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NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES

Towards Europeanization



Edited by **REUBEN WONG AND CHRISTOPHER HILL**

National and European Foreign Policies

National and European Foreign Policies explores the processes of interaction between the national and the European levels in foreign policymaking in European Union states. The volume also assesses the mutual influence which the Member States exert on each other, independent of the EU institutions, thus tracing the extent to which Member State foreign policies are being Europeanized into more convergent, coordinated policies.

With chapters examining France, Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, Poland and Slovenia, the overarching questions the volume addresses centre on the nature of the relationship between the foreign policies of the Member States and 'European' foreign policy. Engaging with 'Europeanization' with theoretical rigour, the contributors to this volume examine the EU's impact on the foreign policies of Member States old and new, the impact of the Member States on the EU's external relations, and the influence of the Member States on each other's foreign policies.

Providing nuanced detail on changes in foreign policy thinking and national policies using the concept of Europeanization, *National and European Foreign Policies* will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics and policy formation, foreign policy and International Relations.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACN	Associated Countries Network
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
ACPs	African, Caribbean and Pacific states
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CCP	Common Commercial Policy
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and East European Countries
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COREU	<i>CORespondance EUropéenne</i> (EPC communications network)
CORTESY	encrypted transmission network linking the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council (successor to COREU)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUEiONA/DUE	Department of the European Union (Poland)
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAS	External Action Service

EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOFIN	Economic and Finance Council
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EE	Estonia
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFP	European Foreign Policy
EFTA	European Free Trade Agreement
EFZ	Ecological-Fishery Zone
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENA	National School of Administration (France)
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ES	Spain
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETA	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> (Basque Homeland and Liberty)
EU	European Union
EU-3	United Kingdom, France, and Germany
EU BAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUJUST LEX	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EU MM	European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUNAVCO	European Union Military Coordination Action against Piracy in Somalia
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EurGendFor	European Gendarmerie Force
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operational Force
EUROMED	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EUSEC	EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security
DR Congo	Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUSSR	EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Guinea-Bissau
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment

FDP	Free Democratic Party (Germany)
FI	Finland
FP	Foreign Policy
FR	France
FREMM	European Multi-Mission Frigate
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GR	Greece
HM	Her (His) Majesty's
HU	Hungary
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTY	International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia
IE	Ireland
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IIER	Institute of International Economic Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
IT	Italy
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
MAE	<i>Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores</i>
MC	Military Committee
MEDA	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the Southern Cone
MES	Market Economy Status
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MT	Malta
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NL	The Netherlands
NNI	New Neighbours Initiative
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PL	Poland
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM	Prime Minister
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PT	Portugal
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
R&D	Research and Development
RECAMP	<i>Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix</i>
RO	Romania
SAA	Stability and Association Agreement
SE	Sweden
SEA	Single European Act
SECI	South European Cooperation Initiative
SEUE	Secretariat of State for the European Union (Spain)
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO)
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
SP SEE	Stability Pact for South-East Europe
TEU	Treaty of European Union
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom
UKRep	UK Representation to the EU
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPB	Union of Poles in Belarus
US	United States (of America)
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEO	World Economic Outlook (IMF)
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Preface

The idea for this book arose from the ‘Foreign Policy Workshop’ in which the editors participated in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the first years of the new century, and in particular from a joint workshop with the Institute for German Studies of the University of Birmingham in 2002 on the theme of ‘Foreign Policy and Europeanization’. Of the contributors here, Michael Aktipis, Elisabetta Brighi, Patricia Daehnhardt and Tim Oliver were LSE PhD students at the time, while Henrik Larsen, Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis had been key members of earlier research generations. The paper-givers at the 2002 Workshop were Jordi Vaquer i Fanés, Alister Miskimmon, Paul Williams, Reuben Wong and Marcin Zaborowski. Wong, working on a PhD on the Europeanization of French policy, was one of the first to see that the proliferating literature on the Europeanization of Member States’ domestic activities could be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to foreign policy, notwithstanding the intergovernmentalism of the European’s Union foreign policy and the fact that it is therefore in large part the work of the Member States themselves. His insight was that the very processes of interaction between the national and the European levels transcended the dualism between on the one hand the EU shaping its members’ choices from above, and on the other the national capitals following their own preferences, leading inevitably to compromise, defections and ‘lowest common denominator’ policies. The interaction between these two sets of processes, together with what may be termed ‘cross-loading’ (or the mutual influence which the Member States exert on each other, independent of mediation by the EU institutions) creates something in between – a loose but discernible *Europabindung*.

Although it has taken rather longer than we intended to move from the original idea to the final product our contributors have throughout been enormously helpful and patient (and productive – at least three babies born between them during the book’s gestation!). We are most grateful to them all. To the original LSE core we have been able to add Esther Barbé, Frédéric Charillon, Hiski Haukala, Sabina Kajnič, Hanna Ojanen and Karolina Pomorska, which has enabled us to cover the range of different states, with their varying lengths of tenure in the EU, that we needed to achieve an effective sample of the 27 – comprehensive coverage simply being impracticable. It also means that there is a clear ‘younger generation’ element to the book, with the majority being under 40 years of age.

That said, the book represents a pleasing continuity with two previous books edited by Hill – *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation* (1983) and *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (1996). Each shares with the present volume an attempt to get beyond the normative arguments about whether or not a European foreign policy is a good thing, or indeed a likely outcome, in order to analyse the varying ways in which the Member States act internationally through – or despite – the auspices of the collective project. Christopher Hill is the only author remaining from *National Foreign Policies*, while Esther Barbé joins Hill as a representative from *Actors*. We are grateful to Routledge, which absorbed Allen & Unwin, the publishers of the first of the trio, for continuing the tradition – and we appreciate in particular the help and enthusiasm of Harriet Frammingham, representing Routledge. The model used has been the same as in the previous two books, namely that of individual country-studies directed by the editors towards certain common themes and questions. At the same time we have respected the rights of our contributors not to have their expertise unduly restricted, encouraging them to use the model we have outlined in Chapter 1 as a helpful framework rather than a series of boxes to be ticked or excised. Our view of knowledge leads us more to respect focused comparisons informed by history, than highly structured attempts to aggregate data, which might gain in 'rigour' but certainly lose something in terms of subtlety and sensitivity to context. And context is part of the main point here – we are seeking to see how certain common objectives and procedures play out in different nation-states, political cultures and time-periods. We do not imply a teleology, whether that of convergence or renationalization, but wish to analyse the dialectical processes that occur as the consequence of two highly concrete facts – the persistence of national foreign policies and the continued development of an EU foreign policymaking architecture. Indeed, no closed model would be possible in such a collaborative venture, given that there is a good deal of healthy disagreement amongst us on most of the major questions relating to European foreign policy.

In the post-Maastricht euphoria of the early 1990s, national foreign policy seemed to many to be about to become an anachronism. A very short time later that perception went into reverse as a result of the political and moral failure of Europe in the Balkan wars. In the Preface to *Actors* in 1996, Hill argued that the pendulum would soon swing again, and indeed in the subsequent decade and a half it has arguably done so several times, notably with the rush to solidarity after 9/11 and the all-too-rapid fracturing of consensus over Iraq. This is likely to continue to be the pattern, but the interesting questions relate to the extent of such oscillation, and indeed whether the end points of the swing have moved over time. It is to be hoped that the reader will find some illumination in the pages that follow on such issues, as well as much fascinating detail on national policies and assumptions. It is particularly important to understand the situations of the 15 states which have joined the EU and its foreign policy enterprise (in the enlargements of 1995, 2004 and 2007) since *Actors* was written. Three of our ten country-chapters deal with these newcomers while the rest provide the elements of continuity with the past.

Working with a team spread out over several countries, time zones and three continents presented some unique challenges which we were able to surmount with internet technology, improved communications and goodwill. But nothing beats face-to-face interaction. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the National University of Singapore's Research Fund R-108-000-015-112, and the research leave which allowed Wong and Hill to coordinate and to make editing decisions on the project, *en direct*, during the former's visiting fellowships at the University of Cambridge (summer 2005), and LSE's European Institute (spring 2008). Karen Smith and Spyros Economides also deserve special mention for being insightful and encouraging sounding boards on both the theoretical aspects of Europeanization and the practical aspects of case study selection, as the project was taking shape.

