leaned West' during the Second World War and the Cold War). During the Cold War, NATO's own focus was centrally on defence and deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Alliance therefore had no policies or institutions for partnerships with non-members. As is explored in the chapters on Sweden and Switzerland in this book, these two countries did have elements of undeclared cooperation with NATO, but these were the exception to the more general pattern of a non-relationship between NATO and the European neutral states. Beginning with the Harmel report in 1967, however, NATO began a policy of engagement with the Soviet bloc countries. This grew into a political dialogue and military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the 1970s and 1980s, which also included the European neutral states in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE). When the Cold War ended, this policy was transformed into one of partnerships with non-members. Initially targeted at the post-communist Central and Eastern European states, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), as the new programme was called, was also opened to the European neutral states. In the 1990s and 2000s, NATO also established partnerships with the southern Mediterranean states, some Middle Eastern states and a group of 'global partners', as well as other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the African Union. Today, NATO defines 'cooperative security'—of which its partnerships are the central element—as one of its three core missions, alongside defence of its member states and crisis management beyond its borders (NATO 2010). Additionally, from the early 1990s, NATO began to play an important role in peacekeeping and crisis management—in particular in the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s and then in Afghanistan in the 2000s—and this became an important focus of cooperation between NATO and its partners. The five European neutral states have all become active partners of NATO since the 1990s, now engaging in a range of political dialogue, military cooperation and shared initiatives with the Alliance, as well as contributing to NATO's peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. This book explores this

new relationship between the European neutral states and NATO, seeking to understand the dynamics behind the relationship, the nature and limits of cooperation between these states and NATO, and the significance of the relationship for both the European neutral states and NATO. Additionally, although all five countries have chosen to maintain their long-standing policies of neutrality, the issue of possible NATO membership remains. As the country chapters in this book indicate, in the Austrian, Irish and Swiss cases NATO membership is simply a domestic political impossibility. In the Finnish and Swedish cases, however, there is ongoing debate on NATO membership—a debate intensified by the wars in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014–15 and growing concern about a renewed 'Russian threat'. This book therefore also explores the circumstances in which Finland and/or Sweden might join NATO and the factors shaping debate on this issue. The rest of this introduction examines which European states may be viewed as neutral, reviews existing academic literature on the foreign and security policies of the European neutral states and situates the analysis of the European neutral states' relations with NATO in the wider fields of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis.

Who Are the European Neutral States?

Before reviewing existing academic literature in the area, the issue of which European states are neutral should be addressed. Historically, quite a wide range of European states adopted policies of neutrality in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, in particular in the context of the two World Wars. Many of these states, however, abandoned these policies in the wake of invasion in one or both of the two World Wars or in the context of the Cold War. Sweden and Switzerland are the longest-standing European neutral countries, having formally established policies of neutrality towards the end of the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century (although a Swiss policy of avoiding being drawn into wars involving neighbouring states can be traced back even further to the sixteenth century). Both countries have maintained policies of neutrality ever since. Ireland established a policy of neutrality at the beginning of the Second World War, and has likewise maintained that policy since then. Finland and Austria became neutral in the context of the Cold War, in Finland's case via a bilateral treaty agreed with the Soviet Union in 1948 and in Austria's case in 1955 in the framework of US-Soviet-British-French negotiations on the

future of Germany and Austria. Communist Yugoslavia also adopted a policy of neutrality after it split with the Soviet Union in 1948. These six states—Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia—were generally recognised as neutral states in the European Cold War context and over time came to be viewed as a distinctive group. This sense of their being a distinctive European neutral group was reinforced by their shared support for and cooperation in the CSCE from the 1960s to the 1980s (Fischer 2009). Ireland's accession to the EEC in 1973 led to some questioning of whether the country could remain neutral and Ireland did not participate in the neutral cooperation in the CSCE because EEC states were themselves coordinating policy towards the CSCE. Irish governments, however, argued that ECC and later European Community and EU membership was compatible with neutrality and Ireland was generally also recognised as a neutral state.

A number of other small and micro-sized Western European states have adopted policies of neutrality or may be viewed as neutral in the sense that they remain outside NATO. Cyprus (i.e., the Greek Republic of Cyprus on the southern half of the divided island) and Malta both have declared policies of neutrality. Andorra, the Holy See (Vatican City), Liechtenstein and San Marino are micro-states that have membership of the OSCE but are outside NATO. Of these states, only Malta participates in NATO's PfP, but its small size makes it less significant than the five states which are the focus of this book. In Cyprus's case, the division of the island and Turkey's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus—Turkey being an important NATO member—have precluded Cypriot participation in PfP. None of the micro-states participate in PfP.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism led to debate about the possibility of Central and Eastern European states becoming neutral or even the establishment of a belt of neutral states between Western Europe/NATO and the Soviet Union/Russia. The majority of Central and Eastern European states, however, sought full integration with the West, including membership of NATO. For these states, in contrast to the Western European neutral states, partnership with NATO was viewed essentially as part of the path to full membership of the Alliance—a goal most of these states achieved in the late 1990s and 2000s, as NATO expanded into Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, a number of post-communist states have sought, at varying points, to maintain policies of neutrality. As Yugoslavia disintegrated amongst bitter wars in the 1990s, the former country's

neutrality was an irrelevance. Serbia, however, as the main successor to Yugoslavia and wary of NATO given the Alliance's interventions in the Yugoslav conflict (in particular its airstrikes against Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo war), has adopted a policy of neutrality. Nonetheless, Serbia joined PfP in 2006 and has since then established quite substantial cooperation with NATO. In the former Soviet Union, a number of post-communist states have also, at various points since the break-up of the Soviet Union, pursued policies of neutrality. The most clear-cut case has been Turkmenistan which has formally pursued a policy of neutrality since the early 1990s (Anceschi 2009). Other former Soviet states, in particular Ukraine and Moldova, have at various points and with varying degrees of commitment and/or ambiguity, adopted policies of neutrality or non-alignment. In both Ukraine and Moldova, however, neutrality and the alternative of pursuing NATO membership have been politically divisive issues: political forces closer to Russia (or at least wishing not to antagonise Russia) have generally supported neutrality, while Western-oriented political groups have been wary that neutrality might condemn their countries to coming under a permanent Russian sphere of influence and/or exclude them from deeper integration with the West. All of the former Soviet countries joined PfP in the 1990s and some, in particular Georgia and Ukraine, have established substantial cooperation with the Alliance. The former Soviet states' partnerships with NATO, further, are centrally intertwined with the larger geostrategic context of Russo-Western relations and, in particular, the debate over NATO enlargement. Although Finland and Sweden's relationships with NATO are also significantly shaped by this Russo-Western dynamic, the overall relationship between the Western European neutral states and NATO is very different from that between the former Soviet states and NATO.

In summary, while a larger number of European states have sometimes claimed to pursue policies of neutrality or may in some sense be viewed as neutral, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland form a distinctive group, in particular on the basis of having long-established and fairly clear-cut policies of neutrality dating back at least to the early Cold War and in some cases earlier. Since the Cold War ended in 1989–90, all five states have maintained their long-standing policies of neutrality but have adapted their foreign and security policies to the new, post-Cold War political and geostrategic environment, including by joining NATO's PfP; it hence makes sense to examine these countries, and their relations with NATO, as a distinct group.

The European Neutrals: Existing Academic Debates

There are relatively few general academic books on neutrality (primarily Karsh 1988 and Leonhard 1988).[1] These works have sought to discuss the nature of neutrality as a form of foreign policy behaviour, noting the range of circumstances that may lead states to adopt policies of neutrality (or have neutrality imposed upon them), the different ways in which states seek to maintain or reinforce policies of neutrality (such as the extent to which states seek to maintain strong armed forces to defend their neutrality—as in the concept of 'armed neutrality') and the particular contributions which neutral states have sought to make to international security (e.g., in the areas of mediation and peacekeeping). Historically, there has been a strong legal strand to work on neutrality, reflecting concern about the rights and duties neutral states (and of other states towards neutral states) and the extent to which these rights and duties are enshrined in international law (Brewer 1916; Chadwick 2002; Lauterpacht 2004; Neff 2000). Authors have also sought to trace the historical development of neutrality (Jessup et al. 1935–36), including to as far back as the ancient Greek city states (Bauslaugh 1991). A number of books have focused on the two World Wars and the inter-war period, a particularly challenging time for states trying to use neutrality as a means of staying out of great power conflicts and war. These works have explored the successes and failures of various states' policies of neutrality during this period, the political and moral compromises made by neutral states in order to stay out of wars (especially the Second World War) and the domestic political and socio-economic impact of the two World Wars on the neutral states (Kitchen et al. 2011; Leitz 2000; Lettevall et al. 2012; Packard 1992; Reginbogin 2009; Wylie 2002). More recently, Abbenhuis (2013, 2014) has sought to rescue the concept of neutrality from at least partial obscurity, arguing that neutrality was in the 'long nineteenth century' (1815–1914) used in a more widespread way than has been generally recognised, not only as a policy for small or weak states, but also by the great powers both as a direct policy option for themselves in relation to particular conflicts and as a tool for managing conflicts over other states by making those states neutral.

The Cold War generated a new body of literature examining the European neutral states in the context of the East-West conflict and a divided Europe, and focusing on the Western European neutral states and Yugoslavia as a distinct group (Bissell and Gasteyger 1990; Hakovirta 1988; Kruzel and Haltzel 1989; Neuhold and Thalberg 1984; Papacosma and Rubin 1989;

Sundelius 1987). This literature pointed to a number of conclusions. First, although these states shared the basic commonality of neutrality or non-alignment in the Cold War context, there was significant diversity in the national and international circumstances which resulted in their being neutral and in the ways in which they sought to maintain and project their neutrality. Second, for the European neutral countries and in particular those on or near the geographical frontline of the Cold War (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia), neutrality was an ongoing balancing act of maintaining their foreign policy and domestic independence while avoiding antagonising the Soviet Union. Third, the European neutral countries sought to act as mediators and peacekeepers: this was a policy that reflected both a national interest in defusing or reducing East-West tensions and a normative commitment to ideals of international peace and cooperation. Symbolically, Helsinki, Stockholm, Geneva, Vienna and Belgrade hosted various important East-West diplomatic meetings and/or became the homes of a number of international organisations within the 'UN family'.

The post-Cold War era resulted in a new generation of literature on the European neutral states' foreign and security policies (Agius and Devine 2011; Engelbrekt 2002; Ferreira-Pereira 2007; Gstohl 2002; Jopp and Ojanen 1999; Ojanen 2003). A number of strands and approaches can be identified within this literature. One focused on the integration of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU (Harden 1994; Miles 2005). Titles such as *Fusing with Europe* (Miles 2005), *Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral Europe* (Engelbrekt 2002) and *Inside the Fence but Outside the Walls* (Ferreira-Pereira 2007) reflected a concern with identifying the dynamics which had resulted in once 'outsiders' joining the EU, including its new foreign, security and defence policy dimensions. The general conclusion was that there were broad pressures towards EU-centred European integration, but that national responses varied and states maintained elements of distinctive national foreign and security policies. A second strand in the academic literature has examined the issue of how far these states should still be viewed as neutral and/or the concept of neutrality has been redefined (Agius 2011; Goetschel 1999; Loden 2012). The consensus on this issue is that while these states remain neutral in the sense of not joining a military alliance (NATO), they have significantly redefined their foreign and security policies towards a set of dominant norms and practices of which active engagement with the EU and NATO are a major part—hence the use of terms such as post-neutrals. There remains ongoing debate, however, about how far the neutral states continue to advance

security policy norms and practices which challenge or modify dominant Western ones and how far the processes at play leave scope for such differentiation or will inevitably result in the neutral states' ever deeper integration with dominant Western norms and practices (Agius 2011; Devine 2011; Loden 2012). It is also worth noting that some analyses frame the European neutral states not solely or primarily in terms of their shared neutrality, but as examples of small states, peripheral states (whether politically or geographically) or, in the cases of Finland and Sweden, the Nordic states as a distinctive region/group (Bailes et al. 2006; Dorfer 1997; Engelbrekt 2002; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Ingebritsen 2006). Hence, whether neutrality is the most important or useful point of reference for analysing the neutral states' foreign and security policies is itself a point of contention.

Earlier academic literature on neutrality in general and on the European neutral states in the Cold War sought to explore the meaning and practice of neutrality but was not particularly informed by theory (in the sense of trying to explain the foreign policy choices and behaviour of the European neutral states in more general theoretical or conceptual terms). Since the end of the Cold War, however, a new generation of literature on the European neutral states has emerged, with a more explicit theoretical focus. A number of authors have taken a social constructivist theoretical perspective, which focuses on the ways in which states' foreign policies are constructed through processes of political discourse and rhetoric, and hence closely linked to national identities (Agius 2006; Agius and Devine 2011; Browning 2008; Malmborg 2001; Tonra 2012). This has also lead to work exploring not only how policies of neutrality have been socially constructed historically, but also how they have been re-constructed in the context of European integration and in particular EU membership and involvement in the EU's CFSP and CSDP (Rieker 2002; Devine 2011). Analysts have also applied the concept of Europeanisation from the literature on EU foreign policy, seeking to assess how far EU membership and involvement in the CFSP and CSDP has resulted in the national foreign, security and defence policies of the European neutral states shifting towards a set of EU security policy norms and practices (Alecu de Flers 2011; Jokela 2011). In line with the general literature on EU foreign policy Europeanisation, the conclusion seems to be that the neutral states' foreign policies have been Europeanised, but that this is a flexible process allowing for continued national differentiation and that it is also a two-way process with member states seeking to 'upload' national foreign policy

preferences to the EU level alongside 'downloading' of EU policies to the national level. In this context, academics have also used the concept of 'norm entrepreneurs' (derived from the wider literature on international norms) to analyse the European neutral states' foreign policies, especially in the EU context. It is argued that the European neutral states have sought to promote a particular set of security policy norms and practices (centred around peacekeeping, conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding) and that the EU has become a key focus for their entrepreneurial role in this area (Bjorkdahl 2007; Ingebritsen 2002; Stromvik 2006; Vayrynen 2006).

Compared to this literature on neutrality in general, the European neutral states as a distinct group and the interaction between EU membership/CFSP/CSDP and the European neutral states' foreign and security policies, rather little has been written on the the relationship between the neutral states and NATO. During the Cold War, almost nothing was written on the neutrals-NATO relationship *per se*, reflecting the fact that no formal relationship existed and there appeared to be very little interaction between them (although, as has subsequently become clear, there was closer cooperation between Sweden, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, and NATO during the Cold War than was publicly acknowledged at the time; see Dalsjo 2006 and Rickli 2004 and the chapters on Sweden and Switzerland in this book). Since the end of the Cold War, a number of article/chapter length works have examined national relationships of individual countries with NATO (Arter 1996; Dahl 1997, 2001; Ishizuka 1999; Michel 2011; Pursiainen and Saari 2002; Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 2000; Wagnsson 2011), although these works have focused very largely on Finland and Sweden. Only a small number of article/chapter length works have sought to provide a broader analysis of the European neutral states relations with NATO (Cottey 2013; Petersson 2011). This book addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive comparative assessment of the five main European neutral states' relationships with NATO, focusing on the post-Cold War period, but placing the analysis in the context of the longer-term history of these states' foreign and security policies and the evolution of NATO since it was established in 1949. The book explores the nature of the post-Cold War partnership between the European neutral states and NATO, patterns of commonality and divergence in the neutral states relations with NATO and the factors shaping the relationship between the European neutral states and NATO, as well as the question of whether and in what circumstances any of these states may join NATO.

The analyses in this book should also be placed in the context of wider academic theories of International Relations (Doyle 1997; Dunne et al. 2016; Viotti and Kauppi 2010) and the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (Alden and Aran 2012; Beach 2012; Breuning 2007). Realist theorists of International Relations have long argued that the anarchic nature of the international system and the distribution of power between states (the balance of power) are central to understanding the international system as a whole and the foreign policy behaviour of states. In particular, Realists have argued that balancing and bandwagoning are central forms of state behaviour, with states either balancing against hegemonic or rising powers or, alternatively, bandwagoning with such powers in order to benefit from cooperation with the dominant power (Walt 1990; Waltz 1979). Neutrality does not fit easily into the balancing versus bandwagoning dichotomy. As a policy of staying out of other states' wars, and more generally seeking not to be drawn into great power conflicts, neutrality can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the choice between balancing or bandwagoning (and the costs that might come with either). To the extent that neutrality is a means of reassuring a hegemonic or rising power that one does not threaten it or its interests, neutrality may be viewed as a particular form of bandwagoning. To the extent that neutrality includes elements designed to deter attack or infringements on one's neutrality (as in the concept of 'armed neutrality'), it may be viewed as a form of balancing. While neutrality does not fit easily into the balancing versus bandwagoning dichotomy, the history of the European neutral states, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War, nonetheless indicates that balance of power considerations were central to the circumstances which resulted in these states becoming neutral and the specific ways in which they practised neutrality. In contrast to Realists, Liberal theorists of International Relations emphasise the role of international institutions—ranging from norms for state behaviour to formal international organisations such as the UN or the EU—and domestic politics in shaping the international system and the foreign policy behaviour of states (Russett and Oneal 2000). In this context, neutrality can itself be viewed as an international institution: a norm agreed by states and codified in international law. The European neutral states have arguably been able to maintain their now long-standing policies of neutrality in part because the institution of neutrality has become embedded in international society and is respected by other states (Raymond 1997). Realist theorists may, of course, counter that the historic willingness of great powers to ride roughshod over the neutrality of

other states when it suits their needs suggests that the neutrality norm in international politics is relatively weak and that the neutrality of specific states is underpinned by particular configurations of the balance of power. A second strand in Liberal thinking in International Relations focuses on the ways in which domestic politics—in particular, the distinction between democracies and authoritarian states—shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states and hence international politics as a whole. This logic has not been particularly applied to neutrality in general or to the European neutral states. It is worth noting, however, that at least in the Swedish and Austrian cases after 1945, the Social Democrats were the dominant political parties and that the national policies of neutrality were (and to some extent still are) strongly associated with these parties. More generally, in all five countries examined in this book, neutrality has sat alongside a number of other policies, including support for the United Nations, détente, Third World development and nuclear disarmament. Although the governments of the five European neutral states have not always been left or centre-left in character, there is an argument that neutrality can be viewed as part of a wider foreign policy that may be described as left or centre-left in global terms. As noted above, more recently academics have sought to apply Social Constructivist approaches, with their focus on discourses/narratives and national identity, to the study of the European neutral states (on Social Constructivism generally see Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 and Katzenstein 1996). This approach makes a persuasive case that the neutrality policies of the European neutral states have become embedded in national narratives about their countries' role in the world—in particular as promoters of peace through support for the UN, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and the like—and are now an important and established part of each country's national identity. Additionally, the analysis of the European neutral states via the lens of foreign policy Europeanisation should be viewed in the context of more general Liberal and Institutionalist literature on the impact of involvement in international institutions on states' foreign policies (Wong 2011). This perspective also raises the questions about whether and in what ways engagement with NATO, albeit as partners rather than members, has impacted on the foreign and security policies of the European neutral. These various broader themes—the balance between external and domestic factors in shaping states' foreign policies, the relationship between national identity and foreign policy and the impact of involvement in international institutions in states' foreign and security policies—are addressed in various ways in the individual country chapters in this book and returned to in the conclusion.

Overview of the Book

Chapter 2 of this book examines the concept and practice of neutrality in international politics, exploring both the wider history of neutrality and the evolution of the foreign and security policies of the five European neutral states, which are the focus of this book. The chapter emphasises the way in which neutrality has moved over time from being a policy option pursued by states in relation to specific wars to a long-term national policy of remaining outside alliances (and, more generally, seeking to avoid being drawn into great power conflicts). The chapter also notes two different faces to neutrality: one, neutrality as a pragmatic or realpolitik policy aiming to maintain national independence and territorial integrity; the other, neutrality as a normative, even moral, policy, seeking to promote peace and international cooperation more generally—these two elements of international neutrality often exist alongside one another, sometimes quite comfortably, sometimes less so. Chapter 3 examines the development of NATO's partnerships. The chapter explores the way in which NATO's partnerships have grown from the PfP, established in the early 1990s as a means for the Alliance to engage with the countries of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, to a wider range of partnerships with countries not only in Europe but also the Mediterranean, the Middle East and a group of global partners. The chapter also examines the complex institutional architecture which has been put in place to support cooperation between NATO and its partners. Additionally, the chapter argues that NATO's partnerships need to be understood in the context of the wider development of NATO, in particular the balance between NATO's role as a defence alliance and its other roles (as a framework for integration amongst its members, as a collective security organisation for addressing conflicts beyond its borders and as a cooperative security institution for engaging with non-members)—the balance between these different roles, the chapter suggests, will have a significant bearing on the future development of NATO's partnerships.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 provide detailed analyses of each of the European neutral states' relationships with NATO. Each chapter examines the historical context of the country's foreign and security policy, the substance of each country's cooperation with NATO, domestic political debates on relations with NATO and the extent to and ways in which the country has contributed to NATO's peacekeeping/intervention operations in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya. Magnus Petersson shows that Sweden has pursued a policy of maximising cooperation with NATO (to the extent that at NATO's headquarters in Brussels, it is

informally referred to as an 'Allied partner' or 'partner number one'), while not seeking NATO membership. Petersson situates Swedish policy in the context of a realist-idealist dichotomy, but argues that both a realist logic (centred on scepticism of military alliances) and an idealist perspective (centred on norms and values associated with neutrality and which have become an important part of Swedish national identity) militate in favour of maintaining neutrality and against NATO membership. Petersson argues that, as a result of declining investment in national defence, Sweden finds itself in the dysfunctional situation where it is no longer able to defend itself but unwilling to join NATO. Tuomas Forsberg shows how Finland has also pursued a policy of maximising cooperation with NATO short of joining the Alliance, while quietly (but explicitly) keeping the door to NATO membership open. Forsberg argues that Finland's NATO policy can be explained by both rational factors (the country's strategic situation and neutrality as a means of maintaining independence and flexibility) and psychological factors (the perceptions and beliefs of elites and the Finnish public), suggesting that the latter may be more important because neutrality has over time become an important part of Finnish national identity and the Finnish elites and public believe that the policy serves the country well. In his chapter, Heinz Gärtner describes Austria's policy as one of 'engaged neutrality', based on military neutrality alongside proactive policies to support conflict prevention and crisis management. Austria's cooperation with NATO, Gärtner argues, reflects this logic: to the extent that NATO is an actor engaged in crisis management operations, cooperation with NATO is likely to be important for Austria (as in the Balkans, where Austria has been an important contributor to NATO's peacekeeping operations); to the extent that NATO returns to being a classical defence alliance, and relations with the Alliance may have less value for Austria. Gärtner also argues that the broader approach of the EU to security means that it is more important to Austria than the more military-focused NATO. In his chapter, Andrew Cottey describes Ireland's relationship with NATO as a 'distinctly low-profile partnership'. Cottey notes that the US and British governments proposed Irish membership of NATO when the Alliance was being established in 1948–49, but the Irish government refused the offer and neutrality has become deeply embedded since then. Ireland was the last of the European neutral states to join PfP, in 1999, reflecting domestic wariness of NATO. Since joining PfP, however, Ireland has actively engaged with NATO, including contributing to NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Nonetheless, domestically, there is a strong attachment to neutrality and a wariness of NATO, and of mili-

tarism more generally, which limit Ireland's cooperation with the Alliance. Christian Nünlist's chapter places Switzerland's relations with NATO in the context of a shift from a security policy based on territorial defence and limited external engagement to one of 'security through cooperation', involving more active engagement with the UN, the OSCE and NATO and a Swiss contribution to international crisis management and peacekeeping operations (which had previously been untenable). Nonetheless, Nünlist argues that Switzerland's relationship with NATO is a 'cautious partnership' because of domestic wariness of NATO and a still quite constrained approach to contributing to peacekeeping. The final chapter highlights a number of conclusions. Most obviously, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland have all maintained their policies of neutrality, reflecting the perceived success of neutrality as a national security strategy, the deep domestic embedding of neutrality and the consequent logic of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. In this context, however, all five states have also opted to develop partnerships with NATO, a choice, it is argued, explained by the changed European security environment, the changed character of NATO itself and the particular importance of NATO in the field of peacekeeping in the 1990s and 2000s. A clear distinction can be seen, however, between Sweden and Finland's maximalist approach to cooperation within NATO and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland's more cautious engagement (focused primarily on peacekeeping). NATO's renewed focus in the 2010s on defence and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia is reinforcing cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea region, but the Alliance's declining role in peacekeeping may reduce the scope for cooperation with Austria, Ireland and Switzerland.

Notes

1. This section reviews English language academic literature on neutrality and the European neutral states. There are also additional works in German, Finnish and Swedish on Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden, as well as on neutrality more generally.

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CHAPTER 2

European Neutrality in Historical Perspective

Andrew Cottey

This chapter places the neutrality policies of the established European neutral states—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland—in historical context. It explores the origins of neutrality in international politics in the idea and problem of non-belligerency in war. It then explores the history of neutrality in modern European international politics, highlighting the way in which quite a wide variety of states, mostly small and medium-sized states, were or sought to be neutral at various points in the nineteenth century or the first half of the twentieth century. The chapter then shows how the Cold War division of Europe resulted in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland (along with Yugoslavia) emerging as a distinctive neutral group of states between the two blocs. The chapter also reviews how the foreign and security policies of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland have adapted since the end of the Cold War. It finishes with some conclusions about neutrality in general and the neutrality of the established European neutral states in particular.

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The Concept of Neutrality

The origins of neutrality in international politics lie in the idea that states may choose to be non-belligerent, that is, not involved as participants, in wars between other states and that this gives non-belligerent states certain rights, which should be respected by other states, but also imposes duties on such states. The idea of neutrality as non-belligerency in war can be traced back to the ancient Greek city-state system (Bauslaugh 1991). As Bring has observed:

> The position of neutrality is probably as old as war itself, but only in the sense that certain actors wanted to stay outside an armed conflict. The self-proclaimed neutrals had no rights in this context, no guarantees, no legal assurances. But during the Middle Ages and later, for example during the Thirty Years War in Europe, bilateral agreements were concluded that promised certain states respect for their position of neutrality during an ongoing armed conflict (Bring 2013, 21).

Since then states have sought to codify the rights and duties associated with neutrality. The evolution of neutrality has consequently been strongly associated with the development of international law. Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, discussed neutrality and the rights and duties of neutral states in his 1625 book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace*) (Karsh 1988, 14–15). The idea of neutrality came to prominence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During the American War of Independence (1775–83), Russia, Denmark, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, Prussia and Portugal formed the First League of Armed Neutrality (1780–83) in order to assert their neutrality and specifically to oppose Britain's policy of searching and seizing ships carrying French contraband (since France was supporting America against Britain). The First League of Armed Neutrality succeeded in largely keeping its members out of the American War of Independence while allowing them to trade with the United States. A Second League of Armed Neutrality was formed by Denmark, Prussia, Sweden and Russia in 1800–01, in the context of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), which pitted Britain against France. The Second League of Armed Neutrality was again an attempt to assert its members' neutrality and resist the British naval policy of searching and seizing vessels, but collapsed after Britain attacked Denmark and Russia shifted its policy to support Britain (Abbenhuis 2014, 29–33). Also during this period, in 1793 President George

Washington declared the United States' neutrality in relation to the French Revolutionary Wars—a sentiment reinforced by his 1796 farewell address in which he warned the United States of the need to stay out of other states' conflicts and of 'entangling alliances' (Washington 1793, 1796). Although the United States did not always maintain a policy of neutrality, support for neutrality remained an important strand in American foreign policy in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, as reflected in America's remaining neutral until 1917 and 1941 in the two world wars. In the early nineteenth century, the major European powers also agreed that Switzerland and Belgium be given the status of permanent neutrality, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 for Switzerland and under the 1839 Treaty of London for Belgium. In both cases, permanent neutrality was a means of ensuring that countries which had been a focus of great power conflict would hopefully not become so in future.

International law relating to neutrality was developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856, concluded as part of the settlement at the end of the Crimean War, established the principles that belligerent states would not seize the vessels of neutral states (or the goods of neutral states on enemy vessels) (Abbenhuis 2014, 87–95). The 1907 Hague Conventions established detailed legal definitions of the rights and duties of neutral states in war. Hague Convention V, on the rights and duties of neutral states in land war, states that: the territory of neutral states is inviolable; belligerents must not move troops or armaments across the territory of neutral states, nor attempt to form forces on or recruit from the territory of neutral states; neutral states must not allow belligerent states to move troops or armaments across their territory or form forces or recruit on their territory; neutral states are not forbidden from trading with belligerents, including trading armaments; restrictions placed by a neutral state on a belligerent must be applied to all belligerents impartially; and belligerent troops received on the territory of a neutral state must be interned (Hague Convention 1907a). Hague Convention XIII, on the rights and duties of neutral states in naval war, states that: belligerent states must abstain from any act in neutral waters which might constitute a violation of neutrality; belligerent states are forbidden from capturing or searching enemy warships in the territorial waters of a neutral state; belligerent states are forbidden from using neutral ports or waters as bases for operations against adversaries; neutral states are not bound to prevent the transit of armaments to belligerents; any restrictions placed by a neutral state on admission into their territorial waters or ports

must be applied to all belligerents impartially; and the neutrality of a state is not affected by the passage of belligerent warships through its territorial waters (Hague Convention 1907b). Since 1907, the Hague Conventions have become well established as the international legal definitions of the rights and duties of neutral states in war.

Beyond the specific rights and duties of non-belligerents in war, neutrality has come to be associated with a number of other features and debates. First, neutrality as a longer-term policy has over time come to mean non-membership of military alliances. While states may choose to be non-belligerent in the limited sense of not being involved in a particular war, any longer-term commitment to neutrality implies staying out of wars in general. Since defence alliances de facto involve some form of commitment, whether explicit or implicit, to defend an ally, they cannot be compatible with a commitment to non-belligerency. The widely accepted minimalist definition of neutrality has thus come to be non-membership of military alliances.

Second, neutrality can be viewed as a particular form of foreign policy or national security strategy. If avoiding war is an objective of most states (although not, of course, in all circumstances and not at all costs), neutrality is a means of pursuing this objective: neutrality involves committing not to be drawn into other states' wars and hoping that other states will also respect that commitment, and the evolution of international law on neutrality illustrates some of the difficulties and dilemmas surrounding this. One common feature of neutrality policies is often therefore an effort to reassure other states that the neutral country does not pose a threat to them and is not likely to become a source of such threats (for example, if third states were to use the state's territory for aggressive purposes). In particular, for small and medium-sized states neutrality can be a means of assuring larger powers that threats are not likely to emerge from the neutral state's territory and thereby of dissuading larger powers from attacking them or seizing their territory for pre-emptive purposes. At various points in their history, the neutrality policies of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland all reflected this logic. This logic of neutrality can also be understood in the context of Realist theories of international relations. Realist theorists argue that weaker states confronting a stronger state face a fundamental choice between balancing and bandwagoning: balancing involves joining an alliance or coalition against the stronger power; bandwagoning involves joining with the stronger power in order to avoid antagonizing it or benefit from its largesse (Walt 1990). Neutrality can be viewed as an attempt to find a third road between balancing and bandwagoning, although to the extent that it involves concessions

designed to reassure the stronger power it may be viewed as closer to (or event tantamount to) bandwagoning. In the context of such choices, neutrality has also become associated with independence: for smaller states, neutrality is often viewed as a means of maintaining their independence in the context of an international system dominated by great powers. This may relate specifically to securing and maintaining the independent existence of the state as such, but also more generally to carving out some element of independent political space for the state in the international system. Neutrality may also therefore be viewed in part as an anti-imperial or anti-great power strategy for small and medium-sized states: a logic reflected in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) established primarily by Third World states in the 1960s.

A third issue relates to the compatibility of neutrality with involvement in collective security systems. Whereas neutrality is fundamentally incompatible with membership of military alliances, the compatibility of neutrality and collective security is a grey area. To the extent that collective security systems involve a commitment to take collective action—in particular military force or economic sanctions—against aggressors or states deemed to have violated international norms, collective security may be viewed as contradicting the principles of non-belligerency and impartiality that lie behind neutrality. For neutral states, collective security may therefore be viewed as involving taking on just the type of commitments to military action and economic sanctions which they have fundamentally sought to avoid. This logic underpinned Switzerland's decision to refrain from joining the United Nations until 2002. Equally, from the perspective of other participants in a collective security system, if a neutral state refuses or may refuse to participate in collective action, it may be viewed as a less than committed member or even as undermining the principles behind the system. In practice, however, neutrality and collective security have proven to be significantly more compatible than the in-principle tensions between the two might suggest. The United Nations Security Council has the power to authorise economic sanctions and the use of military force (United Nations 1945, Articles 41 and 42) and member states agree to accept and carry out Security Council decisions (Article 25) and, in theory, to make their armed forces available to the UN for participation in collective action (Article 43) (United Nations 1945). In practice, however, participation in military actions authorised by the UN Security Council (such as the Korean War in 1950–53 and the Gulf War in 1990–91) has been voluntary and very much optional for UN member states, which has allowed neutral states to opt out of such operations.

UN peacekeeping has also proven to be very largely compatible with neutrality. The largely non-forceful character of UN peacekeeping and its basis in the principle of the consent of the state(s) to which peacekeeping missions are deployed has made it compatible with the underlying neutral principle of non-belligerency. As with Security Council authorised enforcement operations, participation in UN peacekeeping operations is also voluntary, allowing states to opt in/out as they choose. Indeed, given the potential contradiction between neutrality and collective security, it is striking that the European neutral states (along with some Third World states which are prominent in the NAM) have been strong supporters of and leading troop contributors to UN peacekeeping. Despite its non-membership of the UN until 2002, even Switzerland sought to support UN principles and activities (Gunter 1976). One factor which likely lies behind neutral states' support for the UN is commitment to international law: as noted above, the development of neutrality has been historically intertwined with international law and the UN also reflects the aspiration of an international system strongly based in law.

A fourth issue has been the normative character of neutrality and normative assessments of neutrality. Viewed from one perspective, neutrality can be seen as a largely or entirely pragmatic policy: a means to stay out of war, whether in a particular case or in general, and a means to ensure national survival and independence. Over time, however, neutrality has come to have a strong normative dimension, certainly at least in those states with long-standing policies of neutrality. As a general policy, neutrality understood as non-belligerency can be viewed as an anti-war policy or a peace policy. If neutrality involves not only non-belligerency but de facto support for the independence of all states and a law-based international, it can also be understood as a policy in opposition to imperialism and great powers exploiting weaker ones. The larger political logic of neutrality, as it has evolved since the nineteenth century, thus incorporates important normative principles. Furthermore, as their policies have evolved since the Second World War, most neutral states—both in Europe and in the Third World—have supported a set of intertwined normative institutions and policies, including the UN, peacekeeping, arms control and nuclear disarmament. While governments have been wary of making explicit claims of pursuing moral foreign policies, it is probably true that many, perhaps most, citizens, and at least some political leaders, in neutral states view their countries as having morally sound—even morally superior—foreign policies. This perspective was captured in the sometime description of Sweden as a

'moral superpower', based on its support for the above normative principles and its strong opposition to the US war in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the apartheid regime in South Africa (Dahl 2006). Critics of neutrality and neutral states have argued that the claim that neutrality is a particularly moral or morally superior policy is misleading. Such criticisms were advanced in particular in some of the major Western powers during the Second World War and the Cold War and have had a number of elements. First, critics have argued that neutrality reflects an unwillingness to take action against aggressive states, amounts to appeasement and is only likely to encourage further acts of aggression in the longer term. Second, critics have argued that neutral states are free-riders, refusing to contribute to collective defence but benefiting from the deterrence and defence provided by others—a criticism of the European neutrals particularly during the Cold War. Third, critics have argued that neutrality amounts to taking a morally ambivalent stance between democracies and authoritarian regimes, such as between the major Western states and Nazi Germany during the Second World War and between the major Western states and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Switzerland's complicity in providing a haven for 'Nazi gold' and other aspects of Germany's wartime plunder of Europe provides the most prominent example of this type of moral ambivalence. A fourth criticism is that neutral states' claims of pursuing moral foreign policies are hypocritical, since neutral states' foreign policies are arguably motivated by the same underlying national interests—survival, independence, economic gain—as those of other states. Assessments of the normative character of neutrality may thus vary very significantly. What is clear, however, is that as it has evolved historically and, as it is conceived of in neutral states, neutrality has an important normative dimension.

European Neutrality: From the Modern State System to the Cold War

As noted above, the idea of neutrality as non-belligerence in war is as old as war itself and can be traced back to the Greek city states. In this context, bilateral agreements were sometimes concluded between a neutral state and a belligerent, defining the terms by which the neutral would remain outside the war (e.g., in terms of not allowing their territory to be used as a base for attack or for military recruitment, or not trading with other warring parties or supplying them with arms). Nevertheless, as Karsh has observed, such agreements 'were exceptions to the rule; the general

attitude towards the neutral state was one of intolerance and principled reluctance to recognise neutrality as a legitimate political option' (Karsh 1988, 13–14). Furthermore, the absence of general rules or norms relating to neutrality meant that 'every neutral actor was free to interpret the policy of neutrality as he saw fit, with the inevitable result that manifestations of neutrality took on a broad variety of forms: from non-alignment with the belligerents and the maintenance of total objectivity all the way to the hire for full pay of a neutral state's army by one of the belligerents, or alternatively payment to a neutral by one of the warring parties in return for refraining from participation in the conflict' (Karsh 1988, 14). As discussed earlier, over time, disputes over neutrality resulted in the development of international law codifying the rights and duties of neutral states and of belligerents towards neutral states.

Abbenhuis (2013, 2014) argues that neutrality was more widespread and more significant in Europe in the 'long' nineteenth century (1815–1914) than has been generally recognized. Today, neutrality tends to be viewed as an option for weaker small or medium-sized states vis-à-vis great powers and associated with states that have chosen neutrality as a permanent—or at least long-term semi-permanent—national strategy. Abbenhuis, however, argues that neutrality had a wider and more flexible set of meanings and uses in the 'long' nineteenth century. First, drawing on the tradition of non-belligerency, states quite widely adopted the practice of declaring their neutrality in relation to particular wars—a strategy that may be described as occasional neutrality (as opposed to the model of permanent or semi-permanent neutrality to which we are now more accustomed) (Abbenhuis 2014, 16). Second, such neutrality was quite commonly exercised not only by small or medium-sized states but also by great powers. Third, neutrality was explicitly used by the great powers as a means of preventing potential conflicts amongst themselves over the territory of smaller states in sensitive geostrategic locations. Fourth, for some states neutrality was—or became—a long-term national strategy designed to ensure their independence and allow them to avoid being drawn into other states' wars. Abbenhuis (2013, 2–3) concludes that neutrality had four main functions during this period. First, the creation of guaranteed neutral states or territories helped to preserve the balance of power. Second, neutrality with regard to the rights of neutral states to trade freely via the seas helped to maintain European seaborne trade networks (thereby also underpinning the growth of European empires). Third, neutrality helped to promote peace and to keep wars limited if they broke out. Fourth, neutrality stabilised expectations around the conduct and outcomes of military conflicts.

The twentieth century made it more difficult for states to sustain the flexible uses of neutrality seen in the nineteenth century. The all-encompassing character of the two world wars made it difficult for states to avoid being drawn into the war, whether by invasion and occupation or finding themselves facing a choice between aligning with one side or other. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a number of European states were neutral, whether as a result of agreement amongst the great powers or national choice, in particular Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were able to maintain their neutrality during the First World War and Spain also maintained neutral status during the First World War (as did Argentina and Chile outside Europe). Belgium and Luxembourg, however, were invaded and occupied by Germany at the start of the First World War. According to Stevenson:

> Neutrality amid total warfare was a precarious condition, and the conflict began with a spectacular violation of Belgium, despite its status being internationally guaranteed. …(S)ometimes fighting spilled over onto neutral countries' soil or into their territorial waters and air space. Germany considered invading Norway and the Netherlands, although decided the costs would outweigh the benefits. In order to tighten their blockade the Allies controlled ever more strictly the trade of Germany's neighbours: Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, with food shortages and rationing as the consequence. …(E)ven in countries that stayed out, the war caused economic hardship and political schism. It became a watershed for the neutrals as well as the belligerents (Stevenson nd).

After the First World War, despite the potential contradictions between neutrality and collective security, the majority of European states which had maintained policies of neutrality chose to join the League of Nations when it was established in 1919–20. This included Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as Austria (which was, in effect, established as a neutral state by the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye between the allied powers and Germany and Austria). The willingness of hitherto neutral states to join the League of Nations reflected support for the ideal of collective security, as well as recognition of the difficulty of staying out of all-encompassing wars such as the First World War. Both neutrality and collective security could be viewed as peace concepts, and the logic of their being two parallel roads to peace was reflected in the choice of the Swiss capital Geneva as the headquarters for the League of Nations. Nonetheless, aligning neutrality and

the League of Nations involved political contortions in some cases. Switzerland, in particular, adopted a policy of 'differentiated neutrality', which involved a willingness to support any economic sanctions agreed by the Council of the League of Nations but a continued commitment to military neutrality. On this basis, the Council of the League of Nations re-affirmed Switzerland's permanent neutrality in the London Declaration of February 1920 and the Swiss public voted in favour of League membership in a May 1920 referendum (Loeffel 2010, 33–66).

Although the various European neutral states joined the League of Nations, they never abandoned their policies of neutrality. In the 1930s, further, the League of Nations became increasingly discredited, in particular after the 1935 Abyssinia crisis (during which Italy took control of Abyssinia—today's Ethiopia—and the League was unable to mount an effective response). In this context, neutrality remained one of the obvious alternative foreign policies which states might pursue to maintain their independence in the face of intensifying great power tensions. In Western Europe, policies of neutrality were maintained by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland through the 1920s and 1930s. Finland also sought to be neutral in the 1930s. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, neutrality was a potentially attractive foreign policy option for small and medium-sized states, most of which had only become independent at the end of the First World War and found themselves caught between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Yugoslavia in particular tried to pursue policies of neutrality in the 1930s, although other Central and Eastern Europe and Balkan states also partly explored the concept. Beyond Europe, the United States, of course, was the other major power that pursued a policy of neutrality in the inter-war period—enshrined in a series of Neutrality Acts passed by the US Congress between 1935 and 1939.

For most European states who tried to pursue neutrality in the 1930s, the policy did not protect them. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway were invaded by Nazi Germany in 1940. The Central and Eastern Europe and Balkan states were invaded and occupied by either Nazi Germany and its allies or the Soviet Union (and in some cases both), with the only exceptions being those states (such as Hungary and Slovakia) which allied themselves with Nazi Germany. As a result, compared to the quite large group of European states which were or sought to be neutral in the 1920s and 1930s, only a small number of states were able to maintain their neutrality throughout the Second World War – primarily

Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (Leitz 2000; Packard 1992; Reginbogin 2009; Wylie 2002). Geography and geostrategic location, alongside specific facets of their national contexts and policies, played a significant part in allowing most of these states to remain neutral. Spain's and Portugal's relative isolation on the Iberian peninsula, Ireland's location on Europe's far western seaboard and Switzerland's mountainous terrain in different ways helped to protect these countries. Although all these countries remained non-belligerents throughout the war, their proximity to one side or other varied significantly. Portugal was quite closely aligned with the Allied powers, whereas Spain was closely aligned with the Axis powers. Ireland sought to balance between the two warring groups, but quietly leaned towards the Allies. Sweden and Switzerland maintained more genuinely non-aligned positions—although critics have condemned both countries for their willingness to trade with Nazi Germany. Turkey is a less widely recognized case of a European state that remained neutral for most of the Second World War: It stayed out of the war for most of its duration, traded with both Germany and the Allied states, swinging between the two camps depending on its perceived interests at different points in the war, and only declared war on Germany in February 1945 (by which point it was clear that Germany was on the verge of defeat) (Leitz 2000, 85–113).