The editors would also like to express their gratitude to Martin Mik and to Maria McKay who (at rather short notice) came to our rescue with invaluable assistance on preparing the final text and its bibliography. It goes without saying that the support of our respective families has been indispensable, as it always is with academic ventures, which cannot help but spill over into home life.

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1 Introduction

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This book addresses the puzzle of how national foreign policies in the EU affect common EU positions in international politics (e.g. the Common Commercial Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, ESDP); while at the same time how these same national foreign policies are to some extent ‘Europeanized’ into more convergent, coordinated policies.¹ The central research question relates to the interaction between the EU’s common positions (i.e. both Community and CFSP positions) and Member States’ national foreign policies. How does the influence run? In what issue areas? With what significance?

The concept of Europeanization has been applied to foreign policy far less often than in domestic politics. Such literature as there is concentrates on explaining the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU, or what some call ‘EU-ization’ (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003). The chapters in this volume, however, will examine both the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ dimensions of Europeanization in European foreign policy. This chapter introduces the reader to a three-fold conceptualization of foreign policy Europeanization, based on frameworks previously developed by the editors and others (Wong 2007a, 2005). Beginning from the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1991), the ten country chapters that follow apply this framework to assess:

- 1 the impact of EU membership on national foreign policies (in particular, the impact of European institutions and policy processes such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], and common EU policies [Trade Policy, ESDP, Commission and Council-initiated ‘strategy papers’]). The associated concept of ‘downloading’ predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation.
- 2 the impact of the national capitals and their foreign policies on EU foreign policy outputs, also called bottom-up Europeanization or ‘uploading’. This second facet of Europeanization refers to the projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level.
- 3 the balance of trade (influence) between imports (Europeanization) and exports (national initiatives and concerns).

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The above approach can be seen as a relatively narrow process of preference-shaping. But Europeanization here is also understood as a process of identity and interest convergence, so that (to the extent to which it occurs) ‘European’ interests and a European identity begin to take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to both inform and shape national policies (Aggestam 2004; Hill and Wallace 1996). The subsidiary questions asked of the authors of the country studies are:

- (a) What were the Member States’ preferences (if any) in the period under study? What were the stated EU objectives and policies? Who shaped them? In the event of a conflict of interests, how was the specific Member State affected by common European policies on international issues?
- (b) To what extent did the Member State adapt its national foreign policy to the EU/other Member States’ foreign policies? What was the Member State’s input to European Foreign Policy in the formulation of key EU positions on, for example, Russia, the Middle East, China, ESDP and human rights promotion?
- (c) In what ways and to what extent is the Member State’s foreign policy, in broad terms, being Europeanized?

These questions are not addressed mechanically in the chapters which follow. Each author has had the freedom to focus on the elements most relevant to the country in question, while bearing in mind the central themes.

‘Europeanization’ in foreign policy studies

The concept of ‘Europeanization’ is relatively new in the study of the impact of European regional integration, and in particular in that of the impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on national foreign policies (Bulmer 2007: 57; Wong 2007a). It was presaged, however, in previous works on the interplay between the national and European, notably through the concepts of ‘a distinctive (West) European position in international affairs’ (Hill 1983c: 200), or ‘the European rescue of national foreign policy’ (Allen 1996). Other concepts that have been applied to study national foreign policies within the context of Europe – such as ‘Brusselsization’ and ‘Europeification’ (Allen 1998; Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002; Andersen and Eliassen 1995) describe and study the top-down impact of the EU/CFSP as a strictly Pillar II (i.e. intergovernmental) phenomenon in national foreign policymaking. While they rightly focus on CFSP decisions as compromises between national foreign policies of Member States rather than binding decisions from a supranational authority, they are less concerned with the interactive, bottom-up phenomenon of national inputs in CFSP, or the informal socialization of norms – both core research questions in relation to foreign policy Europeanization.

The novelty of ‘Europeanization’ in foreign policy studies is a function of the debate on the existence of a common European foreign policy. Although the

international system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the *domaine réservé* of sovereign governments, and therefore exclusive to states. Foreign policy can be defined as

ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in nonstate actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world

(Holsti 1992: 82)

or as ‘an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives’ (Allen 1998: 43–44). In its essence, it is ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill 2003:3). The problem with the EU of course, is that it is not a unified state actor, nor does it have clear and consistent external objectives. On the other hand, most would agree that it possesses some degree of independent actorness. Any definition of European foreign policy therefore has a particular dimension.

Instead of a coherent and authoritative decision-making centre, we observe persistent national foreign policies that operate under or alongside – and sometimes at variance with – ‘EU’ foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European Parliament and/or the Council. As the EU is not a consistently unified actor, ‘EU foreign policy’ (EFP) is usually understood and analysed as the sum and interaction of the ‘three strands’ of Europe’s ‘external relations system’, consisting of:

- (a) the national foreign policies of the Member States;
- (b) EC external trade relations and development policy; and
- (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU

(Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999; Zielonka 1998b; White 2001; Smith 2002; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Hill and Smith 2005b, 2011). All foreign policy suffers from incoherence, but that of the EU is subject to structural incoherence.

The explicit application of ‘Europeanization’ to foreign policy studies really took off with Ben Tonra’s seminal study of the foreign policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland (Tonra 2000, 2001). Other works have looked at Greece, Spain, Germany, Britain, Austria, France and even new and aspiring Member States such as Poland and Turkey (Stavridis *et al.* 1999; Vaquer i Fanés 2001; Torreblanca 2001; White 2001; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003; Alecu de Flers 2005; Wong 2006; Terzi 2005; Gross 2009). Tonra (2000: 229) defines Europeanization in foreign policy as

a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the

consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.

Ian Manners and Richard Whitman's volume on EU Member States' foreign policies uses the term 'Europeanization' to focus on the limits on Member States' pursuit of independent national foreign policies arising from EU/CFSP membership, and concludes that 'Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policy objectives inside an EU context' (Manners and Whitman 2000a: 245).

With respect to the CFSP, 'Europeanization' can be understood as a process of foreign policy convergence. It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating both from actors (EU institutions, politicians, diplomats) in Brussels, and from member state capitals (national leaders). Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified through EU policy (bottom-up projection).

In this volume, Europeanization is understood as three distinct but interrelated processes, according to the agents, targets and directions of change. As a top-down process, Europeanization refers to the changes in national foreign policies caused by participation over time in foreign policymaking at the European level. As a bottom-up process, it is the projection of national preferences, ideas and policy models onto the level of the European Union. A third aspect is the redefinition of national interests and identity in the context of 'Europe'. Europeanization is thus conceptualized as a bi-directional process that may lead to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels. This may be summarised in the term 'crossloading'. The nature and the extent of that convergence, however, is the subject of the research reported here.

On agency, structure and causality

The debates about the Europeanization of foreign policies have focused on the following five questions (Wong 2007a: 322–329):

- how to conceptualize the process (e.g. is it specific to EU Member States?)
- what is changing and what are the mechanisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the Member States, bottom-up, or socialization)?
- what are the scope of its effects?
- is it producing convergence/harmonization?
- what is the significance of informal socialization as a vector of change?

First is the issue of conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization. This goes back to the wider debate between the paradigmatic European integration theories – intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Is foreign policy as an area immune to Europeanization (if we understand the process as 'policy convergence')?

Intergovernmentalists privilege the role of national governments in defining their national interests independently of the EU, and then bringing these interests to the table for negotiation. Hoffmann (1966, 2000), observing the reassertion of nationalist sentiment in the EC/EU by France under Presidents Charles de Gaulle (in the 1960s) and Jacques Chirac (1995–2007), claimed that states remained the basic units in world politics and that France today remains fiercely jealous and protective of its foreign policy independence. Moravcsik (1991: 56), the chief spokesman for liberal intergovernmentalism, argues that ‘the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels’. The key actors are governmental elites and the motivation for (a limited degree of) integration is the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, not its erosion (Moravcsik 1993: 515). On this basis, little convergence can be expected in areas as central to sovereignty as foreign policy.

Neofunctional expectations of convergence have been given a new lease of life in the study of European foreign policy by social constructivist accounts of the interaction of foreign policy elites under the regimes of EPC (1970), CFSP (1991) and ESDP in the 2000s. Enmeshed in such a context of policymaking where national elites interact with Commission, Council and other EU Member States’ national diplomacies, a *réflexe communautaire* becomes the norm rather than the exception (Øhrgaard 1997; Smith 2000; Tonra 2001; Carlsnaes *et al.* 2004).

The Europeanization approach attempts to transcend these two rival approaches to the study of EU Member States’ foreign policies. In the traditional approach, the focus is on the foreign policy of individual Member States as utility-maximizing, selfish and purposive actors – let us call this the ‘state-centric’ school. The ‘hard’ position in this tradition claims that states are the only essential and salient actors, and that EFP decisions are lowest-common-denominator products of intergovernmental bargaining. Any study of EU foreign policy is thus unproductive as the ‘real’ Europe is the one of state governments. ‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one (Bull 1982). Of course, Bull’s assessment was coloured by the escalating Cold War tensions of the 1980s between the USSR and Reagan’s USA, but his prognosis for a European military capability independent of the USA/NATO finds renewed favour today in the aftermath of Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq (Gordon 1997; Howorth 2005).

In the other camp – which we will call ‘Europeanist’ – is the perspective which treats European Foreign Policy as a given, i.e. as a foreign policy that already exists, has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics and is taken seriously by other actors (Carlsnaes and Smith 1994; Zielonka 1998b; Nuttall 2000; White 2001; Smith 2002; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Bindi 2010). This approach sometimes presumes that EFP’s scope will expand eventually to subsume national policies in almost all other functional areas (Smith 2000). The Europeanist perspective tends to privilege the role of supranational European institutions in building a common ‘European’ identity, and a distinctive moral presence in world politics. François

Duchêne (1973), the first major spokesman in this school, envisaged the EU as a ‘civilian power’, which (in our contemporary terms) wields ‘soft power’ on behalf of states which tend to see the use of force as counter-productive and encourage others to do likewise. Taking as their starting point Duchêne’s premise that the EU should and can become a model of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world, Europeanist authors posit that EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights and security cooperation (K. Smith 1998; Zielonka 1998a; Manners 2002).

A second debate revolves around what is changing and in which direction. Questions relating to the national-level impact of the CFSP/ESDP have focused mainly on the ‘socialization’ effect arising from increasingly close links between the foreign ministries of the EU Member States (Hocking and Spence 2002). Whilst the CFSP assumes the continued existence of national foreign policies, the fundamental research question revolves around the extent to which the CFSP socialization process has led to change in either the *procedures* or the actual *substance* of national foreign policies. The recent enlargement of 2004–7 provides an opportunity to examine the Europeanization effect on new members with radically different national foreign policy traditions. Inevitably, however, significant change is most likely to be observed in Member States of longer standing.

On the third debate (regarding the mechanisms and scope of foreign policy Europeanization), some scholars have found that foreign policy convergence is to be expected over the long term (Wong 2006, looking at France). Others have argued that only the most superficial convergence – usually in procedure rather than substance – is taking place, and that national foreign policies retain their essential independence (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005, looking at Greece). There is general agreement however, that three distinct dimensions of the Europeanization process are evident in the relationship between a Member State’s foreign policy and the EU (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Wong 2005, 2007a; Major and Pomorska 2005).

The first dimension of Europeanization is used predominantly in the literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. This concept predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation. The second dimension refers to the bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest convergence. The three aspects of Europeanization and their expected indicators are examined in more detail in Table 1.1.

Fourth, a key (and probably the most contested) question for research on foreign policy Europeanization, is whether the process leads to a real convergence of the EU Member States’ foreign policy trajectories and an emergence of shared norms and notions of European interests.

Scholars who expect convergence to be the dominant tendency over the long term list geopolitical, institutional and socialization factors. They argue that European states have become relatively less powerful in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the rise of competing centres of power such as the United

Table 1.1: Three dimensions of Europeanization in national foreign policy

Aspects of Europeanization	National foreign policy (FP) indicators
1 Adaptation and Policy Convergence – Harmonization and transformation of a Member State to the needs and requirements of EU membership ('downloading')	a) Increasing salience of European political agenda b) Adherence to common objectives c) Common policy obligations taking priority over national <i>domaines réservés</i> d) Internalization of EU membership and its integration process ('EU-ization') e) Organizational and procedural change in national bureaucracies
2 National Projection – National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European FP ('uploading')	a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other Member States c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella d) National FP uses the EU level as an influence multiplier
3 Identity Reconstruction – Result of above two dimensions. Harmonization process tending towards middle position; common EU interests are promoted ('crossloading')	a) Emergence of shared norms/values among policymaking elites in relation to international politics b) Shared definitions of European and national interests c) Coordination reflex and 'pendulum effect' where 'extreme' national and EU positions are reconciled over time via bilateral and EU interactions

Sources: Wong 2007a:326; Wong 2005:142; Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005: 220-224; Major and Pomorska 2005.

States, Japan, China and India. Smaller Member States such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal and Denmark have been forced to adapt to the changing world environment by aligning themselves with EU positions so as to amplify their voices in international trade and politics. The 'post-neutral' Member States (Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) have had to redefine their defence policies in response to the CFSP in 1991 and the CESDP in 1999. This does not mean that the EU always smothers the smaller states' foreign policies – it sometimes gives them the necessary institutional resources to profile themselves in 'new' regions, or to project their own interests as European interests. Thus the Mediterranean, especially North Africa, became part of Portugal's foreign policy agenda, and Lisbon was also able to draw effective attention to East Timor through the EU (Tonra 2000, 2001; Phinnemore 2000; Miles 2000; Vasconcelos 1996).

Those who expect to see foreign policy convergence point out that the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories), with a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa and Asia. Britain reinforced ties with its former South-east Asian colonies through the ASEAN-EU dialogue from 1980. France was able to re-engage with all the countries in the East Asia region through the vehicle of the Asia-Europe Meeting,

launched in 1996 and effectively a summit meeting of EU and East Asian leaders. The EU also affords a 'politics of scale' to support Member States' interests (Ginsberg 1989). By acting as agents of European foreign policy, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes regions, South-east Asia and even discussions on North Korea. Moreover large operations in the Balkans, Asia and Africa tend not to be confined to CFSP, but require Pillar I resources and Member States' contributions, e.g. peace-keeping forces.

As examples of their need to Europeanize national approaches, these key states sought support from their partners, as seen in British efforts to enlist EC help in the Falklands War in 1982, or Franco-German efforts in 2005–6 to upgrade political dialogue with China and to end the arms embargo imposed since 1989. On the side of those who argue for convergence are foreign policy studies in the enlargements of 1986, 1995 and 2004, where new Member States 'modernized' their foreign policies upon accession by jettisoning outmoded national policies, to align themselves with established European norms. Thus Spain changed its position on the Western Sahara and also recognized Israel, while Austria revised its neutrality policy (Barbé 1996a; Luif 1998; Grabbe 2001). Yet this can be seen as a one-off acceptance of the *acquis politique*.

Of course, such convergence processes are neither predetermined nor irreversible. Member States continue to resist being locked into a fixed path of identity and policy convergence. French and British policies are often contrasted with that of Germany, supposedly the model of a 'Europeanized' state, with a European identity. Yet even Germany took a distinctly unilateralist posture against agreed EU policy in its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 (Marcussen *et al.* 1999; Rummel 1996). National interests, as defined by incumbent national elites, still play a decisive role in national foreign policymaking. But while national elites may resist the institutionalization of EU practices and a reflex of working for the collective interest, changes in the international context and venues of decision making which are increasingly oriented towards Brussels have incrementally altered even the definitions of what constitutes the 'European' or the 'national' interest.

Commercial policy is a prime example of this shift. The Commission's 1991 'Car Deal' with Japan undertook to dismantle, over ten years, quotas for Japanese car imports in the protected markets of France, Italy and Spain (Wong 2006: 111–120). Member States share the same interest in improving access to world markets and habitually entrust the Commission to take the lead in multilateral negotiations with strong economic powers such as the United States, Japan and China, especially at the WTO (Devuyst 1995; M.E. Smith 1998). Furthermore economic convergence is not limited to top-down processes proceeding from the Commission. The productive national policies of other Member States are often copied. British and Dutch successes in attracting Japanese FDI in the 1980s and Germany's export success in China in the 1990s are two examples of policies emulated by other (more protectionist) EU governments (Lehmann 1992; Nuttall 1996). The Lisbon agenda of benchmarking good practices was a natural development.