The Cold War

The experience of the First World War, the inter-war period and especially the Second World War discredited neutrality as a national security policy in much of Europe—the harsh lesson seemed to be that neutrality could not be relied upon in the face of aggressive major powers. The onset of the Cold War resulted in the establishment of two fixed alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—leaving only a small group of neutral or non-aligned states outside these alliances, compared to the larger number of states which had been, or sought to be, neutral in the first half of the twentieth century. When NATO was created in 1948–49, its American, British and Canadian architects sought to include the widest group of Western European states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were considered as potential members, alongside the United States, Britain and Canada (Kay 1998, 20–29). Given that they had been invaded by Nazi Germany in the Second World War and then experienced the trauma of occupation, it was not surprising that Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and

Norway abandoned their earlier neutrality policies and agreed to join NATO—especially against the backdrop of growing concerns about the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the 1948–89 Berlin crisis. As noted above, Portugal had been neutral in the war but in practice closely aligned with the Allied powers and it too agreed to join NATO. In the Swiss case, while the US and British policymakers would have welcomed the country's membership of NATO, they recognized that given its long-standing neutrality it was not likely to join the alliance. The United States and Britain hoped to persuade Sweden to join NATO. After a Swedish bid to establish a neutral Nordic defence alliance with Denmark and Norway collapsed because Norway and Denmark preferred to join NATO, however, Sweden's long-time commitment to neutrality won out over the possibility of NATO membership. In the Irish case, continued British control over Northern Ireland and more general antipathy towards Britain, combined with the success of neutrality in keeping Ireland out of the war, led to the government rejecting membership of NATO. In Finland's case, the experience of invasion by the Soviet Union combined with the continued proximity of the country's much larger neighbour resulted in a policy which sought to maintain independence by, above all, avoiding antagonizing the Soviet Union. The basis was the April 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty), which precluded Finland from joining any Western alliance. Finland was thus not considered for NATO membership in 1948–49. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, NATO thus had 12 founder members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece, which had tried to be neutral before both world wars, and Turkey, which as noted above had been neutral for most of the Second World War, both joined NATO in 1952.

The formation of NATO in 1949 left the future status of Germany as the central unresolved international issue in Europe. The two separate German states—democratic West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) and communist East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, GDR) were established in 1949, but the future of Germany remained uncertain and heavily in the hands of the occupying powers (the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union). In March 1952 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin proposed to the Western powers that Germany be reunified as a neutral, demilitarized state—a proposal subsequently known as the Stalin note or March note. The Western powers rejected Stalin's proposal, as did West

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, doubting that Stalin was serious and fearing that German unification on these terms would allow the Soviet Union to dominate the country and potentially the entire European continent (Steininger 1990; Smyser 1999; Walko 2002). Following this, West Germany joined NATO in 1995 and the Warsaw Pact was established in 1995, with East Germany as one its founder members. There is debate about whether or not Stalin's 1952 proposal was a missed opportunity to achieve German unification. The mainstream view in the West is that Stalin would not have been willing to surrender control of East Germany or allow democratic elections there, that the proposal was more likely an attempt to derail plans for West Germany's integration with the West and that any terms acceptable to the Soviet Union would have been unacceptable to the West. Critics argue that the Soviet Union might have been willing to accept a genuinely democratic, neutral Germany. Obviously, had Germany been reunified in the 1950s on the basis of neutrality the wider history of European neutrality would have been very different. The implications of such a scenario must remain a matter of speculation.

Austria's status was linked to that of Germany, as it was also occupied by the four major powers. Stalin was reluctant to see Austria's status resolved without the larger question of Germany being addressed. Following Stalin's death in 1953, however, Soviet policy towards Austria became more flexible. Given the relatively lesser importance of Austria compared to Germany, both the Soviet Union and the West were willing to accept a neutral democratic Austria. In May 1955 the four major powers and Austria signed the Austrian State Treaty, formally terminating the country's post-war occupation (the treaty entered into force in July 1955). In October 1955 the Austrian parliament proclaimed the country neutral, a declaration that was incorporated into the Austrian constitution. Although the neutrality declaration (or law as it is sometimes known) came after the State Treaty, neutrality was in reality a condition of the major powers, in particular the Soviet Union, for the end of the occupation (Mueller 2011).

In Central and Eastern Europe the post-war period saw the Baltic states integrated into Soviet Union and communist regimes imposed by a combination of Soviet occupying forces, Soviet political manipulation and intimidation and national communist forces. In 1955 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania were incorporated into the Warsaw Pact. Thus, many countries which had tried to be neutral in the inter-war period were incorporated into the Soviet-led alliance. Yugoslavia, where the Communist Party had taken power in 1945

on the basis of their central role in resisting Nazi German occupation, split from the Soviet Union in 1948, with Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito opposing the Soviet Union's attempts to assert hegemonic leadership of the international communist movement. The fact that Yugoslavia had defeated Nazi Germany itself rather than being liberated/occupied by Soviet forces, the particular strength of the indigenous communist movement within the country and its relative distance from the Soviet Union meant that it was less vulnerable to Soviet pressure than other Central and Eastern European states. Yugoslavia thus did not join the Warsaw Pact in 1955, went on to play a central role in the NAM—established at a meeting in the Yugoslav capital in 1961—and was generally recognised as one of Europe's post-1945 neutral states. A less widely recognised case is Albania: Albania's communist regime began to split with the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, culminating in a complete breakdown in relations in 1961, at which point Albania disengaged from the Warsaw Pact. Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968, following the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Albania's is thus sometimes considered a Cold War European neutral, although the particularly extreme character of its communist regime and its relative international isolation (arising in significant part from the character of the ruling regime, which shunned external engagement) made it a rather marginal case.

The impact of these developments was that by the mid-1950s most European states—many of who had been or tried to be neutral at various points in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century—were members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. As the Cold War division of Europe stabilized, the two military alliances became relatively fixed, certainly compared to the more fluid international alliances of previous European history. Those states which were neutral—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia—were thus a distinctive group 'between the blocs' (Kruzel and Haltzel 1989). The stabilization of the Cold War division of Europe, further, reinforced the sense that neutrality was a permanent choice for these countries, as opposed to a short-term tactical response to particular circumstances or something imposed on them by the major powers.

While Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia shared the common feature of being neutral, there were significant varieties of neutrality within the group. Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland were all democracies and market economies and, in some senses therefore, Western states, whereas Yugoslavia was a communist state. Finland's policy was centred on addressing potential Soviet security concerns

in order to create the space in which an independent democratic Finland could survive. Austria and Switzerland pursued relatively strict policies of neutrality, seeking to ensure that they could not be viewed as aligning with either East or West. Sweden and Yugoslavia received important support from the West, Sweden through covert military cooperation with NATO members, Yugoslavia through US economic assistance. Ireland's neutrality arose more from its difficult historical relationship with Britain rather than Cold War dynamics and the country's geostrategic position distanced it from the heart of the East-West conflict. Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia pursued policies of armed neutrality (based on territorial defence and conscription) with varying degrees of commitment, whereas Ireland maintained only a small professional military. All the Cold War European neutral countries, however, shared a certain antipathy towards the superpower conflict and the two opposing alliances.

The other distinctive feature of the European neutral states' foreign policies which emerged during the Cold War was its strong normative element. In varying ways, the European neutral states all supported causes such as the relaxation of East-West tensions, the United Nations, decolonization in the former European empires, Third World economic development, UN peacekeeping and nuclear arms control and disarmament. For Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden, UN peacekeeping became a central role for their armed forces. Both between the two superpowers and in various regional conflicts, the European neutral states offered their good offices and their services as mediators. Switzerland maintained a stricter interpretation of neutrality in terms of foreswearing UN membership and not contributing to UN peacekeeping, but in other ways it too sought to support international conflict resolution and humanitarianism. Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia also played a prominent role in promoting the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s and 1980s and coordinated their positions in what was known as the 'N+N' (neutral and non-aligned) group (Fischer 2009). Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia all hosted important CSCE meetings in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was no coincidence that the CSCE became known as the 'Helsinki process', key agreements on military confidence-building measures were called the 'Stockholm document' and the 'Vienna document' and Vienna became the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)'s permanent home in the 1990s when the CSCE was renamed the OSCE. The particularly strong normative component to Swedish foreign policy led to the country being described as a 'moral superpower' (Dahl 2006), but the other European neutral states

could also be viewed as moral powers (critics, of course, charged that the neutral states had national interests like other states and would put these ahead of moral concerns when it suited them, just as other states do).

An additional relevant development during the Cold War was the emergence of the NAM. The NAM emerged from an initiative of Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia to establish a loose coalition of states, primarily from the developing world, viewing themselves as not aligned to either side in the East-West conflict and seeking to advance common views on issues such as Third World economic development and nuclear disarmament. The NAM went on to gain approximately 120 members, very largely from the developing world (its exact membership has varied over time). NAM members were not neutral in international legal terms, but viewed themselves as aligned to neither side in the Cold War—hence the use of the term non-aligned movement. The NAM was established at a conference in Belgrade in 1961 and Yugoslavia played a prominent role in the NAM. The other European neutral states, however, never became NAM members and remained politically distant from the NAM. Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland were all developed countries and therefore did not fit with the largely Third World NAM. The NAM was also often strongly critical of the United States and the West, which made the European neutral states wary of losing support in the West and/or of undermining their credibility as bridge-builders and mediators between East and West if they were associated with the NAM (Hakovirta 1983; Meister and Widmer 2014). The NAM has outlived the Cold War and continues to play an active role in some areas, in particular nuclear non-proliferation (where its members coordinate the positions in the five-yearly Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences).

The Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 raised obvious questions about the future of the European neutral states. To the extent that they had been neutral between East and West, did neutrality still make sense in a world moving beyond the East–West conflict? If Europe was moving towards integration not only of Western Europe but also of Central and Eastern Europe, via the EU and NATO, would the European neutral states stay outside this process or would they join it and, if so, how? If Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland wished to remain neutral, how far and in what ways might their national neutrality policies change or

need to be adapted? In the 1990s Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, and along with Ireland, also engaged in the EU's new established Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) when it was established in 1999–2000. All five states also joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in the 1990s and contributed forces to the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Nonetheless, all five states maintained their neutrality (in the sense of remaining non-members of military alliances and NATO in particular). Indeed, although EU membership and the implications of the CFSP and CSDP were sometimes domestically controversial, within the European neutral states neutrality remained generally viewed as a cornerstone of foreign policy and there was little or no debate on the possibility of abandoning neutrality and joining NATO. The end of the Cold War, EU membership (with the exception of Switzerland) and involvement in PfP did, however, imply significant adaptation of national foreign and security policies.

The biggest post-Cold War foreign policy change for the European neutral states was the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU in 1995. The decision by Austria, Finland and Sweden to apply for EU membership was driven by two inter-related factors: first, concerns that being outside an EU that was deepening its integration economically (in particular, via the single European market in the 1980s and the euro in the 1990s) would be disadvantageous for the neutral states economies; second, concerns about being increasingly excluded from the European project, in particular in terms of not having a say in collective European decision-making. The impact of EU membership was to make Austria, Finland and Sweden more European and Western: if they had been European democracies and market economies but outside both the EU and NATO and in some senses on the margins of Europe, they were now full EU members with a full say in EU decision-making. The fact that they were joining the EU at exactly the point when it was establishing the CFSP, however, raised questions about the CFSP's compatibility with and impact on national policies of neutrality (the Maastricht Treaty, under which the CFSP was established, was negotiated in 1990–91 and entered into force in 1993; Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995). Ireland had already raised concerns during the Maastricht negotiations about the compatibility of the CFSP (and a possible EU defence role, which was also under discussion) with its neutrality. As a result, while the Maastricht Treaty stated that the CFSP would include 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which

might in time lead to a common defence', it also included a commitment that this 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' (European Union 1992, Article J.4, paras. 1 and 4)—a coded but recognised reference to the neutrality of Ireland (and Austria, Finland and Sweden, who it was clear by this point were likely to become EU members). Furthermore, the fact that the CFSP was based on inter-governmental consensus decision-making meant that member states could not have collective foreign or security policy decisions imposed on them by the EU and therefore also made it less problematic for the four neutral EU members. The commitment that the CFSP and CSDP will 'not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' was reiterated in the 2001 Nice Treaty and the 2007 Lisbon and is part of the Consolidated Treaty on European Union which now forms the legal basis of the EU (European Union 2012, Art 42, para 2). The Lisbon Treaty also included for the first time an EU security guarantee, committing member states to provide assistance if another member state faces armed attack—a step which at least in theory made the EU into a defence alliance and might be viewed as incompatible with neutrality. The Lisbon Treaty article incorporating this security guarantee again, however, included the commitment that '[t]his shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' (European Union 2012, Art 42, para 7) and was therefore acceptable to the neutral EU members.

While the EU Treaty negotiations of the 1990s and 2000s resulted in ways being found to make the CFSP and the CSDP compatible with neutrality, in practice involvement in the CFSP and the CSDP has resulted in a certain convergence of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden's national foreign, security and defence policies with EU norms and policies. Academic analysts describe this process as one of foreign policy Europeanisation: the general assessment of such Europeanisation is that member states' foreign policies have converged towards a set of common EU policies, but that this is a partial process with national policies still retaining significant diversity; it is also a two-way process with member states not only 'downloading' EU policies, but also 'uploading' particular national foreign policy preferences and perspectives to the EU level (and thereby influencing the collective policy of the EU and the foreign policies of other EU member states) (Wong 2011). A number of observations may be made about EU foreign policy Europeanisation as it relates to the neutral member states. First, this has involved them signing up to larger collective EU policies, for example,

towards the EU's neighbourhood and in relation to other major powers (such as Russia, China and India). In most of these cases, however, these policies have involved political dialogue, the development of institutional ties with other regions or powers, trade and the provision of financial and technical assistance—these have largely, therefore, been policies which the neutral states have been willing to support and would not seem to significantly diverge from the types of policies the neutral states have in general pursued anyway (albeit on a smaller scale). Second, if the European neutral states have had a strong normative, even moral, dimension to their foreign policies, the EU has done likewise, for example in terms of support for international law, international institutions and human rights—as encapsulated in Manners' description of the EU as 'normative power Europe' (Manners 2002). Third, however, there have been some policy areas or issues where the neutral EU members have probably adapted their policies in ways which might not have otherwise been the case: for example, some of the European neutral states have historically been strong supporters of the Palestinian cause and critical of Israel; given the range of views amongst EU member states (which includes some strong supporters of Israel, such as Germany and the Czech Republic), the EU has sought to maintain a certain balance in its policies vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Likewise, on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, collective EU policies have been a difficult balancing act between the more pro-nuclear policies of Britain, France and some other NATO EU members and the more pro-disarmament views of the EU neutrals. These dynamics have sometimes resulted in Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden signing up to more centrist EU policies, while at the same time advancing somewhat divergent national policies in other contexts—as with their support for nuclear disarmament. Fourth, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have also sought to 'upload' policies which might be classically associated with their neutrality to the EU level. For example, in relation to support for conflict prevention and resolution and for UN peacekeeping, the four neutral states have tried, with some success, to promote common EU policies in these areas. The overall picture is therefore complex and certainly not simply one of the four neutral states adapting wholesale to larger EU policies. Rather ironically, the CSDP illustrates some of these dynamics: opponents of an EU CSDP in the neutral states feared that their countries might be drawn into an EU process of militarisation; in practice, the CSDP has very largely involved the types of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities which the neutral states have supported for decades in other contexts;

furthermore, the neutral states have been proactive in supporting these dimensions of the CSDP within the EU.

Switzerland's position outside the EU and its stricter interpretation of neutrality marks it out as distinctive compared to the four other long-standing Western European neutral states; in particular non-membership of the EU has meant that Switzerland has not been influenced by the same EU foreign policy Europeanisation dynamics as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Nonetheless, Swiss foreign and security policy has also changed in important ways since the end of the Cold War. As Christian Nünlist argues in his chapter in this book, this has involved a shift from a more isolationist policy to one based on 'security through cooperation', whereby Switzerland tries to promote international security through a range of cooperative international activities. This has resulted in Switzerland joining the UN in 2002, making its first contributions—albeit unarmed—to international peacekeeping in the Balkans since the 1990s, joining NATO's PfP and building on its existing track record of support for the C/OSCE and a variety of international humanitarian initiatives and activities.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine the concept of neutrality and place the foreign policies of the established European neutral states which are the focus of this book in the context of longer-term European history. A number of conclusions may be drawn. First, there has been a shift over time from neutrality as non-belligerency in war, where neutrality is more a short-term policy in response to a particular war or wars, to neutrality as a longer-term peacetime national foreign policy. Such long-term neutrality may be a national policy choice or may be imposed by great powers—although, as international norms have changed, the idea that great powers might simply impose neutrality on a smaller state has moved out of vogue. In the Swiss case, in particular, it resulted in the concept of permanent neutrality. Since the key element of neutrality—in international legal terms—is non-belligerency in war, non-membership of military alliances became the basic definition of a policy of peacetime neutrality.

Second, if one examines modern European history, quite a wide range of states, but especially small and medium-sized states, have been neutral or attempted to pursue policies of peacetime neutrality, especially in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The experience of the two world wars and especially the Second World War, when a

number of neutral states were invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany and/or the Soviet Union, at least partly discredited neutrality as a national security policy. Many Western European states which had pursued policies of neutrality before 1939 chose to join NATO when it was established in 1949. The consolidation of the Cold War division of Europe from the 1950s marked out those states which remained or now became neutral—primarily Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia—as a distinctive group.

Third, neutrality can be viewed as having two features or faces, realist and idealist (Goetschel 2011). The realist face is its role as an explicitly national security strategy: a means by which states try to ensure their survival and independence. The various different circumstances which resulted in the established European neutral states becoming neutral illustrate very clearly the realist dynamics behind neutrality. At the same time, however, neutrality also has an idealist face: even in earlier times neutrality as non-belligerency in war could be viewed as a peace-promoting policy; during the Cold War, however, this normative dimension to neutrality came to the fore in the form of the European neutral states' support for the UN, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, détente and nuclear arms control and disarmament. Indeed, this idealist dimension to neutrality has become a central part of the European neutral countries' foreign policies and arguably also their national identities.

Fourth, since the 1990s the European neutral states have adapted their foreign and security policies quite significantly in response to the end of the Cold War, membership of the EU (with the exception of Switzerland) and the development of its CFSP and CSDP, and new security threats (such as the global Islamic terrorism)—as well as engagement with NATO via their partnerships with the alliance. To some extent, this has resulted in convergence between the wider policies of the West/the EU/NATO and those of the European neutral states. Some analysts argue that the changes in Austrian, Finnish, Irish, Swedish and Swiss foreign policies are such that these countries should no longer be viewed as neutral and are better understood as 'post-neutral' states (Agius 2011); others have talked about a 'vanishing point' where the distinction between neutral states and allies is so slim as to be meaningless (Loden 2012). The analysis in this chapter has suggested that while there is a certain process of convergence between wider Western/EU/NATO policies and those of the European neutral states, the European neutrals nevertheless also retain significant distinctive elements to their national foreign and security policies, as well as the capacity to shape wider Western policies, especially in the EU context.

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CHAPTER 3

NATO's Partnerships

Andrew Cottey

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has established a series of partnerships with countries outside the Atlantic Alliance, as well as with other regional and global security organisations. These partnerships have become an important part of NATO's activities and arguably even of what NATO is. According to NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, cooperative security, including partnerships—is one of the Alliance's three core tasks—alongside collective defence and crisis management (NATO 2010, para. 4).[1] These partnerships involve extensive political and military dialogue between NATO and its partners, the provision of advice and assistance by NATO to partner states in relation to defence and security policy, multilateral military training exercises involving NATO members and partners, the deployment of partner states' armed forces alongside those of NATO's members in NATO-led peacekeeping/crisis management operations, in particular in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, and institutional dialogue and operational cooperation with other international security organisations.

This chapter provides an overview and analysis of NATO's partnerships (for other academic analyses of NATO's partnerships see: Edström et al. 2011; Flockhart 2014; Rynning 2012). It pays particular attention to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the main institutional framework within which

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the European neutral states engage with NATO. The chapter examines the range of partnership institutions and policies which NATO has established; efforts within NATO to reform the complex, overlapping and sometimes messy infrastructure of partnerships which the Alliance has built up since the 1990s; and the relationship between partnership with NATO and membership of the Alliance (Box 3.1 outlines NATO's various partnerships).

Box 3.1 NATO's Partnerships

Partnership for Peace (PfP): established in 1994; open to all states in the Euro-Atlantic area; involves various forms of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the PfP partners. NATO members and PfP partners also meet in the format of the multilateral Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Partners include the Western European neutral states, Balkan states and former Soviet states. Twenty-two partners as of 2016: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Russia-NATO relations: In recognition of Russia's status as a great power and as part of efforts to assuage Russian concerns about NATO's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, NATO has sought to build a particular partnership with Russia. Russia joined the PfP in 1994. In 1997 a NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established. The PJC was upgraded to a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. There were regular political dialogues and various forms of military cooperation during the 1990s and 2000s. Russia also contributed forces to NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and 2000s. Most cooperation was suspended by NATO after the 2014 Ukraine conflict.

Ukraine-NATO relations: NATO sought to develop a partnership with Ukraine in order to bolster Ukraine's sovereignty and as a counterpart to the Alliance's partnership with Russia. Ukraine joined the PfP in 1994. In 1997 a NATO-Ukraine Charter on Distinctive

(*continued*)

Box 3.1 (continued)
Partnership was signed and a NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) established. Since the 1990s, NATO and Ukraine have had regular political dialogue and various forms of military cooperation. Ukraine also contributed forces to NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and early 2000s. The issue of possible Ukrainian membership of NATO has been—and remains—particularly sensitive, given Russia's strong opposition to such a step.

Georgia-NATO relations: Georgia joined the PfP in 1994. Since the country's Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has sought closer relations with the West, including membership of NATO. In the 2000s and 2010s, cooperation between NATO and Georgia gradually intensified. Georgia contributed forces to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in the 2000s and 2010s. Following the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, a NATO-Georgia Commission was established. As with Ukraine, Georgia's possible membership of NATO is highly sensitive given Russia's opposition.

Mediterranean Dialogue (MD): established in 1994, as a southern counterpart to the PfP. Seven current MD partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Involves political dialogue and military cooperation, primarily bilaterally (NATO+1) but also multilaterally (NATO+7).

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): established in 2004, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2003 Iraq War, in an effort to engage with the Middle East. The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were initially invited to participate: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates joined, but Saudi Arabia and Oman declined the invitation. Involves primarily bilateral (NATO+1) cooperation, with a more limited NATO+4 ICI dialogue.

NATO's global partners: NATO has developed relations with a group of countries beyond Europe referred to as 'global partners'. These countries are primarily either Western states allied to the USA or countries in conflict regions where NATO is engaged. NATO's global partners currently include: Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Korea. NATO's global

(*continued*)

Box 3.1 (continued)
partners have varying degrees of institutionalised political dialogue and military cooperation with the Alliance and have contributed forces to NATO's operations.

Partnerships with other international security organisations: NATO has also developed partnerships with other international security organisations, in particular the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU). These relationships involve institutional political dialogue but relate in particular to peacekeeping and crisis management operations, with NATO missions having operated alongside those of the UN, the EU and/or the OSCE in some conflict situations (as in the Balkans and Afghanistan). NATO has also provided operational support for the AU's peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somalia.

Before examining NATO's partnerships and the PfP in detail, it is worth reflecting—from a theoretical perspective—on the nature of the partnerships NATO has developed since the early 1990s. Historically, it made sense to view NATO as a defence alliance: NATO was established in response to the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union; the core of the NATO treaty is a mutual security guarantee amongst the Alliance's members; and NATO's primary operational activity was preparation for defence against the 'Soviet threat'. Alliances do not ordinarily have partnerships—institutionalised cooperative relationships—with other states, whether their enemies, recent former enemies or other countries outside the alliance. The development of NATO's partnerships was, therefore, in historic and theoretical terms, an unusual and striking development, raising questions about what type of activity or institution the partnerships were and what they implied about what NATO itself was becoming. Some observers argued that with the development of both partnerships and a peacekeeping/intervention role (in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Afghanistan in the 2000s) NATO was becoming a collective security organisation, whether for the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole or even globally (Yost 1998a, b). In contrast to alliances which are exclusive in membership and directed against an external threat, collective security systems or organisations are inclusive (incorporating all

states within a region or globally) and are designed to prevent or respond to violent conflicts between their members, with the UN being the primary contemporary example of a collective security system (Pick and Critchley 1974; Weiss 1993; Kupchan and Kupchan 1995). While NATO's adoption of a peacekeeping and intervention role was the central element of a shift from collective defence to collective security, NATO's partnerships were arguably also part of this shift, involving both de facto efforts to resolve conflicts and the integration of partners into NATO's peacekeeping/intervention activities. There remained, however, significant limitations on NATO's collective security role, including the political will and military capability of NATO's member to take on collective security functions, as well as the continuing distinction between members and partners (Yost 1998a, 142–6; 1998b, 278–286).

A second way of conceptualising NATO's partnerships is in terms of cooperative security (also referred to as a security regime or common security) (Carter et al. 1992; Jervis 1982). Cooperative security involves efforts to build peaceful relations between hitherto antagonistic states through political dialogue, transparency and (sometimes) formally negotiated agreements, with Cold War European Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and US-Soviet nuclear arms control agreements the most obvious examples. NATO's partnerships, in particular those with Russia and the other former Soviet bloc states, fit with the concept of cooperative security, with a central aim being to build peaceful cooperative relations between NATO and its partners. The development of NATO's partnerships thus suggested a shift within NATO from collective defence to cooperative security (Flockhart 2014).

A third way of conceptualising NATO's partnerships is in terms of integration: although NATO's central Cold War purpose was defence and deterrence, the Alliance always also had an important role in terms of integration amongst its members—as reflected in the first and third components of the description of NATO's roles, attributed to NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, as being 'to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down' (Yost 1998b, 52 and 349). In this context, NATO's partnerships can be viewed as a means of extending this process of integration to countries outside the Alliance: at the political level partnerships are a means of integrating countries into the larger Euro-Atlantic community; at the functional and operational level partnerships are a means of encouraging countries to reform their national security policies and armed forces along lines compatible with Euro-Atlantic norms (e.g., in terms of democratic

civilian control of the military); and partnership can be a step on the road to full integration—i.e., membership—for those countries seeking that goal. Viewed from this integrationist perspective, the parallels between NATO and the EU's post-Cold War policies towards their neighbourhoods are striking: both NATO and the EU have pursued policies of integration based around institutional cooperation, technical assistance, political conditionality and an, in-principle, open door to potential new members.

Collective security, cooperative security and integration provide three different frameworks for understanding NATO's partnerships and also for assessing the direction in which NATO is evolving and the place of partnerships within this. While a search for clarity may tempt us to try to define NATO as one thing or another, the reality is that NATO is a complex organisation with multiple roles. NATO has arguably always been both an externally oriented defence alliance and an internal integration process amongst its member states. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has added collective security and cooperative security functions to this, while also adapting its integrative function to include both members and non-members. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept definition of the Alliance's three core tasks—collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security—reflects NATO's multi-faceted character as a defence alliance, a collective security organisation and a cooperative security organisation, with integration amongst its members arguably being a fourth unspoken but vital task. The relative balance between these different roles, however, has shifted over time and remains a matter of considerable debate amongst NATO's members. As is returned to later, these ongoing debates have important implications for NATO's partnerships and for the European neutral states' relations with the Alliance.

The Partnership for Peace

The PfP emerged in the context of the rapidly changing European geopolitical environment of the early 1990s—the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, the re-unification of Germany in 1990 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991—and reflected the need for NATO to respond to the new situation. What became the PfP developed gradually and incrementally, as NATO reacted to events in the east. At a summit in London in July 1990, NATO offered a 'hand of friendship' to Eastern Europe and what was then still the Soviet Union, through the establishment of 'regular diplomatic liaison' with NATO

(NATO 1990, paras. 4 and 7). At a further summit in Rome in November 1991, NATO proposed the establishment of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) bringing together the Alliance's members with the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union in a more institutionalised format (the NACC was expanded to include all the former Soviet states after the Soviet Union broke up at the very end of 1991) (NATO 1991, para. 11). The Central European states—in particular, Poland, the then still Czechoslovakia and Hungary—were, however, disappointed with NATO's initial response and sought closer and faster integration with the West, including full membership of both NATO and the EU (Cottey 1995, 128–30 and 141–6). In January 1994, in response to pressure from the Central European states, NATO established the PfP, describing the initiative as 'an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states' and go 'beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership' (NATO 1994a, para2). The PfP offered more substantial political and military cooperation with NATO, a flexible approach allowing each partner to determine the extent of its cooperation with NATO and the prospect of eventual full membership of NATO for interested partners (NATO 2014d)—see Box 3.2.

Box 3.2 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Package, January 1994

- Cooperation with NATO in relation to transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, democratic control of defence forces, and peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations.
- Development of military forces able to operate with those of NATO.
- PfP peacekeeping exercises.
- Establishment of liaison offices at NATO political headquarters and liaison officers to a Partnership Coordination Cell at NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).
- Development of a planning and review process (PARP) in relation to capabilities for multinational training, exercises and operations with NATO.

(*continued*)

Box 3.2 (continued)

- NATO commitment to 'consult with' any active Partner that 'perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security'.
- NATO reaffirmation that the Alliance 'remains open to membership of other European states' and that it expects and 'would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East'.

Sources: *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, 10–11 January 1994, Press Release M-1(1994) 002, available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en and *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, 10–11 January 1994, Press Release Annex to M-1(1994) 002, available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en

When the PfP was established in 1994, the exact nature and substance of the programme remained to be seen. NATO and its partners, however, moved rapidly to develop the programme in concrete terms. Virtually all non-NATO European states joined the PfP in the next couple of years. New institutional arrangements were put in place to give substance and continuity to the PfP. NATO began to provide a wide range of advice, assistance and training to its PfP partners, in particular to those Central and Eastern European states most keen to engage with the Alliance. Multinational PfP peacekeeping exercises were held. When NATO launched its first ever peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, a number of partner states contributed forces (as was also the case with NATO's operations in Kosovo from 1999 and Afghanistan from 2003). In 1995 NATO also established a PfP PARP: Partners who choose to join the PARP engage in a two-yearly defence planning cycle, whereby the Partner reviews its defence plans in conjunction with NATO and commits to achieve certain objectives which are then reviewed (NATO 2014b). By the late 1990s the PfP was a well-established programme, involving a wide range of activities between NATO and its various European partners.

As it developed in the 1990s, the PfP was defined by a number of features. PfP was primarily a bilateral programme, involving cooperation between NATO and each individual partner. The programme was voluntary, with each partner choosing the extent of cooperation with NATO and the types of activities it engaged in with the Alliance. There were also, however, various multilateral activities, involving NATO and groups of partners or combinations of both members and partners. As a result, the PfP proved to be a highly flexible framework, allowing partners to tailor their cooperation with NATO and facilitating cooperation amongst various groups of members and partners in different areas.

Politically, two features of the PfP were also be notable. When the PfP was established, it was targeted primarily at the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. These were transitional states attempting to establish democracies, make the difficult economic transition from communism to capitalism, re-orient their foreign policies and reform their armed forces. As a consequence, the PfP had an implicit donor-recipient logic, similar to economic development aid, with NATO and its member states providing aid and advice to the post-communist states. In addition, many of the Central and Eastern European states were seeking NATO membership placing them in the position of demandeurs, needing to meet NATO's requirements and standards in order to gain full membership. A second political feature of the PfP was a blurring of the boundary between members and non-members. By establishing the formal status of partner, NATO created the institutional possibility of states who were not members but were actively engaged with the Alliance and its activities. Operationally, further, in terms of activities such as exercises and peacekeeping operations, members and partners might be involved alongside one another with little difference in how they actually engaged with NATO. The blurring of the boundary between members and partners served two objectives: it was a means of integrating post-communist states with NATO and the West, even if they might not become full members; and, if NATO was to enlarge, it was a means of softening the potential dividing line between an enlarged NATO and those states remaining outside the Alliance. For some supporters of PfP, the blurring of the boundary between members and partners was one of the programme's key strengths. There were, however, limits to the blurring of this boundary. Fundamentally, the Article 5 security guarantee at the heart of the NATO Treaty is extended to members and not to partners. Both existing members and aspirants, further, were reluctant to allowing any blurring that

might weaken the Article 5 security guarantee. In addition, despite the establishment of PfP and other partnerships, there remain important parts of NATO activities, for example key elements of political consultation and defence planning, which have remained closed off to partners.

Interestingly, both these two features of the politics of PfP—the donor-recipient logic and the blurring of the boundary between members and partners—have played out quite differently in relation to the European neutral states. In contrast to the post-communist states, the European neutrals are all long-standing states, developed economies and stable democracies, with well-established armed forces. As a consequence, when the PfP was established they did not need NATO's assistance in the same way that the post-communist states did. Indeed, in the area of peacekeeping the European neutrals have significant experience of which NATO and its members have been able to make use. Additionally, as the neutrals have also so far not sought membership of NATO they have not found themselves in the situation of applicants seeking to meet NATO's requirements and standards. The relationship between the European neutral states and NATO has therefore been more a partnership of equals. Indeed, as is explored in subsequent chapters in this book, if a donor-recipient dynamic has been at play, the neutral states have often been more donors than recipients, providing advice, assistance and training to post-communist and developing states in the context of NATO's partnerships.

NATO's Partnership Policy

When the PfP was established in the 1990s it was de facto NATO's primary partnership, with the MD being its rather junior cousin. In the 2000s NATO widened its range of partnerships, establishing the ICI with some of the Persian Gulf states and enhancing relations with a new range of 'global partners' (primarily the Western-allied democracies Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea). By the late 2000s/early 2010s NATO had a range of partnership programmes, a very diverse group of partners (ranging from democracies with close cooperation with NATO such as Australia and Sweden, to authoritarian or unstable states with more complicated relations with NATO such as Belarus, Iraq and Pakistan) and a complex, messy set of institutional frameworks for the political direction and management of its partnerships. Against this background, the Alliance initiated a process of partnership reform. One view was that NATO should establish a single, flexible over-arching partnership framework to replace the various existing

frameworks, within which NATO and partners would be able to define varying degrees and elements of cooperation depending on the interests and situations of partners. This approach, however, was problematic on two inter-related grounds. First, some partners feared that their partnerships with NATO might be downgraded if all elements of existing partnerships (e.g., the PfP commitment to consult with partners facing security threats and the PfP possibility of NATO membership) were not included in any new framework. Second, NATO was wary of opening up some elements of cooperation to all partners or extending some commitments (such as the PfP right to consultation in relation to security threats and possible NATO membership) to all partners. The result was a compromise, agreed in April 2011 and referred to as the Berlin partnership policy (because this was where NATO Foreign Ministers adopted the policy), under which existing partnership frameworks would 'be further developed, while preserving their specificity', but all partners would be offered 'deeper political cooperation and practical engagement', as well as 'support for defence education, training and capacity building' (NATO 2011a, para. 7). NATO agreed to 'streamline its partnership tools to open all cooperative activities and exercises to partners and to harmonise partnership programmes' by creating a single Partnership Cooperation Menu and an 'entry-level' tailored Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) available to all partners (NATO 2011a, paras. 12–13). The policy also emphasised the importance of the '28+n' formula (i.e., dialogue or activities amongst the 28 NATO member states and one or more partners) as a flexible basis for cooperation (NATO 2011a, para 11).[2] While formally preserving NATO's various partnerships, the Berlin partnership policy in practice largely integrated the different partnerships into a single framework, with the extent and focus of cooperation with each partner depending on their interest and NATO's agreement.

Box 3.3 summarises the institutional architecture of NATO's partnerships as of the 2010s. Much of this architecture builds on policies, institutional frameworks and cooperative practices established in the context of the PfP in the 1990s and 2000s. Under the Partnership Cooperation Menu most activities are, in principle, open to any interested partner. As of the mid-2010s the Partnership Cooperation Menu incorporates approximately 1400–1600 activities, giving some sense of the scale of the Alliance's partnerships (NATO 2014c). Each active partner develops with NATO a two-yearly IPCP, which defines the joint objectives and the areas for cooperation (drawing on the Partnership Cooperation Menu). Interested partners can also join the PfP PARP, which focuses on the

Box 3.3 NATO's Partnership Infrastructure

- Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC): NATO committee responsible for partnerships. Involves representatives of the 28 NATO members and provides advice to NATO's key decision-making body the ministerial/ambassadorial level North Atlantic Council. Also meets in various formats with partners, including EAPC, MD, ICI, with individual partners at '28+1' and in flexible '28+n' formats on particular subjects.
- IPCP: two-yearly cooperation programmes (previously known as Individual Partnership Programme) agreed between NATO and each partner requesting an IPCP. Forms basis of each partner's cooperation with NATO. Draws on Partnership Cooperation Menu.
- Partnership Cooperation Menu: list of cooperation activities open to partners; as of mid-2010s includes approximately 1400–1600 activities.
- EAPC: multilateral framework for dialogue and consultation, bringing together NATO members and PfP partners; established in 1997, replacing earlier NACC. Meets monthly at Ambassadorial level, annually at level of foreign or defence ministers and chiefs of defence and occasionally at summit level. Discussions cover issues such as crisis management and peacekeeping operations; arms control and proliferation; defence planning, budgeting and policy; and civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness.
- PfP PARP: two-yearly defence PARP agreed between NATO and those partners wishing to be involved in the PARP. Involves development of Partnership Goals, focusing in particular on interoperability with NATO. Open to all PfP/EAPC partners and other partners on a case-by-case basis.
- Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP): two-yearly frameworks, launched in 2002, for deeper cooperation between NATO and some partners, focusing on enhanced support for partners' efforts to reform their defence and security institutions. Agreed to date with former Soviet and Balkan countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro (in the latter's case until it joined NATO in June 1017).

(*continued*)

Box 3.3 (continued)

- Political-Military Framework for partner involvement in NATO-led operations: framework setting out principles and guidelines for involvement of partner countries in political consultation, decision-shaping, operational planning and command arrangements for NATO-led operations. Established in 1999; revised in 2010–11.
- Defence reform, training and education: the provision of advice, assistance, training and education in relation to defence policy and armed forces is a central part of the PfP and NATO's other partnerships. As the PfP and NATO's other partnerships developed, NATO put in place a series of initiatives and frameworks designed to strengthen the Alliance's role in this: the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP, established in 1999); nine PfP Training Centres; a PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (established in 1999); a Partnership Action Plan (PAP) on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB, launched in 2004); an Education and Training for Defence Reform (EfR) initiative (launched in 2005); Defence Education Enhancement Programmes (DEEPs, tailored programmes through which NATO supports partners in developing and reforming their national educational institutions in the area of security, defence and the military, initiated in 2007); a Building Integrity (BI) programme, launched in 2007, aimed at strengthening integrity, transparency and accountability and reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sectors; and a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, established in 2014, to provide enhanced support to partners.
- Military and crisis management exercises: partner involvement in NATO military and crisis management exercises are an important part of the Alliance's partnerships. In the 1990s NATO initiated PfP exercises bringing together NATO members and partners, focused primarily on peacekeeping, humanitarian support and search and rescue operations. In the 2000s and 2010s, some partners participated in other NATO exercises, including for the NATO Response Force (NRF), which brought them into potential

(*continued*)

Box 3.3 (continued)

collective defence (rather than peacekeeping or humanitarian) scenarios. Some partners have also participated in North Atlantic Council-level crisis management exercises (involving relevant ministries in national capitals and national political and military representatives at NATO headquarters). NATO exercises are managed through a Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP), which includes both a detailed two-year plan and outline planning for the following three years.

- Interoperability with NATO forces: another significant function of NATO's partnerships has been to enhance interoperability between NATO and partner military forces (i.e., the ability of armed forces to operate with one another). This was one purpose of PfP exercises from the mid-1990s onwards. In 1999 NATO introduced an Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) for NATO-led PfP operations. The OCC involves NATO evaluating the ability of units from partner armed forces to operate with NATO (through an Evaluation and Feedback Programme) and partners identifying forces they may contribute to NATO-led operations. In 2014 NATO introduced a Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) designed to maintain and build upon the interoperability established with partner forces in NATO's operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and an Interoperability Platform to deepen interoperability with those partners most willing and able to pursue this objective.
- Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T): framework for Allies and partners to cooperate against terrorism; established in 2002. Involves political consultation, cooperation in areas such as intelligence-sharing, terrorism-related training and exercises, and the development of capabilities for defending against terrorism or dealing with its consequences.
- Women, peace and security: women, peace and security (and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which addresses this issue) have been a particular focus of discussion and policy development with NATO's partners. A NATO/EAPC policy for implementation of UNSCR 1325 was agreed in 2007, followed by an Action Plan in 2010 (updated in 2014).

(*continued*)

Box 3.3 (continued)

- Partnership Trust Funds: trust funds whereby NATO members and partners provide dedicated funding to support practical demilitarisation projects, such as the safe destruction of landmines and munitions, in partner countries.
- Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC): 24/7 focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts amongst Allies and partners; established in 1998. Has helped to coordinate responses to events such as floods, forest fires and earthquakes.

development of military forces and capabilities, in particular the ability to operate alongside NATO forces.

In the 1990s and 2000s, peacekeeping and crisis management became an important focus of NATO's partnerships. Peacekeeping and crisis management exercises were a substantive way in which NATO could cooperate with its partners without touching directly on sensitive issues of collective defence or NATO membership. The establishment of NATO's partnerships, further, coincided with NATO's first peacekeeping/crisis management operations: the PfP was launched in 1994 and NATO began its first major peacekeeping operation, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late 1995. Both NATO members and partners were keen to cooperate with one another in peacekeeping operations. From NATO's perspective, the involvement of partners offered not only additional military contributions to peacekeeping operations but also, and perhaps more importantly, the enhanced political legitimacy of a larger international coalition including non-members. From the partners' perspective, participation in NATO-led operations offered them participation in important international security operations, as well as the opportunity to move politically and militarily closer to NATO. NATO member states and partners therefore operated alongside one virtually from the beginning of NATO's engagement in peacekeeping and crisis management. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2004), Kosovo (since 1999) and Afghanistan (since 2003) NATO found itself leading quite large coalitions including a variety of partners (as well as some countries which did not have formal partnership relationships with NATO). The participation of non-members in NATO's peacekeeping/crisis management support operations necessitated the establishment

of operational arrangements for their inclusion, in particular in terms of military command and control and political decision-making. Initially, this was done on an ad hoc basis, but in 1999 NATO established a formal political-military framework, for partner involvement in NATO-led operations, which was further updated when NATO agreed its reformed partnership policy in 2011 (NATO 2011b). By the 2010s, however, NATO was scaling back its peacekeeping/intervention operations: the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been handed over to a much smaller EU operation in 2004; the NATO operation in Kosovo, which involved 50,000 troops when it began in 1999–2000, had been reduced to 4500 troops by 2016; and NATO's ISAF operation in Afghanistan peaked at 130,000 troops in 2012, and was replaced by a smaller follow-on mission in 2015, with NATO's presence in Afghanistan numbering 12,000–13,000 troops in 2016. NATO's experience in Afghanistan, further, had highlighted the difficulty of stabilising failed states by military means and seems likely to make the Alliance's member states wary of engaging in such operations in future. For NATO, the scaling back of its peacekeeping/intervention operations raised concerns about maintaining the ability of both member states and partners to operate alongside one another militarily if the Alliance was no longer engaged in large-scale operations. In this context, at the Alliance's Chicago summit in May 2012, NATO adopted the goal of 'NATO Forces 2020'—'modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment'—and established a Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) to facilitate this goal (NATO 2012a, paras. 5 and 11). At its Wales summit in September 2014, NATO also launched an Interoperability Platform, designed to maintain interoperability with partners (NATO 2014a, para 88). Issues of interoperability with NATO forces and participation in NATO exercises are likely therefore to be an important part of NATO's partnership agenda, although the extent to and ways in which different partners engage may vary significantly.

Another issue which emerged in the debate on partnership reform was the extent to which NATO should formalise enhanced cooperation with those states with which it has particularly close relations and especially those non-members making larger contributions to NATO-led operations—the possibility of a 'gold circle club' of key partners. At their May 2012 Chicago summit, NATO leaders met with representatives of 13 such countries: four of the European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland), plus Australia, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, South

Korea and the United Arab Emirates. The meeting focused in particular on lessons learned from operational cooperation and how to maintain such cooperation (NATO 2012b). When NATO's Interoperability Platform was launched at the Wales summit in September 2014, Alliance leaders met with 24 partners 'that have demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO' (NATO 2014a, para 88). At the Wales summit, NATO Defence Ministers also met with five partners—Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden—'that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations to discuss further deepening dialogue and practical cooperation as part of the enhanced opportunities within the Partnership Interoperability Initiative' (NATO 2014a, para 88). While the meeting marked the five states as particularly close partners of NATO, NATO leaders also noted that '(W)e stand ready to consider the addition of other partners as their contributions and interests warrant' (NATO 2014a, para 88). The cooperation with the five partners subsequently became referred to as the Enhanced Opportunities Partners programme and may include assured approval for select NATO exercises, pre-recognition as potential contributors to NATO operations, the possibility to fill more staffing positions at NATO headquarters and enhanced political dialogue (Lute 2014). By the time of the Alliance's next summit in Warsaw in July 2016 NATO noted that the five Enhanced Opportunity Partners were pre-approved for a range of NATO exercises, engaged in NATO defence capacity building work, participating in the enhanced NRF (a rapid reaction force for crisis management or defence operations) and developing joint threat assessments with NATO (NATO 2016, para. 101). The development of the Enhanced Opportunities Partners programme—including the extent to which the initial five Enhanced Opportunities partners will harden into a relatively fixed group, whether other partners will join and how cooperation may vary with each partner—remains to be seen. Some observers stressed the need to maintain a balanced and flexible approach, avoid neglecting other partners and to maintain a 'pilot light setting' with all or most partners which would allow cooperation to be quickly ramped up if circumstances warranted (Royal Institute of International Affairs 2014, 5).