The Union's human rights policy throws up a more complex picture of convergence and divergence. The EU has suffered from conflicting interests and coordination problems between the Member States, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) in dealing with human rights situations from Chad to China. While the formal locus of effective decision making on human rights issues is the Council – empowered by the Maastricht Treaty to ensure the ‘unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’ – deliberations on human rights action in practice impinge on other policies across the three-Pillar structure (affecting *inter alia* development assistance, Trade and Cooperation Agreements, enlargement, justice and immigration), and thus involve a multiplicity of intra-EU actors, not to mention interactions with the US, UN, Council of Europe and human rights NGOs (Clapham 1999; Smith 2001).

A fifth debate concerns the relative importance of formal CFSP institutionalization on the one hand and informal socialization on the other. Even theories of rational-choice institutionalism admit that ‘institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities’ (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). States may, however, withdraw from multilateral cooperation if the benefits accruing from cooperation do not compensate the costs incurred. Such a conception would lead us to think that CFSP actions have continually to contend with intergovernmental bargaining, coordination and the constant threat of collapse, as the costs and benefits to each member state are inevitably variable. But the nature of even the CFSP, one of the most intergovernmental of EU institutions, has over the last 30 years moved a long way from its original *anti-communautaire* approach towards a *réflexe communautaire*. It is, therefore, not just another venue for rational choices, but a critical set of social forces that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others (Øhrgaard 1997; Bátorá 2005).

Many scholars argue that EU foreign policy is not an independent variable, but is itself dependent on the roles played by Member States themselves – especially the larger and more powerful ones – in fashioning EU structures and policies. These states, in ‘projecting’ their national policies and policy styles onto the larger European structure, ‘Europeanize’ their previously national priorities and strategies, thus creating a dialectical relationship (cf. Table 1.1). By exporting their preferences and models onto EU institutions, they in effect reconfigure previously national policies according to the larger European stage. This has several benefits. First, the state increases its international influence. Second, the state achieves ‘cover’ by reducing the risks and costs of pursuing a controversial or negative policy (e.g. sanctions) against an extra-European actor.

Yet however one may conceptualize Europeanization – whether as a cause, effect or process in national foreign policies – we argue that foreign policy is not a special case immune to the pressures of Europeanization which states face by virtue of being inside the EU. Elite socialization is a phenomenon frequently associated with national officials attached to the Commission and other EU institutions in Brussels. Research undertaken in recent years by Aggestam,

Øhrgaard, M.E. Smith and Glarbo suggests that these officials are increasingly thinking in 'European' rather than 'national' terms. Anthropological studies of European Commission officials indicate that these officials were exhibiting traits of cultural 'hybridization' whereby their 'national being' was becoming 'European' (Harmsen and Wilson 2000a: 149–150). Most scholars agree that intense and repeated contacts have socialized not only EU officials, but also national officials working in EU institutions. Even national diplomacies are becoming more 'European' and displaying the 'coordination reflex' in foreign policymaking first noted in the Copenhagen Report of 1973 (Øhrgaard 1997; Glarbo 1999, 2001; Hill and Smith 2000: 84; Smith 2004: 94). Hill and Wallace pointed out more than a decade ago the potential transformational effects of elite socialization within this complex network:

From the perspective of a diplomat in the foreign ministry of a member state, styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginning of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all these have moved the conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential. (Hill and Wallace 1996: 6)

Whether or not national officials have indeed been 'captured' by EU interests to think 'European' rather than 'national', most studies indicate that officials in Brussels work with both the national and the European interest in mind. In their study of the impact of the EU on Irish officials, Laffan and Tannam note that 'public officials are no longer just agents of the Irish state; they are participants in an evolving polity which provides opportunities for political action but also imposes constraints on their freedom of action' (Laffan and Tannam 1998: 69; Tonra 2001). Research in this school suggests convergence as 'prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU Member States and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines.' (Smith 2000: 164) The main agents for convergence include elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalized 'imperative of concertation' (Glarbo 1999: 650).

Nonetheless the European institutions do not themselves represent a homogeneous system. The Council and the Commission represent 'two cultures' competing in the European foreign policymaking process. The EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet Plan, to prevent Brussels from becoming a foreign policy centre and to keep foreign policy as a national competence within the Council. Nonetheless, the 'Brusselsization' (the steady concentration of foreign policymaking processes in Brussels) shows no sign of abating. Even Member States jealous of their foreign policy sovereignty have not been immune to this process (Allen 1998; Peterson and Sjørnsen 1998; White 2001). Indeed, they have been willing to move institutions such as the WEU to Brussels precisely as a way of balancing the importance of the Commission. On

the other hand, they recognize the importance of Commission expertise and the resources it controls, which explains why the governments were prepared to accept the idea of a double-hatted High Representative, and an External Action Service, in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Limitations of Europeanization

If foreign policy Europeanization is conceptualized as a three-dimensional (top-down, bottom-up and crossloading) and as a mutually constitutive process of change linking the national and European levels (Table 1.1; Major 2005: 177), the key problems in researching this policy area relate to

- 1 defining exactly what the causes, effects and results of Europeanization are;
- 2 identifying and measuring the changes;
- 3 the (current) small number of case studies;
- 4 isolating the effects of European regional integration from other possible causes of change such as globalization.

These are now considered in turn.

As discussed in the preceding section, in European foreign policy there exists ‘no clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the Member States’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 9). Not yet communitarized, CFSP follows an intergovernmental decision-making process. Unlike commercial, competition or monetary policy, there is no supranational entity above the national governments that can authoritatively state what CFSP should be. While the Europeanization approach was originally applied to the impact of the EU on national politics (i.e. both policies and politics in first pillar issues where the direction of change was primarily top-down), applying the concept to CFSP, where decision-making is dominated by a bottom-up process, was certain to cause confusion about actors, structures, cause and effect.

Defining Europeanization as multidimensional and as ‘a matter of reciprocity between moving features’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004) is also epistemologically problematic as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, between dependent and independent variables. Considering Europeanization as a process suggests that the result will be a Europeanized foreign policy, at least to some extent. But how can an EU foreign policy – viewed as being the cause of change at the national level – be also seen as being conceived at the national level (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004)? There are elements of circularity here. Unlike major schools of integration theory such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, Europeanization does not put forward a series of interrelated premises concerning either the limits or the end-state of the European integration process. Europeanization is a concept which can thus be criticized as lacking ‘core tenets, common to all or most usages of the term, which might serve as the basis for constructing a common paradigmatically defined research agenda’ (Harmsen and Wilson 2000b: 19; see also Olsen 2002, 2003).

Identifying and measuring change has proven to be a second major research problem. It is much easier to examine the impact of the CFSP on national foreign policy procedures than on substance. Whilst it is possible to record significant changes in foreign policy working practices that directly relate to the CFSP/ESDP, it is harder to ascribe concrete policy changes to the impact of the EU, as opposed to that of wider international developments. The process of *Brusselsization* has had some unexpected, and arguably integrative, consequences for Member States confident in the increasing predominance of the Council of Ministers Secretariat – which they can control. But compared with the level of institutionalized integration in the first pillar, national changes resulting from foreign policy Europeanization are weaker and less clearly defined (Major and Pomorska 2005: 2). Studies of foreign policy Europeanization have also tended to rely heavily for evidence on interviews with national officials and Commission staff in Brussels (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Tonra 2001). Yet can these officials seriously be expected to tell the researcher that they do not subscribe to the ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP?

A third (and related) problem is the paucity of studies applying Europeanization to national foreign policies. Few full-length studies over a number of years (rather than, for example, over the short duration of a member state's EU presidency) have been conducted, so as to test the longitudinal impact of the EU on national foreign policies (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; and Gross 2009 are exceptions). This problem may, however, be in the process of being resolved as there has in recent years been an explosion of research, with many PhD theses currently being written which examine in detail the interaction between EU and national foreign policies. Research on the foreign policies of new Member States offers a potentially promising control factor in measuring the impact of EU foreign policymaking on non-Western European foreign policies with very different diplomatic traditions (Aleçu de Flers 2005; Pomorska 2007). This volume is itself an attempt to bridge the gap in the studies of national foreign policy Europeanization, albeit in comparative more than longitudinal mode.

Even with a larger 'N' of case studies, however, the theoretical and definitional problem of how exactly to identify 'Europeanization' in foreign policy needs to be resolved (Haverland 2006). Is it a movement towards some 'ideal' European foreign policy position where Member States instinctively coordinate their positions and cooperate on all foreign policy issues, including the hard cases? If this is the yardstick, then the intra-EU disagreements over Iraq in 2003 certainly do not bode well. If, however, foreign policy Europeanization is taken as a *negotiated* convergence between 'extreme' positions within the EU involving both Community and national actors, then what some call a 'pendulum' effect is observable and even measurable (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). It can also be seen as a process of reorientation, whereby the Member States increasingly have EU rather than extra-European reference points for their foreign policy, while retaining ultimate independence and the capacity to surprise.

Unlike intergovernmentalism, the Europeanization approach acknowledges the important roles played by non-state actors and Europeanized elites in

formulating national foreign policy. But, contrary to Haasian integration theory, Europeanization does not foresee a supranational centre eclipsing the national capitals. The Europeanization process is just one – albeit a significant one – among many effects in the domestic politics, processes and foreign policies of EU Member States. It creates a new context in which national foreign policies have to be made and understood, but (as yet) no more.

This leads us to the fourth cluster of research problems – if most of the case studies are of EU Member States, how do we control for other causal variables? The methodological problem here is what Peters characterizes as ‘a collection of cases without variance in the dependent variable’ (Peters 1998: 72). Most studies of foreign policy Europeanization assume a priori that European integration has an important effect on national foreign policies. But variables at the global, European, national and sub-national levels interact in intricate ways, so that to claim pressures from European integration as *the* deterministic, or dominant, causal variable, would be overstating the case (Wong 2005: 151; see also Haverland 2006). It is genuinely difficult to separate out the European factor (not, of course, that this problem is unique to this particular area of political science).

This may be why one study which claims that a Member State’s foreign policy has been Europeanized, is challenged by another which claims the reverse. Interestingly, a lively debate has focused on one particular Member State – Greece – with some studies claiming that a previously obstructionist, uncooperative national foreign policy has come to conform with EU norms (Keridis 2003; Economides 2005; Terzi 2005), and others claiming that conformity has occurred only in form and not in substance (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005).

There is thus a need to account more systematically for foreign policy changes, and to allow for alternative explanations, rather than simply ascribing causation to the EU (Moumoutzis, forthcoming). The use of counterfactual analysis, in other words consciously posing the hypothetical question ‘what if the EU did not exist?’, which is almost inherent in any Europeanization study, would be very relevant here. Counterfactuals are not substitutes for field research, but they are useful to help one arrive at more accurate conclusions after the range of real available cases has been exhausted (Tetlock *et al.* 2006). When even non-EU Member States (notably Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) formulate foreign policies that seem to respond to Europeanization pressures (Major 2005: 178–179; Terzi 2005; Haverland 2007: 69), researchers should be careful to control for the impact of other variables that might cause the same kinds of effects otherwise ascribed to the impact of the European Union. At the simplest level, geographical, cultural and historical shared experiences may prove to be just as important as the pull of the EU.

Convergence – or diversification?

Within EFP studies, an enduring cleavage has been between one school which views Member States as the principal actors, and another which emphasizes the role of supranational institutions (especially the Commission) and the emergence of a pan-European identity and ‘national interest’. Neither school developed good

causal theories of EU foreign policy because they tended to be highly normative and to advocate positions on what the EU should be rather than what the EU is actually doing in world politics. The Europeanization approach attempts to strike a middle path as it accepts that Member States adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same Member States are themselves actively involved in creating/shaping these structures and norms. This is a form of 'structuration', as conceived by Giddens and others (Giddens 1979; Wendt 1999; Hill 2003: 25–30). The growing currency of Europeanization in foreign policy studies in recent years could be attributed to the concept's utility in capturing, more accurately than the paradigmatic European integration or International Relations theories, the significant changes that are taking place at the national level, fostering at the same time both convergence and diversification at the various levels of European polities (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003; Hill and Smith 2005b: 393–394; Wong 2006).

Studies on foreign policy Europeanization share many overlapping assumptions about causes, effects and processes. For example, proponents of the top-down 'national adaptation' dimension would accept the bottom-up claim that certain Member States play critical roles in forging 'European' policies in the first place. And the third dimension of Europeanization – that of identity and interest convergence – stops short of the neofunctionalist claim that the European will supplant the national over time. However, these studies share the common expectation that European identity shapes and is increasingly incorporated into national identities and in turn, national foreign policies.

If Europeanization is a dependent variable or effect, what is/are the independent variables driving the process? The editors argue that we would have to cast the net for explanatory variables farther than the current Europeanization literature in Comparative Politics/Public Policy, and deeper into time. One 'push' factor is the historical process of European integration, which itself can be traced to the underlying political and economic imperatives for coordinated cooperation between Member States that early integration theorists identified (Haas 1958). On the 'pull' side, are the demands of other states in the international system for coordinated European positions, and the need for some means of associating with the United States without being dominated by it.

Structure of the book

This volume contains ten country case studies. Each of the authors has been tasked with examining specific aspects of Europeanization in national foreign policy and the EU's external relations. These were:

- 1 Relations with external powers, especially the USA, Russia and China
 - Are quarrels between the EU and the US symptomatic of a fundamental divergence of interests and views of world order (Kagan 2002)? What is the view of the Member States with regards to a common foreign policy

distinct from the US? What are the roles played by ‘frontline states’ (especially Germany, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states) in emphasising a security role for the Union as a bulwark against Russia since the CSCE and West Germany’s *Ostpolitik*? What is the utility of common human rights and aid policies applied to Moscow and Beijing?

- The process of formulating a united EU position on China (first pronounced in 1995) has also been difficult, with various internal disagreements regarding human rights, aid, trade and the arms embargo since 1989. To what extent has the policy of pragmatic, ‘constructive engagement’ pioneered by Germany and France effectively become ‘Europeanized’ as EU policy?

2 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Is the ESDP destined to be an independent military arm for the EU? What position does each Member State have on this policy, and how has this evolved, from St Malo (1998) through to the implementation of the Petersberg tasks and the creation of more than 20 ESDP missions since 2003? Do Member States set limits on what can be done with the ESDP?

3 Middle East policy

Since the start of the Euro-Arab dialogue (1974) and the Venice Declaration (1980) on the right of Israel and Palestine to coexist, the EU has sought to play an even-handed role in the Israel-Arab conflict, and offered an alternative vision to US policies in Iran and Iraq. What national adjustments have been made by the Member States? Why does apparent Europeanization, in terms of policy consensus, not make for more effectiveness?

4 Decision making

What is the relationship between the process and substance of Europeanization? Is ‘Europeanization’ just another term to describe the process of policy convergence? Or is it a qualitatively different new effect - the result of repeated coordination efforts between officials who work with both national and supranational interests in mind?

The country studies in this volume represent a broad cross-section of EU Member States – the large and the small; from the north and the south; both developed and developing economies; as well as Member States from each wave of enlargement between 1957 and 2004. These chapters thus capture many of the dynamics, constraints and opportunities afforded to Member States’ foreign policymaking processes, within and outside official EU foreign policy making. It would, however, be infeasible to do justice to the foreign policies of all 27 in one volume. Those covered here (with their year of joining) are:

- 1 France (1957)
- 2 Germany (1957)
- 3 Italy (1957)
- 4 UK (1973)
- 5 Denmark (1973)
- 6 Greece (1981)
- 7 Spain (1986)
- 8 Finland (1995)
- 9 Poland (2004)
- 10 Slovenia (2004)

Chapter 2 on France assesses persistent French attempts to export national preferences to the EU level, i.e. to ‘gallicize’ EU foreign policy. Yet from the conduct of EU relations with external powers, to EU outputs on human rights, trade and security policy, Frédéric Charillon and Reuben Wong show that despite French attempts at leadership, France has increasingly had to take into account its reduced influence in an expanding Union, as well as to adapt to the EU *acquis* in foreign policy.

The next two chapters deal with de-Europeanizing trends detected in the recent foreign policies of two of the original founding members, otherwise considered good team players. In Chapter 3, Patricia Daehnhardt examines Germany’s increasing self-confidence in foreign policy; its assertiveness is seen both inside the EU and independently as with its UNSC bid. She thus questions if the conventional view of Germany as a ‘Europeanized state’ needs to be revisited. In Chapter 4, Elisabetta Brighi examines whether Italian foreign policy has been similarly strengthened by membership of the CFSP, asking to what extent the ability to shelter within the collective has paradoxically produced more independent initiatives.