Partnership and Membership: What Link?

NATO's partnerships, in particular the PfP, emerged in the context of intense debates over the enlargement of the Alliance into Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. As a consequence, the relationship

between NATO's partnerships and its enlargement has been complex and politically sensitive. NATO enlargement was not without precedent: NATO's initial 1949 membership of 12 states was expanded to include Greece and Turkey in 1952; West Germany in 1955; and Spain in 1982. These enlargements, however, took place in the context of the Cold War, where the extension of NATO was viewed as a means of both deterring the Soviet Union and tying states into the West, and were not preceded by any formal partnership relationship between these states and NATO. In contrast, the establishment of the PfP was a direct response to the demands of the Central and Eastern European states for closer ties with NATO and membership of the Alliance, with the result that the PfP and enlargement were intimately intertwined. This section examines the relationship between partnership and enlargement as it has evolved since the 1990s.

NATO's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe has been—and remains—controversial. The debate on NATO enlargement can be summarised quite succinctly. For Central and Eastern European states seeking membership and for supporters of enlargement amongst NATO's existing members, extending the Alliance's membership is part of a process of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and re-integrating the region with the West (from which it was artificially separated by the imposition of Soviet communism after 1945), helps to overcome historic disputes between states—as NATO has arguably done between its longer-standing Western European members—and provides deterrence against possible Russian revanchism (Allin 1995; Asmus et al. 1995). Russia, in contrast, has strongly opposed NATO's enlargement, arguing that the eastward expansion of the Western military alliance is both unnecessary and threatening from its perspective and excludes Russia from Europe's security architecture. Western critics of enlargement have made similar arguments, warning that enlargement was a provocative step likely to trigger a dangerous Russian reaction (Brown 1995; Gaddis 1998). The context in which the PfP emerged was therefore one of very different perspectives from the Central European and Eastern European states on the one hand and Russia on the other, and divided opinion within the West over enlargement.

As the debate on NATO enlargement and partnerships emerged in the early 1990s, a variety of options were discussed: the extension of full membership to Central and Eastern European states; the alternative of creating some new form of associate membership for Central and Eastern European states (although it was unclear what this might involve); and the possibility of extending NATO membership not only to the Central and Eastern

European states but also to Russia. When it was initially established in January 1994, the PfP fudged these issues, offering the post-communist states enhanced cooperation with NATO through partnership, leaving the door to membership open but not determining whether or when NATO might enlarge. Some critics, such as US Senator Richard Lugar (a prominent figure in US foreign policy debates, especially on NATO), described the PfP as 'policy for postponement' (Safire 1996). Shortly after the PfP was established, however, the Clinton administration decided to press ahead with enlargement, with President Bill Clinton committing to support enlargement in a speech in the Polish capital Warsaw in July 1994. From this point onwards, NATO effectively committed to a twin-track policy: enlargement for Central and Eastern European states and partnership with those states who would remain outside the Alliance, especially Russia (Asmus 2004; Goldgeier 1999). Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join NATO in 1997, with their accession process completed in 1999. This was followed by a 'big bang' enlargement in 2004, when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Alliance. Albania and Croatia became NATO members in 2009. Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017, becoming the Alliance's 29th member.

One of the issues which emerged during the enlargement debates of the 1990s was criteria for membership. To what extent should NATO have explicit membership criteria and what should these be? How should such criteria be assessed and how should partnership institutions and processes relate to assessment of countries seeking membership? In order to address these and other issues relating to enlargement NATO undertook an official study on the issue. NATO's member states wished to retain ultimate political control over decisions on whether to invite states, did not wish to be bound by a strict set of criteria (which might either force them to accept certain states as members or alternatively preclude them from inviting particular states from to join the Alliance) and did not wish to create a situation in which membership of PfP would become a de facto commitment to extend NATO membership. The 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* therefore stated that '(D)ecisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself. …(T)here is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance. Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis… Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their judgement of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area'

(NATO 1995, chapter 2, para. 7). Nonetheless, the *Study on NATO Enlargement* did indicate that countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to fulfil certain requirements, including: existence of a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures (NATO 1995, 2014e).

Another part of the evolution of NATO's enlargement policy was the development of institutions and programmes designed to support those countries aspiring to NATO membership. Much of the PfP/partnership infrastructure discussed above was created, in part, to serve this objective. In addition, in 1999 NATO established a Membership Action Plan (MAP) process, whereby the alliance provides specific assistance and advice to those countries it formally recognises as likely future members. As a result, there is a hierarchy of PfP cooperation for prospective members starting with an IPCP and rising through the PfP PARP, an IPAP and a MAP to the final stage of membership. The PfP thus became a multi-track programme, with those states seeking membership able to progressively engage with all elements and those partners not seeking membership able to remain outside elements specifically related to membership (such as the MAP).

A further outcome of the enlargement debates of the 1990s and 2000s has been an explicit commitment by NATO to an open door policy to further enlargement. In one sense, this was nothing new: the NATO Treaty states that NATO's members 'may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty' (NATO 1949, Article 10). Nevertheless, prior to the 1990s the open door policy was implicit rather than explicit and lay largely in the background. The enlargement debates of the 1990s and 2000s pushed the issue to the fore. When NATO decided in 1997 to extend membership invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, there were concerns that other Central and Eastern European states might be destabilised by their exclusion from NATO and turn to alternative and potentially dangerous foreign policy paths (such as extreme nationalism). In this context, NATO adopted an explicit open door policy towards further enlargement—one that was given substance by the further rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2009.

NATO's open door policy has been particularly controversial in relation to former Soviet states. If Russia was opposed to NATO's enlargement

into Central and Eastern Europe, possible NATO membership for former Soviet states has been an even more neuralgic issue for Moscow. For Russia the former Soviet states are its historic sphere of influence and an area where it has particular economic and political interests (including large ethnic Russian minorities in some cases). In Moscow's eyes the extension of NATO membership to these countries threatens Russia with the loss of its sphere of influence and encirclement by an antagonistic Western military alliance. Western critics have argued that NATO's open door policy risks a form of entrapment, where the commitment to an open door makes it politically impossible for NATO to refuse membership to aspirant states, in particular in the former Soviet Union, and thereby draws NATO into a strategic conflict with Russia which the Alliance might otherwise have avoided (Kamp 1998). Supporters of NATO enlargement to the former Soviet Union argue that Russia should not be allowed a veto over the foreign policy choices of its neighbours and that refusing NATO membership for former Soviet states would condemn these states to once again becoming part of a Russian controlled sphere of influence. Russia was unable to prevent the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) from joining NATO as part of the Alliance's 'big bang' enlargement in 2004. The issue moved to fore, however, after 'colour revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004 brought to power pro-Western governments and both states started to push for NATO membership. NATO's members have been divided over the issue. At the Alliance's Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO agreed that Georgia and Ukraine 'will become members of NATO', but stopped short of offering the two states MAPs, which would have accelerated their progress towards membership in practical terms (NATO 2008, para. 23). Preventing Georgia from joining NATO appears to have been one of the factors behind the subsequent August 2008 Georgia war, in which Russia took control of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Asmus 2010). Although the prospect of Ukraine moving closer to EU membership was more central in precipitating the 2014–15 Ukraine war (in which Russia seized control of and formally annexed Crimea and provided military support to the secessionist Donetsk and Luhansk regions), concerns over possible Ukrainian membership of NATO were almost certainly a factor behind Russia's actions. In principle, NATO remains committed to its open door policy (NATO 2015). Whether, when and in what circumstances Georgia, Ukraine or other former Soviet states may join NATO, however, remains far from clear.

The position of the European neutral states has not been central to the debate on NATO enlargement and the Alliance's partnerships, but the evolution of NATO's combined enlargement-partnership policy has had significant implications for the neutral states' engagement with the Alliance. A partnership programme which involved a commitment to joining NATO—or even a partnership programme which implied membership was the likely end-point—would have been politically impossible for the neutral states to join. A flexible partnership open to both aspiring members and states who do not seek membership—as opposed to a partnership serving only as an ante chamber for membership—therefore suited both NATO and the neutral states. Additionally, NATO has not sought to pressure the neutral states to join the Alliance. According to NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow, 'partnership is not specifically aimed at promoting membership. …partners like Switzerland and Austria cherish their neutrality, and do not want to join our Alliance. NATO has always respected the right of every country to choose its own future, including the nature of its relationship with our Alliance: because that sovereign right is essential to Europe whole, free and at peace that has been a longstanding goal of NATO' (Vershbow 2014, 2). At the same time, NATO's open door policy does not rule out membership for any of the neutral states should they decide to seek that goal. The informal membership criteria adopted in the 1990s—such as democracy, democratic civil-military relations and contributing to international peace and security—are ones which the neutral states already meet. Should any of the neutral states decide to seek NATO membership, it is generally assumed that the Alliance would be willing to offer them membership and that the transition to membership would be a rapid one. The perspectives of the European neutral states on possible membership of NATO are examined in the country case study chapters of this book, and the issue of whether and in what circumstances any of these states might join NATO is returned to in the book's conclusion.

Conclusion

NATO's partnerships are now an established part of the Alliance's overall policy framework and day-to-day business. As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept identifies cooperative security, including partnerships with other states and international organisations, as one of the Alliance's three core tasks, alongside collective

defence and crisis management (NATO 2010, para. 4). As this chapter has explored, since the 1990s NATO has put in place a substantial institutional infrastructure to support its partnership policy. NATO's partnerships with non-members now encompass a wide range of activities: multilateral dialogue, in a variety of different formats; bilateral dialogue and consultation between NATO and individual partners; NATO assistance to partners, in particular in reforming their armed forces and defence policy-making processes; elements of shared defence planning between NATO and partners; joint military exercises; and partner involvement in NATO peacekeeping operations. The nature of partners' relationships with NATO is also very diverse: ranging from states with a very close cooperative relationship with NATO, which view themselves as part of a common democratic community and have made significant contributions to NATO peacekeeping/intervention operations (such as Australia, Finland and Sweden); to states seeking membership of NATO, where cooperation is strongly focused on the goal of membership (such as Macedonia and Georgia); to states for whom the relationship with NATO is not central but elements of cooperation are viewed as having value by both the partner and NATO; to states where partnership with NATO is largely notional or is problematic for particular reasons relating to their domestic politics and/or strategic circumstances (such as Belarus or Pakistan).

In terms of the four conceptual roles for NATO and its partnerships identified at the beginning of this chapter—defence, collective security, cooperative security and integration—a certain evolution can be identified over the twenty-plus years of NATO's partnerships. First, in terms of integration, in the 1990s and 2000s partnerships could be viewed as a central element of an overall NATO policy of attempting to create a 'Europe whole and free' (and even more ambitiously, if less explicitly, a global liberal order). In this context, the PfP in particular was about extending NATO's internal integrative processes to non-members, paving the way for full membership for those states who wanted to join and trying to ensure that enlargement did not create new dividing lines with those states remaining outside a bigger NATO. The combined development of NATO's partnership and enlargement policies in the 1990s and 2000s reflected this logic. By the late 2000s and 2010s, however, the limits of this policy were becoming clearer. After the enlargements of the 1990s and 2000s, NATO appeared to be approaching the limits of its enlargement (vis-à-vis, in particular, former Soviet states), while the limits of partnership as an integrative process capable of supporting transformation in other states had

also become clearer. While integration may be a function of NATO's partnerships, by the 2010s it was increasingly clear that integration in terms of enlargement was, for the foreseeable future, likely to be limited to a geographic core of Europe west of the former Soviet space, while the integrative impact of partnerships for non-members would also be limited.

Second, in terms of collective security, in the 1990s and 2000s NATO's partnerships were to a certain extent interwoven with the Alliance's emerging collective security or crisis management role. Peacekeeping/intervention operations became a central focus of NATO's partnerships and created a common interest and a common agenda for NATO and many of its partners. As was noted above, however, by the late 2000s and 2010s NATO was scaling down its peacekeeping/intervention operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, while the very serious difficulties encountered in attempting to stabilise Afghanistan appeared likely to make NATO's members wary of taking on similar missions in future. It remains to be seen exactly how far NATO will get out of the business of peacekeeping/intervention. To the extent that NATO's collective security role, in particular its involvement in peacekeeping operations, declines, however, one of the key foci of its partnerships seems likely to be removed.

Third, in the 1990s and 2000s NATO's partnerships—in particular those with the Eastern European states and above all Russia—reflected a cooperative security logic of seeking to overcome or avert conflict with former, current or potential adversaries. As NATO's enlargement proceeded and relations with Russia worsened, the logic of cooperative security became largely irrelevant in some cases but more difficult with regard to Russia. As Central and Eastern European states joined NATO and former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia sought NATO membership they became allies or proto-allies with whom it was no longer necessary to overcome historic legacies of conflict. In contrast, worsening relations between Russia and the West in the late 2000s and 2010s made cooperative security more difficult to advance. Institutionalised efforts to build cooperation between Russia and the West, including NATO's relations with Russia, as well as the EU's parallel ties with Moscow, were unable to prevent the 2008 Georgia war or the 2014 Ukraine war. In the wake of the Ukraine war, further, most NATO-Russia institutions were, at least initially, put on hold and appeared likely to be re-established only very slowly if at all.

Fourth, if in the 1990s and 2000s NATO's partnerships related largely to integration, collective security and cooperative security, they also had rather little to do with NATO's traditional role as a defence alliance. Since

the early 2010s, however, the balance of NATO's overall roles has shifted significantly back to collective defence, especially vis-à-vis Russia, and this, alongside the relatively lower salience of NATO's integrative, collective security and cooperative security functions, is impacting on NATO's partnerships. This is most obvious in northern Europe, where for Finland and Sweden partnership with NATO has become increasingly important in terms of deterrence and defence against Russia, while for NATO Finland and Sweden are viewed increasingly in terms of their ability to contribute to the defence of northern Europe as a whole against Russia. NATO's renewed focus on collective defence, however, also has implications for other partners: partners, such as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, who were viewed as valuable contributors to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and 2000s, may be less significant if they contribute little in terms of a more traditional concept of collective defence. In other contexts too, such as the fight against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, NATO and its members may view partners in increasingly utilitarian terms with regard to their capacity to contribute to warfighting operations rather than softer elements of security policy.

Notes

1. NATO's definition of cooperative security includes not only partnerships with other states and international organisations but also contributing to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament and maintaining an open door to possible NATO membership for other European states (NATO 2010, para. 4).
2. NATO's membership totalled 28 states after Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009. Montenegro became the Alliance's 29th member in June 2017.

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CHAPTER 4

'The Allied Partner': Sweden and NATO Through the Realist–Idealist Lens

Magnus Petersson

Sweden's more than 200-year era of peace, arguably the longest any European state has had in modern times, started in 1814 after the Napoleonic Wars where Sweden stepped in on the winning side in the final phase. In return, Denmark, on the losing side, had to give up Norway to Sweden. A Swedish–Norwegian personal union—with a common monarch and a common foreign policy—was created after a short war between Norway (which tried to gain independence) and Sweden in the summer of 1814.

The Scandinavian Peninsula, a geographically well-defined military-strategic unit with only one land border in the North-East, was thereby secured. For hundreds of years one of Sweden's (including what is today Finland) most serious security problems was that it could be surrounded and threatened from three directions (West, South and East), especially if the Swedish arch-enemies Russia and Denmark (including what is today Norway) allied against Sweden. The long borders in the East and the West were very hard to defend effectively. When Sweden lost Finland to Russia in the war of 1808–09 it became a strategic priority for the new crown prince, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte (later King Charles the XIV John of Sweden), who was one of Napoleon's former Marshals, to seek peace with Russia (in order to secure the eastern border) and to obtain a free hand in

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securing the Western border (by incorporating Norway). This was the so-called policy of 1812 (following Bernadotte's meeting with the Russian Tsar, Alexander I, in Åbo in 1812) (Suominen 2002).

A central component of the policy of 1812 became non-engagement in European great power affairs, by balancing between the great powers in the Baltic Sea region, and remaining neutral when they fought wars with one another. The Swedish neutrality policy tradition can thereby be argued to have strong realist strategic roots, and in addition–during the twentieth century—strong idealist elements including identity and ideology (Petersson 2009; Wahlbäck 2002). The realist–idealist dichotomy, which will be used in this chapter to characterise Swedish foreign policy doctrine, is well established within the field of International Relations. In particular the chapter is inspired by Laurent Goetschel's use of it in his research on neutral states. Goetschel argues that neutrality has realist functions, usually related to security and stabilisation, and idealist functions, such as support of normative change in international relations by exporting norms and values and regulating the use of force in the international system (Goetschel 2011).

The Swedish–Norwegian Union lasted until 1905, and it is in many ways ironic that Sweden fought its last war with Norway, a country that has been one of the politically, economically and militarily closest partners to Sweden for the last 200 years, and one of Sweden's most important security facilitators since the end of the Second World War, both indirectly and directly. Norway, one of the 12 signatory powers of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, became an agent in Sweden's integration in Western defence structures from the very beginning and a base for potential reinforcements from the West.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has become one of NATO's most eager partners, cooperating with the organisation to such a large extent that it is informally called NATO's 'allied partner' or 'partner number one' in NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Cooperation since the Cold War has been open and Sweden has contributed greatly to all major NATO operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya), even more so than many NATO members. Sweden is also part of the NATO-managed Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), which involves pooling resources in order to acquire maximum airlift capability for its contributing nations, and during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales signed an agreement on Host Nation Support and received Enhanced Opportunity Partner ('gold card') status within NATO, together with Australia, Finland, Georgia and Jordan.

Despite this, and despite the debate the 2014 Ukraine crisis has sparked on Swedish defence and NATO membership, membership is not politically realistic in the short term and probably not even in the long term. The reason seems to be both realist and idealist at the same time: a deeply rooted realist scepticism among the Swedish people against joining military alliances combined with a neutralist, idealist identity. Alliances are, arguably, something that most Swedish people do not see as increasing security and guaranteeing peace but rather decreasing security and guaranteeing war (the realist perspective). A Swedish 'independent' security policy (the idealist perspective), without formal connections to the great powers, is also seen as very important for the possibility to export norms and values in the international system, particularly within the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Left Party.

This chapter focuses on Swedish views of NATO and the drivers of relations with NATO from a Swedish perspective. The chapter is divided into two main parts: the Cold War period (the past) and the post-Cold War period (the present). Within each part Swedish attitudes and policies towards NATO and practical cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance are described, analysed and characterised. In the concluding part of the chapter, I will also give a few thoughts about Sweden's relations with NATO in the future. The realist–idealist dichotomy will be used throughout the chapter to frame Swedish policy.

The Past: Secret Cooperation During the Cold War

When the Atlantic alliance was about to be created in 1948, Sweden's neutrality policy was already deeply established domestically, and it had also been 'successful' for over 100 years (in the sense that Sweden had not been attacked, not even during the Second World War). The perceived success of the policy—in combination with Swedish political, economic and military strength at the time—was one of the main reasons that Sweden tried to prevent Denmark and Norway from joining the Atlantic Pact through the proposal for a neutral Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU). (The history of the proposed SDU and the Nordic countries' security policy choices in 1948–49 is now well researched—see *Scandinavian Journal of History* 2012.)

The Swedish idea of a SDU was that it would be a 'neutral alliance', which sounds like a contradiction in terms. The government's ambition was to create a neutral Scandinavian defence alliance without formal

military connections to the Western powers, although it knew that military support from those powers was necessary to guarantee Scandinavian territorial integrity. The Norwegian government's view was, however, that such an alliance had to be formally supported militarily by the Western powers and this difference of views was the main reason why the Swedish initiative ultimately failed. Neither of the parties was willing to compromise, and Denmark, with a similar Second World War experience to Norway (failed neutrality policy and German occupation) followed Norway into the Atlantic Pact (Skodvin 1971).

There was no majority among the Swedish people for joining the Atlantic Pact in 1948–49. Although influential actors—such as leading officers and diplomats—wanted a more explicit pro-Western Swedish foreign policy, very few voices openly argued for abandoning the non-alignment policy and joining the Western defence system (Molin 1991). One of the few exceptions was the editor of the largest Swedish daily newspaper (*Dagens Nyheter*), Herbert Tingsten, who argued that democratic Sweden should show Western solidarity and join the other liberal democracies in the Atlantic Pact to counter the threat from the Soviet Union and its communist allies (Johansson 1995).

Although the initiative to create a Scandinavian military alliance was unsuccessful, it was clearly a realist move from the Swedish government. The idea of creating a Scandinavian alliance was very unusual in the context of Swedish policy since 1814: although there had been a few exceptions to the doctrine of neutrality during the nineteenth century (primarily Sweden's alliance-like policy during the Crimean War and the Danish–German Wars in the 1850s and 1860s) the policy of neutrality was deeply entrenched (Westberg 2010, 19–26), The proposed SDU shows that Sweden was prepared to abandon its isolationist neutrality policy and create a neutral 'military alliance' in order to avoid another military alliance (NATO), which was perceived as being more dangerous for the security situation in the region. When that manoeuvre was not successful, Sweden returned to its traditional security policy, which can be summarised as 'non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war'.

In the late 1940s, Sweden was the leading industrial and military power in Northern Europe; it came out of the war almost undamaged (in many ways strengthened), it could mobilise 600,000 troops and had one of the largest air forces in the world. Sweden realised, however, that should it be dragged into a third world war between the two superpowers, which would be plausible if Denmark and/or Norway were attacked, it would be attacked by the Soviet Union and sooner or later would require help from the West

against the Soviets. Therefore, despite its declared neutrality policy, preparations were covertly made to integrate the Swedish defence into the wider Western defence. It was also in the interests of the West to integrate Sweden into the defence planning of the Atlantic alliance, since Sweden was the only power in the region that had substantial defence forces that could resist a Soviet attack, at least for some time (Petersson 2012).

The following were among the most important preparations made at the beginning of the 1950s: plans to integrate the Swedish air defence with that of Norway and Denmark in a crisis or war; sharing and exchange of intelligence about Russian military capabilities and political intentions with the Western powers on a regular basis; and plans for logistical support of Sweden from the West if the Baltic Straits were sealed by the Russians in a crisis or war (as they had been by the Germans during both the First and Second World Wars). Since plans were politically sensitive due to Sweden's neutrality policy, they had to be kept strictly secret. Only the Chief of the Swedish Defence Staff, responsible for coordinating the plans, had a full overview. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government was regularly briefed about ongoing cooperation. The government, however, publicly denied such cooperation, which since the end of the Cold War has created an animated debate in Sweden about transparency and democratic principles (Dalsjö 2006; Hugemark 2014).

A positive effect of the animated debate is that the military interaction between Sweden and the West, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, to a large extent has been scrutinised by public investigations, journalists and scholars. There was a wave of pioneering research at the beginning of the 1990s which revealed the secret Swedish military integration in the Western defence structures during the Cold War (Cole 1990; Agrell 1991). In 1992, the government established the Neutrality Policy Commission [Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen] which was responsible for investigating preparations for the reception of military assistance from the West 1949–69 (Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen 1994). After that, the research programme 'Sweden during the Cold War' generated several doctoral dissertations on the topic (Silva 1999; Ekecrantz 2003; Petersson 2003) and a lot of important research has been produced both inside and outside Sweden (Zetterberg 1997; Agrell 2000; Moores 2002; Petersson 2002; Aunesluoma 2003; Collmar 2006; Nilsson 2007; Bjereld et al. 2008; Dahl 2008; Widén 2009; Gribbe 2011; Kronvall and Petersson 2012; Dalsjö 2014). The most important contributions that focus on the issue and cover the whole Cold War period are Robert Dalsjö's dissertation *Life Line Lost* (2006) and Mikael Holmström's book *Den dolda alliansen* [The Secret Alliance] (2011).

There are three features of Sweden's military cooperation with NATO and the West during the Cold War, that most scholars and experts agree upon: (1) cooperation was bi- or tri-lateral with NATO countries and not with NATO as an organisation; (2) cooperation was more extensive and intense with some NATO members, especially Denmark, Norway, the UK and the USA, than others; and (3) cooperation transformed over time.

First, since Sweden was non-aligned, the government ruled out formal, open cooperation with NATO members and/or NATO as an organisation. Instead, Sweden established secret, informal but structured bi- or tri-lateral cooperation with NATO countries. Sweden was, however, also using these channels—especially Norway—to *indirectly* inform NATO as an organisation about Swedish defence plans and deployments, and to gather information about NATO's defence plans and deployments. This kind of covert, indirect and informal communication was seen as mutually beneficial; it contributed towards more rational defence planning of NATO's Northern flank, and it was the best solution given that Sweden was not a member of the alliance. For example, in the overall NATO defence planning in Scandinavia, Norway could concentrate its land forces in the North, knowing that Sweden would 'cover' the rest of Norway. Regardless of Sweden being attacked or not, Sweden was not expected to allow Russian forces cross its territory on their way to attack Norway. In Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War, Sweden was, in retired Norwegian Army General Gullow Gjeseth's words, seen as a 'Chinese Wall'. This, of course, was also reflected in NATO's defence plans (Gjeseth 2012).

Second, Swedish covert bi- and tri-lateral cooperation with NATO countries was more extensive and intense with Denmark, Norway, the UK and the USA than with other NATO members. The reason was geographical and functional; it was almost unthinkable that Sweden would be able to stay out of a war that included Danish and/or Norwegian territory. The two hotspots in the Scandinavian region during the Cold War were the Baltic straits—shared by Denmark and Sweden—and Northern Norway, directly linked to Sweden by a long common border. The Scandinavian countries were therefore seen, by both NATO and Sweden, as geographically and strategically intertwined (Tamnes 1991).

Furthermore, the UK and the USA were the only powers of the Atlantic Alliance that could reinforce Swedish and Scandinavian defence in a substantial way should the region be attacked by the Soviet Union. Even if Sweden could manage to keep out of a war, it was taken for granted that UK and US air forces would fly over Sweden on their way to bomb Russian

harbours, industries and cities in the Baltic Sea region and further east. It was therefore important, especially for the Swedish Air Force, to be able to communicate directly with allied air forces to avoid dangerous misunderstandings. For example, the Swedish Defence Forces established a direct link to the headquarters of the US Air Force in Europe in Wiesbaden, Germany. Several Swedish air force bases were also modified, for functional reasons, so that they could host and service allied planes, should this be necessary (Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen 1994).

In addition, the intelligence services of Sweden, Denmark and Norway, were to a large degree integrated, reflecting particular areas of expertise. Danish intelligence were the foremost experts on East Germany and Poland, the Norwegians on North West Russia, and Sweden on the Baltic Sea, including the important Leningrad area. Trilateral cooperation, 'The Scandinavian Triangle', therefore slowly developed during the 1950s containing more and more areas of intelligence and even systematic sharing and exchange of information on the Soviet order of battle (Petersson 2006).

Third, the character of the cooperation changed over time; above all, it became less and less formal during the 1970s and 1980s. The government was not regularly briefed on the cooperation as in the 1950s and 1960s, and fewer and fewer in government knew about the preparations. During the 1950s formal, written Swedish–Norwegian and Swedish–Danish plans where created and agreed upon, for example, plans to integrate the air defence of the Scandinavian countries. Many of these plans seem to have been literally destroyed at the beginning of the 1980s (Dalsjö 2006, 92).

However, this gave way to more informal coordination, such as regular meetings regarding how to act in crisis or war. For example, during the crisis in Poland in 1980, the Norwegian Chief of the Defence Staff flew to Sweden to meet his counterpart and brief him on Norway's and NATO's estimates regarding the situation. Chiefs of Staff continued to meet regularly during the Cold War and talk about the defence of Scandinavia, and some of the written plans were still in use (Holmström 2011, 347).

As noted in the introduction, there was practically no debate surrounding Swedish NATO membership during the Cold War. Periodically, journalists, politicians, scholars and other experts argued for closer Swedish military ties with the West within the framework of the non-aligned policy. During the 1950s the leader of the Conservative Party, Jarl Hjalmarson, argued that Sweden should, within the framework of its neutrality policy, establish military cooperation with Denmark and Norway. Such cooperation would, according to Hjalmarson, be compatible with the non-aligned

policy and reduce the risk that Sweden be attacked by the Soviet Union in a major war. Hjalmarson also argued for a common Danish–Swedish defence of the Danish island Bornholm (Bjereld 1997).

Such arguments and suggestions were normally attacked by the Social Democratic government and government officials, because they were interpreted as a challenge to the government's neutrality policy. Dalsjö, who has systematically studied this phenomenon, argues the fact that the Swedish neutrality policy rhetoric became more and more rigid over time—and fewer and fewer knew about the cooperation—in itself created a narrative that hindered a rational security policy debate and a pragmatic security policy in Sweden; the neutrality policy became a religion and those who challenged the religion were stigmatised (Dalsjö 2006; see also Dahl 1999).

To sum up, Sweden's covert integration within the Western defence structures during the Cold War was, to use Goetschel's dichotomy, mainly realist driven. Its function was to increase the military capability to defend Sweden with support from NATO, should Sweden be attacked by the Soviet Union and its allies, and to strengthen Western defence of Scandinavia.

The Swedish neutrality policy also had, however, idealist functions. There was a strong element of anti-imperialism, and activism for the Third World, in Social Democratic foreign policy from the 1960s onwards, personified by Olof Palme's engagement. Östen Undén, Foreign Minister 1945–62, had stood for a realist, low-profile Swedish policy. The new generation of Social Democrats were much more idealist and activist (Säkerhetspolitiska utredningen 2002).

Palme—and other Swedish government members—openly criticised the US intervention in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, worked for nuclear-free zones and corridors in Europe and declared solidarity with developing countries in Africa and South America. To some degree, this was traditional Social Democratic policy (e.g. disarmament), but it also—according to Ann-Sofie Dahl—had a moral dimension: 'the Social Democratic Party and neutral Sweden perceived itself as a higher and better ideal; the guardian of reason and morals in a world characterized by reprehensible and primitive power politics and superpower hegemony'. As Holmström has shown, Swedish conscripts were educated that Sweden stood for world peace and NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) for the opposite. Dahl has pertinently characterised Sweden during these days as a 'moral superpower' (Dahl 1991, 1999, 66; Holmström 2011, 85).

In this activist and moralist foreign policy—which was strongly connected to the Swedish neutrality policy during the second part of the Cold

War—a central element was to describe the two superpowers of being, to quote Dalsjö, 'more or less equally to blame for tensions in the world'. If someone challenged that idea, for example by saying that communism (the Soviet Union) was worse than capitalism (the USA), or argued that Sweden was threatened by the Warsaw Pact and belonged to the Western camp, they were normally criticised by the government for undermining the credibility of the Swedish neutrality policy and even described as a security risk (Dalsjö 2006).

The activist and moralist components of Swedish neutrality policy fall well within the idealist features of neutrality that Goetschel describes: averting war, promoting non-violent means of conflict resolution and exporting ideas and norms of behaviour.

The Present: Open Cooperation After the Cold War

Sweden's neutrality policy was heavily modified—arguably abandoned—almost immediately after the Cold War. Since 1992, the official foreign policy doctrine has been military 'non-alignment'. The reason was, naturally, the collapse of the Soviet Union (Doeser 2008; Petersson 2011a; Nordenman 2014). In fact, it is fair to say that Sweden has fundamentally changed its foreign policy doctrine from a 'neutrality policy' to a 'solidarity policy' since the end of the Cold War (Bring 2008; Winnerstig 2014b; Dalsjö 2015). This has been a drawn-out process, but in 2009 the government formally declared, and the parliament confirmed, that Sweden was willing to defend European Union (EU) members and the Nordic countries (which includes the two Nordic non-EU members Iceland and Norway):

> It is impossible to imagine military conflicts in our region that would affect only one country. Sweden will not remain passive if another EU member State or Nordic country suffers disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected. Sweden should therefore be in position to both give and receive military support. (Försvarsdepartementet 2009, p. 29)

No other EU country has made a unilateral commitment of solidarity similar to Sweden's (Bertelman 2014, 66). The wisdom of such a foreign policy doctrine—to promise other states military support without being guaranteed such support in return—has been questioned. The foreign policy doctrine may even be more dangerous and less democratic than the dual policy of neutrality and secret military cooperation with the West

during the Cold War, Holmström argues, especially since the security situation in the Nordic–Baltic region has worsened since 2009 (Holmström 2015, 627; see also Björnsson and Zetterberg 2016).

Even before the 'solidarity declaration', Sweden's abandonment of its neutrality policy led to two very important changes in Swedish security policy: NATO partnership (in 1994) and EU membership (in 1995). During the Cold War the government declared several times that EU (back then the European Economic Community (EEC), then the European Community (EC)) membership was not compatible with Swedish neutrality policy, because common economic and foreign policy decisions would undermine Sweden's ability to conduct an independent neutrality policy. The EEC was also seen as being intertwined with NATO: 'NATO's economic leg'. In 1961 the Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander argued that an application to join the EEC could 'be harmful for Swedish vital interest because it could be perceived as a political statement meaning that we [Sweden] were prepared to diverge from our neutrality policy and seek attachment to the Atlantic Pact' (Andrén and Möller 1990, 164).

In 1990, before the neutrality policy doctrine formally changed, the Social Democratic government suddenly changed its policy and declared that Sweden should join the EC and that this was compatible with Swedish neutrality. The decision was presented as a component in a larger package to handle the then economic crisis (Doeser 2008, 225). In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government—now a non-socialist coalition led by Carl Bildt—abandoned the neutrality policy or, more precisely, made neutrality policy an option rather than a goal in itself; instead of 'non-alignment *aiming* at neutrality in war', the new doctrine was 'to *enable* us [Sweden] to remain neutral in the event of war in our immediate vicinity'. As Fredrik Doeser has argued: 'The neutrality goal had, thus, been replaced by a neutrality option that was more geographically restricted' (Doeser 2008, 240). After that the use of the word 'neutrality' was gradually phased out of the vocabulary of the government (Petersson 2010a, 150).

While formal, open cooperation with NATO was not perceived as politically possible during the Cold War because of the neutrality policy, with the end of the Cold War, the Swedish government took the view that such cooperation was desirable. Like EU membership, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme became a realist solution that combined traditional non-alignment with the new formal, more open cooperation with NATO. It also provided for more active Swedish and Finnish support for the Baltic States—also NATO partners (rather than members) at this

point—in the 1990s. As Dahl writes: 'Extensive amounts of political and military assistance were delivered across the Baltic Sea to support the build-up of these democracies and their militaries, and to help them gain membership of NATO' (Dahl 2014a, 3). Again, we can see the combination of realism and idealism in Swedish security policy.

For many of the partners PfP became a stepping stone to full membership, but for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland—the Cold War neutrals–it rather became a way of modernising defence forces, while at the same time maintaining their traditional security policies, working for transparency and democratisation, and contributing to UN-mandated peace operations (Cottey 2009, 2013; Petersson 2011b; Dahl 2014b).

Sweden, together with Finland, joined PfP from the beginning and the two states have, since then, been the most active partners among the former neutrals with Sweden commonly referred to as 'the number one partner' (Dahl 2012). When the PfP programme was launched in 1994, Finland and Sweden immediately signed up. Since the decision to join PfP did not mean any mutual security guarantees, it had majority support in the Swedish parliament. By December 1994, Finland and Sweden had also managed to conclude their first Individual Partnership Program (IPP), that is a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the partner state and NATO. Austria became a partner in 1995, Switzerland in 1996 and Ireland in 1999. When looking at the 'primary tool' for achieving interoperability, the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), the same pattern appears: Finland and Sweden joined the process in 1995, Austria in 1996, Switzerland in 1999 and Ireland in 2001 (Petersson 2011b; Hendrickson 2013).

When it comes to troop contributions to UN-mandated and NATO-led operations Sweden and Finland also stand out. In 1995–96, Austria, Finland and Sweden contributed to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Implementation/Stabilization Force, IFOR/SFOR)—Austria with a transport element, Finland and Sweden with an infantry battalion each. From 1997, Ireland (not yet a PfP member), contributed a military police company headquarters, a military police platoon, and a national support element. Both the quantity and the type of forces sent by Finland and Sweden reflected their willingness to contribute to NATO's operations: Finland and Sweden sent relatively large combat (or combat-like) forces, while Austria and Ireland sent relatively small support (or support-like) forces. And that pattern continued (Petersson 2011b).

From 1999, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland participated in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo (Kosovo Force or

KFOR); Finland and Sweden in a similar way to that in Bosnia and Herzegovina (battalion level), Austria for the first time contributed with combat forces comparable to the Finnish and Swedish, including five small manoeuvre task forces with a total strength of approximately 450 soldiers, and Switzerland with a contingent of around 200 peacekeeping forces. In the KFOR operation, Ireland also replaced its support units with combat units; at the beginning of the operation Ireland contributed with a transport/logistics company, which later, in October 2004, was replaced by an armoured infantry company (Petersson 2011b).

The Swedish military contribution to IFOR/SFOR and KFOR can be seen as having both realist and idealist motivations. As Jan Ångström has shown, Swedish peace operations after the Cold War have been motivated both by military (interests/realist) and humanitarian (values/idealist) arguments, again fitting well with Goetschel's dichotomy of realist and idealist functions of Swedish and other former neutral's security policies (Ångström 2015). The need for a realist dimension in Swedish non-alignment policy after the end of the Cold War thus did not disappear.

Participation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo was mainly described by the government as peacekeeping (idealism) (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014, 55). In addition, however, the government declared that an important objective of Swedish contributions to NATO-led peace operations was to develop and maintain the ability to conduct military crisis management (realism):

> NATO's organisation and procedures have become the international standard for military cooperation and crisis management. Because of this, Swedish participation in NATO-led operations has been an important tool for Sweden to develop and—from time to time during demanding conditions—test its ability to conduct military crisis management (Regeringen 2009, 12).

As the contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan increased, Sweden downsized its forces in Kosovo and moved them to Afghanistan. Sweden led a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif in the northern part of the country from 2006, and contributed approximately 500 troops to the ISAF operation. Finland's contribution to ISAF was approximately 100 personnel, mainly in the Swedish-led PRT. Austria and Ireland contributed to ISAF with a few staff officers (Switzerland also did so between 2004 and 2007) (Petersson 2011b).

Although ISAF in many ways was a combat operation rather than a peacekeeping operation, it was relatively undisputed in the Swedish parliament and marketed as in line with the Swedish peace building tradition (Noreen and Angstrom 2015). In 2005, the government argued that the forces in Mazar-e-Sharif would increase security, undertake rebuilding, facilitate security sector reform and support the Afghan army. The Left Party objected to that description, arguing that the tasks of Swedish forces were being transformed from peace support to war fighting in a political and military conflict, and called for troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but there was strong support for the government's line. Two years later, in 2007, when the government wanted to increase Swedish troop numbers in Afghanistan, it again highlighted the connection between security and economic and social development. The overarching goal was, according to the government, to 'fight poverty, strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and equality'. The Left Party again objected, warning that Swedish operations could become part of US military strategy, and argued that Swedish troops should be brought home. There was, however, still strong support for the government line (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014).

Wilhelm Agrell has shown how the Swedish forces actually changed their way of thinking and operating from traditional peacekeeping and stabilisation to counterinsurgency (COIN), recognising that COIN was a separate form of conflict compared to traditional peacekeeping. The Swedish government refused to use the term COIN, but in reality Swedish forces abandoned many of the former peacekeeping restrictions and started to educate, train and operate more in accordance with the clear–hold–build concept. The aim was to create security for the people in the area and to win their support (gain legitimacy), according to established COIN principles. Sweden did not have sufficient forces to implement COIN extensively, but the tendency was clear according to Agrell: Swedish forces did the maximum they could with limited troop numbers (Agrell 2013).

So in sum, a clearly changed pattern of military operations from 2009 and onwards, from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency, can be traced in the Swedish ISAF operation (Kronvall and Petersson 2016). The ISAF mission is yet another example of realist and idealist elements in Swedish security policy: fighting poverty, strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights and equality (idealism), at the same time as conducting COIN operations in accordance with the overarching NATO doctrine (realism).

In 2008, Finland and Sweden became the only non-NATO members participating in the NATO-managed Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)

initiative. This was quite an unusual commitment for two non-aligned states and a clear signal from Finland and Sweden that they were prepared to be deeply integrated in NATO's defence structures, even more so than several members (Petersson 2011b). In addition, Sweden and Finland announced in 2013 that they would offer contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF), a high readiness multinational force (NATO 2015).

Sweden, but not Finland, also participated in the UN-mandated and NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 with eight fighter jets. It was the first time that Sweden participated with fighter jets in a peace operation since the Congo mission in the 1960s. Since it was a UN Security Council mandated operation with a clear mission to protect Libyan civilians, this operation had majority support in the Swedish parliament and among the Swedish people. Here again we see both the realist and idealist features of the Swedish policy: keeping the Swedish Air Force able to operate in a NATO context (realism) and protecting universal norms and values (idealism). The planes were not allowed to hit ground targets (except for in self-defence), which was not surprising. As Robert Egnell writes: 'There was plenty of political nervousness in Stockholm regarding the political impact of Swedish bombs causing civilian casualties' (Egnell 2015, 331).

Egnell also underscores the military technical, tactical value of Sweden's participation in NATO-led operations after the Cold War, that is the realist function of the policy:

> With Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden, and Operation Unified Protector in Libya, Sweden has taken two important steps as a credible contributor to international peace operations by moving out of its comfort zone as it deployed naval and air capabilities. OUP in Libya clearly was a continuation of Swedish ambitions to play a substantial role in international crisis management. (Egnell 2015, 337)

Finally, Sweden and Finland's active NATO partnership resulted in their being awarded Enhanced Opportunity Partnership (EOP) status from NATO during the Alliance's Wales Summit in 2014, that is 'enhanced opportunities' for cooperation and a 'special relationship' with the alliance. The EOP signalled that Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden were the most able and willing NATO partners that made 'significant contributions to NATO operations'. During the summit, Finland and Sweden also signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO, the Host Nation Support Agreement, which clarified policy and procedures for operational

and logistic support sites for NATO forces on Finnish and Swedish territory, if mutually agreed. The agreement was ratified by the Swedish parliament in 2016 (NATO 2014a, b; O'Dwyer 2014; Dahl 2016).

To sum up, Sweden and Finland are the most NATO-integrated NATO partners, probably more integrated in NATO on the operational and tactical level than many NATO members, and they have also contributed more to NATO-led operations than many NATO members. They also cooperate very closely bilaterally (Government Offices of Sweden 2015).

However, on a political-strategic level, Sweden and Finland are neither prepared, nor allowed, to act like NATO members. For example, the countries have not participated in the air policing of the Baltic States and Iceland. In 2014, both the Swedish and Finnish air force were present on Iceland when Norway had the responsibility to air-police the island, but the Swedish and Finnish air forces were not allowed to be part of the air policing; they were only there to participate in exercises (Dahl 2014a; Holmström 2014; Hultgreen 2014).

The bi- and tri-lateral pattern of Swedish cooperation with NATO countries—not least with Denmark, Norway, the UK and the USA—has also been maintained since the end of the Cold War. With Denmark and Norway, a very ambitious project has been going in recent years, Nordic Defence Cooperation or NORDEFCO, which also includes Iceland and Finland (and occasionally the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) (Petersson 2010b; Forsberg 2013; Dahl 2014a; Hilde 2014; Järvenpää 2014). The primary driver of NORDEFCO has been cost-efficiency rather than common security: the focus has been on procuring defence systems together, rather than planning to defend Scandinavia together. Despite this, NORDEFCO has integrated Sweden (and Finland) even more so into NATO's defence structures, with defence staffs in the four countries (Iceland does not have armed forces) working closely together.

The Nordic defence cooperation that eventually led to the establishment of NORDEFCO in November 2009 was a bottom-up initiative, that is it came from the military level and was directed upwards to the political level; within a year it also included Finland and contained a very ambitious programme for cooperation. No less than 140 areas of cooperation were identified within land-, sea- and air operations, logistic support, human resources, education, and research and development. In November 2008 came the blessing from the political level: an agreement was reached between all the Nordic countries to increase defence cooperation (Saxi 2011).

The final step in the establishment of NORDEFCO came in November 2009 at a defence ministers' meeting in Helsinki, where an agreement was reached that all types of Nordic defence cooperation should be subject to one structure, NORDEFCO. According to the agreement, the defence cooperation has nine overarching goals:

(a) a comprehensive, enhanced and long-term approach to defence related issues;
(b) identify, discuss and strive for a common understanding of defence related strategic and policy issues of common interest;
(c) increase operational effect and quality of the armed forces;
(d) strive for optimum resource allocation and cost-efficiency in defence related areas;
(e) enhance interoperability within existing standards and the capability to act jointly;
(f) develop cooperation in the area of multinational operations, defence related security sector reform and capability building in support of international peace and security;
(g) achieve technological benefits;
(h) promote the competitiveness of the defence industry; and
(i) strengthen cooperation on any other possible future area of cooperation.

NORDEFCO is chaired by one of the Nordic countries on a rotating basis; the Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee (NORDEF PSC) is the political body that defines the overarching goals; and the Nordic Military Coordination Committee (NORDEF MCC) is the military body that implements the goals on a practical level. Finally the bottom-up initiative became a top-down political-military structure, supported by the governments in all the Nordic countries.

NORDEFCO has not, however, been particularly successful. Several of the most prestigious projects, such as Norwegian–Swedish procurement of the Swedish artillery system Archer, have been shut down and the good ideas about cost-efficiency have not been realised. NORDEFCO nonetheless shows how the pattern of Swedish bi- and tri-lateral (covert) defence cooperation with NATO members Denmark and Norway during the Cold War continued openly after the end of the Cold War. Dahl argues, however, that 'true integration will be possible only when Sweden and Finland take the final step of joining NATO as full members' (Dahl 2014a, 12).

As indicated in the introduction and in the first part of this chapter, there was never a comprehensive NATO debate in Sweden—not even in 1948–49—until 2013. As Mike Winnerstig argues, the issue has been discussed within the defence establishment and elite environments since the end of the 1990s, but a public, systematic and prolonged debate did not take place until recent years. Winnerstig connects the activation of the Swedish NATO debate to two factors: the effect of the Swedish 2009 defence bill and the Ukraine crisis of 2014 (Winnerstig 2014a, b).

The effect of the defence bill, when Sweden abolished conscription and created an all-volunteer defence force, has been that the armed forces have become so small that they can defend only a limited part of Swedish territory for one week. The navy has been cut by approximately 75 per cent, the air force by 85 per cent and the army by 95 per cent (Petersson 2010a, 155). In practice, the Swedish armed forces cannot operate independently over time.

When the 'one week defence' was 'revealed' in an interview with the Swedish Supreme Commander (equivalent to the Chief of Defence), not only experts and analysts but also ordinary people were surprised and a defence debate was sparked. That debate has since been ongoing and it has included a discussion of the pros and cons of Swedish NATO membership. The effect of the Ukraine crisis has only served to reinforce that debate and it has resulted in major changes, both within political parties and public opinion (Arvidsson 2014; Kunz 2015; Winnerstig 2014a, b).

Furthermore, the Christian Democratic Party and the Center (Agrarian) Party have changed their view from negative to undecided to pro-NATO. The Moderate (Conservative) Party and the Liberal Party continue to support Swedish NATO membership and they have argued forcefully for Swedish membership or, at least, a serious investigation of the benefits and disadvantages of a membership.

Public opinion has become more and more positive to Swedish NATO membership, and the interest shown in membership has increased significantly (Winnerstig 2014a, b; Dahl 2016; Åsberg 2015). In 1994, only 15 per cent of the population supported joining NATO, in 2004 this increased to 20 per cent and by 2015, membership was supported by 38 per cent, with 31 per cent against (Berndtsson et al. 2016). In 2015, 31 per cent of people were unsure, however, on such an important issue. Furthermore, there would almost certainly need to be a referendum before a political decision could be made.

The Social Democratic-Green government elected in October 2014 was opposed to Swedish membership of NATO and has no plans to undertake

an investigation regarding the pros and cons of Swedish NATO membership. The government did, however, mandate a former Ambassador, Krister Bringéus, to investigate the pros and cons of Swedish security policy cooperation with other countries and organisations (including NATO). In his report, Bringéus argues that Swedish NATO membership would increase predictability in the Baltic Sea region and increase Western deterrence. He also, however, argues that NATO membership would cause a political crisis with Russia, and Russian military adjustments in the region (Bringéus 2016).

Given the balance of domestic political views on the issue, it is not likely that Sweden is going to be a NATO member even in the long term. An aspect that is seldom mentioned is also that even if Sweden and/or Finland would like to join NATO, it is not certain that all NATO members will welcome them; the parliaments of all 29 member states have to say 'yes', and as the Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, recently said: 'you don't just step in' (Yle 2016).

Conclusion

Swedish defence has to some extent been integrated into NATO's defence since the beginning. During the Cold War this was covert, and since the end of the Cold War this cooperation has been made openly. Today Sweden is more dependent on NATO than ever: it has no credible national defence, it cannot conduct major military operations alone, and it has a defence doctrine that presupposes that NATO will reinforce Swedish defence, should this be needed. There is no will, however, from the government to join NATO and NATO officials have said several times that non-members, such as Sweden, are not covered by NATO's security guarantees.

Although Swedish foreign policy doctrine has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War—from neutrality policy to solidarity policy—non-alignment and neutrality are deeply embedded in Swedish national identity, and especially within the Social Democratic Party. The Swedish foreign policy doctrine is still built on a mix of realism and idealism.

Sooner or later, however, Sweden has to make a choice about its security policy if it wants to make it credible: either to join NATO or to create a strong national defence. There is no political will, however, to do either of these things. NATO membership is not on the agenda for the current (2014–) Social Democratic-Green government and as long as the Social Democratic party is against it, NATO membership is not realistic (Dahl 2012; Kunz 2015). Besides this, a referendum would almost certainly be

necessary for such an important change in Swedish security policy, and it cannot be assumed that a referendum would result in a vote for NATO membership.

Furthermore, there is no political will to create a strong national defence. The costs are much too high to be politically acceptable. At the end of the Cold War, Sweden spent approximately 2 percent of its GDP on defence; now it spends approximately 1 per cent. The level of defence spending is, of course, not the only a factor that creates a strong defence, but in the Swedish case, with a territory bigger than Germany's, a certain mass of troops are needed to have a credible defence that can conduct military operations over time (sustainability) and in several directions at the same time (flexibility), and that costs a lot of money.

Sweden will therefore probably go on cooperating closely with NATO and mismanaging defence at the same time, hoping that NATO has a collective self-interest in defending Sweden, should this be necessary. This is a dangerous security policy, not worthy of a country that in many other ways is functional. As has been shown by Norway, Denmark and many other NATO members, membership in the alliance does not have to eliminate the idealist part of foreign policy. In fact, these countries support normative change in international relations (idealism) as much as Sweden. And they are also exporting norms and values and seek to regulate the use of force in the state system, although they have been NATO members for almost 70 years. At the same time, they contribute to security (realism) in the Nordic–Baltic region. Sweden could follow their example.

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CHAPTER 5

Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions

Tuomas Forsberg

Finland has decided to remain militarily non-aligned, although the country has been willing to develop defence cooperation inside the EU and a partnership with NATO. In fact, it is the only EU country bordering Russia that is not a member of NATO. The question of Finland's NATO membership has been discussed in public since the end of the Cold War, and the debates have intensified since the 2014 conflict in Ukraine and Russia's renewed confrontation with the West. At the same time, Finland has been keen on deepening its partnership with NATO, engaging in an 'enhanced partnership' and signing a Host Nation Support agreement with the Atlantic Alliance. Despite these changes, it is nevertheless unlikely that there will be a swift decision to apply for full NATO membership.

Finland's current relationship with NATO has evoked a great deal of international interest recently, in light of the increased tensions between the Alliance and Russia that have become palpable in the Baltic Sea region, too (Andersson 2014; Buhne 2015; Chakarova et al. 2015; Giles and Eskola 2009; Haynes 2017; Seip 2015). This discussion reflects some of the general attitudes towards strategies of deterrence and containment when dealing with Russia. More systematic research endeavouring to explain Finland's policy choices and decision-making on the issue has been

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lacking, which is not surprising given the earlier stability in the area and Finland's modest size. Even including Finnish-language analyses and popular overviews, scientific contributions on the issue are few and they tend to deal with NATO as a whole rather than with Finland's relationship with the Alliance (Ries 1999; Forsberg 2002; Honkanen and Kuusela 2014; Karvinen and Puistola 2015; Salomaa 2015). On the other hand, the government has commissioned two reviews of Finland's NATO membership besides the regular general reviews of the country's security and defence policy (Bergquist et al. 2016; Sierla 2007).

This chapter argues that understanding Finland's relationship with NATO, including some of its apparent paradoxes, requires a knowledge of psychology and domestic politics more than insights into geopolitics and strategy. The chapter begins with an overview of Finland's historical relationship with NATO, starting from the Cold War and moving on to the post-Cold War era. This will be followed by a discussion of the domestic political factors in the debate and decision-making over NATO membership. The key determinants of Finland's membership with NATO will then be assessed: Russia, NATO itself, the United States and Sweden. Finally, strategic rational choice elements are contrasted with psychological factors to do with perception and decision-making, and the issue of whether Finland could eventually join NATO, and for what reasons, is considered.

History and Its Strategic Lessons

It is commonplace to argue that Finland became a political entity as an autonomous Grand Duchy under the rule of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. Although Finland did not have a foreign policy of its own, the question of neutrality emerged even during the Crimean War, when the British and French navies bombed the Finnish coastline and the war affected trade relations. The nation-builders at the time regarded the idea of neutrality as folly for the most part, however, and believed that loyalty to the Czar would best guarantee Finland's security and economic prosperity as well as its development as a nation-state.

Finland gained independence in 1917 after the October Revolution in Russia, but this was quickly followed by a brutal civil war between the 'Whites' and the 'Reds'. The war ended in a victory for the former, who had already held a majority in the parliament before the war. During the interwar period, Soviet Russia was naturally perceived as an existential threat since the key leaders of the 'Reds' had escaped there, and it was widely believed that external assistance was needed to counterbalance Soviet power.

In its foreign policy, Finland first tried to lean on Germany: the government had already accepted a German intervention in the civil war of 1918, but the German orientation came to a rapid end when Germany lost the First World War, and the allied powers refused to recognise Finland's independence if the country aligned itself with Germany. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Finnish government then chose to align itself with the other new eastern 'rimstates', Poland and the Baltic states, but this plan fell through because Poland's foreign policy was regarded as too adventurous and therefore risky in the aftermath of the Russo-Polish war of 1920. The 'rimstate policy' was followed by a more abstract orientation towards the League of Nations, but Finland effectively tried to boost its relations with the leading European powers in the organisation, the United Kingdom and France. When the League of Nations started to appear weak in the mid-1930s with the rise of Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, which challenged the international security order, Finland adopted yet another foreign policy orientation and tried to approach the Nordic countries, particularly Sweden. The Nordic orientation was then manifested as a policy of 'strict neutrality' between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union.

As far as Finland was concerned, the Second World War was divided into two—or even three—phases. First was the Winter War in 1939–40 when the Soviet Union attacked Finland, as a result of which the country had to give up large areas of land in the east, almost the entire province of Karelia, including the second biggest city in the country, Viipuri. The interim peace ended when Finland joined Nazi Germany in its attack against the Soviet Union in 1941 in the so-called Continuation War, where Finland occupied areas in Soviet Eastern Karelia. Germany was not the preferred ally because it had de facto backed the Soviet Union during the Winter War, and aversion towards Nazism was widespread, but it was seen as the lesser of two evils by the elite. The Continuation War subsequently ended in a second defeat in September 1944. The third phase of the war was when the Finnish forces had to drive the remaining German forces out of Finland's territory in 1944–45. As a result of the war, the 1940 border was re-established with some additional areas given to the Soviet Union in the north, as confirmed in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, but Finland was spared the Soviet occupation and annexation that befell the Baltic states.

During the immediate post-war years, Finland needed to fulfil its peace treaty obligations after the lost war and convince the Soviet Union that it did not pose a threat: since Finland itself could not challenge the Soviet Union, the threat was seen as coming from hostile countries that would be

able to use Finland's territory to launch an attack against the Soviet Union. Gaining trust was not easy with Moscow, where Stalin was inclined to fear the worst, but he eventually respected Finland's independence and its post-war leaders. In 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty), which included Finland's aspiration to remain neutral but also a clause on joint military consultation if a threat were jointly identified. The treaty was different from that signed by those Eastern European states that joined the Warsaw Pact because there was no automaticity in the military clause—President Juho Kusti Paasikivi's (1946–56) achievement in the negotiations compared to Stalin's initial proposal. Although neutrality was mentioned in the treaty—an object of later disagreements over interpretation between the parties—it was not flagged, while the Soviet Union maintained its military base at Porkkala near Helsinki up to 1955.

For Finland, NATO membership was impossible to countenance during the Cold War (Hanhimäki 1997). The FCMA Treaty symbolised Finland's adaptation to the new foreign policy line that was based on the friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The return of the Porkkala base strengthened the belief of the Finnish leaders that the Soviet Union did not have any immediate expansionist aims with regard to Finland. At the same time, the idea that foreign countries would be able to help Finland was castigated; it was seen as both utopian, given that Finland had been left to fend for itself during the Winter War, as well as dangerous because such thinking would lead Moscow to believe that such plans were being crafted in secrecy. Although Germany was named as the enemy in the peace treaty and the FCMA Treaty, everybody understood that in practice the key concern was the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (and when West Germany joined in 1955, it underlined the Soviet-leaning perception that NATO was a threat).

Nevertheless, Finnish leaders remained suspicious regarding the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union. Paasikivi stressed the importance of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, but he was also of the opinion that, by accepting the FCMA Treaty, Finland had complied as much as possible. The 'Finlandisation' model that Finland had adopted signified that the country would be as flexible as possible in its relations with the Soviet Union, paying lip service to the policy of friendship, but safeguarding the essence of its sovereignty at the same time (Forsberg and Pesu 2016). Beneath the veneer of all the official talk of trust and friendship, a constant battle over the limits of this sovereignty was fought. Finland avoided criticising the Soviet Union and upheld the idea of friend-

ship, but rejected joint military exercises and maintained as credible a military deterrent as possible, based on a large mobilisation capability. Finland also developed economic relations with the Soviet Union, but avoided creating vulnerable economic dependence. Moreover, cultural contacts were limited, preserving the cultural gap between the two countries; in this connection, the Russian language was spoken by very few and the tiny Russian minority consisted mainly of Czarist-era emigrants. Finally, it was important for the Finnish parliament and president to be the ones making the decisions on who was able to form the government and serve as ministers, otherwise it would be a slippery slope, although Russian opinion could be taken into account. At the same time, a rather benign image of the Soviet Union was easier to accept for the Finns, because the civilian population had not encountered Soviet atrocities of the same magnitude as those that had deeply traumatised the people of the Baltic states or Poland. The FCMA Treaty thus became the bedrock of Finnish-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War, with the result that, even in 1988, by which time perestroika had gained a foothold in the Soviet Union, 80 per cent of Finns still supported the treaty.

In many ways, the Finnish policy of neutrality combined with friendly relations towards the Soviet Union was consistent until the end of the Cold War, and maintaining a clear distance from NATO was an essential part of it. Although the strategic room for manoeuvre increased when compared to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the policy aimed at strengthening Finland's position internationally through membership of international organisations had to be implemented without violating Soviet interests, which meant that Finland stayed out of international organisations and cooperation schemes, when the Soviet Union resisted the idea. The first decision was to refrain from Marshall Aid, but Finland obtained Western economic assistance by other means. Whereas Moscow clearly signalled its resistance to Finnish membership of organisations that it had labelled as 'anti-Soviet', such as NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), associate membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as well as the participation in Nordic cooperation were acceptable, but the formation of a Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK) in the late 1960s, which was seen by Moscow as a stepping stone to the EEC, was not. Moscow nonetheless accepted that Finland could conclude a free trade treaty with the EEC in 1973, but it contained special provisions that included less time than normal to withdraw from the treaty, and no political development clause

(Antola 1989). Furthermore, Finland refrained from publicly criticising Soviet domestic or foreign policy. For example, Finland did not condemn the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, yet it also avoided criticising the United States and NATO in the name of its policy of neutrality. The Finnish paradox, according to President Urho Kekkonen (1956–82), was that Finland could only approach the West if it simultaneously approached the East: the better the relations with Moscow, the better they were likely to be with the West (Kekkonen 1961).

In these circumstances, NATO membership was hence not considered possible and military cooperation with NATO countries was extremely limited (Penttilä 1991). Moreover, NATO was not seen as a stabilising factor in Northern Europe: Finland did not subscribe to the idea of a Nordic balance whereby the Finnish FCMA Treaty was balanced with Norwegian and Danish NATO memberships. Military contacts with NATO countries, even with Norway and Denmark, were sensitive. An exception was the Nordic military training programme for UN peacekeeping operations. Apart from standard military-to-military contacts, through visits and military attachés, Finland engaged with NATO countries mainly in procurement policy. In fact, Finland had to consult the United Kingdom in procurement issues because the United Kingdom was a signatory of the 1947 peace treaty (Finland had not been at war with the United States, which was hence not a signatory of the peace treaty). London, and Washington in particular (whom London consulted in the issue), had a surprisingly restricted interpretation of the peace treaty in 1962, when Finland wanted to upgrade its anti-aircraft defence system by buying British missiles, because they feared that such missiles could be used against NATO's strategic bombers (Penttilä 1991, 106–7; Visuri 1994, 198–204).

The conclusion that can be drawn from this brief historical review is that history, in itself, does not determine policies; rather, the collective memory of the past and the constructed historical lessons do (Browning 2002). The experiences of NATO members Norway and Denmark, as well as those of the Baltic states, were different from Finland's. Finland's historical tradition of neutrality is shorter than Sweden's and the experience is mixed. Nevertheless, many Finns believe that Finland's neutrality policy was the key to its success during the Cold War. Unlike other Eastern European states, Finland did not become a Soviet bloc country, prospered economically, and benefited from having good relations with both East and West. The saying 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' applies, and explains Finland's orientation in the post-Cold War era.

Post-Cold War Evolution

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union swiftly transformed Finland's geostrategic position. Finland was rather slow to react to this change but it renegotiated the FCMA Treaty in 1991 and concluded a regular friendship treaty with Russia without any military clauses in 1992. Even more importantly, on the eve of German unification in September 1990, Finland unilaterally reinterpreted the peace treaty so that the clauses that placed restrictions on Finland's armed forces were regarded as null and void (Penttilä 1994).

At first, the new situation seemed only to solidify Finland's neutrality, but this interlude was short-lived. Finland soon abandoned the term neutrality and reduced it to military non-alignment, which was considered a more technical term and did not imply political neutrality. This change was made as Finland applied for membership of the EU. The most immediate reason for the policy change was Sweden, which rather unexpectedly announced its plan to apply for membership in autumn 1990. Finland followed suit—the imperative was partly economic, since in many fields, such as forestry, Sweden and Finland were competitors in the European market—but President Mauno Koivisto (1982–94) argued that at the end of the day, the economy was secondary and general security policy reasons constituted the primary motivation for applying for EU membership (Koivisto 1995, 246). An intensive public debate over the pros and cons of membership was conducted and 57 per cent of Finns supported it in the referendum held in 1994, which sealed the country's membership in 1995 (Arter 1995, 1996).

NATO membership was only discussed as a theoretical option, since prior to 1994, it was not clear to the Finnish leaders that NATO had any intention of enlarging. Finland, however, wanted to develop its relations with NATO, since its role was soon deemed central. It joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997 and quickly expanded its relations with NATO (legend has it that Finland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as an observer in 1992 by accident, the Finnish Ambassador accepting the invitation from a Norwegian colleague to attend the meeting in Oslo). Finland took part, first cautiously but soon more eagerly, in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), which was aimed at developing military interoperability with NATO. Finland also participated in the NATO-led crisis management operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The official image of NATO improved after the Cold War years, and the Alliance, as well as the presence of the United States, was seen as essential for European stability (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001). Although the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was still seen as a Finnish brainchild of sorts, it became clear that NATO was there to stay. At the same time, NATO's past role in the Cold War was now assessed positively in Northern Europe. In the post-Cold War Europe, NATO was mainly seen as an organisation for crisis management, 'the only international organization with the ability to handle militarily demanding crisis management tasks', and its role in broad-based comprehensive security cooperation was emphasised, although its core function of providing collective defence was not denied. The key test was the Kosovo War in 1999: Finland was hesitant to support NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia at first because it lacked a UN Security Council mandate. Eventually, Finland did so on the basis of the necessity of preventing a humanitarian crisis from ensuing, and President Martti Ahtisaari played a major role in the peace negotiations that ended the conflict (Forsberg 2000).

Finland developed its so-called option policy towards NATO membership at an early stage. Accordingly, Finland was not seeking full membership or Article 5 security guarantees, but reserved an 'option' to do so if circumstances changed. Yet the exact nature of the change that would trigger 'the option' was never spelt out clearly. The Government Report on Security Policy delivered to the Parliament in 1995 stated that 'Finland will not seek new defence solutions', but 'if the international environment changes essentially, Finland will reconsider its security choices in the light of this development'. Similar formulations were then used in the subsequent security and defence policy white books published in 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2012 and 2016 (Finnish Ministry of Defence nd). The exact formulation of this 'option' often constituted a major political tug-of-war between the parties. Indeed, the sentence was over-interpreted and often overshadowed other more important issues. In the 2004 Report, for example, the paragraph read as follows: 'Finland is continuously monitoring the changes occurring in NATO, the development of its capability and the organization's international significance. Applying for membership of the Alliance will remain a possibility in Finland's security and defence policy also in the future' (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2004, 82). In the foreign and security policy review of 2016, the stance was the same: 'While carefully monitoring the developments in its security environment, Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership' (Prime Minister's Office 2016, 24).

The president has a key role in directing foreign and security policy and thus also defining Finland's relationship with NATO. The first linkages were already established under Koivisto's tenure and they expanded under President Martti Ahtisaari (1994–2000). For example, Finland's ambassadorial level mission to NATO was established in 1997. Ahtisaari had a much more positive view of NATO than Koivisto. He did not, however, support Finland joining NATO when in office, although he has since advocated membership. Trying to join the EU and NATO at the same time was considered too risky in terms of popular support. His hands were tied by political resistance, including his own party, the Social Democrats, who held key positions in the government, as well as the prevailing public opinion, which remained rather sceptical towards NATO. Moreover, those among his advisors who were more willing to consider membership also wanted to postpone the decision for identity reasons, so that Finland would not join NATO along with the former Warsaw Pact countries. Hence, there was no decision about applying for NATO membership during Ahtisaari's term as president: the issue was not even properly tabled. As Steven Blank observed in 1996, 'one gets the impression the government would like the issue of Finland and NATO to go away from the headlines' (Blank 1996, 14–5).

President Tarja Halonen (2000–12) was less sanguine about developing Finland's relationship with NATO than her predecessor, and particularly objected to Finland joining the Alliance. In her inaugural speech, she stated very clearly that Finland should not aim for NATO membership, and in her memoirs she was even more explicit about her task of defending Finland's militarily non-aligned status against pressure from within the administration. Finland's perspective on NATO was often ambivalent at that time, and also shaped by generally critical views of the Bush administration and the Iraq war. NATO's 'big bang' enlargement, which included the Baltic states in 2004, was first seen as indifferent or even detrimental to the security situation in the Baltic Sea region, although Finland stressed the countries' sovereign right to join a defence alliance. The Government Report of 2001 hinted at this attitude: 'If NATO decides to take new members, enlargement should, in Finland's view, be carried out so that it strengthens security and stability for the whole of Europe' (Finnish Ministry of Defence 2001, 34). Yet, when enlargement to include the Baltic state was announced, Finland welcomed it and was relieved that it would no longer bear the responsibility, along with Sweden, for defending the Baltic states should the question arise.

At the same time, during Halonen's term in office, cooperation with NATO was not halted and Finland sought to preserve its status as a

first-class partner. As long as Finland remained as a partner with no article 5 commitments, participation in NATO-led military operations could be seen as a continuation of the peacekeeping tradition and new forms of cooperation were generally seen as acceptable. NATO cooperation was urged particularly by the Ministry of Defence, but the administrative elite did not highlight the expanding ties in political terms. Critics soon described such tactics as 'inching towards NATO'. Against such criticism, many key politicians reminded citizens of the dangers of 'anti-Americanism' and wanted to keep the 'option' as real as possible. Moreover, although Finland was a staunch supporter of European Union (EU) security and defence policy, it often sided with the Atlanticists on many institutional questions relating to European defence. Willingness to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) in a supplementary role was announced in 2008 and Finland has participated in its activities since 2012. Finland also deemed it important to participate in NATO's crisis management activities because this guaranteed an invitation to the Alliance's meetings. Halonen, however, wanted Finland to participate in UN peacekeeping operations as well, as a balancing act.

Halonen's term as president came to an end in 2012 when Sauli Niinistö (2012–) was elected president, but Finland's policy towards NATO did not change much. Two important decisions were made, however. First, Finland upgraded its status to that of an 'Enhanced Opportunity Partner' at the Wales NATO Summit in 2014. This status corresponded with the country's wish to develop its partnership in a tailored manner on a country-by-country basis rather than as a general policy towards a wider group of countries. Second, Finland also signed a Host Nation Support agreement with NATO that had been under preparation for several years. Moreover, in October 2016 Finland concluded a bilateral defence deal with the United States similar to Sweden's (Yle News 2016; Ministry of Defence of Finland 2016).

A Foreign Ministry review of Finland's defence cooperation published in 2015 contends that it has been important for Finland to be one of the more advanced partner countries in order to be able to maximise the benefits of the partnership. Finland wants to remain an advanced partner in the future as well and prefers to continue close cooperation with Sweden within the PfP framework. However, the report underlines that 'the goals of partnership will, naturally, be defined on a national basis and from Finland´s perspective'. The report considers that the focus of the PfP policy is shifting as NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan has been terminated. The crisis in Ukraine will, according to the report, also bring about changes to the context in which

partnership activities will be carried out, but 'Finland does not see any need to change its central premises or goals' (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2015, 58–64).

Developing Relations with NATO

As a partner country, a great deal of Finland's cooperation with NATO was related to crisis management. Finland was an active peacekeeper during the Cold War, participating in UN operations in Suez, Cyprus, the Golan and Lebanon to name the most prominent. Finland wanted to preserve this role in the post-Cold War era too, but in practice, its role was diminishing, relatively speaking. In any event, in the post-Cold War era, when peacekeeping activities were generally shifted from the UN to NATO as well as to the EU, Finland accepted that if NATO had received a UN Security Council mandate for a crisis management operation, Finland should try to contribute to such an operation. Finland has, indeed, participated in most of NATO's peacekeeping operations with contingents commensurate with the size of the country. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 150 personnel took part in the Implementation/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR); up to 700 men in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), where Finland also assumed the lead nation role of the Multinational Task Force South three times; 200 men in ISAF in Afghanistan, serving mainly in the north, as well as 80 soldiers in the post-ISAF assistance mission Resolute Support. However, Finland did not participate in NATO's Unified Protector operation in Libya in 2011, although it had a UN Security Council mandate. One explanation for this is that not all western NATO states participated; but another is that the decision was to be made just ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2011 and it was simply easier for government candidates to avoid the potentially difficult issue amid the campaigning (Doeser 2017).

Another principal area of cooperation, not unrelated to crisis management, was the development of interoperability between Finnish and NATO armed forces. Even many NATO sceptics regarded this as a technical rather than a political activity, since it was accepted that NATO's standard had become the overall international standard that was also applied in the EU battle group and Nordic exercises. In the PARP process the goal was mainly international crisis management, but since 2010, Finland has chosen its Partnership Goals more consciously from the perspective of national defence requirements. Although Finland regarded its defence system as being different from the NATO mainstream, based on territorial defence and conscription, it took NATO's goals of developing 'Smart

Defence' and the 'Connected Forces Initiative' (CFI) seriously. Moreover, Finland also developed military cooperation with NATO in order to improve its readiness to receive military aid. In this regard, the conclusion of the Host Country Support agreement was crucial.

Bilateral cooperation with NATO member states also increased tremendously after the end of the Cold War. With regard to the United States, the paramount decision was to buy 64 F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets in 1992 (Crossette 1992). This purchase led to intensive cooperation between the air forces that radiated outwards to the overall political and military relations between the countries. Procurement also played a visible role in relations with Germany, since right after German unification, Finland bought redundant East German Soviet tanks cheaply, and later in 2003 and 2014 bought hundreds of used Leopard tanks from Germany and the Netherlands.

Nordic cooperation has also played an increasingly important role in Finland's defence policy. Overall, Finland's partnership with NATO has developed in tandem with Sweden and their bilateral relationship is often seen nested in this larger framework of Western security cooperation (Pyykönen 2016). Although the primary partner among the Nordic states has been Sweden, with which Finland has concluded many bilateral arrangements, cooperation is also carried out with the Nordic NATO countries in the context of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) (Forsberg 2013). For example, Finland and Sweden have identified several areas for cooperation and launched joint projects with Norway, including exercises in the Northern Calotte area. The most famous of these activities is the biannual aviation Arctic Challenge Exercise in which many NATO countries also participate. Yet Finland did not participate in the Icelandic airspace patrol operation when it was proposed in 2012, partly for legal reasons, but also because the political opposition regarded engaging in an activity that might incur the risk of encountering Russian forces while patrolling a NATO country as too dangerous.

Finland's role as a NATO partner country is generally praised by NATO representatives. When NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Helsinki in 2012, he stated that 'Finland is a model partner for NATO. Because you fully understand the importance of cooperative security' (Rasmussen 2012). NATO and Finland 'share the same principles and values'. He also welcomed Finland becoming a full member, if the country chose to do so. Similarly, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg (2015) stated in 2015 that 'there is an excellent relationship between Finland and NATO and Finland is one of our most active and closest partners' (Stoltenberg 2015). From NATO's point of view, Finland's

contribution to NATO-led operations and the development of smart defence was seen as valuable. A particular aspect of Finland's crisis management profile has been the emphasis put on civilian crisis management. Finland has also highlighted the role of women in international peace and security and cooperation with NATO on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in this context. Most recently, more emphasis is put on information exchanges on 'hybrid warfare', coordinating exercises, and developing joint situational awareness. Finland takes part in the work of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre in Riga since 2015 and has set up together with NATO and EU partners a Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki in 2017. At the same time, one of the key points of President Niinistö's discussions with Stoltenberg in 2016 was the question of how to enhance dialogue with Russia and reduce tensions in the Baltic region: Niinistö deemed small issues such as air safety to be important (President of Finland 2016).

The Domestic Politics of NATO Membership

Finland's policy towards NATO can also be regarded as an outcome of domestic politics, reflecting not just one position based on 'national interests' but a compromise between several positions. Indeed, the national consensus over the current NATO policy is mainly instrumental, since both those who favour Finland's membership in NATO as well as those who oppose it, can subscribe to the 'option' in principle, but disagree over when the 'option' should be redeemed. Often several schools are detected without clear parameters. There are the stereotypical 'Atlanticists' and 'Friends of Russia' on opposite sides, and there are the 'Europeanists', who put EU defence before NATO and even 'Nordicists'. Then there are 'Globalists' who think that the biggest security problems are not of military nature, but to do with climate change and other environmental catastrophes as well as global inequality and think that NATO does not help to solve them. Yet the clearest divide is often between the liberal internationalists and conservative nationalists, although these groups are not coherent in their views on NATO (Haukkala and Vaahtoranta 2016).

Nevertheless, domestic power relations affect Finland's policy towards NATO. Three levels of domestic politics should be distinguished, relating to the question of NATO membership and policy towards NATO in general. First is the President, who has traditionally been the leader of foreign policy but whose constitutional powers have been curtailed, since European policy is part of the Prime Minister's domain. The second level is the

government and the key parties that form it and build a majority in the parliament. Third, there is public opinion. As Finland's NATO membership would require support at all these levels, the domestic politics of NATO in Finland has to be regarded in terms of the interplay between all three.

As already mentioned, President Ahtisaari has been in favour of NATO membership, but when in office he did not initiate any formal process. By contrast, his successor as President, Tarja Halonen, also a Social Democrat in terms of party background, saw herself as a guarantor of Finland's militarily non-allied status and an interlocutor with President Vladimir Putin. Although President Sauli Niinistö is a conservative, he has not been willing to push for NATO membership openly. On the contrary, he has argued that Finland has not joined NATO because it would damage the country's good relations with Russia, which he sees as a prerequisite for Finland's security. On occasion, he has been rather cryptic in his views regarding NATO and possible Finnish membership. 'Sitting on the fence' is one of his famous metaphors. In August 2013, he argued:

> Dissatisfaction with our current NATO policy — consisting of close cooperation with NATO and the potential of applying for membership at some point — often appears in two different ways. Viewing this as sitting on the fence, one way is to think we should be quick about jumping over the fence, while the other is to think we should not have climbed it in the first place — or at least there was no point to it. I happen to think that being on top of the fence is quite a good place to be. Our present position serves our interests well at this point in time, taken overall. We have freedom to take action, we have choices available, and we have room to observe and to operate. We are not pulled one way or the other. (Niinistö 2013)

Traditionally, the Finnish president has been charged with acting as a guarantor of good relations between Finland and Russia, and Niinistö has clearly taken on this role. Indeed, if the president wants to avoid the role of a ceremonial president, he is institutionally geared towards playing an active role in bilateral relations with Russia, since EU-related foreign policy matters belong to the domain of the prime minister. However, as mentioned earlier, Niinistö has also been keen on developing Finland's partnership with NATO: in October 2016, he paid a historic visit to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

With regard to the major parties, only the Conservatives (*Kokoomus*) have adopted a pro-NATO stance. The party leader, and from 2015 Minister of Finance, Petteri Orpo, as well as his predecessors, and former Prime Ministers Alexander Stubb and Jyrki Katainen have openly favoured NATO membership. Yet, even when Stubb and Katainen were prime min-

isters, they did not have a chance to actively foster this party position. In a multiparty system, the government is bound to consist of a coalition of at least two major parties, and as political security decisions are traditionally based on a broad consensus, in practice three of the present four (or two out of three) major parties would be needed to back any membership bid.

The biggest party at the time of writing, the Centre Party, has traditionally been loyal to the policy of military non-alignment and the 'old guard' of the party is doctrinally rather rigid in their attitudes towards NATO, while those in the party who would approve a closer relationship with NATO are in a clear minority. The Party Leader and Prime Minister from May 2015, Juha Sipilä, does not have a notable background in dealing with foreign and security policy questions, but he has asserted that he does not support Finland's NATO membership, although he is in favour of a factual debate on the issue. The government chose not to make any firm statements on its NATO policy, but did launch a review process.

The majority of Social Democrats are also against Finland's membership of NATO, with former President Halonen and long-time foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja (2000–07 and 2011–15) famously associated with a reserved attitude towards the issue, but again, there are also a few prominent supporters of NATO within the party ranks as well. The current party leader, Antti Rinne, represents the very traditional line: 'In my opinion, it is absolutely clear that at present, Finland should not apply for NATO membership. My position is that NATO membership would increase the risks to our foreign and security policy' (Yle News 2015; see also Sputnik News 2015). However, he believes that cooperation with NATO is still important.

Moreover, the populist Finns party (formerly known as the 'True Finns')—the second biggest party in the 2015 parliamentary elections, but split in the summer 2017—also favours military non-alignment, but their logic is based more on the idea of preserving Finland's traditional defence system and the country's will to defend itself, rather than on profoundly critical judgments about NATO. Thus, the former longtime party leader and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Timo Soini, has not ruled anything out: in one interview he said that he himself does not know his stance on NATO membership (Martikainen 2015). For the 'Finns', NATO appears a lesser 'evil' than the EU. It is worth noting that Soini has praised relations with the United States, supported the bilateral defence agreement with the United States, and regarded overall the US role in security questions as essential for Finland. The new party leader of the Finns, Jussi Halla-Aho has said that he has supported Finland's NATO membership since the 1990s but does not consider it realistic.

The smaller parties have different positions with regard to NATO's role and Finland's membership in it. The Swedish People's Party supports membership and several of its party leaders who have held the post of Minister of Defence in previous governments have been outspoken advocates of joining the Alliance. The Greens, as a party, are against membership, but in reality divided on the issue, whereas the Left Alliance is the fiercest opponent of Finland's closer links to NATO.

This overall political situation, whereby many parties with no preformed blocks form the government, leads to rather complex games when coalition agreements are negotiated. The six-party government formed in 2011 included a clause in the programme that precluded the government from preparing an application for NATO membership despite the fact that the 'option' of applying was preserved in principle. The three-party government formed in 2015 kept the 'option' as before, but dropped the notion that denied preparation, because it was deemed as superfluous.

Over the years, public opinion has been rather stable on the NATO issue: while around 60 per cent support cooperation with NATO, support for membership has varied between 20 and 30 per cent of the population on average, while the majority, 60–70 per cent, have been against (Advisory Board on Defence Information 2016; Forsberg and Pesu 2017). Support for Finland joining NATO reached its nadir during the Kosovo and Iraq wars, but grew slightly when the perception of the Russian threat increased after the Georgian war and the Ukrainian conflict. Yet the changes were not significant and the percentage of supporters was never bigger than that of the opponents. The mostly pro-NATO media content has had little effect on making Finns more favourably disposed towards NATO over time. Indeed, politicians and public opinion are against joining NATO for the most part, whereas the foreign policy elite, consisting of officials, journalists and researchers, as well as military officers, largely support NATO membership (Advirory Board for Defence Information 2016 [see Fig. 5.1]; Rahkonen 2007; Vento 2016).

Although there is no visible quantitative trend in support of NATO membership, there may have been a qualitative change more recently. Those in favour of NATO membership are more convinced than ever that they are right. For many of those who supported NATO membership in the past, the Russian threat was not the key issue, but rather Finland's willingness to belong to the relevant organisations that can better influence its security environment and allow it to participate in decision-making. Since the Ukraine crisis, NATO membership supporters have advocated their position more intensively and openly, pointing also to the



Fig. 5.1 Finnish public opinion on NATO membership

Russia threat, while those defending the policy of military non-alignment have needed to defend their views more effectively than before.

As long as the majority of the public at large are against NATO membership, politicians will tend to stick to the existing policy line. Nevertheless, the relationship between public opinion and party positions is a chicken-and-egg question. There is some evidence to the effect that if the government supported NATO membership, public opinion would change. Less than one-third of the population supports membership, but only roughly one-third opposes it consistently. The opinion of the remaining one-third is volatile and might change were the leadership to argue for membership, but there is no certainty on the issue. Leading politicians and parties have circumvented the public opinion issue by stating that a referendum would be organised on the membership question (O'Dwyer 2014).

NATO Membership as a Security Question

The key issue in debates over Finland's membership of NATO is naturally Russia. Russia and its possible aggressive military intentions towards Finland are often the key reasons for supporting membership of the

Alliance, although many supporters denied this logic, particularly before the Georgian war and the Ukrainian crisis. Nevertheless, the argument is the traditional one: Finland is too small to defend itself alone and membership would provide the best guarantees that the country can have, first as a deterrent to raise the threshold of military invasion, and second as an insurance policy to obtain military assistance if required. Alternatives such as the EU or Sweden are not seen as reliable.

Those who prefer Finland's military non-alignment often state that there is no 'security deficit' for which NATO membership would be needed, but they are not necessarily unanimous in harbouring a benign view of Russia as a state. In fact, many defence enthusiasts are concerned that with NATO membership Finland would be inclined to give up its territorial defence based on conscription, while the traditionally strong will to defend the country would diminish. Some have feared that Finnish forces would be required to defend the Baltic states rather than their own country, and that a commitment to defending the Baltic states would send out the wrong signal to the United States about the importance of its presence in the Baltic Sea region. Moreover, neutrality is preferred in terms of stability. Conventional wisdom has it that Finland should avoid provoking 'the Bear'. It is the legacy of Cold War thinking that Russia does not have offensive interests with regard to Finland, and that its military goals are defensive. According to this line of thought, a military conflict between Russia and Finland would only emerge if Finland were allied with enemies that have military designs on Russia, or if Russia perceived that to be the case. Ergo, Finland should not join NATO (see e.g. Blombergs 2016).

The idea that provoking Russia by joining NATO is dangerous and should be avoided comes up against a number of counter-arguments. One is that Russia already perceives Finland as a potential adversary and that NATO membership would sharpen this image only marginally. Russia's assertive and sometimes arrogant behaviour is seen as proof of its strategic interests in Finland, irrespective of NATO membership. Some express criticism that Finland already bears the political, military and economic costs of NATO membership, but fails to reap the benefits. 'We share the risks, but do not get the security guarantees', argued Jaakko Iloniemi, a former diplomat and *éminence grise* of Finnish diplomacy, at a June 2014 seminar hosted by Finland's president (Iloniemi 2015). Moreover, it is not clear what causes offence to Russia, because almost any form of military or political cooperation can be deemed provocative. Limiting defence policy

options based on what Russia deems acceptable could imply that Finland would not be able to deepen Nordic defence cooperation, participate in NATO exercises or have national military bases or manoeuvres in proximity to Russia's borders.

It is clear that Russia would prefer that Finland did not join NATO, but politicians and security experts disagree over what Russia's countermeasures would be. Those more inclined towards NATO membership generally believe that the measures would be restricted and temporary, and that it would be possible to continue good relations with Russia in the same manner as Norway or Germany after a frosty interlude. Those in favour of NATO membership think that Russia would, in fact, benefit from having more amicable nations in NATO. Yet the sheer uncertainty about Russia's reaction should Finland attempt to join the Alliance plays a role in the debate. Finns do not want to portray an image of betrayal that could be held against them (Saari and Pursiainen 2002). Conversely, Finland does not command as much visible goodwill from Russia as it used to. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry has criticised Finland for human rights violations in a disproportionate manner. President Vladimir Putin's personal envoy, Sergei Markov, said in an interview with Finland's Swedish-language newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* in June 2014 that 'Finland is one of the most Russophobic countries in Europe, together with Sweden and the Baltic states' (Lauren 2014). As if to underline the sentiment, Russia has also violated Finland's airspace and simulated a military attack on the country (Blair 2015). Indeed, it is considered that membership 'would constitute a significant political defeat for Moscow' and that 'Finno-Russian relations would take a beating and the political reaction would be harsh and probably also "personal"' (Bergquist et al. 2016). When visiting Finland in July 2016, Putin sarcastically noted that 'NATO would gladly fight Russia to the last Finnish soldier' and indicated that Russia would need to respond and shift troops if Finland joined NATO (RT.com 2016). It is not difficult to imagine other possible countermeasures by Russia. The Finnish dairy products sector is already suffering from the Russian sanctions against the EU and in the spring 2016 Russian authorities allowed a couple of thousand asylum seekers to enter the Finnish border, which was seen as an intentional change of a previous long-term practice. By various means, Russia would most certainly try to affect the result of any referendum on NATO. Accidentally or not, Russian military planes violated Finnish air space on the same day that the bilateral defence agreement with the United States was signed.

Influence as an Issue

A second dimension of Finland's debate on NATO has dealt with political influence. Once again, the argument runs both ways. Those who support NATO membership argue that Finland should have a seat at the table where important decisions are taken, whereas those who are against NATO membership believe that Finland would lose its sovereignty and be forced to succumb to NATO decisions and dispatch its soldiers to foreign wars.

Those in favour of Finland's membership of NATO argue that this would guarantee Finland's access to information and to the decision-making bodies that crucially affect its security. As Finland's former ambassador to the UN and Sweden and foreign policy heavyweight Max Jakobson noted in 1997, '(T)o remain outside of NATO is to be without a seat at the table where the decisions on European security will be made' (Barber 1997). Even if Finland is a valued partner, it does not receive the material that is circulated amongst NATO members, it does not have voting rights and it does not participate in defence planning. Prime Minister Katainen stated once that Finland is like a pitiful man in NATO's hallway, trying to find out what is discussed inside. Additionally, it is argued that Finland's membership of NATO would also dispel suspicions inside the EU that the Nordic country is not truly committed to shared goals. Finnish political leaders have complained that the representatives of non-NATO member states are not able to get EU top posts in foreign and security policy (Grüne 2009, 37).