In Chapter 5, Michael Aktipis and Tim Oliver apply the dominant view of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU to the domain of foreign policy, where the UK has traditionally sought to lead Europe. It demonstrates the extent to which British foreign policy interests are now pursued through the EU. Henrik Larsen, in Chapter 6, focuses on Denmark’s twin roles as a ‘Euro-sceptic’, and a key advocate of human rights and environmental concerns in the EU. He examines the reasons behind the Danish willingness to accept increasingly the importance of the EU to its foreign policy, while maintaining its opt-out on defence. Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis, in Chapter 7 on Greece, ask whether Greek foreign policy has become Europeanized in form, but not in substance. As noted earlier, Greece is a particularly interesting and controversial case for the discussion of foreign policy Europeanization.

In Chapter 8, Esther Barbé examines the ‘Mediterranean dimension’ that Spain’s accession in 1986 was to have brought into the European Union. It examines Spain’s ‘uploading’ role in the EU’s external relations (especially in Euro-Med, the Middle East and in the Americas), as well as the reasons behind the relative lack of Spanish inputs on other issues (human rights, trade). Hiski

Haukkala's and Hanna Ojanen's chapter on Finland (Chapter 9) assesses the impact of EU foreign policy making on a small, post-neutral state with a regional security obsession, because of Russia's proximity. It suggests that far from being overwhelmed by EU norms and priorities, Finland has managed successfully to inscribe, with its neighbours, new regional interests (e.g. the 'Northern Dimension', conflict mediation, and human rights promotion) onto the EU agenda.

Chapters 10 and 11 examine post-communist states which joined the EU in 2004. Karolina Pomorska's chapter assesses the adaptations that the Polish foreign ministry and other key government agencies underwent in the decade leading to accession, as well as the contributions made by Poland in defining the EU's policies towards Russia and other CIS states like Ukraine and Belarus. Like Finland, Poland's entry into the EU was viewed in highly strategic terms. Finally, Sabina Kajnc̃ discusses Slovenian foreign policy's relatively swift and smooth adaptation to European foreign policy coordination.

The overarching questions the volume addresses centre on the nature (or perceived nature) of the relationship between the foreign policies of the Member States and 'European' foreign policy. What kinds of norms and objectives does the EU promote in its external environment? Who speaks for Europe? Who are the lead actors on these various issues? How and why does the EU push political, economic or normative concerns in its dealings with external parties? Are the large EU Member States (e.g. UK, Germany, France, Italy) the predominant actors on each issue? Do EU institutions (e.g. ECJ, Commission) take the lead, or is leadership on each issue shared by a different condominium of actors? Is there a discernible trend towards convergence ('Europeanization') between the Member States on their foreign policies?

The significance of Europeanization in the foreign policy arena is that foreign and security policy is one of the last remaining bastions of national sovereignty. Treaties, not legislation, govern CFSP. Foreign policy Europeanization has to be much more a process of socialization than forced, formal adaptation. Yet socialization and learning processes have taken place and actually fostered integration – albeit in a distinctive form – even in this policy area, originally designed to avoid supranational integration. Perhaps, indeed, the primary contribution of the Europeanization concept to foreign policy analysis has been its utility in making sense of this unexpected socialization of foreign policy elites (Tonra 2001; Glarbo 2001; Aggestam 2004).

Underlying the issue of convergence is that of the long-term role of Europe in the international system. Will the European Union gradually come to act in a unified way, and thus to represent a 'pole' in a multipolar world system? Or will the Member States continue to assert their own distinctive identities and rights to pursue independent strategies? The chapters that follow can only give some indications of how these questions may be answered. They may suggest, indeed, a variegated pattern, with some states more willing to merge their foreign policies than others. In that event we may see the emergence of new groupings and institutions through which the various faces of Europe will be visible in the world. What is certain, however, is that the issues of convergence and divergence will

continue to be central to the foreign policies of the Union and its Member States over the foreseeable future.

Notes

- 1 The literature on Europeanization in domestic politics and policymaking includes K. Featherstone and D. Papadimitriou, *The Limits of Europeanization Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; P. Graziano and M. Vink, 'Challenges of a new research agenda', in P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds) *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 3–20; K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli, *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; K. Dyson and K.H. Goetz (eds), *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; J.P. Olsen, 'The many faces of Europeanization', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(5), 2002, pp. 921–952; J.P. Olsen, 'Europeanization', in M. Cini (ed.) *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 333–348; K. Goetz and S. Hix (eds), *Europeanized Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*, London: Frank Cass, 2001; M.G. Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001; R. Harmsen and T. Wilson, 'Introduction: approaches to Europeanization', in R. Harmsen and T. Wilson (eds) *Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000; A. Cole and H. Drake, 'The Europeanization of the French Polity: continuity, change and adaptation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(1), 2000, pp. 26–43; H. Kassim, B. Guy Peters and V. Wright (eds), *The National Coordination of EU Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; V. Wright, 'The national co-ordination of European policy-making: negotiating the quagmire', in J. Richardson (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-making*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 155–177; Y. Mény, P. Muller and J.-L. Quermonne (eds), *Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies*, London: Routledge, 1996; and R. Ladrech, 'Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32(1), 1994, pp. 69–88.

2 France

Europeanization by default?

Frédéric Charillon and Reuben Wong

Introduction – France in the EU

France is usually considered, along with Germany and Britain, to be one of the most influential countries in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) process, with a “penchant for leadership” (La Serre 1996; La Serre and Moreau-Defarges 1983; Gross 2006). Some European diplomats think that France’s approach to European institutions has been driven by a constant quest for grandeur through a European *directoire*. Indeed, leaders from de Gaulle to Sarkozy have openly expressed the same political dream – a France that provides its partners with a homemade *Weltanschauung* whose relevance would inspire a European Foreign Policy, mainly with German support and in the framework of a very select club of “big” member states – France, Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy (Poland is often excluded from this club by French leaders). Nicolas Sarkozy made this French vision explicit in 2009 in a speech to the annual meeting of French Ambassadors:

All the States in Europe are equal in terms of rights; they aren’t all equal in terms of duties. When a crisis erupts and a solution has to be found, France and Germany have greater duties than other countries because France and Germany are the two largest European Union countries. Each State’s responsibilities are directly proportionate to its weight. The stronger it is in Europe, the more responsibilities it has. This doesn’t require the establishment of any particular structure. It simply implies an approach, a commitment which, now more than ever, it seems to me, are the hallmarks of Franco-German understanding.

(Sarkozy 2009)

The ability to play such a leadership role is premised on the assumption that France is able to articulate its political vision for the European Union’s role in the world, and that the EU endorses France’s vision and deems it sufficiently “European”. But it is doubtful that France has developed a precise and accepted outlook for “Europe”. The French difficulty in responding to German initiatives in the 2000s, or the failed referendum on the European constitutional treaty in 2005

(for the first time since 1957, a majority of the French – 55 per cent – voted “no” to Europe), have been clear examples of that trend.

Second, Paris has lost some of its centrality since the early days of a post-war, six-member European Community when neither Germany nor Italy (for political reasons) nor the small Benelux countries (because of their insufficient economic and political size) could challenge General de Gaulle’s authority (Irondele 2008). Today, in a 27-member EU with its (not so well identified) collective decision process, it cannot be presumed that French diplomatic preferences would be accepted by the other members of the EU as a *fait accompli*. Dealing with “*la grande nation*”, and accepting its peculiar sociology of the elites and the domination of the “*Enarques*” (graduates of the ultra-elite French National School of Administration [ENA]) is no longer a given (Cogan 2003; cf. Suleiman 1974). Sharing its diplomatic approaches and obsessions is not a foregone conclusion either, especially on issues related to the US, the Mediterranean region or sub-Saharan Africa. This was publicly recognized by President Sarkozy himself just a few months after taking office:

As all convinced Europeans well know, as a result of the 2005 referendum – let’s say things as they are – but not entirely because of it: our country was still playing the European game in a way that perhaps had its merits 20 years ago, but was out of sync with the realities of today’s Europe. We can’t have the same European policy today as 20 years ago.