The opposite view is that NATO membership would curtail Finland's sovereignty and would not bring any additional benefits in terms of influence in international affairs. Those who subscribe to this view claim that Finland would not be able to influence NATO's decisions to any great extent, but would have to accept them and adapt to them. Moreover, in global politics, Finland's ability to shape policies, for example in the UN, would be diminished because the country would be seen as just another appendage of the larger Western bloc. President Halonen, in particular, stressed that Finland can better offer good offices as a peace mediator if the country remains militarily non-aligned.

Identity Matters

Identity questions have played a prominent part in the NATO debate in Finland (Rahkonen 2006). Socially constructed elements of identity have largely supported military non-alignment in the country. For Finns,

neutrality has many positive connotations. The internalised Cold War teaching was that neutrality reflects the Finnish mentality and maximises freedom of choice (Rainio-Niemi 2003). Moreover, as in Sweden, there is a strong psychological commitment to the belief that being outside of military alliances is ethically grounded. Militarily non-aligned countries are believed to be able to serve as bridges or mediators in international conflicts. Diversity is regarded as a positive value on a global scale. Hence, military non-alignment is seen as being compatible with nationalism and sustaining the will to defend, as well as with pacifist and cosmopolitan thinking. Finland has not always identified strongly with Sweden, but Sweden's status as a militarily non-aligned country is important because it creates a natural and positive in-group (Forsberg 2016).

On the other hand, NATO membership is likewise defended for reasons of identity. In the simplest terms, NATO can be seen as the antithesis of Russia. If Russia is the constitutive 'other' vis-à-vis Finland, there is a logical proclivity for NATO membership. However, this is an argument that is seldom used by those who advocate Finland's membership of NATO, and is more typically the interpretation put forward by critical academics or membership opponents (Harle and Moisio 2000). By the same token, pro-NATO pundits do not argue that Finland should join NATO in order to become more Western, but rather to remain as such. It seems that for most people, EU membership already solved the question of Finland's Eastern or Western identity in favour of the latter. Rather, the argument is therefore that military non-alignment is seen as unnatural in the context of the EU, where mutual defence guarantees already exist and almost all countries are members of NATO. President Ahtisaari has defended Finland's joining NATO by stating that 'I don't want Finland to be the odd one out when most other states are already members' (YLE News 2008). At the same time, he stressed that NATO membership should not be viewed as a move against Russia. The adaptation to a Western identity should therefore be seen as a propelling factor for Finland's membership of NATO quite independently of whether Russia is seen as a negative other or not.

Some additional identity factors may also make it more difficult to support Finnish membership of NATO. Firstly, the central identity aspiration during the Cold War was to become a Nordic country rather than the fourth Baltic state (as designated in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty of 1939). In these circumstances, it has been difficult to abandon this achievement and join NATO along with the Baltic states and other Central and Eastern European countries that were once a part of the Soviet bloc.

For example, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stated in 1995, when the first-round enlargement debate on NATO emerged on the agenda, that the NATO membership question was not topical because 'Finland is not an eastern European country' (Keskinen 1995). The tendency to emphasise the different backgrounds and motivations of the Baltic States still plays a role in security policy, although they have joined the EU too. Although Ahtisaari, for example, argued in 2010 that if Finland were not a member of NATO, it would affect the country's image, asking 'are we going to be in the same group as Belarus and Ukraine?' (YLE News 2010), very few people actually think that Finland would fall into the same category with those countries (despite its non-membership of NATO and shared border with Russia). Secondly, identity also matters when NATO is equated with American hegemony in the world. There is an identifiable anti-American undercurrent in Finland that shapes public discourse and, occasionally, political decision-making. It is telling that Finnish public opinion regarding NATO membership has been weakened because of American policies, particularly the Iraq war, more than it has been strengthened by Russia's behaviour and growing military clout.

Rational and Psychological Factors

Can Finland's NATO policy, with its emphasis on partnership but rejection of membership combined with the stated 'option' to join the Alliance should circumstances change, be understood rationally? I have already argued that it can be seen as a domestic political compromise between two opposite positions without any strategic logic of its own. Yet, there are arguments that can be put forward in defence of the 'option policy' towards NATO.

First, it is possible to construct a strategic rationale for the policy of military non-alignment combined with a strong partnership with NATO, membership of the EU and deepening Nordic defence cooperation. This strategic equation is based on the idea that full membership of NATO, and particularly joining when Russia is keen on safeguarding its status, would provoke Russia more than it would enhance security. So the real question is not whether Finland aspires to be a member of NATO or not, but how to join the Alliance without provoking Russia.

Moreover, preserving the NATO option—political trust and interoperability granting the possibility to plug in militarily—is also seen as a better deterrent than NATO membership as such. According to this logic, Russia

would not exert any significant military pressure on Finland because this would push the country to join NATO, which would, in essence, be perceived as a defeat. As President Niinistö argued, the option is a security policy instrument and Russia knows that it is an instrument (Laurén 2016). The historical lesson is that the Soviet Union did not want to upset the military balance in Northern Europe because it feared that Denmark and Norway would abandon their restrictions in their NATO policy and that Sweden might move closer to the Alliance. However, if the readiness to apply for NATO membership acts as a deterrent for Russia, it is unclear what kind of Russian actions would indicate that the deterrent has failed, and trigger the process for joining NATO. Niinistö himself said that 'if the situation evolves into something that is very serious, we have to rethink' (Schauman 2016). Apparently, neither Russia invading a neighbouring country and annexing a chunk of its territory, nor frequent violations of the Finnish airspace constitute such actions. This is because Russia's behaviour in the area of the former Soviet Union (besides the Baltic states) is not seen as posing a direct threat to Finland and, further, the airspace violations practically stopped when they were made public.

Moreover, the policy of stating that Finland has an option to join NATO despite being unwilling to apply for membership can also be defended on the grounds that it symbolises the sovereignty of the small states in line with OSCE principles. Having the option to apply for and eventually join NATO is important, regardless of whether Finland would ever opt for full membership. This explains why many are willing to support the right to join NATO, in some hypothetical circumstances, although they do not spell out what those circumstances might be.

From the critic's perspective, the strategic logic of the present policy with regard to the NATO option is not well thought out. A crucial dilemma, namely, exists with regard to the right timing in the light of 'changed circumstances'. In times of crisis, when there is a need to join a military alliance, it is questionable whether the Alliance would accept new members; whereas, in times of peace, when it is possible to change policy, there is no perceived need. Moreover, over time, maintaining credibility for the option incurs more costs in terms of preserving a positive image of Finland in the eyes of the key NATO countries, and it would still entail the risk that some of the smaller ones could block or delay membership in the event that Finland would seek it.

Both rational reasoning and psychological belief systems may also explain why the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's growing military assertiveness have

only resulted in a slight increase in support for NATO membership. The rational explanation is that such Russian behaviour has already been factored into the analysis. The psychological explanation is that facts do not matter as such, since the question has more to do with identity, and facts are interpreted to suit existing beliefs. Indeed, only a few public figures have changed their opinion on NATO membership because of the Ukrainian crisis but, interestingly enough, some of the most prominent converts are former communists or belong to the Green Party, and are willing to admit that their view of Russia has changed and affected their NATO stance.

The Factors for Change

What is the likelihood that Finland's policy towards NATO will change and, in particular, that the country will seek to join the Alliance? Finland has preserved the 'option' of applying for membership, but there have been no major changes regarding the membership question during the post-Cold War era. Although various stumbling blocks to membership, such as the need to support Russia's process of democratisation, have lost their meaning, the decision to apply has not been taken. Indeed, it does not seem very likely that Finland would suddenly send a membership application to Brussels, but a change is not out of the question. In particular, we should consider three factors: Russia, the United States and Sweden.

Perhaps surprisingly, Russia's military action towards Georgia and Ukraine has not altered Finland's policy towards NATO very much, although military exercises with the United States in the region have been conducted more than before. Public opinion towards Russia has been rather stable, with roughly one-third of citizens harbouring a negative opinion, one-third neutral and one-third positive (Forsberg 2006). As argued earlier, although the threat perception of Russia has increased due to the Ukrainian crisis, it has not changed the basic calculus much. The logic is that the degree of provocation towards Russia caused by joining NATO in times of crisis is thought to grow concurrently with the increased level of deterrence and protection that would be achieved through membership. Yet, there are some notable statements indicating that Russia's behaviour can influence, and has influenced, opinions. Former Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, not an advocate of NATO membership in the past (indeed, rather to the contrary), wrote in his book that if the stability in the Baltic Sea area were shaken by Russia's behaviour, Finland would not turn towards Russia but towards NATO (Vanhanen 2016). He also expressed the hope that Russia would be cognisant of this fact.

The second factor is NATO itself and the United States, which is so closely associated with the Alliance as its leading member. Indeed, in the early stages, it was argued that Finland would join NATO when the Alliance becomes a pan-European security organisation. NATO has transformed itself and enlarged, but obviously the Finns would not consider it truly pan-European unless Russia joined. The image of the United States also plays a role, but it is more of a negative factor than a positive one. US President George W. Bush was very unpopular, but even if the perception of Barack Obama was decidedly more positive, this did not serve to increase the support for NATO membership. Clearly, Donald Trump's election to President has mostly been seen as an argument against NATO membership, although President Niinistö immediately assured that Finland's possible membership in NATO does not depend on one person (Finland Today 2016). When Niinistö visited the White House in August 2017, President Trump assured that the United States is 'very protective' of the Baltic Sea region.

Sweden is, however, an outside factor that can determine whether Finland will apply for membership. Sweden's bid for EU membership was the essential catalyst for Finland's own EU application in 1992. Nevertheless, Finland joined the euro without Sweden, which indicates that Finland might apply for NATO membership independently of Sweden as advocated, for example, by former President Ahtisaari. If, however, Sweden decided to apply for membership, it would be hard for Finland not to follow suit. Finnish and Swedish leaders have constantly stressed that they would prefer to synchronise their policies with regard to their relationship with NATO and try to avoid sudden moves that would take the other by surprise. The group that assessed the effects of Finland's NATO membership concluded that 'possible NATO membership would be considerably more benign for Finland if such a decision were made in a coordinated manner by Finland and Sweden, than if Finland joined alone. Similarly, a Swedish decision to join NATO and a Finnish decision not to join would leave Finland isolated and exposed'. However, the choice would still be precarious (Bergquist et al. 2016, 57). When President Niinistö was asked what he would do, should Sweden announce its readiness to apply for membership, he replied that he did not want to speculate: 'I am not answering the question of what I would do if the sky were falling either', unintentionally implying that a Swedish bid for NATO membership might be catastrophic for Finland (MTV Uutiset 2015). Yet, it has to be noted, Sweden's membership in NATO would pose foremostly an identity challenge for Finland, rather than changing the strategic calculus.

Conclusion

From neutrality during the Cold War, Finland has progressed into military non-alignment and a close relationship with NATO in the post-Cold War era. I have argued in this chapter that Finland's relationship with NATO can be seen as a rational strategic choice, but it cannot be fully understood without paying attention to domestic politics, psychological factors and identity politics. The arguments are so interwoven with strategic and identity elements that it is not always possible to say which one comes first.

There has been a NATO membership debate in Finland since the mid-1990s, but no essential changes have happened in the overall support for membership, which has remained in a clear minority. As of 2017, the current president is not actively against NATO membership, but nor is he actively for it either. Only one of the major parties supports NATO membership, and at least two of the bigger parties would need to actively support it and a third refrain from strongly opposing it in order for NATO membership to be pursued by the government. Only one-third or less of the population support Finland's membership.

The Ukrainian crisis has led to an intensified debate and Finland's partnership with NATO has been upgraded, but concrete steps towards Finnish NATO membership have not been taken. The security environment in Europe has changed, but the psychology remains more entrenched. The Finnish view is still one of not wishing to fix something that is not seen as broken yet. Russia's bullying tactic of threatening with consequences if countries join NATO may weaken its international image, but nevertheless influences the decision-making process by increasing the risks. Moreover, the perceived uncertainties with regard to the US commitment to NATO and Europe in general after Donald Trump's election to President have possibly already reduced the value of the Article 5 guarantees in the eyes of many Finns, although the real impact remains to be seen as of this writing.

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CHAPTER 6

Austria: Engaged Neutrality

Heinz Gärtner

This chapter examines Austria's policy of neutrality and Austria's involvement with the European Union (EU) as a security actor and with NATO. The chapter argues that Austrian security policy should be understood as one of engaged neutrality: a strong commitment to stay outside military alliances alongside an equally strong commitment to an engaged—as opposed to passive or insular—security policy. Key elements of Austria's engaged neutrality are support for a norm and law-based international system, support for international institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN), and for causes such as nuclear disarmament and Third World economic development. The chapter shows how neutrality was the only foreign and security policy option available to Austria in the context of the early Cold War in the 1950s, but how Austrian leaders sought, over time, to make use of the political space available to the country to pursue a policy of engaged neutrality which went beyond the narrow confines of non-membership of military alliances. In this context, membership of the EU and the EU's common foreign, security and defence policies have proved compatible with Austria's engaged neutrality. Indeed, the EU's focus on a comprehensive concept of security (based on broad political efforts to prevent conflicts and the recognition of non-military dimensions

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of security) and on crisis management and peace operations (as opposed to more traditional collective defence) reflect central priorities of Austrian foreign and security policy. Austria has also been an active contributor to EU security policy activities, in particular the EU's crisis management and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. To the extent that NATO too has adopted a comprehensive concept of security and taken on tasks of crisis management and peacekeeping, Austria has also sought to work with NATO through the Alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and contributing to NATO peacekeeping operations (again, in particular in the Balkans). If NATO refocuses on its role as a collective defence alliance and emphasises policies of re-armament and nuclear deterrence, however, Austria's partnership with NATO is likely to decline.

Historical Background

After the Second World War, Austria was, like Germany, divided into the occupation zones of the four victorious powers. In the eastern part that was occupied by Soviet troops, political and social structures began to develop differently. The Soviet Union claimed that it would prefer to keep Austria's national unity. The Communist Party only got 5 per cent in the elections in 1945 and was largely ignored by the Soviet Union. Still there was the danger that Austria would remain divided as an eastern part and a western part. The only option that would give Austria its sovereignty appeared to be neutrality. In the early-to-mid-1950s, nobody believed that Austria could obtain sovereignty and neutrality. Even the Soviet Union linked Austria's neutrality to the German question. Only after Stalin's death and Khrushchev's rise was the Austrian chancellor Julius Raab able to seize the window of opportunity for successful negotiations. In October 1955, the Austrian National Assembly adopted a Law of Neutrality, under which the country committed itself to permanent neutrality and, as a constitutional act of parliament, is part of the Austrian constitution. The declaration was Austria's guarantee to the great powers that the country would not join any eastern or western military alliance. Ever since, neutrality has been at the centre of Austria's foreign and security policy. In Austria's early formative years, neutrality was synonymous with independence. Neutrality helped Austria to develop a strong identity for the first time since the First World War, which is why Austrians continue to support neutrality by more than a two thirds majority.

As the Cold War was characterised by the development of blocs in Europe and military alliances, Austria's neutrality represented an anomaly. Austria managed to stay out of the spheres of influence created by the two military superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949, rejected the concept of neutrality out of hand. In his memoirs, he wrote:

> The immediate goal of Soviet policy was neutralizing and preventing the integration of Europe. The ultimate goal was the incorporation of Germany and eventually all of Europe into the communist sphere. (Adenauer 1966, 37, author's translation)

Adenauer feared that Germany was going to be removed from the Western bloc and that neutrality would weaken the order, thus generally rejecting the concept of neutrality. On several occasions, he pointed to the danger of a 'neutral belt in Europe' (Adenauer 1967, 284–92). 'Such a belt would signify, in my opinion, the end of Germany and Europe' (Adenauer 1966, 442, author's translation). Behind this categorical rejection of 'neutralisation', Adenauer desired to integrate West Germany firmly into the transatlantic relationship. Adenauer's constructed link between 'neutralisation' and a communist seizure of power throughout Europe served this purpose. However, the link between 'neutralisation' and a communist seizure of power was not necessarily causal or automatic. One could reasonably assume that neutrality would have been possible without a communist takeover. Austria and Finland serve here as the classic examples.

In Central Europe, such a solution was only possible for Austria after 1955. Yet, Adenauer viewed it with suspicion, fearing conspiratorial Soviet tactics:

> The pivotal point of the issue regarding Austria was a clever calculated step by Moscow. Without doubt, it was possible that Soviet Russia had the intention among other things to promote similar thoughts and ideas as Austria's neutrality here in Germany that already haunt and are spread in order to strengthen other parts of Europe and the world. The behaviour of the Soviet Union was based on a very clever tactic. (Adenauer 1966, 441–2, author's translation)

While Adenauer saw the concept of 'armed neutrality' in Austria as a put-to-sleep-tactic by the Kremlin, at the time it was supported by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower. At a press conference in May 1955 Eisenhower said:

> It seems that the idea has developed that one could build a number of neutralized states from North to South through Europe. Now, remember: The Treaty regarding the neutralization of Austria does not mean that Austria would be disarmed. It is not a void, not a military void, it is along the lines of Switzerland. ... This kind of neutrality is very different from a military vacuum. (Quoted in Adenauer 1966, 442)

Austria could also be integrated into the west without having to join NATO. This case also proves that the presumption of neutrality as a conspiracy leading to a communist takeover of Europe was wrong. However, it should be noted that Austria's neutrality would certainly not have been possible before Stalin's death in 1953.

The core of Austria's neutrality depends on its military nature. Military neutrality is enshrined in the Law on Neutrality: Austria may neither join any military alliances, nor can there be foreign troops stationed on its territory. The legal principle that neutral states are not allowed to participate in a war, in the sense of international law, was not included directly in the Law on Neutrality, but this is the prevailing understanding of neutrality.

Austria's neutrality law of 1955 requires from Austria 'for the purpose of the lasting maintenance of her independence externally, and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory' to 'maintain and defend this with all means at her disposal' (Austrian Federal Assembly 1955, Article I (1)). This includes the establishment of independent armed forces. The Austrian military structure had been part of the German Wehrmacht and was largely dissolved. The formula 'with all means at her disposal' was very flexible and far-sighted. Austria would be able to adapt its forces according to its constitutional requirements and technological development.

The experience of the 1956 Hungarian crisis had a crucial impact on how Austria formulated and imagined its threat scenario. It took almost ten years, however, for the Council of Ministers to implement a defence concept. In May 1965, three main possibilities were identified: a) a crisis scenario under conditions of international tensions; b) the neutrality case, which may become relevant in case of war in the vicinity; c) the defence case, which comes into effect when Austria is attacked (see the Ministerial

Decree of 11 May 1965 on the objectives of the extensive national defence and tasks for each field; see also Bayer 1995, 1).

The 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia also influenced the work on a defence doctrine (Wiener Zeitung 1985). After the defence doctrine was approved in 1975 and the national defence plan was developed, the defence budget experienced an annual real growth of more than 3.5 per cent over 12 years.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the concept of pre-emptive defence was contrasted with one of the total spatial defence, known as 'Spannocchi Doctrine'. Spatial defence meant the defence of key zones in crucial terrain, thus a defence between 'front' and 'rear'. The strategic objective remained the same: disincentive. If Austria were to be attacked from the outside, the country should be defended not only at its territorial borders but also completely from 'deep within', much like a hedgehog, in order to increase the risks/costs for any invader. These arguments obtained general acceptance and matched government policy. Nowadays however, there are doubts whether this concept could have ever been implemented in practice.

It was not until 1983 that the Council of Ministers approved the National Defence Plan, which was proposed by the National Defence Council and incorporated the categories of the 1965 decisions by the Council of Ministers (Bundeskanzleramt 1985; for the related concept of 'extensive national defence' see Docsek 2001). It claimed to be a basic conception for Austria's security regarding 'every' threat. The security policy was defined as

> [t]he sum of all measures, mainly in the areas of foreign policy, of policy for the maintenance of internal stability, as well as defense policy, for the protection of the population and the basic values of this State concerning all threats as well as the maintenance and defense of its permanent neutrality. (Bundeskanzleramt 1985, 19)

Neutrality was increasingly supplemented with an active foreign policy. Contrary to the Swiss model of 'sitting still', Austria joined the United Nations the same year it declared its neutrality (1955), the Council of Europe in 1956, and the European Free Trade Association in 1960. Austria presented itself as a meeting point, by hosting in Vienna, for example, meetings between the Presidents of the United States and of the

Soviet Union, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 and Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in 1973.

The Social Democratic government under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1970–83) developed a policy of 'active neutrality', understood as active third-party diplomacy, multilateralism on a global scale (particularly within the United Nations), support for the process of détente between east and west and engagement in the conflict between north and south, which culminated in the proposal of a Marshall Plan for the Third World. Chancellor Kreisky was the first western head of government to stand up for the rights of Palestinians. Together with the German and Swedish Social Democrats, Willy Brandt and Olaf Palme, Kreisky discovered an international basis within the Socialist International. In the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, together with other neutral and non-aligned States, formed the 'N+N group', a loose association of neutral and non-aligned European states, which were not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. From 1975 until the end of the Cold War, these states offered mediation and good offices and fought against the stagnation of the détente policy.

Last, but not least, thanks to the policy of neutrality, Vienna was chosen as the third UN-capital and seat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN specialised agencies (for example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)), and the secretariats of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE). Furthermore, the PrepCom (Preparatory Commission) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the secretariat of the Wassenaar agreement (which addresses the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use goods), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) also settled in Vienna. Vienna also became the central place for the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme in 2014–15. In 2015, an Austrian diplomat was appointed as special representative of the OSCE in the Ukraine. Austria is also one of the leaders of the initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW). One hundred and thirteen states have already adopted the Humanitarian Pledge, launched by Austria after the third HINW conference in December 2014. By contrast, not a single NATO member or nuclear weapon state (NWS) is among the signatories (Kmentt 2014a; Kmentt 2014b; Sauer 2015). In 1995 Austria became a member of the European Union,

emphasising, however, that the country's neutrality would not be undermined by EU membership. This was not absolutely necessary because EU structures (the principle of consensus in relation to foreign policy decisions and freedom for member states to exempt themselves from collective defence measures) do not compromise the concept of neutrality. Russia did not welcome Austria's membership but stated that it was Austria's sovereign decision.

International Solidarity

Austria's neutrality has proven time and again that it can adapt to new situations. What are the big new challenges after the end of the Cold War? There is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); terrorism, which potentially reaches new dangerous dimensions in its combination with proliferation; and fragile and dysfunctional states, which can be breeding grounds for terrorism, a source of uncontrolled immigration, and a source for the development and spread of organised crime. These states also contribute to the loss of important economic areas. As a neutral state, Austria is well suited (in many ways better than other states) to make an important contribution to addressing these new dangers. Moreover, neutral states sometimes have greater legitimacy than members of alliances in the eyes of other states. Assistance for reconstruction and humanitarian aid efforts in war-torn countries may take place within the framework of the UN, the EU, the OSCE or NATO partnerships. Austria's option of participating in the foreign policy and crisis management activities of the EU was explicitly confirmed through a constitutional amendment (23j), which, however, stresses the main responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for peace and security (Austrian Constitution 2013, Art. 23j).

In 2015, Austria contributed 1050 military personnel, 25 police and 25 civilian personnel to international crisis and conflict management operations. In terms of military personnel, Austria's contribution lies in the top one-third of EU members, although in terms of police and civilian personnel, Austria's participation is below the EU average. The balance of personnel deployed between UN, EU and NATO missions varies. Regionally, Austria's military and civilian engagement concentrates on the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, the Middle East, and North and Central Africa. The priorities of Austrian activities are: support for peace, stability, human security and development; the promotion of the rule of law, democracy and human rights; security sector reform; mediation; and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons and munitions.

As of the 2010s, the focus of Austria's civilian contributions is on the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the OSCE in the Ukraine, on the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM) and the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS).

Austria has also been part of robust peace support operations, in particular, those within the NATO PfP. Since the Balkan wars in the 1990s, Austria has become with 550 troops, the third largest contributor to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), after Germany and the United States, and the largest non-NATO contributor. With 400 troops, Austria is the largest contributor to the EU stabilisation mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Operation Althea). Until October 2015 Austria held the position of the deputy commander of KFOR and the commander of the multinational logistics command. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria occupies the post of the Force-Commander of EUFOR-Althea. Austria provides mainly logistical support, communication units and liaison officers.

The Austrian security strategy of 2013 links comprehensive with cooperative security and solidarity with neutrality:

> Comprehensive security policy means that external and internal aspects of security are inextricably interlinked, as are civil and military aspects. It extends beyond the purview of the ministries and departments traditionally in charge of security and encompasses instruments from policy areas, like economy and social affairs, integration, development, environment, agriculture, finance, transport and infrastructure, education, information and communication, as well as health. Integrated security policy must be based on a cooperative approach between governmental and non-governmental actors; security must be understood as a 'comprehensive package', as it were. Proactive security policy means working towards preventing threats from emerging in the first place or at least taking steps to mitigate their negative impact (shaping security). Security policy based on solidarity takes into account that the security of neutral Austria is now largely interconnected with the security of the EU as a whole. (Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich 2013, 4)

Depending on the particular situation, the Austrian security forces are committed to deploying at least 1100 soldiers on a permanent basis to international operations. Of the 18 missions which Austria participated in 2016, 6 were purely military. Austria provides 5 per cent of the troops for EU missions and 2 per cent of the budget for EU missions. Civil–military

cooperation is of particular importance in these missions. Some missions require the services of specialised forces, such as battlegroups or rapid reaction forces. Within the spectrum of missions, Austria has developed important niche capabilities, such as: evacuation; support in relations to natural disasters and humanitarian crises (for example, the construction of field hospitals); peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts (for example, engineers); Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) defence; search and rescue operations; as well as prevention, stabilisation and combat missions. As a small neutral state, Austria is able to perform central tasks, particularly in the civil–military field, as it is much more accepted by International Organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civilian forces than allied countries. Moreover, Austria's neutral status facilitates domestic cooperation between the military and NGOs.

Austria can provide specialist forces in some areas. The Austrian Federal Forces Disaster Relief Unit (AFDRU) is a good example—despite its proportionally small size and underfunded status—as its strengths include protection and rapid response in cases of emergencies on national and international levels. This allows Austria to take on a leadership role in this area and fill a gap within Europe.

The Austrian security strategy stresses Austria's role as a mediator in international conflicts: 'Austria playing an active role as a mediator in international conflicts and seizing suitable opportunities for mediation resulting from Austria's status as both an EU Member State and a neutral country' (Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich 2013, 19).

The Concepts of Collective Defence and Neutrality: Unequal Partners

The most important feature of any alliance is a mutual defence obligation amongst its members. Neutrality and alliances are negatively related. When the importance of collective defence obligations—that come into force in case of an attack on a member state's territory—increases, neutrality becomes less relevant. On the other hand, when alliance obligations are no longer necessary, the status of neutrality is not really required any more. Thus, neutrality means non-membership in an alliance based on constitutional and international law.

NATO and Austria's neutrality have the same historical origin: the Cold War. They have the opposite meaning, however. Both gave a different answer to the threat situation at that time: NATO was the creation of

an alliance; neutrality meant staying out of the bloc confrontation. NATO was the rule of the Cold War, neutrality being its exception. The only irreconcilable alternative to military alliances is neutrality.

NATO's capacity for change allowed Austria to cooperate more closely with some NATO structures. NATO has been re-developing its basic structure: preparation for a collective defence was no longer the only or even primary item on its agenda and its focus included crisis management and expeditionary missions as a second core task. NATO turned towards new tasks, which have little to do with the collective defence of the Alliance's members. In particular, this included international crisis management, even in those regions outside the defined alliance borders ('out of area'), as in the former Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan ('out of continent'), and the involvement of non-members within the framework of the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In 1995, Austria joined the PfP. Austria also participated in NATO-led operations. Austria's engagement with PfP has focused on: general transatlantic dialogue on security policy; the interoperability of Austrian armed forces with those of other European states; defence against cyberattacks; and participation in crisis management operations that are also in Austria's interest. Austria continues to make contributions within PfP in order to ensure military interoperability, participation in operations, and the utilisation of available cooperation opportunities, in accordance with Austria's interests and requirements.

In addition to the existing core tasks of 'collective defence' and 'crisis management', NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 introduced the new task of 'cooperative security', which provides another area for Austria to participate in NATO activities. This core task involves coordinating the network of partner relationships with non-NATO countries and other international organisations around the globe. Cooperative Security, as defined by NATO, also involves contributing to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Here, Austria's armed forces are active in almost all areas, including the nuclear non-proliferation regime, nuclear and conventional arms export controls, small and light weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), land-mines and cluster munitions.

In general, for Austria, the concept of cooperative security provides a framework for political dialogue and regional cooperation, increased military interoperability and preparation for operations. Cooperative security also offers for Austria not only a network of European partners, but a wide range of partners on a global scale.

Indeed, in some situations or operations, Austria may play an even more important role than some NATO members, for example in the field of peace operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (providing food, water and medicine), protection of civilians (POCs), reconstruction and crisis management. Austria as a non-NATO state is able to participate in these types of missions and cooperate with NATO while retaining its current defence profile. Austria is definitively more committed to crisis management than to territorial defence. It is more oriented towards the south than towards the east.

Naturally, the fundamental priority of a neutral state during security operations and deployments abroad does not consist of alliance obligations. However, modern neutrality does not exclude cooperation with alliance members or alliances, as long as neutral states and allied ones can agree on the key issues. Austria shares the basic threat analyses and goals with NATO within the framework of the Alliance's partnerships, which are not necessarily limited to the PfP institutional framework. In this partnership context, peace operations are fully compatible with neutrality. Within the concept of 'framework nations', interoperability can be tailored to particular circumstances. Austria views cooperation as a functional tool. Nevertheless, Austria views a United Nations mandate as a prerequisite for its participation in any armed peacekeeping operation.

In the wake of the Ukraine crisis 2014–15 those forces within NATO supporting territorial and collective defence once more prevailed. The Ukrainian crisis 2014–15 had a strong impact on the debate within NATO. It bolstered the view that NATO should return to traditional territorial and collective defence rather than focusing on crisis management or cooperative security. For Austria, the issue is a question of priorities. The Ukraine crisis refocused NATO's priorities on the east of Europe. The Austrian perspective, however, is that the threats and challenges to the south have not disappeared. Human security, dysfunctional states, regional conflicts, refugee flows, natural disasters, terrorism and nuclear proliferation will remain with us in the near future. The emergence of Islamic State is a warning sign. The unravelling of the Westphalian system in many states of the Middle East and the Mediterranean will produce dysfunctional states and increasingly radical non-state actors. It would be unfortunate and dangerous if crisis management, conflict prevention, early warning and post-conflict settlement were abandoned, ignored or neglected by NATO. This would narrow the room of manoeuvre for neutral states such as Austria. In Ukraine, if there is a cease-fire agreement and a mandate from the UN Security Council, Austria has committed to sending peace-

keeping troops. In 2015, the Austrian Ambassador Martin Sajdik was appointed as the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group on the implementation of the peace plan in the east of Ukraine.

At the Wales summit in September 2014, the NATO allies agreed to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) which would be integrated into the Alliance's existing NATO Response Force (NRF) in order to enhance the capabilities of the NRF to respond to emerging security challenges posed by Russia. Although the NRF was initially supposed to respond to risks emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, it is now mainly based on collective defence. Austria cannot be part of collective defence operations, therefore, the possibilities for Austrian participation are becoming increasingly limited. An exclusive focus by NATO on the east and on collective defence would reduce the Alliance's cooperative security role, as well as the role of partners. Also, any effort to define crisis management and missions (such as the NRF and the VJTF) in the south as collective defence would leave little room for partners to contribute. Rather, the Alliance should reinforce its common and cooperative security capabilities, which include interoperability, the Connected Forces Initiative, the NRF, civil–military cooperation, counter-insurgency and host-nation-support.

Austria's non-membership in an alliance is anchored in the 1955 neutrality declaration. The most important feature of alliances is mutual assistance obligation, which is incompatible with neutrality. As long as NATO sees itself as a 'military alliance' and Austria as 'neutral', membership in NATO remains impossible. Within the framework of partnerships, crisis management and cooperative security, however, Austria can provide contributions as a neutral state that are similar to those of the members of a transformed non-traditional NATO.

The Austrian security strategy takes a non-traditional stance towards the new challenges:

> Conventional attacks against Austria have become unlikely for the foreseeable future. Instead, both Austria and the EU are all more affected by new challenges, risks and threats. These include first and foremost: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (also amongst non-state actors); domestic and regional conflicts or turmoil that affect Europe or have global repercussions; 'state failure'; natural or manmade disasters; attacks against the security of IT systems ('cyber-attacks'); threats

> to the strategic infrastructure; transnational organised crime; drug trafficking, crime, corruption, illegal migration; unsuccessful integration; the scarcity of resources (energy, food, water), climate change, environmental damage and pandemics; piracy; and threats to the transport routes, and the repercussions of the international financial and economic crisis on security. In the light of continuously increasing political, economic and social linkages, it has to be expected that the challenges facing Austria's security will become progressively more international in scope. (Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich 2013, 7)

The European Union and Neutrality

Austria can neither negate its responsibility to take part in the resolution of regional and global problems, nor should it be solely guided by interests, whether they are its own or European interests. Of course, many new challenges, such as climate change, demographics, organised crime, proliferation and terrorism, have a direct impact on Austria and Europe.

Within the framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon established a solidarity clause (Article 222), which stipulates support in case of manmade disasters (for example, terrorist attacks) and natural disasters, following a request by the concerned state. However, this clause is not part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and is thus separate and distinct from the mutual assistance obligations contained in Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty.

According to Article 42.7, member states must provide each other with 'aid and assistance by all means in their power' in case of armed aggression towards a member state. This includes the promise to use military force. However, the Treaty of Lisbon also includes the so-called Irish guarantees, which supplements this article by stating that it 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states'. The neutral and non-aligned members of the EU, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland, and their special status, are thus recognised under the Lisbon Treaty.

The Austrian Security Strategy stresses the difference between Article 42.7 and the principle of solidarity of Article 222:

> Security policy based on solidarity takes into account that the security of neutral Austria is now largely interconnected with the security of the EU as a whole. … (A) mutual assistance obligation in the event of an armed aggression was introduced, which shall not prejudice the specific character of the

> security and defence policy of certain Member States as well as a solidarity clause stipulating the obligation to provide aid in the spirit of solidarity in the case of a terrorist attack or disaster. (Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich 2013, 6)

In theoretical terms, Austria supports the idea of collective security that stands behind the solidarity clause. The concept of collective security aims to enhance security internally amongst a group of states. In contrast, the concept of collective defence, which is enshrined in Article 42.7 and is aimed at an outside enemy, would contradict Austria's neutrality.

It has to be underlined, however, that Article 42.7 makes not only exception for neutral and non-aligned states, but also for NATO members: '(C)ommitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which … remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation'. The Treaty therefore allows opting out for both the neutral and the NATO allies of the EU. For these states, it indicates exceptions that result from their commitments to the NATO treaty. Thus, exception clauses regarding this part of the treaty are valid for all EU member states. Contributions from member states are still voluntary and only provided upon the state's request. After the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 France, for example, called upon the member states to invoke this defence clause to obtain support for its international missions. The French president called for article 42.7 instead of the 'solidarity clause' (Article 222) of the EU Treaty that was especially designed for cases of terror attack. Austria invoked its constitutional requirements of the 'specific character of the security and defense policy'. It decided, however, to increase its support of the UN operation in Mali (MINUSMA) and the training mission of the EU in Mali in order to ease the French burden in that country.

Austria is aware that the general rules of the Lisbon Treaty emphasise that national security 'remains the sole responsibility of each member state' (Article 4). This does not mean that Austria does not meet its obligations in relation to the CSDP; rather it emphasises EU member states' independence in making their own decisions. It implies that such obligations do not conflict with the neutrality of some member states. This statement is valid from an international legal perspective. From the constitutional viewpoint of Austria, the neutrality law states that Austria 'will never in the future accede to any military alliances' (Article 1.2.).

For Austria it is important that the Lisbon Treaty provides the basis for crisis management. According to Article 42.1:

> The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

For Austria a clear authorisation of these missions by the United Nations is not only a precondition because of international law (Article 103 of the UN Charter) but also overrides obligations under any other treaty. A UN Security Council mandate also enhances the domestic acceptability of such operations. Opponents of the requirement of UN Security Council authorisation for Austria's participation in EU missions argue that it is impossible to wait for such a mandate during certain urgent missions—such as evacuations. The argument, however, is spurious. The protection of civilian and mission personnel is always part of any mandate in conflict areas (for example, in Mali, the Central Africa Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur and Chad). Furthermore, evacuation measures do not imply support for a warring party which is forbidden for neutral states.

In the Austrian debate, the understanding of security has transformed from a geographic to a functional one. An analysis of the statement of pundits and officials shows that Austria focuses less and less on traditional territorial defence, but rather on stabilisation and humanitarian operations, conflict prevention and crisis management. Austria developed instruments to improve civilian structures (for example, aid for reconstruction, machines for water purification and experts to advise on developing functioning police, judicial systems and public administration). Notwithstanding its own defence requirements, Austria views itself as having an obligation to contribute to the provision of human security. This is why the Austrian armed forces prepare especially for tasks in the fields of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, disaster relief and the reconstruction of post-war and dysfunctional societies. The Austrian armed forces concentrate on duties enshrined in the 'Petersberg tasks' of the EU and crisis management in NATO rather on territorial and collective defence.

The EU's humanitarian mission in Chad in 2007 is a case in point reflecting the priorities noted above. A humanitarian catastrophe was developing as conflict displaced half a million people or forced them to flee from border regions to the CAR and Sudan. These refugees were regularly victims of violent assaults at this point. EU member states could not remain indifferent, whether or not they were neutral. To provide help in this case was considered to be a moral obligation, but was not motivated only by altruism. The EU's members agreed that the mission in Chad could effectively contribute to the fight against organised crime, drug trafficking and flows of refugees, as well as establish or restore viable economic, trade and investment zones. The stabilisation of the country's situation was therefore also in the interests of the EU and Austria. Austria's participation in the EU mission was legally based on a UN Security Council mandate. The establishment of a broad legitimacy for coercive measures in the form of a UN Security Council mandate was not only crucial for Austria, but also sensible for the international community of states. Austria provided 160 soldiers for the European peace force and the following UN mission. The goals for this mission were primarily the protection of civilians from violent assaults and the safeguarding of the distribution of relief supplies and other humanitarian aid, such as basic health services. The participating troops did not explicitly side with one of the conflict parties, the government or the rebels, which would be the usual procedure in a war. Not a single neutral EU member state stood apart. Finland and Sweden provided troops, Ireland even supplied the operational commander and Austria the commander of special forces.

Austria also agreed to participate in two of the EU's rapid reaction forces or battlegroups. The mandates of EU battlegroups are potentially very broad, ranging from humanitarian assistance and solidarity to robust missions, which may include armed combat for self-defence purposes. The latter missions should be legitimised through a UN Security council mandate. If there is no authorisation by a legitimate authority, Austria's participation would be problematic. It would trigger a debate about the meaning of neutrality within the EU.

Austria expressed its willingness to be part of so-called permanent structured cooperation in relation to EU battlegroups, a new possibility introduced under the Lisbon Treaty. In the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states 'whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments in this area' may establish 'permanent structured cooperation'. However, the 'criteria and com-

mitments on military capabilities' are established by the member states themselves. This means that Austria can make an independent decision on which capabilities it aims to activate in a battlegroup context. For example, there is no obligation to provide troops for high-tech combat missions. Austria's participation in short-term deployments of a battlegroup or operational reserve forces is independent of its permanent commitments. All of the forces deployed by the Austrian armed forces must, in principle, be designed for dual use in, both national and international operations.

Austria would like to see the EU battlegroups embedded in UN-missions. The Charter of the United Nations called for military contingents for Chapter VII tasks under the command of the UN Security Council (Article 43–47), but this commitment has never been implemented due to member states' unwillingness to make forces permanently available. The protocol of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the permanent structured cooperation especially stresses that the 'United Nations Organisation may request the Union's assistance for the urgent implementation of missions undertaken under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter'.

During recent decades, with increasing occurrence of large natural disasters, Austria has provided assistance for disaster relief both within and outside Europe. This is consistent with the Lisbon Treaty. Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty includes a commitment that '(I)n its relations with the wider world, the Union ...shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples', which may be viewed as a sort of solidarity clause that goes beyond the EU's member states. The refugee crisis in the middle of the 2010s emerged as a particular challenge from the south. Austria's armed forces have been deployed at check-points on the Austrian border to control the refugee flow and to prevent human trafficking and smuggling. Austria would also be prepared to control the external borders of the EU.

The future of the EU does not lie in collective or territorial defence but in crisis management and collective security. The July 2015 EU report, *The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world*, leaves collective and territorial defence to NATO and concentrates on crisis management: 'At the same time, as NATO refocuses on territorial defence, CSDP can work with NATO to sharpen its focus on crisis management and hybrid threats' (Council of the European Union 2015, 13). For Austria, it would be preferable if the EU becomes a collective security actor rather than collective defence

organisation (Gärtner 2015). This means Austria is more likely to participate in crisis management rather than collective or territorial defence.

Conclusion: Engaged Neutrality

This chapter has sought to analyse Austria's security policy and the country's interaction with the EU and NATO as security actors. The central argument is that Austria's security policy should be understood as one of engaged neutrality, involving a commitment to non-membership of military alliances, alongside a commitment to a proactive policy of supporting multilateralism, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Domestically, there is a strong political commitment within Austria to the maintenance of a policy of neutrality, but also to the activist elements of engaged neutrality which have been features of Austrian foreign and security policy for some decades now. Austria's relations with EU foreign, security and defence policy and with NATO can only be understood in this context. Central elements of EU foreign and security policy—in particular, a commitment to a comprehensive concept of security and to crisis management and peacekeeping—sit comfortably with Austria's foreign and security policy tradition and Austria has been an active contributor to EU foreign policy and EU operations. NATO's development of partnerships, of a peacekeeping role and to some extent also of a broader understanding of security provided a context in which Austria sought to engage with the Alliance and contributed to its peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. As NATO has arguably returned to a more militarised approach to security in the 2000s and 2010s, however, the political space for cooperation between Austria and NATO has shrunk—and this trend may continue in future.

The primary task of a security policy is the elimination of the structural causes of potential violent conflicts: violence avoidance through the granting of minority rights, economic and social stability, and prevention of environmental disasters. Concrete instruments for conflict avoidance can be, among other things: preventive diplomacy, early detection and timely action, peaceful conflict settlement, but also economic sanctions, disarmament and military confidence-building. Membership in a military alliance, like NATO, is not necessary for the prevention of violent conflict. Crisis management and conflict prevention can also be conducted within the framework of the EU, NATO partnerships or the OSCE. Austria actively participates in EU crisis management tasks, as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty. As an EU member and a party to the Treaty, Austria is 'a full and

equal partner' in the planning and decision-making process of these activities. Neutrality is no obstacle to involvement in EU crisis management operations, whatsoever. Austria closely cooperates with NATO in important areas, such as crisis management, humanitarian operations or peacekeeping. Cooperative security and the concept of partnership offer the possibility of co-decision for every operation in which Austria participates.

In the West Balkans, Austria, for example, is the largest troop contributor to the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the NATO mission in Kosovo. The amount of money spent on defence does not tell everything about efficiency. In 2015, Austria spent only two and a half billion euros on defence which amounts to 0.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Defence expenditure will increase by two billion over the next decade, however. Nevertheless, Austria deploys more troops abroad than any other non-NATO state in Europe. Austria's focus on peace and expeditionary missions is part of its broader security strategy. 'Engaged Neutrality' means active participation in the international security policy in general, and in international peace operations in particular.

Diplomacy and conflict prevention are traditionally fields in which neutral states can be active. Neutrality should not be interpreted as 'sitting still' in the passive sense of sitting on the sidelines. This definition would support economic neutrality as well as an equidistance between the blocs, which would be incompatible with membership in the United Nations. Austria's neutrality has always proven its flexibility, rather than orienting itself along very fixed lines. A flexible understanding of neutrality and its adaptability to modern requirements should not be interpreted as a loss of its significance. Similarly, nobody would argue that the Austrian constitution has become irrelevant simply because it has been adapted to different historical circumstances repeatedly since 1929.

It goes without saying that there cannot be neutrality between democracy and dictatorship, between a constitutional state and despotism, between adherence to human rights and their violation. The Austrian neutrality law does not relate to these questions. Neutral states are not allowed to offer other states or alliances the prospect of entering into a war at their side. This does not, however, mean neutrality towards glaring human rights violations, injustice, torture or genocide. Rather, neutrality is defined in specific terms as non-membership in a military alliance, not participating in foreign wars and no deployment of foreign troops on

Austrian territory. Even during the Cold War, Austria remained firmly grounded in the community of western values.

Nonetheless, Austria's neutrality allows for a crucial advantage in the debate on these values. It releases Austria from geopolitical and alliance-related considerations. Western democratic constitutional states can sometimes not hold on to their values due to simple pragmatic considerations. Austria, however, does not have any particular global geopolitical interests that would result in the establishment of military bases in or the export of weapons to authoritarian states that neglect human rights and constitutional values. Neither is Austria limited by any alliance obligations in its support for democracy, human rights and constitutional states anywhere. Austria's neutrality does not allow the country to have double standards. However, a reassessment of neutrality is necessary. The old Swiss concept of 'sitting still' should definitely be left behind. False diplomatic caution has to be replaced by a courageous and aggressive advocacy of universal values. There can be no exceptions.

Austrian neutrality cannot mean 'staying out', but rather calls for an intense involvement in international crisis management. Austria does not have global geopolitical interests, nor do any close obligations of alliance restrict the country's involvement in supporting international peace and security. Austria needs to make use of these advantages and possibilities, which result from its engaged neutrality policy. The state of neutrality itself already implies that Austria, from the outset, would not maintain a hostile attitude during conflicts. 'Engaged neutrality' means involvement whenever possible and staying out if necessary; it does not mean staying out when possible and engagement only if necessary.

Multilateralism, willingness to engage in dialogue and global partnership have priority for Austria and the other European neutral states. The use of force must remain the exception. Priority setting is important. There is a significant difference between a policy, which orients itself along the lines of the abovementioned principles, and one that primarily supports military intervention, arms build-up, military alliances or sanctions outside the United Nations.

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CHAPTER 7

Ireland and NATO: A Distinctly Low-Profile Partnership

Andrew Cottey

In 2015 the Irish government published official policy papers on foreign policy and defence policy, only the second such papers in the history of the state following earlier white papers on foreign policy in 1996 and defence policy in 2000 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015; Department of Defence 2015). In terms of security policy the two 2015 policy papers confirmed the long-standing Irish policy of military neutrality, alongside support for the United Nations and active engagement with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In terms of NATO, the foreign policy white paper made only two passing references to NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP). The defence white paper emphasised the importance of engagement with NATO/PfP for Ireland's ability to operate alongside other European militaries in peacekeeping operations and contribute to peacekeeping more generally (Department of Defence 2015, 29–30 and 64–5). Nonetheless, in the overall context of Irish foreign and security policy, relations with NATO are a relatively low priority. Domestically, the two papers caused rather little debate beyond specialists and none on relations with NATO. The relationship between Ireland and NATO can thus be summed up as a distinctly low-profile partnership.

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This chapter examines relations between Ireland and NATO. It traces the origins of Ireland's neutrality in the struggle for independence from Britain and the dilemmas Ireland faced in the Second World War, the Irish government's decision to reject possible NATO membership in 1948–49 and the subsequent consolidation of neutrality during the Cold War, and the debate on PfP membership in the 1990s which made Ireland one of the last European states to join PfP in 1999. It also highlights how debates within Ireland on EU defence cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s have buttressed neutrality and reinforced the position of both EU defence cooperation and relations with NATO as politically neuralgic issues domestically. For much of the political elite, policy-makers and the military, PfP, alongside the EU's CSDP, are frameworks from which Ireland benefits, particularly in terms of the ability of the Irish defence forces to operate alongside other Western militaries, and where Ireland has positive contributions to make. Given the domestic sensitivities of NATO, however, and the absence of compelling reasons for an upgraded partnership, Ireland's relationship with NATO is likely to remain a distinctly low-profile partnership.

History

Ireland's relationship with NATO can only be understood in the broader context of the country's post-independence foreign policy, in particular the struggle to secure and consolidate independence from Britain and the deep embedding of a policy of neutrality from the Second World War onwards. England claimed sovereignty over Ireland from the twelfth century, with rule being consolidated by the Tudor conquest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and formalised by the Acts of Union—joint acts of the British and Irish parliaments creating a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland governed by a single parliament in Westminster—passed in 1800 and coming into effect in 1801. Irish nationalism emerged as a powerful political force in the nineteenth century. Following the Easter Rising of April 1916 and a landslide election victory for the pro-independence Sinn Féin in December 1918 elections, in January 1919 an independent parliament (Dáil Éireann) was established and a Declaration of Independence passed. Between January 1919 and July 1921, Sinn Féin fought a guerrilla War of Independence against British forces. A cease-fire was agreed in July 1921, followed by negotiations leading to a December 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty which established the Irish Free State as a

self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth (but left the six counties of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom). The Anglo-Irish Treaty triggered a civil war, from June 1922 to May 1923, between supporters of the Free State and Republicans who viewed the Treaty as a betrayal of the goal of full independence. Backed by British arms, the Free State forces were victorious—the civil war ending with the Republican forces dumping their arms (rather than officially surrendering). Under the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty Britain also retained responsibility for the marine defence of Ireland and control of three key Treaty Ports —as they became known—at Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly.

From 1919 to the Second World War, the central focus of Irish foreign policy was establishing and consolidating the country's position as an independent state and in particular securing and giving substance to independence from Britain (Kennedy 2012). With the establishment of the Irish Free State (which formally came into existence in December 1922), Ireland joined the League of Nations in 1923 and began the process of securing diplomatic recognition from other states (with the United States being the first country to recognise Ireland in 1924). From 1923 to 1932, the Cumann na nGaedheal party—which had supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the civil war—governed the country and sought to extend Irish independence within the Commonwealth and make the Commonwealth more of a partnership of equals than a British-dominated grouping. The election in 1932–33 of Fianna Fáil, a Republican Party established in 1926 incorporating many of those who had opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the civil war, paved the way for further steps to consolidate independence from Britain. These included a 1936 constitutional amendment ending the British monarch's residual role in Irish internal affairs, a new Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann) in 1937 and a new Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1938 which returned the three Treaty Ports to Irish control. Ireland during this period was led by Eamon de Valera, a giant of modern Irish politics. De Valera had been a commander in the 1916 Easter Rising, a key political leader in the War of Independence and the Civil War and the founder of Fianna Fáil and was head of government/Taoiseach (prime minister) 1932–48, 1951–54 and 1957–59. More than anyone else de Valera shaped Irish foreign policy in the crucial period before, during and after the Second World War.

In terms of security policy, support for the League of Nations was an important feature of Irish policy in the 1920s and early 1930s: the League of Nations offered not only a framework for Ireland to consolidate its

independent statehood but also the possibility of international support. The League of Nations' weak response to Italian aggression in the Abysinnian crisis of 1934–35, however, convinced De Valera and the Irish government that the League could not be relied upon and lead to consideration of a policy of neutrality. The idea of a neutral foreign policy also had deeper origins in Irish nationalist and republican thinking, going back to seminal figures of Irish republicanism such as Wolf Tone (1763–98). At the outbreak of the First World War an Irish Neutrality League was formed by republicans to promote the cause of neutrality. Under the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, however, British responsibility for the marine defence of Ireland and control of the Treaty Ports effectively precluded Irish neutrality. In 1936 de Valera indicated that Ireland wanted to become neutral. The new 1938 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the return of the Treaty Ports paved the way for neutrality. At the outset of the Second World War, the Dáil approved a policy of neutrality by almost unanimous vote (only a single representative voted against). The policy of neutrality reflected a number of imperatives. Neutrality was a means of asserting Ireland's independence from Britain and disassociating the country from great powers, imperialism and war. Aligning with Germany would have risked triggering a British invasion to secure military control of Ireland. Aligning with Britain would have been unacceptable to much of Ireland's population given the continued partition of the country, potentially triggering a new civil war. Neutrality therefore also provided a means of maintaining domestic political unity in difficult times.

Throughout the war, however, Ireland maintained a somewhat one-sided form of neutrality, described as having 'a certain consideration' towards the Allied powers: British aircraft flew over Irish headlands and inland (without Irish government protest), British warships pursued and attacked hostile submarines in Irish territorial wartimes, the British and Irish militaries and intelligence services cooperated with one another (in particular in planning to counter any German invasion), and Allied airmen grounded in Ireland were allowed to return to Northern Ireland and their equipment was transported across the border (whereas grounded German airmen were interned). This reflected a view that Ireland and Britain shared a common interest in countering a possible German invasion of Ireland, as well as a concern that denying all support to Britain might risk triggering a British invasion.

By the end of the Second World War, Irish neutrality was quite deeply entrenched domestically: the policy had allowed Ireland to assert its

independence, avoid invasion or strategic bombing by either Germany or Britain and maintain peace domestically. In addition, among the Irish public partition came to be viewed as a key rationale for neutrality (Doherty 2002, 41). There was little obvious reason or pressure to abandon a policy which was widely viewed within Ireland as having been successful.

The onset of the Cold War in 1947–49 and the development of plans for a Western European and then North Atlantic defence alliance put the issue of possible Irish membership in such a pact on the agenda. The United States, the British and the Canadians—the main architects of NATO—supported the inclusion of Ireland in the planned alliance, following the logic that Ireland was a friendly Western state and that from a geo-strategic and military perspective Ireland's inclusion would be advantageous (Kay 1998, 20–1; Kaplan 1999, 10–11 and 15–16). In geo-strategic terms, the United States wanted Ireland inside the proposed alliance as one of a number of 'stepping stones' (in particular as a base for anti-submarine warfare) (Kay 1998, 28).

At the time of NATO's formation in 1948–49, the domestic political context in Ireland was a new coalition government—the First Inter-Party Government—composed of Fine Gael, the Labour Party and three smaller parties. Following 16 years of Fianna Fáil government under de Valera, the February 1948 election left Fianna Fáil as the largest party in the Dáil but without an overall majority. The First Inter-Party Government, under the leadership of Taoiseach John A. Costello, was an unwieldy coalition united primarily by shared opposition to Fianna Fáil. The Minister for External Affairs was Sean MacBride, a prominent republican, leader of a small republican/socialist party Clann na Poblachta and strongly committed to the goal of Irish unity. Now the leader of the opposition, De Valera embarked on an international campaign to address the issue of partition, visiting the United States, Australia, New Zealand and India. Partition was thus a central issue in Irish politics and one on which the government was vulnerable.

The Irish government's position on what was to become NATO, which it had begun signalling in early 1948, was that it supported the general concept of the proposed alliance and was open to membership but that it could not join an alliance with Britain so long as Ireland was divided (McCabe 1991, 104, 108–9). The government appears to have hoped that it might be able to use Britain and America's desire to include Ireland in the planned defence alliance as leverage to bring an end to partition.

In January 1949, on behalf of the states negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States delivered an aide memoire to the Irish government asking for its informal views on a possible invitation to join the Treaty. The Irish minister in Washington, DC, Sean Nunan, was also called into the State Department: he was informed that the governments negotiating the treaty wanted Ireland to join and that if the Irish response was positive it would be formally invited, but if Ireland chose not to, 'That's all right too.' A month later, in early February, the Irish government replied in an aide memoire approved by the cabinet. The aide memoire indicated that while Ireland was opposed to communism and supported the purpose and ideals of NATO, the central obstacle to Irish membership was partition: the Irish government could not join a military alliance with Britain so long as partition remained and joining the proposed alliance so long as partition remained would risk a renewed civil conflict in Ireland. Nunan, however, also conveyed a message to US government indicating that the Irish response should not be regarded as 'closing the door' and that Ireland desired US mediation on the question of partition. Nunan also lobbied US Senators along the same lines. The US response was unambiguous: the defence treaty was not about the resolution of such issues and the United States would not mediate on partition unless the British government would welcome such a role (which it did not) (McCabe 1991, 112–4). The final negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty proceeded without Ireland and the treaty was signed on 4 April 1949.

Historians have debated the reasons why the Irish government chose not to join NATO in 1949: while the official rationale for rejecting NATO membership was partition, some have argued that possible loss of foreign policy independence and financial concerns may have played a role (Doherty 2002, 46). Given that Irish neutrality in the Second World War had been driven in a significant part by Partition and the inter-party government was a fragile coalition facing opposition from de Valera's campaign for an end to Partition, it would have been politically difficult—perhaps impossible—for the government to join NATO without an end to Partition or at least very clear steps towards that end.

Developments in the next couple of years reinforced the dynamics behind Ireland's non-membership of NATO. In May 1949 the British parliament passed the Ireland Act, which included a guarantee to Ulster Unionists that Partition would not end without their consent, thereby reinforcing Partition. In 1950 the United States again considered possible Irish membership of NATO but concluded that any initiative be left to

Ireland and also decided to avoid any bilateral defence agreement with Ireland (McCabe 1991, 114). In the next Irish election in May 1951 NATO was not an issue: the election 'was fought on internal issues… Except for John Costello's attempts to justify leaving the Commonwealth, foreign affairs, including defence, were not seen as major electoral issues' (McCabe 1991, 153–4). Fianna Fáil won the election, with de Valera returning as Taoiseach, further reinforcing the dynamics that Ireland could not join NATO so long as partition remained.

The specific dynamics of the rejection of NATO membership in 1948–49 suggest that Ireland might have joined NATO had partition been resolved. The government's position was that Ireland was not in principle opposed to alliances and was supportive of the idea of an anti-communist alliance, but that Partition was a fundamental obstacle. Membership of NATO was popular with the Catholic Church, the military, the intellectual community and a significant number of back-benchers (Doherty 2002, 46). Had Ireland joined NATO in 1948–49 the subsequent development of Irish foreign, security and defence policy would obviously have been different—although exactly how different is difficult to guess. As it was, subsequent developments reinforced the gap between Ireland and NATO: neutrality became more deeply embedded, especially in the popular consciousness; disinterest in territorial defence and low levels of defence spending continued to characterise Irish defence policy; after joining the UN in 1955, peacekeeping became almost the raison d'etre of the armed forces; and Ireland became a strong supporter of nuclear arms control and disarmament (in contrast to NATO's Cold War reliance on nuclear deterrence).

Following the Irish government's rejection of NATO membership in 1948–49, the policy of neutrality became largely settled, although there were periodic debates on the meaning of neutrality and the appropriate policies to pursue on specific issues (such as, for example, communist China's possible membership of the United Nations). The issue of neutrality and relations with NATO, however, re-emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of Ireland's pursuit of European Economic Community (EEC) membership. When the United Kingdom decided to move to join the EEC, Ireland had little choice but to pursue EEC membership too given the extent of economic and trade relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom. With all existing members of the EEC and Britain being members of NATO and the EEC committed in principle to political integration which might ultimately include defence, the issue

of whether Ireland's neutrality was compatible with EEC membership emerged when the Irish government decided to seek EEC membership in 1961. The Irish government mounted a diplomatic campaign to make clear to the EEC member states that Ireland's neutrality and non-membership of NATO did not represent any ambivalence about European political integration, while at the same time seeking to reassure the Irish public that nothing in the existing EEC treaties prejudiced Irish neutrality and that any future developments in political integration would be subject to negotiations of which Ireland would be a full part (Hayward 2012, 138). The Taoiseach at the time was Sean Lemass, who was sceptical about neutrality anyway (Fitzgerald 1998, 15–6). When membership negotiations opened in January 1962, Lemass sought to reassure the EEC member states that Ireland's neutrality would not be a problem in relation to its prospective membership:

> While Ireland did not accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, we have always agreed with the general aim of that Treaty. The fact that we did not accede to it was due to special circumstances and does not qualify in any way our acceptance of the ideal of European unity and of the conception …of the duties and responsibilities which European unity would impose. (quoted in Keogh 1989, 233–4)

Ireland's membership of the EEC, however, was delayed until 1973 by French President Charles de Gaulle's vetoes over British membership in 1963 and 1967. The issue of neutrality re-emerged in the context of Ireland's membership negotiations in the early 1970s, particularly as the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC, the forerunner of today's CFSP) was established in 1970, and a referendum on EEC membership in May 1972. By this point, however, it was clear that joining the EEC would not require also joining NATO and concern over Ireland's neutrality was not an obstacle from the perspective of the existing EEC member states. Within Ireland, some opponents of EEC membership nonetheless argued that joining the EEC threatened Ireland's neutrality and would entail membership of NATO. The government argued that EEC membership was compatible with Ireland's neutrality and pointed out that as a matter of fact EEC membership would not involve joining NATO. The debate on EEC membership within Ireland, however, revolved primarily around economic issues and the referendum on joining the EEC was carried by 83 per cent to 17 per cent on a turnout of 71 per cent.

The issues of neutrality and NATO re-emerged in the context of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and a 1987 referendum on the SEA. While the central element of the SEA was the proposal to establish a single market, neutrality and NATO were issues because the SEA also formally brought the EPC process into the EC treaties—EPC having hitherto been an informal process outside the EC treaties. Once again, some opponents of the SEA argued that it undermined Irish neutrality and would involve Irish membership of NATO. The Irish government and supporters of the SEA argued that the treaty was compatible with Ireland's neutrality, did not involve joining NATO, did not involve a defence dimension and that EPC was a consensus process that could not involve decisions being imposed on Ireland (Keogh 1989, 273–80). The SEA referendum was carried by a majority of 70 per cent to 30 per cent on a turnout of 44 per cent.

Post-Cold War Evolution

The end of the Cold War did not impact very dramatically or very immediately on Irish foreign and security policy. In March 1996, however, the government published a White Paper on foreign policy entitled *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad*—the first such paper in the history of the state. The White Paper included an unambiguous commitment to 'military neutrality' (defined as non-participation in military alliances):

> Successive Irish governments have taken the view that in the event of a major international or European conflict the security of the State could best be preserved by the adoption of an attitude of neutrality. Irish foreign and security policy has therefore been conducted in such a way as to preserve the option of neutrality in the event of an outbreak of hostilities that might threaten the security of the State. (Government of Ireland 1996, chapter 4, para 4.11)

At the same time, the white paper argued that 'Ireland's foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are. …(T)he majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland's military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as time of war' (Government of Ireland 1996, Agenda for Irish Foreign Policy section, paras 1 and 27). In terms of NATO, the white paper argued that Ireland's original decision not to

join NATO reflected the desire to preserve the option of neutrality in war (Government of Ireland 1996, chapter 4, para 4.11)—a notably different position from the Irish government's argument in 1948–49 that it in principle supported the objectives of NATO and that partition was the primary reason Ireland could not join NATO. The white paper stated that the government would not seek membership of NATO or the Western European Union (WEU), and that 'Ireland's policy of military neutrality …will not be changed unless the people of Ireland decide otherwise in a referendum' (Government of Ireland 1996, chapter 4, paras 4.10, 4.115 and 4.9). The strong commitment to neutrality in the white paper reflected the extent to which neutrality has become deeply embedded in the Irish body politic since the Second World War and is largely viewed as an uncontested good. Indeed, at no point since the end of the Cold War has any political party or significant political figure made the case for ending the policy of neutrality and seeking membership of NATO.

Whether to join PfP, however, did become a domestic political issue in the 1990s, with the result that Ireland was the last of the European neutral states to join the PfP in 1999. Ireland's relatively late engagement with PfP reflected domestic wariness of ties with NATO. When PfP was established in 1994, the then Fianna Fáil-Labour coalition government 'manifested little public interest in this development' (Keatinge 1995, 168). Following a split between Fianna Fáil and Labour, a new Fine Gael-Labour-Democratic Left government (known as the Rainbow Coalition) was formed. Fine Gael was sympathetic to joining PfP and in February 1995 the government indicated that it was considering whether Ireland might participate in PfP. Fianna Fáil, now in opposition, argued that joining PfP was not necessary and had no relevance for Ireland (Keatinge 1996, 164). Further consideration of PfP was delayed until the foreign policy white paper was published in March 1996. The White Paper argued that PfP would be compatible with neutrality, since PfP was not an alliance, and stated that the government would explore the possible benefits of joining PfP but a decision would only to be taken after consultation with parliamentary committees and parliamentary approval (Government of Ireland 1996, chapter 4, paras 4.48–53). PfP was discussed in a subsequent formal Dáil debate on the White Paper: Fine Gael and Labour indicated broadly positive views of PfP; Fianna Fáil emphasised its support for neutrality and the need for a referendum on PfP; and the Democratic Left and the Greens opposed PfP (Rees 1997, 166). While not central, PfP was also an issue in elections in June 1997: Fine Gael, Labour and the

Progressive Democrats were 'more willing to take a positive view' of PfP; whereas Fianna Fáil, the Greens and the Democratic Left were 'less inclined to have anything to do with NATO or the PfP' (Rees 1998, 137). The elections resulted in a new Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat government, with Fianna Fáil having been wary of PfP and committed to a referendum on the issue.

Against the background of a referendum on the EU's Amsterdam Treaty in May 1998, debate on security and defence policy, including PfP, intensified. The Joint Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on PfP, with presentations from a representative of NATO and the Ambassadors of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland (all four countries having already joined PfP). The Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (the department's most senior civil servant) also addressed the Committee, describing Ireland's non-participation in PfP as 'curious' and arguing that the situation might adversely affect future participation in peacekeeping. Fianna Fáil's position also shifted once they entered government: towards the end of 1998 the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and the Foreign Minister David Andrews stated that they believed involvement in PfP would not undermine Ireland's neutrality (Rees 1999, 269–70). By March 1999 Ahern was arguing in favour of PfP: 'The isolated Republic was never a beneficial peacetime foreign policy… I see no valid argument in terms of national interests as to why we should continue to remain out of line with other European neutrals on the PfP, or become more neutral than the neutrals themselves' (Ishizuka 1999, 198). In January 1999 Fine Gael brought before the Dáil a motion proposing that Ireland join PfP. Most parties now formally supported joining PfP, but Sinn Féin and the Greens opposed and there were divisions within Fianna Fáil and Labour. A government amendment committing to 'favourably examine' participation in PfP was passed by 73 votes to 68, indicating support for PfP but also continued opposition. In April the government announced that it was not necessary to hold a referendum on the issue because PfP did not involve an international legal commitment and would not require an amendment to constitution—reversing Fianna Fáil's earlier commitment to a referendum. PfP was widely debated during 1999, with groups such as the European Movement and the Institute for European Affairs holding conferences on the issue. An opinion poll in May indicated 61 per cent support for joining PfP (although also 71 per cent support for a referendum). In October the Cabinet formally approved terms for joining PfP, which reiterated the country's commitment to neutrality and that

Ireland would not be joining NATO. The Dáil then voted in favour of joining PfP by 112 to 24, although considerable pressure was put on Fianna Fáil members (some of whom still favoured a referendum) to vote 'yes'. On 1 December 1999, Foreign Minister Andrews signed the PfP Framework Document and Ireland joined PfP (Rees 2000, 259–60).

Overall, the nearly six-year gap between the establishment of PfP in January 1994 and Ireland joining in December 1999 reflected the strong attachment to neutrality within Ireland, wariness of any engagement with NATO and concern that PfP might undermine Ireland's neutrality, as well as a significant learning curve in terms of the actual implications of PfP. A number of factors appear to have shifted the Irish debate between 1994 and 1999. With Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland all having joined PfP, Ireland risked becoming an isolated outlier if it remained outside PfP. With NATO having launched its large peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from late 1995, Ireland risked being excluded from major developments in peacekeeping if it refused to engage with NATO. In addition, it had also become clear that PfP did not involve a commitment to collective defence and was therefore in formal or legal terms compatible with neutrality.

Ireland's relationship with NATO cannot be understood separately from its engagement with the EU's CFSP and CSDP, which as a full member of the EU inevitably impacted more directly on the country. The development of EU foreign, security and defence policy in the 1990s and 2000s became a key driver of debate on security policy within Ireland. The negotiations for the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties forced the Irish government to define its position on European foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, as opposed to the constructive ambiguity of Ireland's earlier position of being, in principle, fully committed to European political cooperation, including a security and defence component when that might come to pass. The Irish constitutional tradition of holding referenda on any legally binding international treaties signed by the state meant that successive governments also had to secure explicit public support for Ireland's engagement with the EU's CFSP and CSDP and that the foreign, security and defence policy dimensions of Ireland's EU membership became subjects of significant, sometimes heated, debate. In the 1990s and 2000s, successive Irish governments sought to facilitate EU defence cooperation, while ensuring that this would not result in Ireland having to abandon its policy of neutrality (in particular in the sense of not undertaking a commitment to collective

defence) or loss of control over decisions on whether to deploy Irish troops overseas. At Irish insistence, the Maastricht Treaty commitment that the CFSP include 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence' also incorporated a commitment that this 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' (i.e., Irish neutrality) (European Union 1992, Article J.4, paras. 1 and 4). This commitment was supported by Austria, Sweden and Finland after they joined the EU in 1995 and reiterated in the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties.

Neutrality was a significant issue in the various Irish EU referenda of the 1990s and 2000s, although not the only issue, with independence and sovereignty within the EU, economic factors and social questions (in particular abortion) also playing an important role. Opponents of the EU treaties argued that the CFSP and CSDP would erode Irish neutrality and might involve loss of national control over decisions to deploy troops overseas, increases in defence expenditure, compulsory participation in European arms procurement projects and conscription into an EU military. Irish governments argued that the commitment to the CFSP and CSDP were compatible with Irish neutrality, that there were specific guarantees protecting Irish neutrality and that Ireland retained national control over decisions on the deployment of forces overseas, defence spending and arms procurement. Although the EU treaties involved no commitments in relation to NATO, the debates on these treaties nonetheless became entangled with relations with NATO. Opponents of the EU treaties argued that the treaties were a slippery slope to full participation in a common European defence and membership of NATO; one slogan of opponents of the Nice Treaty in the 2001 and 2002 referenda on that treaty was 'No to Nice, No to NATO' (the slogan featured prominently on roadside campaign posters).

Referenda on the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties were passed by substantial majorities, with 70 per cent in favour and 30 per cent against in June 1992 for the Maastricht Treaty and 62 per cent in favour and 38 per cent against in May 1998 for the Amsterdam Treaty. The Nice and Lisbon treaties, however, proved much more politically complicated within Ireland, with security and defence policy being an important issue in both cases. In June 2001, on a turnout of 35 per cent, the Irish public vote by 54 per cent to 46 per cent to reject the Nice Treaty. The result was a significant shock, particularly as it had been widely assumed that there would be a 'yes' vote: traditionally pro-European Ireland had for the first

time rejected an EU treaty; as Ireland was the only member state which had decided to hold a referendum, the Irish vote also potentially threatened to derail the entire treaty. The other EU member states signalled their expectation that Ireland not derail the Nice treaty and the Irish government agreed to consider a second referendum. With the Nice Treaty formally incorporating the CSDP into the EU, concerns that the treaty undermined Irish neutrality were a significant factor within Ireland. The government sought to put in place arrangements guaranteeing Irish neutrality and designed to assuage public concerns over the CSDP. These took the form of the 'Seville Declarations', agreed at the European Council meeting in that city in June 2002, and a constitutional amendment. The Seville declarations were a national declaration by the Irish government and a parallel statement by the EU's member states recognising the Irish declaration. The Irish declaration stated that participation in the CFSP did not prejudice Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality, that the country was 'not bound by any mutual defence commitment' and that it was not 'party to any plans to develop a European army', and committed the state to hold a referendum on any decision to move to a common defence or any future treaty involving a departure from military neutrality. Importantly, the declaration also included a commitment to the so-called triple lock over any decisions to deploy forces overseas: namely that such decisions require (i) authorisation by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, (ii) agreement of the Irish government and (iii) approval of the Dáil (European Union 2002). At the same time, the government proposed the addition of a new article to the Irish constitution (Article 29.4.9) explicitly committing Ireland not to adopt any future EU decision establishing a common defence and thereby introducing a de facto requirement for a referendum on any such step in future. On the basis of these guarantees, in October 2002 the Nice Treaty and the amendment to the constitution were passed by a majority of 62 per cent in favour and 38 per cent against on a turnout of 50 per cent.

The Irish debate on the Lisbon Treaty followed a pattern very similar to that for the Nice Treaty. Despite opinion polls suggesting a majority in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, in an October 2008 referendum the treaty was rejected by 53 per cent to 47 per cent on a turnout of 53 per cent. With the Lisbon Treaty incorporating a mutual assistance clause in the event of an EU member state being a victim of armed aggression (European Union 2012, Article 42.7), concerns over neutrality were again a significant factor in opposition to the treaty (although opinion

polls suggested that a lack of understanding of a complex treaty and broader concerns over national sovereignty and identity were more important factors). With Ireland once again being the only member state to hold a referendum on the treaty, the Irish government sought to address public concerns and then hold a second referendum. In June 2009 EU member states agreed 'guarantees', again comprising a collective statement by the EU member states and an Irish national declaration. On security and defence, 'the guarantees' reiterated the Seville declarations. They also additionally included statements that the Lisbon Treaty 'does not affect or prejudice Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality' and that, in relation to the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses in the treaty each state would 'determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided' (European Union 2009; Institute of International and European Affairs 2009). On the basis of these 'guarantees', in a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in October 2009 the Irish public voted in favour by a majority of 67 per cent to 33 per cent on a turnout of 59 per cent.

Ireland's interaction with the EU's evolving CFSP and CSDP has had interesting and to some extent contradictory implications. Ireland is now actively engaged in EU CFSP and CSDP, which arguably both constrains Irish policy and encourages Ireland to contribute to EU missions and activities in ways which might not otherwise have been the case. At the same time, however, the debate on EU foreign, security and defence policy within Ireland has reinforced the country's commitment to neutrality: in the 1960s Ireland's leaders stated that if EC membership came to include a defence commitment Ireland would be fully involved, even if this meant abandoning neutrality; by the 1990s and 2000s Ireland's position was that it was willing to be involved in European defence cooperation, but that this could not involve abandoning neutrality. The debates within Ireland on the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties reinforced broad public support for neutrality, copper-fastened neutrality (in terms of the Irish constitution, EU treaties and the triple-lock mechanism) and made politicians acutely aware of the domestic political risks of being seen to abandon neutrality.

In terms of relations with NATO, Ireland's involvement in PfP has become an established fact since 1999. The details of PfP cooperation have become simply one of the myriad policy issues which governments, civil servants and armed forces deal with on a day-to-day basis. Nevertheless, the PfP and EU treaty debates of the 1990s and 2000s also reinforced the

commitment to neutrality within Ireland and highlighted continued wariness of NATO amongst at least a significant part of the Irish public.

The Domestic Politics of Security Policy and NATO

In terms of domestic politics there has been quite a high degree of consensus on the central elements of Irish foreign and security policy, including neutrality, membership of the EU and active support for the UN, in particular by contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. Within this, however, there are differences of nuance amongst Ireland's political parties and different views from various institutional and civil society actors.

In terms of political parties Ireland is unusual in that the primary political division has not been a left–right one but rather that between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael—the two largest parties for most of the state's history—dating back to the founding of the state, the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the civil war. Fianna Fáil is the political descendant of the anti-Treaty forces and Fine Gael the descendant of the pro-Treaty forces. Both are centrist/centre-right parties, with Fianna Fáil being a more catch-all party and Fine Gael a more liberal-conservative party, although the characters of and differences between the two can be hard to encapsulate. Alongside Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been a number of smaller parties, in particular the Labour Party, Sinn Féin and the Green Party, as well as some other small parties which have proved short-lived. Ireland's proportional electoral system favours multi-party politics and usually produces coalition government, reinforcing consensus and compromise over foreign and security policy (as opposed to sharply defined differences between political parties).

All of Ireland's political parties have been committed to neutrality and none have advocated NATO membership. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been broadly pro-European parties, campaigning for 'yes' votes in all of Ireland's EU treaty referenda since 1972. There have been and remain, however, subtle differences between parties over the interpretation of neutrality and EU foreign, security and defence policy cooperation. To the extent that Republicanism (in the sense of being committed to a united Irish Republic including Northern Ireland) is associated with neutrality—which it arguably is in the Irish context—Fianna Fáil, as the more Republican or nationalist of the two main parties, has probably been more committed to neutrality than Fine Gael. De Valera, after all, established Irish neutrality in the Second World War and campaigned against NATO

membership in 1948–49 so long as partition remained. More recently, in the 1990s and 2000s within Fianna Fáil there has been wariness of engagement with NATO and of involvement in the EU's CSDP—hence the party's initial opposition to joining PfP. Fine Gael has been more sympathetic to engagement with NATO and involvement in the EU's CSDP, leading the argument for joining PfP in the 1990s. Leading Fine Gael figure Garret Fitzgerald (1926–2011), who served as Foreign Minister 1973–77, Fine Gael leader 1977–87 and Taoiseach 1981–82 and 1982–87, had argued in favour of NATO membership in 1949, made no secret of his belief that Ireland should join NATO even if practical politics made that impossible and strongly supported Irish involvement in EU defence cooperation (Fitzgerald 1998, 18–9). Differences between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, however, should not be understood simply as a crude divide between the two parties on NATO and European defence. Some prominent Fianna Fáil figures, such as Sean Lemass (1899–1971), a veteran of the Easter Rising, a founder of Fianna Fáil and Taoiseach 1959–66, have been sceptical of neutrality and sympathetic to NATO (Keogh 1989, 233–4). There are also differences within both parties and their policies have shifted at times (as with Fianna Fáil's view of PfP in the 1990s). Additionally, at times Fianna Fáil has found neutrality and NATO political convenient brickbats with which to attack Fine Gael.

As parties of the left, the Labour Party, the Green Party and Sinn Féin have been anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, anti-nuclear and strongly committed to neutrality. In general, this has made them wary of partnership with NATO and of involvement in EU defence cooperation. The Labour Party has been the largest of the small parties and a partner in coalition governments with other parties at various points since the 1980s. The Labour Party opposed Ireland's entry into the EEC in 1972 and the SEA in 1987 (primarily on economic grounds), but has since become more pro-European and supported the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties in the referenda in the 1990s and 2000s. Like other European social democratic parties, Labour has also been internally divided between leftist members strongly opposed to NATO and EU defence cooperation and centrist members willing to support cooperation with NATO and engagement with EU defence cooperation. During the PfP debate of the 1990s Labour shifted from wariness of PfP membership to support by the time Ireland joined in 1999. The Green Party has generally been strongly opposed to militarism, NATO and EU defence cooperation and opposed joining PfP during the debate of the 1990s. The Green

Party lost all its parliamentary seats in the 2011 election and it remains to be seen if it will recover support. Sinn Féin is a Republican and socialist party, previously associated with the Provisional Irish Republic Army (IRA). It has been opposed to the EU, in particular the EU's pro-market economic policies, and has strongly opposed cooperation with NATO and involvement in EU defence cooperation. Were Sinn Féin to enter government as a junior coalition partner, however, it might be forced to moderate its policies on the EU and security and defence policy.

Beyond political parties, a variety of actors contributing to debate on security policy can be noted: these include in particular parliamentary committees; the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence and the defence forces; and non-governmental groups. Historically, Ireland's parliament has been relatively weak vis-à-vis the government in terms of providing oversight of government policy or contributing to wider national debate on issues, especially in relation to foreign policy. A parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs was only established in 1993, followed by an additional Committee on EU Affairs in 1995 (Keatinge 1998, 35). The Committee on Foreign Affairs, however, played an important role in the debate on PfP in the 1990s, in particular by holding detailed hearings on PfP which contributed to understanding of the issue and the discrediting of some common misunderstandings, thereby helping to pave the way for Ireland to join PfP. With regard to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence and the defence forces, Ireland has quite a strong tradition of control of policy by elected political representatives, which civil servants and military personnel generally respect. Within these parameters, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence and the defence forces have been supportive of Ireland's engagement with NATO via PfP. As noted above, in the debate on PfP in the 1990s the Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs effectively supported Ireland's joining PfP, highlighting the country's anomalous status outside PfP at that point. Retired senior defence forces personnel and the professional organisation of the defence forces also argued in favouring of Ireland joining PfP, highlighting in particular what they viewed as the risk of being excluded from the cutting edge of developments in peacekeeping. Within the defence forces, views of NATO and PfP are generally very positive, with NATO seen as the military gold standard and engagement with NATO via PfP as important in terms of ensuring the ability of the defence forces to operate alongside other militaries.

In terms of non-governmental groups addressing foreign and security policy, a number of groups may be identified. The Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA, originally established as the Institute for European Affairs in 1991) is Ireland's only foreign policy think tank (Institute of International and European Affairs nd). The IIEA is independent and does not take political positions; its primary activities are hosting expert speakers and conferences and publishing reports on policy issues. Although not taking policy positions, the IIEA sought to facilitate debate on PfP in the late 1990s and has contributed to ongoing debate on Ireland's involvement in the EU's CFSP and CSDP, helping to correct some popular misperceptions about PfP and EU CFSP/CSDP. The main pro-European civil society group within Ireland is the European Movement Ireland (European Movement Ireland nd). Established in 1954 the EM Ireland seeks to promote debate on, understanding of and engagement with Europe (primarily the EU). Although independent and not taking formal positions, the EM Ireland is broadly pro-European in terms of Ireland's membership of and active engagement with the EU. With its focus on the EU, the EM Ireland has not focused on NATO, but during the debate on PfP in the 1990s the EM Ireland held a seminar on PfP which facilitated public debate and again corrected some popular misperceptions. The IIEA and EM Ireland can be viewed as mainstream groups, which, while not taking positions as such, have been broadly supportive of Ireland's engagement with PfP and its involvement in EU CFSP and CSDP. It is also worth noting that there is no equivalent in Ireland to the pro-NATO/pro-Atlanticist Atlantic Council/Commission groups that exist in most NATO member states and a number of other European states.

On the left of the civil society spectrum have been a number of peace groups, in particular the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA), Action from Ireland (AFRI) and the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Irish CND) (Peace and Neutrality Alliance nd; Action from Ireland nd; the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament nd). These groups are strongly supportive of neutrality and have opposed Ireland's participation in PfP and the EU's CSDP, arguing that these are components of a broader Western militarism and undermine Irish neutrality. These peace groups are quite vocal and have a certain presence on the Irish political scene, but their views have not ultimately swayed the balance of public opinion.

Opinion polls over a long period of time indicate strong public support for neutrality but also a degree of confusion and contradiction in

public thinking (Ishizuka 1999, 192; Keatinge 1995, 162 and 169; Rees 2000, 259). The debates of the 1990s and 2000s suggest public concern about a number of issues: neutrality per se (in terms of taking on a formal collective defence commitment); possible loss of national control over the deployment of Irish troops overseas, especially for combat operations; possible compulsory involvement in armaments projects; and hypothetical conscription into a European army. As discussed above, once Irish governments were able to reassure the public in relation to these concerns, there was majority public support for participation in PfP and the EU's CSDP. Overall, Irish public opinion can be viewed as characterised by a mix of principled support for neutrality, wariness of a slide into militarism and pragmatic support for participation in PfP and the EU's CSDP.

Cooperation Within PfP

When Ireland joined PfP in 1999, the terms of Irish participation were approved by the Cabinet and the Dáil and laid out in Ireland's PfP 'Presentation Document'. The Irish government identified five priorities for cooperation with NATO: peacekeeping; humanitarian operations; search and rescue; protection of the environment; and marine matters (Irish Times 1999). Since then, these priorities have been re-affirmed in Ireland's biannual Individual Partnership Programmes (IPP) and Partnership Goals within the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) (Department of Defence 2002). Ireland's cooperation with NATO thus has a strong emphasis on peacekeeping and humanitarianism. Within PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Ireland has sought to champion these issues. Two particular humanitarian issues which Ireland has sought to support discussion and action on in PfP/EAPC have been landmines and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Ireland has also contributed to PfP trust funds. One additional issue which has been a particular priority of Irish foreign policy has been women, peace and security: building on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, Ireland has developed two national action plans on women, peace and security, covering the periods 2011–14 and 2015–18 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade nd). Within PfP/EAPC, Ireland has sought to highlight the importance of addressing issues relating women, peace and security and encourage dialogue on how to take this agenda forward.

Within the Irish government and the defence forces, there is a strong recognition of the value of cooperation with NATO. According to the 2015 defence white paper noted at the beginning of this chapter:

> NATO has become the standard-setting organisation for modern military forces, in effect the de facto 'ISO' of the military world. …(F)or practical reasons, and given that 22 EU member states are also members of NATO, the EU uses NATO standards and procedures on its missions. In order to be accepted as a peacekeeping partner, it is now necessary for the Defence Forces to be trained and equipped to NATO standards. (Department of Defence 2015, 65)

The white paper states that Ireland will 'continue to participate in NATO's PfP with a view to ensuring that the Defence Forces have the necessary interoperable capabilities to participate in modern, demanding peacekeeping operations alongside other European military forces', including through engagement with NATO's Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) (Department of Defence 2015, 30).

In terms of peacekeeping, Ireland has also been involved in the Viking peacekeeping exercises in 2011 and 2014. The Swedish-led Viking exercises are military command post exercises, simulating a crisis management situation involving multiple countries and multiple actors (including militaries, international organisations and non-governmental humanitarian actors). The Irish Defence Forces Training Centre has acted as one of the sites for the exercise, alongside other sites in both NATO and non-NATO countries.

Beyond PfP, Ireland also has elements of defence cooperation with a number of NATO member states. As noted above, Irish defence cooperation with Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, can be dated back to the Second World War when there was quite a high degree of practical cooperation and planning for joint military action in the event of a German invasion of Ireland. Elements of this cooperation with Britain and the United States continued into the post-war period, for example in relation to surveying of underwater gradients off Gormanstown military airbase, County Meath (near Dublin) in 1948 and the testing of a US defence navigation system in 1953 (McCabe 1991, 115–16 and 153). In subsequent decades, the troubled situation in Northern Ireland resulted in cooperation with the British military in relation to terrorism and the

management of the border. Given the sensitivity of Northern Ireland as a domestic political issue within the Republic, however, such cooperation was low-key and largely below the public radar. The Irish defence forces have also had long-standing arrangements for the training of officers in the United States, the United Kingdom and some other European countries. More recently, participation in the EU's battlegroups has also involved cooperation with EU member states which are also NATO member states. Ireland's participation in the EU Nordic Battlegroup in the late 2000s and early 2010s involved cooperation with NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway, as well as fellow neutrals Finland and Sweden. In 2015 Ireland agreed to participate in an EU battlegroup with NATO members Germany, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, as well as neutral Austria (O'Halloran 2015). Interestingly, given the sensitivity of relations with the United Kingdom, in the early 2010s Ireland began to expand defence cooperation with Britain. In 2013 Ireland agreed to deploy forces to Mali in a joint British-Irish unit to help train the Malian army (as part of a larger UN mandated EU mission) (thejournal.ie 2013). In 2015 the two countries went further, concluding a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation: the agreement will involve closer cooperation between the two countries' militaries, the Irish military training British soldiers in peacekeeping and the British supplying surplus military equipment to Ireland (Collins 2015).

The overall picture which emerges from a review of Irish military cooperation activities in the context of PfP and the EU is of a military increasingly engaged in a European wide network of military training and cooperation, with NATO and the EU as hubs alongside various other multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Within this, however, the emphasis in Irish engagement remains very much on peacekeeping and humanitarian support and not collective defence or high-end combat operations.

Peacekeeping and Crisis Management

Ireland's responses to NATO's interventions and peacekeeping operations since the 1990s have been shaped by the twin imperatives of a strong wariness of the use of force, arising from the long-standing policy of neutrality, and the desire to contribute to and engage with NATO's peacekeeping operations so long as these do not push the boundaries of peacekeeping too far in the direction of use of force or combat operations. At the height

of the Bosnia conflict in 1995, that war 'did not seem to engage Irish political life in such a focused way… So far as Irish party political debate was concerned the Balkans seemed almost as remote as Beijing or East Timor' (Keatinge 1996, 166). While Ireland supported humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution efforts, it emphasised a policy of neutrality towards the various parties in the conflict and opposed the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to defend themselves or more forceful intervention (Delaney 2010). During the Kosovo war in 1999, Ireland was torn between traditional wariness of the use of force (reinforced by the fact that NATO acted without UN Security Council authorisation once it was clear that Russia would have vetoed a UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force) and arguments that NATO's action was nonetheless legitimate and necessary (and had the support of virtually all EU members). The Irish government initially refused to either condemn or support NATO's air war in Kosovo. Minister of Defence Michael Smith argued that 'There are matters that are totally outside our control. We work within the UN and we have sought to get agreement.' Foreign Minister David Andrews described Ireland's position being 'between a rock and hard place.' Some on the political right argued that Ireland should support NATO's action. The Green Party and some on the left strongly opposed NATO's action. Within the EU, Ireland eventually agreed to an April 1999 foreign ministers' statement describing NATO's action as 'necessary and warranted' (revised from a draft statement using the word 'justified' because Ireland and the other EU neutral states did not view NATO's action as having a clear international legal basis). Shortly thereafter, however, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern issued a strong statement supporting NATO's action, saying 'these things have to happen' (Rees 2000, 266–7).