(Sarkozy 2008)

Has France managed to adapt its foreign policy to the constraints of EU membership in spite of its own ambiguities and specificities?¹ Did Europe change French foreign policy? Did France contribute to the evolution of CFSP? This chapter argues that as a member of the European foreign policymaking process, Paris accepts – with great reluctance – that its foreign policy is at least partially Europeanized. The problem is that many French decision-makers still instinctively work towards “Gallicizing” the CFSP (Védrine 1998). The rhetoric of French leaders and policymakers, and even the substance of many of its foreign policy outputs, have changed from bald Gaullism towards a more cooperative French policy *within* the framework of Europe, although the old reflexes persist on some issues.

Downloading: France as “reluctant European”?

Several French presidents (especially George Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand) have in the past expressed sincere, personal support for European integration, yet France remains reluctant to take the CFSP seriously. General de Gaulle (president from 1958 to 1969) is probably the most well known for his jealous defence of French national prerogatives; indeed his name has become synonymous with French national independence and foreign policy assertiveness (Grosser 1989; Gordon 1993). But the presidencies of Jacques

Chirac (1995–2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (since 2007) have also been noted for Gaullist tendencies trumping coordinated European foreign policy cooperation (Moreau-Defarges 2003; Wong 2006; Charillon and Ramel 2009).

The French attitude towards a “Europeanized” foreign policy has been shaped by several dominant political beliefs that often prevent national political elites from expecting too much from Brussels. The first is that the EU must not be viewed as a source of inspiration but rather as a tool. French leaders constantly declare that “there can be no strong France without Europe, just as there can be no powerful Europe without France” (Sarkozy 2007). Logic follows that France must thus magnify its diplomacy with the support of its European partners, not “download” it from them. The second belief is that the CFSP may be indeed a useful source of diplomatic socialization, but only for small states that would benefit most simply by participating in such high-level politics discussions. France, being a big country with a big diplomatic structure, would not need such a service.

Third, foreign policy is in any case a highly particular area of public policy. Unlike agriculture or competition policies where communitarization is a priority, it is closer to defence as a reflection of national sovereignty. For those reasons, the main actors of the French foreign policy decision process remain defiant and distrustful towards the EU’s capacity to develop a real common foreign policy. Critics habitually derided both CFSP and its former chief representative, Javier Solana, as unable to define a coherent political line at a time when national diplomacy remains the cornerstone of France’s approach to international relations. As Lukáš Pachtá has argued, “Since the 1950s France has viewed the process of European integration as an important means of promoting the country’s foreign policy objectives” (Pachtá 2003: 6).² Other studies demonstrate the discourse of French leaders – and the understandings and self-perceptions embodied by that discourse – undergoing major changes in the 1980s and 1990s as these leaders begin to recognise the utility and importance of EU institutions to achieving national foreign policy goals (see Larsen 1997).

Still, it would be erroneous to dismiss the political impact of “CFSP in the making” on the evolution of French foreign policy. In many respects, the impact of EU membership can be gauged by the changes to France’s diplomatic prerogatives – its room to manoeuvre has narrowed, the sociology of diplomacy has changed, and its diplomatic discourse has undergone significant evolutions. But most traditional French external priorities remain unchanged.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the national margin for manoeuvre has narrowed in the sense that the announcement of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 has triggered high expectations that must now be matched. And the political cost of not playing the collective game is high. Two lessons have been learned by countries like France in this process. First, no member state should be singled out and held responsible for the failure of the common ambition, i.e. for not being able to present a united European front. Second, no member state must appear isolated, or in a minority. France experienced the price of isolation in 1995 after resuming its nuclear tests in the South Pacific; although the angry reactions

of Australia or Japan were expected, Paris did not foresee the absence of support from 12 European partners (out of 14, only Britain and Germany, with some reservations, supported the French decision). On such occasions, Paris discovered that any foreign policy position had to be supported by a majority of its partners (and not only by Germany) *before* being pursued. Times had changed since the days when General de Gaulle could cry “*Vive le Québec libre!*” (as he did in Canada in 1967) without fearing his European neighbours’ reactions.

More recently, the goal of being seen as a consensual producer of initiatives, rather than as a diplomatic maverick, has guided several major diplomatic initiatives from Paris. When France was presiding over the Council in the second half of 2008, President Sarkozy had to deal with the Russian invasion of Georgia on 8 August. Sarkozy responded energetically and struck a deal in the name of Europe, for a six-point plan to stop the war – a cease-fire agreement signed by Moscow after five days of fighting. The “Stability Pact” proposed for Central and Eastern Europe in 1993–4 by former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur on behalf of Europe, drew on similar motivations. At the time, this plan consisted of proposing a set of diplomatic frameworks and bilateral and multilateral treaties in order to prevent the eruption of various looming minority conflicts in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (see also Chapters 10 and 11 on Poland and Slovenia).

The sociology of diplomatic elites has also changed within the new European framework. With the introduction of new actors (EU special envoys, French representatives to the EU, new diplomatic and military levels of actors in Brussels, etc.), new decision processes, new channels and diplomatic tracks (formal and informal consultations, European papers and non-papers, coalition buildings, etc.), most member states were forced to adapt (see Duke 2005; Duke and Vanhoonaeker 2006). They had to find the right (i.e. skilful) agents, match them to the appropriate key posts, and develop a global vision for the new diplomatic system all in order to claim a strategy of influence within the EU. In many respects, France has found it difficult to play this game. With a long-standing diplomatic tradition and a deep reservoir of highly trained diplomats, Paris could easily place seasoned and heavyweight agents at the heart of the EU bureaucratic machine (Lequesne 1993). This was demonstrated with the appointments of Ambassador Pierre Sellal as permanent French representative to the EU (2002–9); Claude-France Arnould, Director of Defence Issues at the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe since 2001; Christine Roger, French permanent representative at the Political and Security Committee and WEO; and General Bentégeat, former French Chief of the Defence Staff (2002–6) and Chairman of the EU Military Committee (2006–9).³

Still, Paris prefers appointing charismatic personalities to top-tier symbolic jobs, rather than to discreet but strategic positions that would allow for more efficient control of diplomatic inputs and outputs. Urging its (sometimes reluctant) partners to appoint Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as head of the European Convention (2002–3) or Jean-Claude Trichet as head of the European Central Bank (president since 2003) carried a political price when it came to sensitive lower-level

appointments. Finally, the question of whether France has a global vision of its strategy in Brussels remains unanswered. First available insights indicate that all levels of the process must be dramatically improved – from identifying the right actors, coordinating and sending them to Brussels, to recognizing and promoting their “European experience” in the French central administrative “machine” (Charillon and Ramel 2009).

This is all the more problematic since the impact of the European process on French diplomatic discourse has proven important. The most appreciable evolutions can be witnessed in the French approach to what were once France’s “*pré carrés*”, namely Africa and the North African-Middle East region. Instead of presenting itself as an indispensable hegemonic guarantor of stability, Paris now merely tries to cope with those regional tensions alongside its European partners. Examples can be found in several ESDP operations. In Ituri (2003), the Artemis mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although mainly French-operated, carried the European label. In 2008, the Eufor mission to Chad and Central Africa also showed that the French would not act alone in sensitive former colonies. This case was much different from during the Cold War, when France undertook several military operations, noticeably in Zaire (former name for DRC) in the 1970s or Chad in the 1980s (Utley 2002; Terpan 2008; Gross 2009).

Further, France now promotes interregional dialogues between the EU and Africa or the Middle East instead of developing ambitious (even if contested) national strategic orientations. For instance France placed her RECAMP programme (*Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix*, or Strengthening of African peace-keeping capacities) in the European Union framework, in order to support the African Union (as also in Darfur). Nowhere is the shift more visible than in France’s approach to the Middle East, which went from being France’s “Arab policy” to the “Union for the Mediterranean” following Sarkozy’s election as President in 2007 (Dumoulin 2006). Is it the Europeanization of foreign policy that can be held responsible for such an evolution? After all, a substantial decrease in foreign policy and defence budgets may also account for these more modest objectives in French external action. Based on the “Mediterranean case”, the answer would be yes. The reluctance of other EU member states to support an “Arab policy”, and their discomfort with a French-inspired regional initiative that would exclude EU member states not bordering the Mediterranean, led to the watering down of the 2008 “Mediterranean Union” initiative to a “Union for the Mediterranean”. Germany’s opposition to the original idea played an especially important role in France’s rewriting of Sarkozy’s initiative (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008:17–22).