Initially, Ireland engaged very cautiously with NATO's emerging peacekeeping role, reflecting the sensitive domestic political debate over PfP in the mid-to-late 1990s. When NATO deployed forces in late 1995–early 1996 to enforce the peace settlement in Bosnia, Ireland did not contribute forces (Keatinge 1996, 166). As it became clear that NATO would play a major role in peacekeeping in the Balkans—and potentially more generally—the Irish government, foreign policy-makers and defence forces took the view that it was important, even vital, for Ireland to contribute to NATO operations and be able to operate alongside NATO forces—which, as noted above, was one of the arguments for joining PfP. Even before joining PfP, in 1997 the Dáil approved participation in the NATO

operation in Bosnia and an initial force of 49 troops was deployed (Rees 1998, 143–4). Between 1997 and 2003, the Irish contribution consisted of a Military Police Company Headquarters and a Military Police Platoon; these elements were withdrawn in 2003 and since then Ireland has had approximately 10 people serving in the headquarters of what transitioned into the EU mission Operation Althea/EUFOR (EU Force) in December 2004 (Defence Forces nd a). In Kosovo, at the point when Ireland was joining PfP in 1999, the Irish government decided to make a more substantial commitment. Initially, this involved the deployment of a transport/logistics company; from 2004 the transport/logistics company was replaced by an armoured personnel carrier-mounted infantry company and in 2007–08 Ireland commanded Multinational Command Task Force—Centre (MNTF-C), one of the regional elements KFOR is structured around and an important position in the overall command structure of the mission (Defence Forces nd b). NATO officials view Ireland as having made a valuable contribution to KFOR. As the KFOR mission has been scaled down since the late 2000s, the Irish presence has also been scaled back and now involves approximately 10 staff at KFOR HQ. Between 2002 and 2014 Ireland also contributed about seven personnel to the headquarters of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. In January 2015, the Irish government decided to maintain a similar commitment to the NATO follow-on mission in Afghanistan. There was never, however, any consideration of Ireland making a larger contribution to the NATO force in Afghanistan.

Two features of Ireland's engagement with NATO in relation to peacekeeping and intervention may be noted. First, where NATO has engaged in operations closer to traditional peacekeeping Ireland has been involved (as in Bosnia and Kosovo); where NATO has engaged in coercive air operations (as in Bosnia in 1994–95, Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011) and ground combat operations (as in Afghanistan) Ireland has found itself treading an ambivalent line in between support, agnosticism and opposition and certainly has been wary of any large-scale involvement (since Ireland has no combat airforce, there is no question of possible involvement in coercive air operations). Second, when it appeared in the 1990s and 2000s that NATO would play a central role in peacekeeping, Irish governments came to view engagement with NATO and contributing to NATO-led operations as important. Since NATO has wound down its operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, engagement has become to some extent less important in terms of Ireland's role in peacekeeping.

The extent to which NATO remains a significant player in peacekeeping may therefore have a significant bearing on Ireland's engagement with the Alliance.

Conclusion

Ireland's relationship with NATO since the 1990s has moved from being a previously non-existent one to a partnership but a distinctly low-profile partnership. This reflects the wider context of Ireland's international identity which can be characterised as a distinctive combination of a Western democracy and a small post-colonial state, within which neutrality and support for a normative and anti-militarist foreign policy are central elements. The idea of neutrality and the commitment to a normative and anti-militarist foreign policy, furthermore, have become deeply embedded in the Irish national identity. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Ireland was a late engager with PfP in the 1990s and that Ireland's partnership with NATO has been a low-profile one.

In terms of the drivers of Ireland's engagement with NATO, a number of factors can be noted. First, by the late 1990s staying outside PfP risked placing Ireland in a position of self-exclusion in terms of European security institutions alongside only a few other highly marginal micro-states. Second, once NATO assumed a central role in peacekeeping in the Balkans—and potentially more broadly—cooperation with NATO became important if Ireland was to remain at the forefront of developments in peacekeeping and able to join NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Third, if, as the 2015 Irish defence white paper argues, NATO is now the military ISO, cooperation with NATO is important, arguably even essential, if the Irish defence forces are to be able to operate alongside other advanced militaries, including in peacekeeping operations. As a consequence of its involvement in PfP and the EU's CSDP, as well as other multilateral and bilateral arrangements, Ireland is now quite densely integrated into a European nexus of military cooperation and integration within which NATO and the EU are central. Within all of this, however, the focus of Irish activity remains very much on peacekeeping and humanitarian support and constrained (or protected, depending on one's preference) by the specific Irish guarantees put in place in the context of the EU's Nice and Lisbon treaties.

In terms of the theoretical questions about the drivers of states' security policies and processes of security policy adaptation outlined at the

beginning of this volume, the Irish case suggests a number of conclusions. First, the initial decision to become neutral in the late 1930s reflected fairly Realist logic of maintaining independence and avoiding attack by either Germany or Britain, reinforced by the need for policy that was domestically sustainable in the wake of the civil war. Second, the decision not to join NATO in 1949 reflected the extent to which neutrality had already become quite deeply embedded domestically and abandoning that policy might re-open serious domestic divisions (plus a misplaced hope that the invitation to join NATO might be used to leverage Irish re-unification). Third, the development and evolution of Irish neutrality since the 1930s can be viewed as a process of social construction, whereby a particular model of neutrality, with a strong normative and anti-militarist component, has become a deeply embedded part of collective Irish national identity. Fourth, in terms of adaptation in the PfP/NATO context since the 1990s, Ireland has adapted to PfP/NATO/EU institutions and norms, but that adaptation has occurred alongside the retention of core elements of distinctive national Irish policies rather than simple adoption of a wholesale package of PfP/NATO/EU institutions, norms and policies. In addition, Ireland has also sought to bring its own national policies and expertise to the table and to shape wider PfP/NATO/EAPC policies (even if the extent to which it can do so is limited).

In terms of the future, Ireland's participation in PfP and the EU's CSDP are now well established and policy in this context is largely the subject of ordinary governmental policy-making rather than more prominent public debate or controversy. Given the strong domestic embedding of neutrality, there is no prospect of Ireland joining NATO. Equally, although some on the political left remain strongly opposed to NATO, PfP and the EU's CSDP, there is little or no prospect of Ireland disengaging from these processes now that it is part of them. For the Irish government and defence forces, further engagement with NATO is viewed as very important—vital even—in terms of maintaining the ability to operate alongside other European militaries in peacekeeping operations (Department of Defence 2015, 29–30 and 64–5). The extent of Ireland's engagement with NATO, however, is likely to be shaped to an important degree by how central or otherwise NATO remains to the business of peacekeeping in the future.

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CHAPTER 8

Switzerland and NATO: From Non-Relationship to Cautious Partnership

Christian Nünlist

For Swiss foreign and security policy, Switzerland's decision to participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in November 1996 marked a watershed. After 1945, Switzerland had continued to pursue the policy of neutrality that had allowed the country to survive two world wars relatively unscathed, despite its geographical position at the heart of Europe. During the Cold War, Switzerland remained aloof from international organizations like NATO, the United Nations or the European Communities. While there were sporadic, informal, contacts with the Western military alliance, Switzerland overall maintained its armed, permanent neutrality. Instead, Switzerland distinguished itself as a bridge builder between the two blocs. In the Helsinki process, Swiss diplomats played a remarkably active role as mediators between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, making a constructive contribution to overcoming the Cold War in Europe. Historian Philipp Rosin recently described this strategy as 'influence by neutrality' (Rosin 2014).

To this day, Switzerland continues to chart an independent course and remains a special case in Europe. It is neither a member of the EU, nor of NATO. After the end of the Cold War, however, Swiss foreign and security policy changed dramatically. Since the mid-1990s, international security

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cooperation has been promoted under the new slogan of 'security through cooperation'. This high-minded rhetoric was followed by concrete action, including participation in the PfP from 1996. In addition, Switzerland also contributed substantially to military peacekeeping in the Western Balkans.

The first part of this chapter reviews informal contact between Switzerland and NATO during the Cold War, particularly in the early 1950s. The prevailing image of a 'non-relationship' (Mantovani 2000) between the neutral country and the Western military alliance needs to be revised. The second part reconstructs the long path from invitation to Swiss participation in the PfP from 1993 to 1996 and analyses Switzerland's partnership with NATO from 1996 to 2016. In the third part, domestic criticism of Switzerland's NATO policy from right-wing national-conservatives as well as leftist pacifists is discussed. Swiss PfP activities remained largely under the radar of the general Swiss public, despite regular reports of the government on its dealings with NATO. The fourth section is dedicated to Switzerland's military contribution to NATO-led stabilization missions in the Western Balkans and in Afghanistan. The fifth and final part analyses concrete bilateral military cooperation between neutral Switzerland and individual NATO member states.

Switzerland and NATO During the Cold War

Swiss foreign policy has traditionally been shaped by neutrality as its dominant principle. In 1815, Europe's major countries formally accepted Swiss neutrality. Since then, neutral Switzerland flourished as an impartial pole amid competing great powers, having a calming influence as well as offering a venue for summit meetings and hosting international organizations. Neutrality stood the test of time both during the nineteenth century and the two world wars.

After the Second World War, Switzerland found itself isolated within the new European and global order. Relations with the two emerging superpowers, the United States and the USSR, were tattered because of Swiss arms sales to, and financial transactions with, Nazi Germany. Switzerland's traditional neutral aloofness was incompatible with the very idea of collective security. In 1946, the Swiss Federal Council decided not to join the UN, since membership under reserve of neutrality was not accepted (Spillmann 2001, 34–8). Swiss Foreign Minister Max Petitpierre (1945–61), however, managed to improve relations with Washington and Moscow. The evolving East-West conflict paralysed the UN and afforded

the neutrals a niche policy of providing good offices and mediation. Thus, Switzerland was able to continue its well-proven policy of neutrality (Trachsler 2011, 59–75).

During the Cold War, there was never any doubt that strictly anti-Communist Switzerland was firmly anchored in the Western camp, not only geographically, but also culturally and economically. For example, Switzerland participated in 1947 in the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe after the war. The move revealed a clear Western orientation, departing from a strict policy of neutrality. Swiss accession to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 was again framed during parliamentary ratification debates as a move to join a purely economic organization without any political character. This dogma, the insistence that politics and economics constituted two completely separate spheres, enabled Switzerland during the entire Cold War to join so-called non-political, technical international organizations, while the country stayed away from 'political organizations' due to neutrality reasons (Möckli 2000, 254–66).

Western Debates on a Swiss NATO Membership, 1948

On the question of Switzerland's relations with Western defence alliances, however, Foreign Minister Petitpierre had no political leeway. Both the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty were military alliances with a mutually agreed duty to provide assistance in case of attack by a third party. Permanent neutrality prohibited the Swiss government from joining such an alliance. In peacetime, Switzerland was not allowed to enter into commitments which would have made it impossible to respect neutrality laws in case of war (Trachsler 2011, 137–40). Officially, Switzerland's relationship with NATO throughout the Cold War was characterized by a policy of distancing.

Nevertheless, in the process leading to NATO's creation, Switzerland was quietly considered by Western powers as a possible ally. In March 1948, the US State Department recommended that the Western European Union (WEU) should 'eventually include Eire, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, and Austria' (FRUS 1948, 61f). In Washington, powerful advocates of Switzerland's accession to a defensive alliance of Western democracies included Policy Planning Staff Director George F. Kennan and John D. Hickerson, the person in charge of the secret Pentagon negotiations on the establishment of NATO (Mantovani 1999, 40).

On 30 March 1948, however, Petitpierre emphasized, during a private meeting with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, that Switzerland would preserve its armed neutrality in the East-West conflict (DDS 1999, 220f). During secret trilateral consultations with the United States and Canada, the British thus recommended that Switzerland not be invited to a preparatory conference for an Atlantic Pact, since this would merely provoke a rebuff (FRUS 1948, 70f). During the Washington Talks in July 1948, the Canadian representative again mentioned Switzerland as a 'spiritual and economic member of the North Atlantic community', but this time, the United States made clear that Switzerland would not join NATO (FRUS 1948, 169–83, 204f, 470f).

At the time, Western interest in economic cooperation with Switzerland prevailed. In no way should too much political pressure over possible NATO membership discourage Swiss economic participation in the reconstruction of war-torn Western Europe. This link between Switzerland's participation in the Marshall Plan and Western 'tolerance' of Swiss neutrality policy also prominently appeared in the US State Department's first internal policy guidance on Switzerland in March 1949: 'The success of US policy of encouraging Switzerland to contribute to and participate in the cooperative effort for the rehabilitation of Western Europe, it must be recognized, depends to some extent on refraining from bringing pressure on Switzerland to ally itself with any political or military group in defence of Western Europe' (Mantovani 1999, 43).

For the West, Swiss NATO membership was also not essential in strategic military terms. Geographically, Switzerland was completely surrounded by Western powers or by territory occupied by Western powers. NATO planners thus assumed that the alpine terrain and the military will of the Swiss would deter a Soviet military attack or, if such an attack occurred, the Swiss army would resolutely and, at least initially, effectively defend their territory (Mantovani 1999, 44).

Informal Contacts Between Switzerland and NATO, 1949–58

For credibility reasons, neutral Switzerland had to strictly distance itself from NATO, even though, paradoxically, the country would be dependent precisely on the military assistance of NATO countries in wartime (Mantovani 2000, 210). For neutral Switzerland, the politically most sensitive issue of cooperating with NATO was entering into preliminary military agreements in the case of war. Due to its geographically central

location in the NATO front, Switzerland was included in Anglo-American war plans for the defence of Western Europe from 1948. At the same time, Western military planners knew how delicate secret operational war planning was for the Swiss: 'Prior coordination is unfortunately impossible owing to the Swiss policy of neutrality' (Mantovani 1999, 93). In 1940, written agreements between the Swiss army leadership and the French General Staff had fallen into German hands: these 'La-Charité-sur-Loire' documents severely compromised Switzerland's neutrality in Berlin; after 1945, Switzerland wished to avoid another embarrassing instance of public collusion.

British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery played a central role in the informal contacts between the Western alliance and Switzerland. From 1946, the legendary Second World War hero regularly met with Swiss federal councillors or leading figures of the Swiss army during skiing holidays in the Bernese Oberland. On 30 January 1949, Montgomery talked with the Chief of Staff Louis de Montmollin in Mürren about possible military cooperation of Switzerland with the WEU in the event of war. Montmollin explained that Switzerland's preparations were aimed at defending the country on its own. An automatic alliance with the WEU was impossible, Montmollin emphasized, and the Swiss government would only decide on a military alliance in the event of a crisis. In response, Montgomery asked for at least immediate contact when war broke out (DDS 1999, 334–7, 355–62). The WEU commander promised Switzerland immediate air support. Montmollin replied that Switzerland would actually prefer the Western powers to attack Soviet fighter jets, without a formal request to Switzerland and even in Swiss airspace. 'The Swiss would turn a blind eye', he assured Montgomery; 'how blind would depend on how close the Russians were' (Mantovani 1999; Wyss 2013, 64f). Later that year, Switzerland expanded its military airfields within the 'Redoubt' to enable the landing of NATO transport planes and acceptance of help from the air in the event of war (Mantovani 1999, 95).

When Montgomery met again with Montmollin on 28 January 1950, he criticized the Swiss army as being both unable to cooperate with the Western powers, due to their lack of strategic mobility and offensive weapons, and unable to autonomously defend the country (DDS 2001, 81–4; Mantovani 1999, 100f). On 15 February 1950, Montgomery met Swiss Foreign Minister Petitpierre in Mürren and said bluntly that 'Switzerland was not getting full value for the large sums she was spending on defence' (Mantovani 1999, 102; DDS 2001, 95–9).

After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Swiss government did not seriously think about joining NATO. However, Switzerland massively ramped up its armament programme. Its defence budget rose from CHF 381 million (1947) to CHF 666 million (1951) and CHF 880 million (1952). From NATO member Great Britain, Switzerland purchased fighter planes and tanks (Fuhrer 2005, 109). Although Petitpierre still propagated maintaining economic relations with the East, ideologically Switzerland was clearly positioned in the Western camp. With the so-called Hotz-Linder Agreement of July 1951, a deal which only became public in 1987, Switzerland under US pressure secretly joined Western embargo policy towards the Soviet Union and its satellite states. This secret alignment with Western economic warfare against the Soviet bloc clearly contradicted Switzerland's official policy of neutrality (Schaller 1987).

In August 1951, Montgomery for three days inspected the Swiss defence line from Basel via Schaffhausen and Sargans to Chur along the Rhine line. Montgomery explained to the Swiss 'how, and where the NATO forces on their flanks would like to hook on to the Swiss defences' (Wyss 2013, 169). He established points of contact in the Engadin and Münstertal for potential combined operations of the Swiss and Italian armies. Montgomery, now the deputy to NATO Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, also felt responsible for the defence of neutral Switzerland: 'I am engaged in ensuring that the neutral bastion of Switzerland shall fit suitably into the grand tactical design of Western Europe; this is immensely important' (Mantovani 1999, 106).

At another meeting in the spring of 1952, Montgomery and Montmollin apparently defined exact contact, connection and hinge points between Swiss troops and NATO forces in the border region to jointly resist a possible attack of the Red Army. In 1952, he promised Montmollin that NATO would protect Switzerland's southern flank in the event of war. In return, he recommended that Switzerland's 3rd Army Corps be withdrawn from the Alpine region and moved into the Central Plateau to strengthen the defence of Switzerland's northeastern border. Instead of receding into the 'Redoubt', Montgomery argued, the Swiss should fight on the borders in the northeast, in coordination with NATO (Mantovani 1999, 107–13).

As yet, no archival evidence from the Swiss side has appeared to document such a verbal deal between the Swiss armed forces and NATO for wartime operations in the spring of 1952. Documents from British

archives, however, make clear that Montgomery was satisfied with his 1952 agreement with Montmollin: 'We at last have the Swiss deployed to fight in concert with other Powers in a general European war, and not deployed for all-round defence as was done before I persuaded them to re-deploy their Army in relation to our dispositions in NATO', he wrote in late 1953 (Mantovani 1999, 112, 288). While the Swiss indeed moved their defensive lines from the Alps into the midlands, recent research has shown that this was not a direct consequence of the Montgomery talks, which were known only to a few people, but rather a result of domestic debates about modern defence (Möckli 2011; Braun 2006).

The military strategic location of Switzerland in the heart of the West changed in 1955 with the inclusion of West Germany into NATO and Austrian neutrality. Although the Red Army withdrew from Austria, Swiss military commanders still complained that their country was 'dangerously exposed' after the withdrawal of British and French troops stationed in Austria. A senior officer of the Swiss army even said that after the Austrian State Treaty, 'the Russians are now standing as close as on Lake Constance' (Mantovani 1999, 174). For Montgomery, however, the new geostrategic situation in 1955 meant a significant advantage for Switzerland. As he wrote to the Swiss defence ministry, Austrian neutrality in his view strengthened the strategic position of the West and Switzerland, because it moved the defensive line to the East. Thus, the West would win valuable time (Mantovani 1999, 175). The connection points between Swiss and NATO forces, as agreed in 1952, now became irrelevant (Fuhrer 2005, 114).

In January 1956, Montgomery met with the new Swiss Defence Minister Paul Chaudet. When Montgomery said that there could be no neutrality for small states in a modern nuclear war between two blocs, Chaudet agreed and added that 'If war should ever break out in Europe, Switzerland would join the Western Alliance.' Chaudet said that 'this must be kept entirely secret and I was the only person with whom they would ever discuss the matter.' In peacetime, the Swiss policy of strict neutrality would remain (Mantovani 1999, 296f). In the Swiss memorandum of the conversation, the sentence that Switzerland would join NATO in case of attack is missing (Lezzi 1995a). If Chaudet had indeed made such a statement, without including reference to a previous violation of Swiss territory by the Red Army, it would have been a delicate political statement. But ultimately, it corresponded perfectly to Swiss security strategy in the Cold War. If the Red Army did not respect Swiss neutrality in an attack on Western Europe, the Swiss army would have defended its territory initially

independently, hoping for the help of NATO. Montgomery actually assured Chaudet of NATO's air support, if necessary including the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Lezzi 1995b). It is important to bear in mind that in case of war, neutral Switzerland was allowed to enter into a military alliance for her defence. For a permanently neutral country, only participation in preliminary military agreements in peacetime was forbidden. The informal talks of Montmollin and Chaudet with Montgomery of the early 1950s certainly made maximum use of the political leeway afforded to neutrality policy. Wyss (2013, 170) argues that Switzerland undermined its status as a permanently neutral state through this peacetime defence cooperation.

Another delicate question concerned the integration of Swiss airspace and territory into Western air defence concepts. In 1960, Etienne Primault, Commander of Switzerland's Air Force and Air Defence, discreetly visited NATO's Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF) in Ramstein (2th ATAF) and in Mönchengladbach (4th ATAF) to discuss how to coordinate the Swiss Air Force with NATO's air defence. Primault learned that Swiss airspace was split between the 4th (Ramstein) and 5th ATAF (in Vicenca, Italy) and that NATO planned to defend Switzerland's air space on its own, neglecting Swiss military potential. Apparently, NATO even considered using its nuclear armed anti-aircraft missiles stationed in the Black Forest over the Zurich region. In wartime, NATO seemed determined to integrate Swiss airspace from the beginning into its own theatre—even in a situation where the Soviet Union respected Swiss neutrality (Mantovani 1999, 195–207; Braun 2012, 168f).

Swiss Security Policy, 1973–90: Autonomous Defence and Détente

After the stabilization of the status quo in Europe and the first signs of East-West détente in 1963, informal military contacts between Switzerland and NATO became less important. An indirect reference to NATO was made in the landmark Swiss Security Policy report of June 1973, which postulated a similar two-pronged strategy for Swiss policy as that of NATO's Harmel doctrine. In the 1967 NATO Harmel report, the task of actively using the alliance for a reduction of East-West relations was added to the original NATO task of military deterrence and defence. The 1973 Swiss Security Policy report also recommended a dual-track strategy of defence and an active neutrality policy (Spillmann 2001, 112). In practice, however, Swiss security policy from 1973 to 1990 remained predomi-

nantly shaped by military and defence policy and passive neutrality—that is, 'security policy without foreign policy'—with the notable exception of the very active and constructive Swiss participation in the multilateral diplomatic marathon of the Helsinki Process (Breitenmoser 2002). In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Switzerland played a valuable dual role, often together with the other European neutrals Austria, Sweden and Finland. On the one hand, Switzerland played a mediating role between East and West, repeatedly advancing the multilateral negotiation process by mutually agreed compromises. On the other hand, Switzerland's interests were closely aligned with Western objectives, especially in the realm of human rights. That Switzerland was, unlike most Western CSCE participating states, not involved in complex intra-bloc consultation processes turned out to be an advantage for Swiss diplomats like Edouard Brunner (Nünlist 2008).

In the 1980s, the military component of Swiss security policy was again upgraded both quantitatively and qualitatively in response to a deteriorating security situation in Europe. In the final stages of the Cold War, Switzerland purchased modern battle tanks, anti-tank missiles and a tactical aviation radar system from NATO states. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Swiss army as the 'showpiece' of Swiss security policy was massively expanded and modernized to maintain its deterrent value (Schneider 2013, 129–33).

In sum, the image of a strictly autonomous national defence of Switzerland during the Cold War needs to be revised from today's perspective, mainly due to the important study by Mantovani (1999). We now know that already in the early Cold War, Switzerland and NATO had cautiously approached each other. However, neutral Switzerland's relationship with the Western military alliance remained clearly less close than Sweden's secret collusion with NATO (Dalsjö 2006), and was largely based on informal bilateral contacts between Swiss officials and Montgomery.

Switzerland as a Peace Partner of NATO, 1996–2016

After the end of the Cold War, Swiss security policy and Switzerland's relationship with NATO changed significantly. As a small neutral state, Switzerland still pursued an autonomous foreign and security policy and thus remained a special case in Europe. To this day, it is a member of neither the EU nor NATO. However, after 1993, the slogan of 'security

through cooperation', quite a revolutionary concept in the Swiss context, replaced Switzerland's traditional autonomous defence and self-imposed international isolation of the Cold War. Active foreign policy henceforth became an important pillar of Swiss security policy (Nünlist 2015a, 2017). This time, the rhetoric of Swiss White Papers was translated into concrete action. Switzerland's decision to join NATO's PfP initiative in November 1996 marked one important step towards the new cooperative security approach.

Swiss Debates on NATO's Partnership for Peace, 1993–96

Already in November 1993, Switzerland had expressed an interest in the US idea of a 'peace partnership' with NATO, in fact as one of the first potential NATO partner countries. The Swiss foreign and defence ministries wanted to seriously examine the US proposal (Tages-Anzeiger 1993; Stocker 2000, 69). For Swiss domestic political reasons, it was certainly an advantage that the original 'partnership for peacekeeping' was renamed by giving it the more general label 'partnership for peace' after the death of 18 US soldiers during an ill-fated UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in October 1993 (Wallander 2000, 721). Swiss Defence Minister Kaspar Villiger regarded the possibility of closer relations with NATO as a great opportunity for internationalizing Swiss security policy, because it offered cooperation that was tailored and individually adapted for each country (Der Bund 1993). For Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, too, PfP perfectly matched with Swiss ambitions for an active neutrality policy; however, in his view, the question of how a partnership with NATO would affect Swiss neutrality policy in peacetime first had to be clarified (Tages-Anzeiger 1994a). Following NATO's official invitation to all CSCE participating states in January 1994 to join the PfP initiative, the Swiss government defined Switzerland's room for manoeuvre. The Federal Council made clear that Switzerland would still maintain its neutrality and would never join NATO. Also, Switzerland would not participate in PfP military exercises relating to collective defence. After the referendum of December 1992 not to join the European Economic Association (EEA), the government wanted to avoid a renewed domestic debate on neutrality at all cost (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 59).

While Finland and Sweden joined PfP in 1994, Switzerland's participation was delayed by more than two years. The reason was another referen-

dum. In June 1994, Swiss voters voted against sending Swiss UN peacekeepers abroad, by a majority of 57.2 per cent. Thus, Swiss voters frustrated the government's desire for Switzerland to contribute militarily to international peacekeeping efforts (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 60). Subsequently, the PfP dossier rested for the time being. During a period of reflection, an interdepartmental working group concluded that participating in the PfP was compatible with Swiss neutrality policy. Through customized cooperation, Switzerland would benefit from rapprochement with Europe's most important security actor without sacrificing its sovereignty (Tages-Anzeiger 1994b).

On 11 January 1995, the Swiss government again discussed the question of a possible PfP participation. The new defence minister, Adolf Ogi and Foreign Minister Cotti both advocated a partnership with NATO, but the seven-member Federal Council collectively thought that joining PfP at that time was still premature (Federal Council 1996a; Der Bund 1995). The presidents of both parliamentary security policy commissions were in favour of Swiss PfP participation, but in the light of upcoming parliamentary elections of October 1995, they recommended that the decision again be delayed (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 62f).

Switzerland's rapprochement with NATO, however, suddenly became very topical because of the activities of the international community during the Bosnia war in 1995–96. When the Swiss government realized that political parties and public opinion supported Switzerland's involvement in Bosnia through a Swiss 'yellow bérets' contingent under the OSCE banner in 1996—when the OSCE began to deploy military observers and military specialists in the Caucasus and the Balkans, these personnel wore yellow berets to distinguish them from blue helmeted UN units—the Federal Council, after consultation with the parliament, decided on 30 October 1996 that Switzerland should join the PfP. Switzerland's new partnership with NATO was legitimized with the argument that Swiss PfP participation was really a continuation of traditional Swiss good offices (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1996; Tages-Anzeiger 1996b).

On 11 December 1996, Swiss President Cotti signed the Swiss PfP Framework Document in Brussels, establishing the formal participation of Switzerland in the NATO partnership programme. Cotti again reiterated that Switzerland would continue to adhere to neutrality and would refuse to participate in military exercises relating to collective defence (Federal Council 1996b).

Swiss PfP Activities, 1996–2016

In 1997, Switzerland established a diplomatic mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels to represent it as a partner country. Within PfP, Swiss activities focused on the democratic control of armed forces, transparency in defence planning and budgets, capabilities for peace support operations, cooperation in crisis management and civil emergency planning. These PfP goals perfectly matched the new cooperative security policy of Switzerland of the 1990s. From 1997, Switzerland participated in 200–250 PfP courses, conferences and exercises every year to improve cooperation with PfP partner countries in crisis management and, after 2001, in the fight against global terrorism. In the past 20 years, the focus of Switzerland's PfP activities offered to partners remained fairly constant. They included courses in international humanitarian law, demining, arms control and disarmament, medical service and medical education, information and communication technologies, winter and summer mountaineering skills, civil protection, military observer training and general security policy education (EDA 2004, 14, 24f; Andrey 2010, 86f).

PfP also proved to be a central framework for Switzerland to strengthen military cooperation with the aim of building interoperability with foreign armed forces for multinational peace support operations and humanitarian assistance missions. With the Planning and Review Process (PARP), NATO offered its PfP partners an instrument for the guidance and control of military interoperability. PARP objectives became directly relevant for the defence planning of the Swiss armed forces (Perrig and Wigger 2006). The Swiss army greatly benefitted from Swiss participation in PfP military exercises. In November 2000, a first PfP military command post exercise ('Cooperative Determination') took place on Swiss territory, involving 400 officers and soldiers from 30 countries. The exercise served to improve military interoperability for peace support and humanitarian assistance missions at the level of a multinational brigade (Stocker 2000, 83).

Constant Swiss Focus on Kosovo Despite a Changing NATO, 2001–16

In retrospect, it is remarkable how constant Switzerland's policy as a NATO partner remained, even if NATO itself changed greatly from 1996 to 2016. For Switzerland, participation in PfP in the mid-1990s was possible and of interest because NATO had changed after the end of the Cold

War from a military defence alliance into an instrument for peace. The use of this 'new NATO' for democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, including the export of Western values, such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and the principle of civilian control over the military perfectly matched Switzerland's new cooperative security policy approach. Neutral Switzerland's cooperation with NATO was only conceivable due to NATO's new mission to further peace and stability in the OSCE area. The context of the Balkan wars was instrumental in shaping domestic acceptance of Switzerland's tentative rapprochement with NATO. When NATO changed after 9/11 to focus on the fight against global Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan, with functionality becoming more important in the alliance than geography, NATO partners, such as Sweden and Finland took advantage of the opportunity to develop their armed forces through active military participation in the international stabilization mission in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force or ISAF). Switzerland, like Austria, remained cautious. In general, Switzerland's partnership with NATO became more problematic during the 'Afghanistan decade' than in the 1990s. Switzerland remained an active PfP partner, contributing to NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission, but remained still bound to NATO's role of the 1990s (Nünlist and Zapfe 2014, 4).

To the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Switzerland only temporarily contributed a maximum of four staff officers as military observers between 2003 and 2008 (Nünlist and Zapfe 2014; see Federal Council 2003). The stabilization of the Western Balkans remained Switzerland's main focus. With Swiss boots on the ground in Kosovo, Switzerland contributed to reducing the burden on NATO allies and PfP partners fighting in Afghanistan. In 2012, Switzerland assumed command of the Regional Detachment North in Kosovo. Unlike the dwindling commitments of other countries, Switzerland's commitment in the Western Balkans has in fact increased in recent years. While KFOR was massively reduced from 50,000 troops (1999) to 2500 troops (2015), Switzerland increased the troop strength of the Swiss Company (or Swisscoy) from 220 to 235 soldiers in 2014. Swisscoy also assumed more critical tasks, such as the leadership of the liaison and observation teams in Northern Kosovo, which were tasked with gathering information on the situation on the ground through direct contact with the local population. In 2014, Switzerland contributed over CHF 150 million to programmes in the Western Balkans in the fields of development and cooperation, human security and peacekeeping. With niche capabilities such as explosive

ordnance disposal and mine clearance, Switzerland complemented the activities of other NATO states and PfP partners (Bieri 2014, 2015).

With the end of the ISAF mission and Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, NATO was transformed again in 2014. After Putin's aggression against Ukraine, NATO prioritized strengthening its eastern flank at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014. For Switzerland's partnership with NATO, the renewed transformation of the Western alliance provided a dilemma. On the one hand, Switzerland welcomed the shift of NATO's geographical focus back to Europe after the Afghanistan years. On the other hand, NATO's collective defence, again increasingly practised through military exercises, still remains a taboo for neutral Switzerland. In particular, Switzerland regretted that in 2014, the concept of cooperative security was drastically weakened and that NATO shifted back to a more confrontational attitude towards Russia (Nünlist 2015b).

Domestic Politics and Public Attitudes on NATO in Switzerland

The Swiss political system is a special case in Western Europe due to unique features including direct democracy and strong federalism. The Swiss executive (Federal Council) is composed of seven councillors (ministers) representing the main four political parties, each responsible for a department. Federalism and direct democracy has led to a consensual form of government, with members of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP), the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) traditionally forming the seven-member body of the Federal Council. Direct democratic participation is above average in international comparison. Swiss citizens have distinctive popular rights to shape not just domestic policy, but also Switzerland's foreign, defence and security policy through popular referenda. To avoid a negative reaction of Swiss voters at the polls, the Swiss government and parliament usually develop compromise, inclusive policy proposals. In general, Swiss foreign policy is thus structured bottom-up rather than top-down, and a workable compromise is traditionally preferred over a stringent concept (Haltiner 2011, 40f).

During the Cold War, the Soviet threat cemented a basic consensus on military and defence policy among Swiss political parties and the general public. With the exception of the extreme left, the Swiss population stood united behind the government's defence policy. The first sign that this

bipartisan consensus was slowly crumbling, was the lack of parliamentary approval from the Social Democrats (SP) to the 'troop regulation 61' ('Truppenverordnung 61') in the fall of 1960, a defence concept modelled after the United States' and NATO's mobile defence strategy. This model had been pushed through by reformist Swiss military officers after heated discussions against the resistance of those inclined to more traditional military thinking, who wanted to stick to the traditional nationwide infantry-based defence even in the nuclear age (Braun and Bühlmann 2006, 13ff).

The 'Mirage Affair' and the End of Swiss 'NATO Dreams'

Huge cost overruns on planned procurement of the Mirage fighter jet in 1964 led to an uproar in the Swiss parliament, the resignation of Swiss Defence Minister Paul Chaudet, and a loss of confidence of parliament and the public in the Federal Council and the administration. The 'Mirage affair' abruptly ended Switzerland's flirtation with the military defence concepts of the United States and NATO. With the forced reduction of the Mirage fleet, it was no longer possible for the air force and mechanized divisions to engage in combined operations. The affair also ended the brief dream of Switzerland developing its own national nuclear weapons programme (Spillmann 2001, 91–4).

Afterwards, the political forces critical of NATO were on the upswing. In the summer of 1964, National Councillor Walter Bringolf of the SP introduced a motion urging the government to consider a military-political course correction and a more cost-effective and more neutral national defence. In June 1966, the Federal Council submitted a new defence concept that reflected the 'spirit of realistic self-restraint' as demanded by Bringolf. The policy was also supported by the liberal-conservatives. This compromise ended the dispute over Swiss military strategy for the remainder of the Cold War (Braun 2006, 936–42).

Domestic Criticism of Swiss Security Policy After 1990

It was only after the end of the Cold War that the domestic political debate on Swiss security policy re-emerged. A first warning shot was the astonishing 35.6 per cent of voters who supported a referendum in favour of abolishing the Swiss army in 1989, just a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In June 1994, as mentioned above, Swiss voters refused to establish a Swiss contingent for UN peacekeeping missions. Shortly after taking

office, Swiss Defence Minister Adolf Ogi (SVP) announced a radical reform of the Swiss army, significantly downsizing it. He established an expert commission led by star diplomat Edouard Brunner to develop a modern military policy for Switzerland for the twenty-first century. In the 'Brunner Report', published in February 1998, neutrality was put into perspective and cooperation with neighbouring countries and international organizations and alliances was recommended instead of the previous strategy of going it alone (Brunner 1998; Spillmann 2001, 204f).

One member of the Brunner commission did not agree with the recommendations and published his own, alternative report. National Councillor Christoph Blocher (SVP), who in 1992 had significantly contributed to the campaign against Switzerland's accession to the EEA, called for retaining a large militia army, but rejected the idea of deploying it for international missions abroad. In addition, he argued, Switzerland should adhere to a strict concept of neutrality (Blocher 1998). Nevertheless, the Swiss government in its Security White Paper entitled 'Security through Cooperation' in June 1999 still firmly emphasized the new course of strengthening cooperation with foreign partners (Bundesrat 1999).

Criticism of Swiss PfP Participation from Left and Right

In 1996, Switzerland's rapprochement with NATO through the PfP already had been critically followed in domestic circles. Closer diplomatic and military contact with NATO at that time were still welcomed by the national-conservative SVP. The SP, however, emphasized, that Switzerland's foreign policy priorities should not be geared towards military security cooperation, but rather towards the civilian dimensions of European integration (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 67ff). In 1996, two parliamentary motions demanded that the Federal Council give parliament and Swiss voters a say in the PfP question. The government disagreed, maintaining that the PfP was only a political initiative without legal obligations and that PfP participation did not change Swiss neutrality policy. The Federal Council argued that planned Swiss PfP activities in the areas of training, planning and exercises were already covered in the 1995 military law. After parliamentary debates, National Councillor Remo Gysin (SP) withdrew his motion. The motion of National Councillor Rudolf Keller (SD) was rejected in the upper house by 98 to 19 votes (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 71–4).

Political battles in the Swiss parliament on national security policy continue today. The majority of the centre parties (CVP and FDP), the Federal Council, and sections of the Swiss army favour interoperability, foreign missions and PfP participation and thus approve of a rapprochement between Switzerland and NATO. Among the PfP's critics are the right-wing national-conservatives (SVP) as well as associations like 'Pro Militia' (an association of former military personnel of the Swiss army) or the 'Gruppe Giardino'. These circles criticize foreign missions, PfP participation, and a strong adaption to NATO, preferring a strong army geared towards national territorial defence. The SVP has repeatedly called for an end to Switzerland's PfP participation (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2007; Basler Zeitung 2014). On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Social Democrats (SP) want to downsize the army, but support foreign missions, Swiss UN peacekeeping operations and PfP participation. However, their focus is on civilian peacebuilding and development aid rather than military peacekeeping. The Greens support the radical idea of abolishing the Swiss armed forces altogether (Schneider 2013, 265f). In the federal budget debate of 2006, they requested, unsuccessfully, that all Swiss contributions to NATO be eliminated in favour of increasing Switzerland's contributions to the UN (Green Party, November 2006).

The Swiss population is against joining NATO, as opinion polls since 1990 testify. Annual surveys published by ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) Zurich demonstrate that in the mid-1990s, almost one-third of Swiss citizens supported Swiss NATO membership. After 9/11 and the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this number halved to 15 per cent (2003), before stabilizing at 20 per cent in the years from 2007 to 2013. Most recently, support for Switzerland joining NATO rose from 16 per cent (2014) to 19 per cent (2016). In parallel, support for closer relations between Switzerland and NATO also declined from nearly 50 per cent (1999, 2000) to 27 per cent (2003), before levelling off at around 35 per cent after 2011. Support for Swiss autonomous national defence remains constantly high (e.g., at 49 per cent in 2016), while approval of neutrality after 9/11 climbed from 82 per cent to over 90 per cent (95 per cent in 2016) (Szvircsev Tresch et al. 2016, 122–32).

Swiss defence ministers after 1990 include both 'internationalists' and 'traditionalists' with regard to the course of Swiss security policy. Kaspar Villiger (FDP) characterized by the US proposal of PfP and the prospect of Switzerland's enhanced tailored cooperation with NATO as 'an

extremely interesting idea' (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1993). His successor Adolf Ogi (SVP) was clearly the driving force for Swiss PfP participation in 1996. Samuel Schmid (SVP) continued Ogi's international course from 2001. Ueli Maurer (SVP, 2008–15) was the first Swiss defence minister to represent the Zurich wing of the SVP and a confidant of Christoph Blocher. Consequently, Maurer specifically criticized the adaptation of the Swiss army to NATO standards, including in public speeches. In April 2009, for example, he stated: 'We no longer purchase any military vehicle that does not have a trailer hitch that is not compatible with NATO' (Aargauer Zeitung 2009). After the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, he questioned the Swiss strategy of 'Security through Cooperation' by arguing that Georgia's closeness with its NATO partners had not brought the country security, but rather a quick defeat on the battlefield (Maurer 2009). In January 2016, Maurer was replaced as defence minister by Guy Parmelin, a French speaking SVP member (SRF Echo der Zeit 2016).

To date, the Swiss government has failed to garner support for its vision of a modern security policy among the Swiss population or to reach a broad domestic consensus, as was the case with the strategies of 1966 and 1973, which enjoyed support for the remainder of the Cold War.

Peacekeeping and Crisis Management

Following the strategic watershed of 1989, Switzerland wished to expand its commitment to international peace promotion. During the Cold War, Swiss participation in international peacekeeping had long been limited to Korea, where Swiss army military observers have been stationed since 1953, as well as to modest logistical, technical and humanitarian niche contributions to other missions (Rösli 2010; Diethelm 1997). In 1990, the Swiss government failed in its attempt to create a legal basis for a Swiss UN peacekeeping battalion when 57 per cent of Swiss voters decided against deployment of Swiss peacekeepers overseas. As a consequence, the 1995 military act specified that Swiss peacekeeping contingents had to be unarmed (Wenger et al. 2003, 25).

Swiss 'Yellow Berets' in Bosnia, 1996–2000

The Swiss contribution to the stabilization of the Western Balkans marked a quantum leap in terms of Swiss military missions abroad. At the end of

1995, the UN Security Council issued a mandate for NATO to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Swiss government decided on 4 December 1995 to allow NATO to transport persons and material for its Bosnia mission by land or by air through Swiss territory. NATO made active use of this free passage with overflights and rail transports (Wenger et al. 1997–98, 64).

In addition, Switzerland offered to send Swiss specialists from medical, engineering and rescue corps to Bosnia. When NATO insisted that troop-contributing countries should to be able to defend themselves, the Federal Council had to withdraw its earlier offer. Instead, Switzerland supported the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with civilian airlift capabilities and a logistics unit—and was thus able to signal solidarity during the year of the Swiss OSCE chairmanship of 1996. Compared with the relatively larger deployments by comparable countries such as Sweden, Finland and Austria in the NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, the Swiss deployment of a few unarmed Swiss 'Yellow Berets' was a rather modest niche contribution (Tages-Anzeiger 1996a; Rösli 2010; Lezzi 2001).

The Kosovo War: Operation Alba and Swisscoy, 1999–2016

During the Kosovo War, Swiss Defence Minister Adolf Ogi suggested to the Federal Council as early as April 1999—that is, still during the hot phase of the war—that Switzerland should participate in an international peacekeeping force. As long as the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and NATO's bombing of Serbia lasted, however, Ogi's initiative was not implemented (Wenger et al. 2000, 124). However, from 6 April to 24 July 1999, as part of Operation Alba, the Swiss army supported the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in humanitarian tasks in Albania with three Super Puma helicopters (Luftwaffe 1999).

After UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, Switzerland participated with a logistical unit in company strength ('Swisscoy') in the NATO-led international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. At first, Swisscoy troops had to be unarmed due to Swiss law. The UN mandate for KFOR helped to secure domestic acceptance for participation in the NATO mission (Wenger et al. 2000). In early October 1999, the first Swisscoy troops arrived at Camp Casablanca in Suva Reka in Kosovo. By this point, KFOR troops had already achieved a deterrent effect through the presence of their heavy weapons and they had stabilized

the military situation on the ground. Open organized fighting was no longer to be expected when the Swiss soldiers arrived in Kosovo. However, the relatively late arrival of Swisscoy in the region corresponded with the mission parameters of comparable PfP partner countries including Austria, Sweden and Finland (Wenger et al. 2000, 124f).

Swisscoy soldiers had to be unarmed according to Swiss military law. In order to guarantee a minimum level of self-protection as well as to ensure compliance with their orders, they were protected by the Austrian battalion and other forces—a rather unique solution in international peacekeeping history (Wenger et al. 2000, 125; Lezzi 2001, 216).

On 10 June 2001, Swiss voters decided in a referendum that future Swiss peacekeepers with a UN or OSCE mandate could be armed. This change marked a big step towards normality for the Swiss participation in KFOR. Also, the Swiss contingent was increased from 160 to 220 soldiers (Lezzi 2001, 218). In 2014, the Swiss parliament increased its size again to a maximum of 235 soldiers (Tages-Anzeiger 2014). In 2016, the Swiss Federal Council decided to reduce again the size of its armed contingent in the Kosovo down to a maximum strength of 165 soldiers by the end of 2020 (Tages-Anzeiger 2016).

Swiss Reluctance in Afghanistan and Libya

The Swisscoy mission remained by far the largest Swiss contribution to NATO peacekeeping operations. When NATO after 2001 turned its focus to fighting jihadist terrorism in Afghanistan, Switzerland made a purely symbolic contribution, sending a handful of staff officers to the NATO-led ISAF mission. On 16 April 2003, the Swiss government authorized the Swiss defence ministry to deploy a maximum of four officers, armed for self-protection, to join ISAF, among other things to serve in field reconnaissance missions as part of the German-led reconstruction team in Kunduz. When NATO's ISAF mission turned into a real war against the Taliban, Switzerland ended its military involvement in Afghanistan in early March 2008, referring to the changed security situation on the ground and ISAF's transformation from a peacekeeping into a peace enforcement operation (Swissinfo 2007).

When NATO agreed in March 2011 to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to support a UN Security Council resolution, Switzerland did not participate in the military operation. On the other hand, the Swiss government did allow overflights of NATO jets over Swiss territory and free

passage of NATO military convoys through Switzerland, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2011a, b). During both the Kosovo War in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003, Switzerland had denied the warring countries consent for military overflights, because both military interventions lacked UN Security Council authorization.

This overview of Swiss participation or non-participation in NATO's main crisis management missions since 1990 shows that Switzerland's contribution so far has been limited almost exclusively to NATO's Kosovo mission. Swiss peacebuilding efforts in the twenty-first century largely concentrated on NATO, with some 220 soldiers participating in Swisscoy, whereas only up to 20 Swiss experts and military personnel contribute to EU peacekeeping (EDA 2016). It is remarkable that Switzerland has been a far more active partner of NATO than of the EU. Overall, in light of the size of the Swiss armed forces, Switzerland's contribution to international peacekeeping remains rather modest compared to the efforts of Sweden, Finland, Austria or Ireland.

Military Cooperation

Switzerland's deliberate choice after 1945 to remain neutral during the Cold War and to survive a war as long as possible on its own strength meant that military cooperation with foreign armies was reluctantly practised. In arms procurement, however, international cooperation was essential for Switzerland as a small state. For example, attempts to produce a Swiss jet fighter failed (Schürmann 2009, 101–34). Preliminary studies for a Swiss fighter jet had begun in 1947; in June 1958, however, the Federal Council stopped the project P-16 after an accident over Lake Constance. In the 1970s, with 57 Mirage III fighter jets, equipped with US electronics and air-to-air-missiles, the Swiss Air Force for a decade possessed one of the best-equipped air defence systems in Western Europe. In the early stages of the Cold War, France and the United Kingdom in particular vied for the Swiss armaments market. It was not until the F-5 (1976) and F/A-18 (1993) were purchased that Switzerland switched to US technology, which had meanwhile become the industry benchmark (Dürig 2002, 3ff). In general, all important ordnance of the Swiss armed forces was purchased from NATO countries (Wyss 2013).

With the advent of modern military jets, the densely populated, small Swiss territory no longer met the requirements for training flights at home

(Dahinden 2005, 28f). In the mid-1960s, the Swiss government, therefore, contacted other countries for permission to let Swiss Air Force pilots exercise abroad. Swiss pilots flew military exercises in Sweden (from 1965), France (1977), Italy (Sardinia 1985) and since 1990 also in the United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Germany and Belgium (Schürmann 2009, 117f). The legal basis for such field training was established in bilateral memoranda of understanding with NATO countries the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway from 1995 (Küpfer 2002, 111–4). These exchanges allowed dogfight training, live-fire exercises with ground-to-air or air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, as well as low-level flight training. Live-fire testing and training exercises were no longer possible in Switzerland. Thus, procurement authorities and the Swiss Air Force had to rely on air bases and firing ranges abroad (Dürig 2002, 15).

Apart from the Air Force, other formations of the Swiss army also trained abroad after 1990. Disaster relief exercises with neighbouring countries were at the centre of Swiss interest (e.g., civilian emergency exercises 'LEMAN' in 1997 and 1999). The Swiss defence ministry based these bilateral military cooperative arrangements on so-called bagatelle treaties for which no parliamentary involvement was necessary (Küpfer 2002, 112f).

Within the PfP, Swiss professional military officers were seconded to NATO branches, including the strategic headquarters of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk (US), the regional Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum (NL) and the NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany). In the Allied Command Operations (ACO) military headquarters in Mons (Belgium), Switzerland is permanently represented for routine military cooperation in the PfP Coordination Cell and participates in committees and working groups that deal with standardization, interoperability and guidance systems (Wirz 2005, 16).

Since 1997, Switzerland has regularly participated in NATO/PfP military exercises, on average in five to seven exercises annually. In May 2009, Switzerland renounced its participation in two PfP exercises in Georgia, for which it already had registered, citing political reasons after the Russian-Georgian War (Federal Council 2009). In sum, military cooperation with foreign militaries since 1990 has focused either on disaster relief in neighbouring countries or on training opportunities for the Swiss Air Force. It is interesting to note that the Swiss Air Force plays no role in Swiss contributions to NATO-led peace support operations abroad beyond the use of its Super Puma helicopters in the Western Balkans.

Conclusion

Switzerland's 'non-relationship' with NATO changed significantly after 1996 through PfP and Swisscoy. Since military non-alignment in peacetime is the core of any permanent neutrality policy, the decision to cooperate with NATO by participating in PfP was, in retrospect, a courageous political move—even if Switzerland repeatedly emphasized that full NATO membership was completely out of the question and not even a distant goal. In the two decades since 1996, Switzerland's cooperation with NATO has become an accepted normality, albeit distant from media and public attention. The partnership has benefited both Switzerland, in particular the Swiss army, which gained experience by deploying troops on the ground in Kosovo, and NATO.

NATO's stance during the 1990s, with its political focus on exporting Western values including democracy, rule of law and civilian control of the military in former Warsaw Pact states, matched Swiss security policy significantly better than NATO's focus on fighting jihadist terror in Afghanistan in the decade after 2001. Thus, it is no coincidence that Switzerland continued to focus its military engagement on NATO-led operations in the Western Balkans. NATO appreciated Switzerland's commitment with Swisscoy in Kosovo. For example, Switzerland was among 13 selected 'core partners' invited to the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012 (Hlatky 2012).

Since March 2014, the Ukraine crisis and relations with Putin's Russia have dominated NATO's agenda. When the Western military alliance re-emphasized collective defence of its alliance territory, 61 Swiss parliamentarians asked the Federal Council to re-evaluate Switzerland's relationship with NATO and indirectly demanded a termination of Swiss PfP participation. In its reply, the Federal Council described PfP participation as still 'useful' and 'an important tool to promote peace and stability in Europe' (Federal Council 2015). The right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP) once more demanded a Swiss withdrawal from PfP in a new policy paper in August 2014 (Basler Zeitung 2014). The renewed confrontation between NATO and Russia complicates the search for cooperative security solutions, as preferred by Switzerland. Switzerland advocates a European security order that includes Russia, not a Western alliance against Russia. In reality, however, inclusive frameworks like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have lost relevance since 2014 after heated debates between Western ambassadors and the Russian delegate. From a Swiss

perspective, it is regrettable that a traditionally useful forum for political consultation stopped functioning (Nünlist 2015b).

In addition, the unity of NATO's five 'Western European partners' (WEP-5: Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland) also suffered after 2014. While Sweden and Finland increased their bilateral military cooperation with NATO, with a view to a possible common defence of the Baltic states, Switzerland has strictly adhered to its permanent neutrality policy. Participation in NATO activities for the collective defence of alliance territory is categorically ruled out for Switzerland. Instead, Switzerland is still trying to be a useful bridge builder and mediator between Russia and the West. Its military cooperation with NATO continues to be focused on the Western Balkans. The traditional split among the WEP-5 between the militarily integrated and active members Sweden and Finland on one hand and the militarily less integrated and more passive members Switzerland, Austria and Ireland on the other hand has widened since 2014 (Nünlist 2015b, 201–21).

After a 15-year-old domestic political blockade and persistent criticism of an internationalization of Swiss security policy from right-wing national-conservatives, the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship of 2014, which was perceived positively, marked a new window of opportunity for a significant opening of Swiss security policy, even if Swiss NATO membership remains politically impossible and is not an option in the near future. Against the background of the watershed of the Ukraine crisis for European security, the 20th anniversary of Switzerland's participation in NATO's PfP initiative provided a unique chance to make the advantages of cooperative security and Switzerland's security partnership with NATO better known to Swiss parliamentarians and the Swiss public. Switzerland is better equipped to deal with modern security challenges in concert with its Euro-Atlantic partner states. Unfortunately, the myth of neutrality blocks a more sober look at a modern security policy in wider political and public circles. Thus it remains unclear whether Switzerland's relationship with NATO can also profit from the most recent opening of Swiss foreign policy in 2014.

Switzerland's relationship with NATO since 1949 has been marked both by realpolitik on the part of the government and the Swiss foreign policy elite and by clinging to neutrality as an important part of Swiss identity by a vast majority of the Swiss population. Both during the Cold War and in the period after 1990, Switzerland enormously benefitted from NATO even without being an alliance member. Geographically located in the heart of Europe, NATO's security umbrella also covers non-member

Switzerland by providing stability in Europe. In 1996, Switzerland profited from a short window of opportunity when war seemed unthinkable in Europe and NATO's image had transformed from the Cold War era. Switzerland wanted to avoid international isolation and used NATO's PfP initiative and NATO's military stabilization mission in the Western Balkans to demonstrate Swiss solidarity in European security.

Yet national identity shaped Switzerland's relations with NATO as well. Neutrality is still the most important axiom of Swiss foreign policy (Widmer 2007, 134), and 95 per cent of the Swiss population wishes to cling to neutrality. Swiss 'soft power' in the twenty-first century is remarkable—the country ranks among the leaders in terms of economic power, innovation and competitiveness, infrastructure, rule of law, political stability, global interdependence and openness. This raises expectations of the international community that Switzerland as a wealthy, medium-sized European country should contribute actively to finding solutions to current foreign and security policy challenges. Switzerland's partnership with NATO since 1996 demonstrates that neutrality does not automatically hinder international cooperation. 'Modern neutrality' (Gärtner 2011, 475f) is far from free-riding, and neutral Switzerland is well-placed in the twenty-first century to meaningfully contribute to finding multilateral solutions to current global challenges as a 'broker of peacebuilding ideas' (Goetschel 2011).

The 2016 Security White Paper of the Federal Council still considers Swiss participation within PfP to be important, because it facilitates institutional access to NATO and allows collective security cooperation with NATO and other partner states (Bundesrat 2016, 48). With its soldiers in Swisscoy, Switzerland contributes substantially to NATO's peacekeeping and stabilization efforts in Europe's neighbourhood. Should the situation in the Western Balkans ever be stable enough to permit a full withdrawal of NATO's KFOR mission from the Kosovo, Switzerland's partnership with NATO would be dramatically reduced after the end of Swisscoy, since a similar Swiss commitment to another NATO-led military mission is not foreseeable in the near future. Also, NATO's partnership policy is in flux, and most recent developments are moving in the wrong direction from a Swiss perspective, as the PfP and the WEP-5 format are less and less useful and important for NATO. Thus, Switzerland's cautious partnership with NATO from 1996 to 2016 might soon be viewed as a brief interlude in the traditional non-relationship between the neutral small state and the powerful Western military alliance.

To avoid such a scenario, Switzerland currently tries to shape NATO's evolving partnership policy with the aim of preserving the PfP's utility as a Euro-Atlantic dialogue forum for discussing common security challenges. Switzerland also wishes to intensify the informal political dialogue between the Western European Partners (WEP) and NATO. In this way, PfP would remain an important part of Swiss security policy and a crucial instrument of cooperative security in Europe (Nünlist 2016).

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CHAPTER 9

The Europe Neutrals and NATO: Future Prospects

Andrew Cottey

This book has examined the relationship between the five main European neutral states—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland—and NATO, focusing in particular on the cooperation which has emerged between each of these states and NATO since the Alliance established institutionalised partnerships with non-members in the 1990s. The first and most obvious conclusion—indeed, so obvious that it is easily overlooked—is that all five states have maintained their long-standing policies of neutrality. In the context of the end of the Cold War, Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the European Union (EU) in 1995 and NATO's own enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, some or all of the European neutral states could have opted to pursue NATO membership. Instead, all five countries have chosen to remain outside NATO. The primary logic behind the five states' continued policies of neutrality is captured in Tuomas Forsberg's chapter on Finland in this book: 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it.' For all five states, neutrality allowed them to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence, while avoiding war, during the Cold War and after and can therefore be viewed as a successful national security policy. In the Irish case this logic of success includes the

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experience of the Second World War also and in the Swedish and Swiss cases the success of neutrality as a national security policy extends back much further. Some critics of the European neutral states argue that they have been free-riders, benefiting from the defence and deterrence provided by NATO during the Cold War and the Western allies during the Second World War while not contributing to those collective goods (Kux 1986). The implication of this argument is that the apparent success of neutrality rested in fact on wider Western deterrence and power balancing rather than neutrality. A realpolitik response might be that neutrality worked exactly in the sense that it allowed the European neutral states to free-ride successfully. Some within the European neutral states, however, would argue that great power politics, alliances and militarism were the larger part of the threat and that neutrality was a means of countering these problems and allowed the neutral states to play a particular role as mediators and peacemakers. Whatever the merits of these arguments, neutrality is certainly *perceived* within the European neutral states as having been a successful national security strategy and in the absence of compelling reasons to abandon the policy it is hardly surprising that all five states have maintained their neutrality. Additionally, as a number of other authors have argued (Agius 2006; Browning 2008; Jokela 2011), and as the five country chapters in this book reinforce, neutrality has become strongly domestically embedded in the European neutral states and should now be understood as part of these countries' national identities, making the abandonment of the policy even less likely.

At the same time, all five of the European neutral states have chosen to accept the offer of partnership with NATO and have been proactive in shaping their national partnerships with NATO and contributing to wider NATO partnership activities. A number of arguments and dynamics explain why the European neutral states have been interested in engaging with NATO. First, the flexible nature of NATO's partnerships has made them compatible with neutrality: establishing a partnership with NATO does not involve committing to NATO's Article 5 security guarantee; nor does it involve adopting other commitments in terms of defence spending, military contributions to collective defence or nuclear weapons. Governments in the neutral states have therefore been able to argue that partnership with NATO does not involve abandoning neutrality or taking on commitments that their countries might not otherwise undertake. Second, NATO changed significantly in the 1990s and 2000s. The European neutral states were therefore establishing partnerships not with

the NATO of the Cold War, but rather with a new NATO which was cooperating with former enemies to the east, was undertaking peacekeeping and crisis management operations beyond its borders, had partnerships with non-members and was engaged with a wider security agenda beyond defence and classical military security issues. NATO's new agenda was more in tune with the foreign and security policies of the European neutral states. In terms of domestic politics within the neutral states, this shift also made cooperation with NATO more politically acceptable. Third, during the 1990s NATO also came to be viewed as a part of a broader set of Euro-Atlantic institutions, alongside the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), based on principles of democracy, human rights, respect for existing borders and the non-use of force. Even if they were not members of NATO, the European neutral states were members of the OSCE and (with the exception of Switzerland) the EU and supported these values. In this context, partnership with NATO came to be viewed as part of this wider values-based approach to European security. Fourth, as the country chapters in this book have shown, peacekeeping was central to the partnership which emerged between the European neutral states and NATO in the 1990s and 2000s. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden all had long track-records of contributing to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. In the 1990s, however, the Yugoslav conflict emerged as the central security challenge facing Europe, as well as a testing ground for the challenges of a new generation of peacekeeping operations. Once NATO took on the task of peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia, the European neutral states needed to engage with NATO if they wished to contribute to peacekeeping in the region. More broadly, NATO's role in former Yugoslavia suggested that the Alliance might remain at the forefront of peacekeeping more generally, implying that the neutral states needed to cooperate with NATO if they wished to remain longer-term contributors to peacekeeping. From NATO's perspective, the European neutral states—with their track-records in the area—were valuable partners in peacekeeping and brought something substantive to the table. Fifth, and tied in with peacekeeping, was the issue of military interoperability. If the neutral states wished to contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping operations, their militaries needed to be able to operate alongside their NATO counterparts. Training for peacekeeping operations and military inter-operability more generally therefore became one of the central elements of partnership with NATO. Although only said sotto voce, for Sweden and Finland military inter-operability with NATO also related to

Russia: were Sweden or Finland ever to face attack from Russia, interoperability with NATO would make it easier to receive assistance from NATO and for their militaries to work alongside those of NATO members.

Patterns of Partnership

Some distinct patterns can be identified in the five European neutral states relations with NATO. Most notably, a clear distinction can be seen between Finland and Sweden on the one hand and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland on the other. Finland and Sweden have pursued maximalist approaches to relations with NATO, which might be described as 'everything but membership', involving participation in all possible NATO partnership activities and institutions and proactively seeking to deepen cooperation with NATO and its member states (especially the United States). In Helsinki and Stockholm, partnership with NATO is viewed by foreign policy-makers as a very important part of their countries' national security policies. While Austria, Ireland and Switzerland have also actively engaged with NATO, both political engagement and military cooperation with the Alliance have been more limited than in the Finnish and Swedish cases. For Austria and Ireland, the EU and the UN are significantly more central than is partnership with NATO to their national foreign and security policies. Although Switzerland was a late-comer to the UN (only joining in 1992) and remains constrained in how it contributes to UN peacekeeping, the UN and the OSCE are more central than partnership with NATO to the country's foreign and security policy.

The distinction between Finland and Sweden on the one hand and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland on the other was to some extent clear from the beginning of NATO's partnerships: Finland and Sweden were amongst the first countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) when it was established in 1994, whereas Austria and Switzerland did not join until 1996 and Ireland until 1999. During the late 1990s and 2000s, however, all five states contributed forces to NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, contributing to a sense of the five states being a like-minded group of important NATO partners. NATO sometimes informally treated the five states as a distinct group (referred to as the Western European partners) and the five states also discussed cooperation with NATO as a group. (Malta was also sometimes viewed as part of this group of Western European partners, but its small

size has made it less important, while it has had a particularly ambivalent relationship with NATO, joining PfP in 1995, withdrawing from the partnership in 1996 and then re-joining in 2008.) Since the 2000s, two shifts have reinforced the distinction between Finland and Sweden on the one hand and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland on the other. First, NATO's intervention in Afghanistan highlighted a clear distinction between Finnish and Swedish willingness to join more robust NATO peacekeeping/intervention operations and Austrian, Irish and Swiss reluctance to do so. Second, the downturn in relations between NATO and Russia in the late 2000s and 2010s reinforced the Finnish and Swedish desire to pursue all possible avenues of cooperation with NATO and also made the development of relations with Finland and Sweden increasingly important from NATO's perspective. The special status of Finland and Sweden was formalised at NATO's Wales summit in September 2014 when the two countries were designated as Enhanced Opportunities Partners (together with Australia, Georgia and Jordan) (NATO 2014a, para 88).

This pattern of a distinction between Finland and Sweden on the one hand and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland on the other in terms of NATO can be seen in particular in the area of peacekeeping and intervention operations. As the country chapters in this book have shown, in the 1990s and 2000s all five European neutral states contributed to NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Although the forces they deployed were not very large in numerical size (certainly compared to the forces deployed by the larger NATO member states at the initial stages of these operations), they nonetheless performed valuable roles in particular geographic subregions and/or in particular facets of the operations—a contribution acknowledged by NATO. Furthermore, since the NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were mandated to use military force if necessary, these operations took Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden beyond the largely non-forceful UN peacekeeping operations which they had participated in to date. In the Swiss case, as Christian Nünlist's chapter in this book demonstrates, participation in the NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo was an important part of the country's coming out in terms of international peacekeeping. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US 'war on terror' and NATO's intervention in Afghanistan, however, marked a turning point in terms of the European neutral states' peacekeeping ties with NATO. Both Finland and Sweden contributed forces to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, reflecting a willingness to

participate in peacekeeping operations which include the use of force, as well as the view that the mission provided another opportunity to reinforce cooperation with NATO and further enhance military interoperability with the Alliance. Sweden led the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the strategically sensitive Mazar-i-Sharif region in the north of Afghanistan, with Finland also contributing soldiers to this force. Although Austria, Ireland and Switzerland provided small numbers of military personnel to the ISAF headquarters, all three countries were wary of contributing in any sizable way to the more robust intervention in Afghanistan and more generally of being associated with what could be viewed as part of the US-led 'war on terror'. Sweden's willingness to supply aircraft for NATO's 2011 airpower intervention in Libya marked it out as particularly unusual as a partner, since some NATO member states themselves refused to participate in the operation.

Additional patterns can be noted in terms of the domestic political dimension of the European neutral states' relations with NATO. In all five countries there seems to be an elite–public divide. The policy-making elite—understood as senior politicians, especially those in government, and those in senior positions in foreign and defence ministries and the armed forces—tend to favour cooperation with NATO (and in some cases, especially in Finland and Sweden, support NATO membership). In contrast, public opinion in all five countries is more wary of NATO. This divide may be interpreted as reflecting an emotional attachment to neutrality amongst the general public, as opposed to a better understanding of the realities of international politics and of NATO amongst the policy-making elite. Alternatively, it might be argued that interaction with elite counterparts in other countries may have socialised elites in the European neutral into more pro-NATO views, whereas publics have been less subject to such socialisation. While this elite-public divide is apparent, its depth or significance should not be pushed too far: elites are also aware of the costs and risks of cooperation with NATO, while publics have been persuaded of the benefits of cooperation with NATO. Certain patterns may also be noted in terms of views on NATO across party political spectrums. In most of the European neutral states mainstream right/centre-right political parties and leaders tend to favour cooperation with NATO and sometimes NATO membership, whereas left/centre-left and green political parties and leaders are more wary of cooperation with NATO. This pattern is hardly surprising and may be seen as reflecting similar left-right divides on foreign policy in established democracies in Europe and North

America. In Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, however, it is also notable that conservative-nationalist right forces are wary of cooperation with NATO and possible Alliance membership viewing them as threats to neutrality, national sovereignty and the tradition of a (theoretically) strong independent national defence. Switzerland is also distinctive in that it is left/centre-left forces who have favoured engagement with NATO, which is viewed as part of a wider internationalist or cooperative security policy (as opposed to a narrower, arguably isolationist, interpretation of neutrality).

The Membership Question

The end of the Cold War re-opened the question of whether any of the European neutral states might join NATO, especially when Austria, Finland and Sweden had already joined the EU, the neutral states were developing extensive cooperation with NATO via their new partnerships with the Alliance and NATO was enlarging into Central and Eastern Europe. In the Austrian, Irish and Swiss cases NATO membership is simply a non-issue: domestic support for neutrality is very strong; there are no political forces within these countries arguing for NATO membership; and, short of a prolonged Europe-wide war between Russia and NATO, it is difficult to conceive of geo-strategic circumstances which could lead to Austria, Ireland or Switzerland abandoning their policies of neutrality—and even then they might maintain their policies of neutrality, as Switzerland did during the two world wars and Ireland did during the Second World War.

In Finland and Sweden, in contrast, real debate on NATO membership has emerged since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, as Tuomas Forsberg's and Magnus Petersson's chapters in this book note, the issue was effectively settled for both countries: in the Finnish case the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union explicitly committed Finland not to join any Western alliance; in the Swedish case, after the 1948–49 debate on NATO membership and the possible alternative of a Nordic/Scandinavian defence alliance, neutrality was widely accepted domestically. The end of the Cold War, however, at least partly re-opened the debate on possible NATO membership. In the Finnish case, the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union was replaced by a new treaty with Russia in 1992, which did not include the 1948 commitment not to join any Western alliance. In both Sweden

and Finland some voices, mainly on the centre-right of politics, began to make the case for NATO membership. Interestingly, arguments advanced in favour of NATO membership during the 1990s and early 2000s did not relate primarily to Russia, but were more about fully integrating Sweden and Finland in the West and having a full say at the decision-making table within NATO. The issue, however, was never near the top of the political agenda. Those political leaders and parties advocating NATO membership remained a minority. In both Finland and Sweden opinion polls consistently indicated majorities in favour of maintaining neutrality.

The dramatic downturn in relations between Russia and the West in the 2010s—which some observers describe as a new Cold War—triggered intensified debates on NATO membership, within Finland and Sweden, as well as in NATO countries. Russia's interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014–15 indicated a willingness to use military force against neighbouring states and raised questions about whether Russia might repeat the pattern in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (which became NATO members in 2004). The increasingly confrontational relationship with Russia has also had a specifically Baltic/Northern European dimension, with Russia building up its military forces in the region, violating the airspace and territorial waters of various northern neighbours (including Finland and Sweden) and undertaking large-scale military exercises (involving scenarios of offensive action against other states in the region, apparently including the use of nuclear weapons) (Rosen 2016). In this context, debate has intensified in both countries on NATO membership, as well as their national security and defence policies more broadly. In the Finnish case, as Tuomas Forsberg notes in his chapter, this resulted in an expert commission to examine the issue in 2016, which concluded that the risks of antagonising Russia outweighed the benefits of NATO membership, but that the option of NATO membership should be kept open. In the Swedish case, as Magnus Petersson notes in his chapter, the Social Democrat-Green government which came to power in 2014 was opposed to NATO membership.

The arguments for and against Finnish and Swedish NATO membership can be summarised quite succinctly. The central argument for NATO membership now relates clearly to Russia: if Russia is now pursuing a confrontational—even aggressive—foreign policy, joining NATO will help to deter any possible future aggression against Finland and Sweden and

reduce both countries' vulnerability to Russian pressure. An additional important consideration is the overall defence of the Baltic/Nordic region and in particular the Baltic states: so long as Finland and Sweden are not NATO members it is difficult to fully coordinate the defence of the region; if Finland and Sweden were to join NATO defence planning could be fully integrated with their regional NATO neighbours, enhancing the Alliance's overall ability to deter Russia or to fight a war with Russia if ever necessary. These arguments relating to the defence of the Baltic states have particular Swedish and Finnish elements, as the Swedish island of Gotland lies in the centre of the Baltic Sea between Sweden and the Baltic state, while Finland is only a short distance across the Gulf of Finland from Estonia, making both countries important in scenarios of Russian military action against the Baltic states. The central argument against NATO membership for Sweden and Finland is that such a step would antagonise Russia and risk Russian countermeasures, including a further Russian military build-up and possible political and economic steps against Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, pursuing NATO membership at a point when Russian foreign policy is already aggressive and unpredictable might only make it even more so. As Tuomas Forsberg argues in his chapter, an additional issue is whether Sweden and Finland would join NATO together: were one to join NATO (with Sweden generally viewed as the country more likely to do so), the country remaining outside NATO might be more vulnerable to Russian pressure. Forsberg concludes that Finland is most likely to join NATO only if Sweden makes the first move—which was the case when Sweden opted to pursue EU membership and Finland rapidly followed suit, resulting in the two countries joining the EU together (along with Austria).

Whatever the merits of the cases for and against Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO, the domestic politics of foreign and security policy militate against such a step. In both countries, those parties and politicians supporting NATO membership do not appear to be in a position to mobilise a governing coalition which might push the issue forward. In both countries, opinion polls indicate consistent support for neutrality. Public opinion matters because, although a referendum on the issue may not be a formal constitutional requirement, it would likely be a political necessity in both countries. Most observers conclude that Sweden and Finland are unlikely to join NATO in the short-to-medium term and probably not in the long term also.

Understanding the European Neutral States and NATO

From a theoretical perspective, how can we understand the evolution of the European neutral states' foreign and security policies since the end of the Cold War and their partnerships with NATO? As was noted in the introduction to this book, general theoretical approaches from International Relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis can be applied to neutrality. Realist theorists argue that neutrality is a response to the balance of power, with states choosing to be neutral (or having neutrality imposed on them) as a result of particular external balance of power configurations and the viability of neutrality depending on the balance of power. In contrast, Liberal and Social Constructivist theorists may view neutrality as an idealistic policy (underpinned by belief in the development of international norms and institutions) and/or an element of national identity politics. As was argued in the introduction to this book, balance of power considerations were central to the particular historical circumstances which resulted in each of the five European neutral states becoming neutral, but over time the idealistic and national identity elements of neutrality became more prominent. It is notable that all of the five country chapters in this book emphasise the idealist and identity elements in each country's foreign policy and in their continued commitment to neutrality.

In terms of understanding the five European neutral states' decisions to develop partnerships with NATO and the patterns of partnership noted above, a number of theoretical points may be made. The end of the Cold War moved Europe in part (but never completely) to a post-balance of power era. The winding down of the East-West confrontation removed significant parts of the constraints which the Cold War had imposed on the neutral states in terms of their relations with NATO. At the same time, new post-Cold War security agendas emerged, in particular in terms of crisis/conflict management (as in relation to the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s) and the widening of the concept of security to include non-military issues. These changes created the political space in which the European neutral states could cooperate with NATO without fundamentally undermining or damaging their neutrality (at least as argued by governments in the neutral states and by NATO, although this was—and is—disputed by some domestic opponents of cooperation with NATO). This might be viewed as reflecting a Realist logic: the balance of power shifted, constraints

imposed by the Cold War were loosened and cooperation with NATO became possible. At the same time, idealistic and identity elements were important to the decision to cooperate with NATO: contributing to peacekeeping had over time become an important part of national identity in Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden and if NATO was becoming central to peacekeeping then cooperation with NATO became a necessity. More broadly, dynamics of inclusion and exclusion also played a part in the European neutral states developing partnerships with NATO: with most European states either becoming NATO members or joining the PfP, the European neutral states concluded that they did not wish to be marginalised by being outside the NATO/PfP framework. This could be interpreted as reflecting a Liberal logic of an increasingly institutionalised values-based security system which all European states were being drawn into (although a Realist response might be that integrating with this system reflected little more than bandwagoning with Europe's new hegemonic powers). This logic of NATO partnership as part of the European neutral states joining a larger Liberal security system was reinforced by Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the EU in the 1995 and their involvement, along with Ireland, in the EU's CFSP and CSDP. Overall, there seems be a strong case that both Realist and Liberal/Constructivist dynamics can be seen at play in the relationship between the European neutral states and NATO and that disentangling the two and assessing their relative impact is difficult, if not impossible.

Although more traditional Realist balance of power dynamics may have been less important in European security in the 1990s and 2000s, they, of course, never entirely disappeared. While NATO changed very significantly during this period, it nevertheless remained a defence alliance and the NATO-Russia relationship remained characterised by elements of competition for power and mistrust. The continued impact of these dynamics clearly explains Finland's and Sweden's closer relations with NATO compared to those of Austria, Ireland and Switzerland. As is discussed below, the worsening relationship between NATO and Russia is reinforcing the distinction amongst NATO partners between Finland and Sweden on the one hand and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland on the other.

An additional theoretical perspective which may help in understanding the relationship between the European neutral states and NATO is Historical Institutionalism. The central insight of historical institutionalism is '(T)he basic, and deceptively simple, idea that the policy choices

made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have continuing and largely determinant influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters 2012, 70). Key concepts within Historical Institutionalism are path dependency (the idea that once set on a particular path a policy or an institution will tend to remain on that path) and critical junctures (the idea that there are key moments when policies or institutions are formed or may change significantly) (Peters 2012; Thelen 1999). There is also debate within Historical Institutionalism about how readily institutions or policies change and what causes change: critical junctures may trigger radical change, but policies may also evolve or adapt in important ways within broad path dependencies. Historical Institutionalists argue that institutional layering is common: once core policies are established, additional policy adaptations are layered on top of the existing core policy. From this perspective, the neutrality policies of the European neutral states can be viewed as an institution which has become strongly path dependent. Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, the core policy of neutrality—in terms of non-membership of military alliances—has been maintained, in particular because the policy has become strongly embedded in domestic politics and national identity. At the same time, governments have faced pressures to adapt and new policies, in particular partnership with NATO and involvement in the EU's CFSP and CSDP, have been layered on top of the long-standing policy of neutrality. The outcome is a mix of neutrality and integration with collective EU and NATO policies, alongside distinctive national policy features which themselves have also been adapted to the post-Cold War environment and to cooperation with the EU and NATO.

Future Prospects

In the 1990s partnership with NATO was new. Given the natural antipathy of neutral states towards alliances, partnership with NATO was also in some ways surprising and sometimes domestically controversial within the European neutral states. Today, the partnerships between the five European neutral states and NATO are an established part of these countries' foreign policies and fairly deeply embedded and institutionalised. Much partnership activity has thus become normal foreign policy business, implemented on an ongoing basis by governments, foreign and defence ministries and armed forces in the European neutral states and their counterparts within NATO, and usually not the subject of higher-level political debate or

contestation. While the European neutral states may be unlikely to join NATO, their partnerships with NATO are likely to continue. The substance, character and political significance of these partnerships with NATO, however, are less certain and are likely to be significantly influenced by the overall evolution of NATO and the place of partnerships within this, and also by the future development of relations between NATO and Russia.

As was argued in Chap. 3, NATO can be viewed as having multiple roles or identities, in particular as a defence alliance, as a form of integration amongst its member states, as a cooperative security institution engaging with other states and as a collective security organisation with a role in managing conflicts beyond its borders. In the 1990s and 2000s NATO's role as a defence alliance was downplayed, while the Alliance took on new roles, particularly in terms of cooperative security and collective security. NATO's development of partnerships fitted clearly in the context of the Alliance's new cooperative security and collective security roles: partnerships were a means by which NATO built cooperative security with non-members (especially former enemies) and contributed to crisis management beyond its borders. Peacekeeping and intervention were central to NATO in the 1990s and 2000s: the 1990s was NATO's Yugoslavia decade and the 2000s was the Alliance's Afghanistan decade. In this context, peacekeeping was central to NATO's partnerships: peacekeeping exercises were one of the first ways in which NATO cooperated with its new partners and partners contributed to NATO's operations in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, necessitating the development of detailed operational cooperation and institutions for the management of that cooperation. As has been seen, all five European neutral states contributed to NATO's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and Sweden and Finland to the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Given the importance the European neutral states attach to peacekeeping as part of their foreign and security policies, and even arguably their countries' national identities, the relation with NATO became important—if NATO was going to be at the forefront of peacekeeping and the European neutral states wanted to continue to contribute to peacekeeping they needed to have a relationship with the Alliance and to be able to contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping operations.

Since the late 2000s, NATO has changed in two important ways. First, NATO is scaling back its peacekeeping and intervention activities. When NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

were initiated in 1995–96 and 1999–2000, each mission involved 50,000 or so military personnel. Over time, as the situation stabilised, force numbers were significantly reduced. In December 2004 the NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (then numbering 7000 troops) was transferred to an EU mission, which over time was further reduced in size and as of late 2016 had 600 personnel. NATO's operation in Kosovo was similarly recued over time and as of late 2016 numbered 4300 personnel. In Afghanistan, NATO's operation peaked in size in the late 2000s–early 2010s at over 120,000 personnel, but was reduced quite rapidly after that. NATO's ISAF operation in Afghanistan was terminated at the end of 2014, but replaced by a smaller follow-up mission which numbered 13,300 personnel as of late 2016. The severe difficulties NATO faced in attempting to stabilise Afghanistan, however, led observers to conclude that Alliance members would be reluctant to engage in similar nation-building or stabilisation operations again. Although NATO intervened in Libya using airpower in 2011, member states were reluctant to consider the deployment of ground forces after the Gaddafi regime was overthrown. In Syria in the early and mid-2010s NATO's member states were wary of undertaking military action against the Assad. Although outside the framework of NATO, from autumn 2014 the United States and some European states (the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium) began a campaign of airstrikes in Syria and Iraq against Islamic State. Some other European states (Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain) did not participate in the airstrikes but supplied forces on the ground helping to train and advise local forces in Iraq, and were joined in this by neutral Finland and Sweden. The overall trend appears to be one of declining NATO involvement in peacekeeping and, to the extent that NATO (or ad hoc coalitions of states centred around key NATO member states) may be involved in intervention operations, these are more likely to involve airstrikes and/or the deployment of small numbers of special forces or trainers in support of local forces. In their chapters on Austria, Ireland and Switzerland in this book, Gärtner, Cottey and Nünlist all argue that the future of these countries' relations with NATO will depend in significant part on the extent to which NATO remains active in the area of peacekeeping. Given the trend noted here, the scope for cooperation between Austria, Ireland, Switzerland and NATO may reduce over time. While Finland and Sweden may be willing to contribute to more robust intervention operations (as in Afghanistan and their contribution to the operation against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq), given Austria,

Ireland or Switzerland's attachment to more traditional non-forceful models of peacekeeping it is difficult to envisage these three countries contributing to more robust interventions or counterterrorism operations. Austria, Ireland and Switzerland are likely to continue to cooperate with NATO, and may emphasise niche areas where they have particular interests or contributions to make, but their broader partnerships with NATO may atrophy.

The second key trend within NATO since the late 2000s, and especially since the 2014–15 Ukraine conflict, has been a renewed focus on defence and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. At the Alliance's summits in Wales in September 2014 and Warsaw in July 2016, NATO agreed a series of measures designed to enhance its ability to deter potential Russian threats against its eastern members and to defend them if necessary. These measures included: expansion of the existing NATO Response Force (NRF) from 13,000 to 40,000 personnel; creation of a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF, informally referred to as the spearhead force), capable of deploying within days and composed of 20,000 personnel (of which 5000 are ground troops); the establishment in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania of multinational headquarters (NATO Force Integration Units or NFIUs) capable of facilitating the deployment of the VJTF and follow-on forces into these countries if necessary; the deployment of four multinational battlegroups of about 800 troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; and an expanded schedule of military exercises to support these plans (NATO 2014a, 2016). In late 2016 outgoing Secretary of Defence in the Obama administration Ash Carter spoke of the United States 'preparing for a longer-term situation of tension and military competition with Russia' (Carter 2016–17, 57). To the extent that the relationship between Russia and the West does indeed return to a more confrontational pattern and NATO's agenda is shaped by defence and deterrence in that context, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland are likely to be less comfortable cooperating with NATO and these three states may have less relevance to NATO.

In the context of a more confrontational Russo-Western relationship and a renewed focus within NATO on defence against Russia, the position of Finland and Sweden appears to be very different. Given their proximity to Russia, Finland and Sweden are vulnerable to Russia in a way that is obviously not the case for Austria, Ireland and Switzerland. Although this 'Russian threat' logic was not so prominent in the 1990s and 2000s, it nonetheless underpinned Helsinki and Stockholm's maximalist approaches

to cooperation with NATO. Since late 2000s, and especially since the 2014–15 Ukraine conflict, however, Finland and Sweden have sought to further reinforce cooperation with NATO in ways which very clearly link to Russia. In September 2014 Finland and Sweden signed Host Nation Support agreements with NATO, which provide a basis for NATO forces to be deployed on or transit across each country's territory (although the decision on whether to accept such deployment would remain taken by each country on a case-by-case basis) (NATO 2014b). Although not explicitly cast in such terms, the Host Nation Support agreements provide a basis for preparing for possible NATO support to Finland and Sweden in the event of an attack by Russia on either state or for the use of Finnish or Swedish territory/airspace/waters by NATO forces (and possibly wider Finnish or Swedish involvement) in the event of NATO operations to defend the Baltic states against Russia. By the time of its Warsaw summit in July 2016 NATO was stating:

> In the Baltic Sea region, where the security situation has deteriorated since 2014, the Alliance has developed mutually beneficial partnership relations with Finland and Sweden on a broad range of issues. …(W)e are dedicated to the continuous process of further strengthening our cooperation with these enhanced opportunities partners, including through regular political consultations, shared situational awareness, and joint exercises, in order to respond to common challenges in a timely and effective manner. (NATO 2016, para. 23)

In 2016 NATO, Sweden and Finland also completed a joint political-military assessment of the Baltic Sea region. NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow described the objective of NATO and the two states as: 'to continue to consult politically, share intelligence, develop a better situational awareness on evolving threats in the region, and work more effectively together to meet those threats.' Vershbow argued that NATO, Sweden and Finland 'could more closely integrate out defence and contingency planning, strengthen intelligence exchanges, and collaborate even more on transparency and risk reduction measures aimed at restoring predictability to our relations with Russia' (Vershbow 2016). Given these trends, deep and intensifying cooperation between NATO, Sweden and Finland appears likely in future. In a broader sense, Finland and Sweden may become politically closer to NATO, whereas Austria, Ireland and Switzerland seem likely to remain more politically distant from the Alliance.

The increasingly close relationship between Finland, Sweden and NATO also raises once again the question of whether the two states may join NATO. As was argued above, domestic political attachment to neutrality militates against the two states joining NATO. The logic of this argument is that while Sweden and Finland may move ever closer to NATO they are unlikely to take the final step of joining the Alliance. It is, however, worth considering possible game-changers which might lead to significant shifts in public opinion on neutrality and NATO in Finland and Sweden. In the case of EU membership, while the end of the Cold War and the deepening of integration within the EU created the context for EU membership, in the Swedish case a serious economic crisis in 1990 eventually triggered the decision to apply for EU membership (which the Swedish parliament voted in favour of in December 1990) (Huldt 1994, 115–21).[1] In the Finnish case, Sweden's decision to seek EU membership was unexpected in Finland but increased the risk of Finland being isolated outside the EU (at a point when the EU itself was deepening integration via the Maastricht Treaty) and tipped the domestic debate in favour of pursuing EU membership (with the country formally applying in March 1992) (Lipponen 1994, 76–80). The 2006 Georgia war and the 2014–15 Ukraine war did not prove to be game-changers in terms of the domestic politics of neutrality and NATO within Finland and Sweden. The obvious potential game-changer would be a Russia-NATO conflict over the Baltic states. Whether or not any such Baltic war would be a game-changer would presumably depend on the exact nature and outcome of such a conflict, the impact on Finland and Sweden and the extent to which they were involved as participants.

The election of the maverick populist Donald Trump as US President in November 2016 added important new elements of uncertainty to NATO and transatlantic relations. Trump had called NATO 'obsolete', questioned the legitimacy of the EU (a project which all American Presidents since 1945 had supported) and praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as a potentially better partner than America's long-standing European allies. In early 2017 *The Economist* magazine's Charlemagne column argued that Trump appeared 'to promise the biggest rupture in transatlantic relations since 1945' (Charlemagne 2017). How far President Trump would seek and would be able to make good on some of his rhetoric remained to be seen, but if there were significant impacts on NATO and transatlantic relations these would presumably have implications for the European neutral states and their relations with NATO. A significant

weakening of NATO and the US commitment to European security would presumably reduce the salience of the Alliance's partnerships, including for the European neutral states. It might also trigger a re-orientation of European defence efforts away from NATO and towards the EU, requiring the four EU neutral states—Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden—to re-think the EU and NATO dimensions of their national security policies. A new US-Russia détente or grand bargain might recast European international politics in other ways. A US-led attempt to cut a deal with Russia (for example, over the status of former Soviet countries) might have implications for the Baltic region in particular. At a minimum, Finland and Sweden—having invested significantly in their partnerships with NATO—would presumably be watching the evolution of US policy very carefully to assess the implications for themselves and for the Baltic region.

Notes

1. The Maastricht Treaty, under which the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU), was negotiated in 1990–91 and entered into force in 1993. Thus when Sweden and Finland applied to join the body it was the EC, but by the time membership negotiations were completed and they joined in 1995 it had become the EU. For simplicity, the term EU is used here.

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[1]Note: Page number followed by 'n' denotes note

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