Another visible evolution in recent French foreign policy is evidenced by the rapprochement between France and the United States, and especially by the French “return” to NATO’s integrated command (Dumoulin 2006). After an unsuccessful attempt by Chirac in 1996, Sarkozy implemented the decision in 2008–9. Again, and paradoxical as it may seem, the Europeanization of foreign policy and security issues is what led France to realize such a dramatic change. In addition to Nicolas Sarkozy’s personal stance, the French diplomatic and military elites had been

insisting that deepening interconnections between NATO and the EU (like multilateral operations carried out in de facto military complementarity) would make it increasingly difficult for France to play a major role in European security if excluded from the Atlantic Alliance's main structures. Second, such a political move would reassure those Europeans who suspected Paris of systematically undermining relations with the US. As Tomas Valasek puts it: "By offering to change its position towards NATO, [France hopes it will be in a better position] to encourage its allies to sign up to the French vision for European defence" (Valasek 2008: 3; cf. David 2008). This rationale is explained by Sarkozy:

It is in this spirit ... that France rejoined the Atlantic Alliance's military structures. Now that France is playing her full role in NATO, it is the Europeans who are the strongest in the Alliance. ... France now has the means to make her full weight felt in this key debate for our security. Finally, who would understand if – just as we are transforming the Alliance – France didn't play her full role? And who could think that France would have more influence outside than inside it? And who could think that the Alliance's European pillar could be strengthened without France?"

(Sarkozy 2009)

In Asia, there is growing evidence that despite the French tendency to grandstand and cultivate "special relationships" with selected countries (especially those of the former French Indochina), France has gradually been moving towards a more "European" framework of relations in this region (Wong 2006: 204–6). Even with China – a country with which France has historically tried to maintain the myth of a "special relationship" – Paris has started to work through the EU framework (as a collective entity), rather than as a single member state in order to benefit from the advantage of scale (Wellons 1994; Nesshöver 1999; Dorient 2002). This has increasingly been the case in French dealings with other dynamic actors (e.g. ASEAN, South Korea and India) in the region, and in the enthusiastic French support which proved critical in launching the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) at summit level in 1996 (Dorient 2002; Wong 2008).

But other developments in French foreign policy are not (or are barely) determined by the EU dimension. Whatever its genuine will to see a common European position emerge on strategic energy supplies, Paris has maintained a very conciliatory tone and lenient attitude towards Russia in spite of harsh criticisms expressed by some other member states (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008: 23). Calling for pragmatism and economic cooperation, Sarkozy has suggested that the EU and Russia "have a lot to talk about in the economic arena, with respect to the creation of a vast economic area, and in the security arena. Let's take President Medvedev at his word, let's try to build relations" (Sarkozy 2009).

As far as other emerging giants are concerned, France has actively participated in EU-level talks and meetings while maintaining its own approach to China (as discussed above), India and Brazil. The French prerogative in these cases is

mainly determined by national, and often trade-related, interests. After having developed a highly EU-compatible approach to “ethical foreign policy” in 2007, Sarkozy promptly returned to the usage of more commercially oriented language to describe the French stance (Charillon 2007). On a variety of international issues, ranging from the famous defence of the *Francophonie* to the “cultural exception”,⁴ France has shown itself to be more willing to lead a caucus inside the EU while working to build that caucus into a majority. It is less interested in forging a European consensus. France tends to promote its foreign policy preferences within the EU in kind, by uploading its contribution to the European level.

Uploading

How has France influenced the march to a veritable common foreign and security policy so far? As one of the European Union’s founding states (since 1957) with one of the largest major European and world economies, a nuclear power with a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and as a former colonial empire claiming special relationships with several parts of the world, France has had the political weight – and the will – to play a special role within the EU. On most issues, the French presence in Brussels, the experience of its diplomats and the extent of its diplomatic network have all made Paris a central actor with a particular clout. France’s sizeable representation in Brussels is perceived by most European partners as active and politically influential, though this does not necessarily mean that France has always been able to impose itself as a natural leader on crucial issues.⁵ The recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by Germany in the early days of the Balkan crisis (1991) was considered a major diplomatic setback in Paris (and a serious breach in the Franco-German relationship). Another example was the pace of EU enlargement, with France then being in favour of a slower process.

Unlike its often strident position on EU policies like agriculture or trade, Paris does not attempt to impose its views in the CFSP arena. Rather, as mentioned above, its method has usually consisted of defending one specific trend and campaigning to present it as the best among a host of other options. Uploading French preferences involved taking leadership on specific issues and persuading others to come along, for example, in pushing (together with the British) for European military capacity with the St Malo Declaration in 1998. Only on rare occasions (and mainly during France’s EU presidency) did the French try to broker a consensus and speak in the name of Europe (see Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008: 10–18).

The fierce competition between Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair during the Iraqi crisis in 2002–3 illustrates this attitude of presumed leadership and claiming to speak for Europe. Each of the two leaders purported to represent a majority within the EU.⁶ Having long subscribed to the idea that the EU mostly represented a competition between the Franco-German and British visions, Paris was interested in demonstrating its difference from London by defending the superiority of its position. It was less interested in paving the way for an intermediate position or a

European soft consensus. Another possibility for France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was to consult its EU partners before deciding on its position at the UN. Hostile to any US-backed resolution allowing the use of force, France could have proposed to use its veto if there was a majority in the EU opposing military action against Iraq, while only abstaining if it was not the case. Although hinted by a few diplomats, such a “European” position at the UN was never seriously envisaged.

More generally on transatlantic issues, France has been more concerned with ensuring Germany’s support and winning the support of other member states than it has with building a consensus – since a common position with London had been written off as unattainable, proving the superiority of the French vision mattered more. On this French characteristic, we fully agree with Charles Cogan’s view that French diplomacy is often more interested in demonstrating its intellectual superiority than reaching a consensus (Cogan 2003).

Under such conditions, how does Paris’ habit of promoting its own preferences contribute to the formulation of EU foreign policy? Three factors are salient in the CFSP issues over which France wields some influence. On European security and transatlantic issues, France’s military power and the size of its army help it to wield political clout. On Africa and in parts of the Middle East, French decision makers’ historic familiarity with the region and its elites contributes to its credibility. On global issues (global conferences, climate change, initiatives on global finance, etc.), the sheer size of the French diplomatic machine allows the Quai d’Orsay to be particularly active. However the reform of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry initiated by the Foreign minister Bernard Kouchner in 2008 (although innovative and ambitious), leaves several questions unanswered on the management of the European dimension. For instance the new mapping of French embassies in the world (with different categories, depending on the importance of the host country) hardly facilitates common representations of the kind intended in the External Action Service set up by the Treaty of Lisbon.

France has long advocated that the EU maintain an independent defence capacity, and has been interested in strengthening EU operational planning and its other military tools. As President Chirac argued in 2005:

to be recognized in the world as a global player in the field of peace and security, Europe must continue to reinforce its collective instruments. The European Union Operations Centre must be in a position to conduct further autonomous military operations along the lines of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Europe must be at the leading edge of military technologies. The European Defence Agency must be given a genuine research and development budget and must forthwith take on responsibility for concrete projects, such as drones and tanker aircraft fleets.
(Chirac 2005)

To this end, Paris has focused its diplomatic efforts on convincing its EU partners that Europe should be more than just a civilian complement to US-led NATO

operations. Paris has proposed, *inter alia*, to lead “NATO-less” EU military operations.⁷ It worked to tighten the link between any CFSP developments to the overall nature of EU-US relations. This of course fostered suspicions among some EU partners (especially Britain) that France’s ulterior motive in both the CFSP and ESDP was to distance (if not decouple) the “old continent” from its American ally. In other words, they feared that France might “export” its American obsession to its partners. After Hubert Védrine’s slogan qualifying the Franco-American relationship as “*amis, alliés, mais pas alignés*” (friends, allies, but not aligned), Prime Minister François Fillon coined another formula (although similar in nature) in 2009: “France, ally but not vassal, loyal but not submissive, fraternal but never subordinate: that’s the nature of our relationship with America” (French Embassy 2009).

A long-time champion of the EU over NATO, Paris now hopes to regain influence in both circles with a “comeback” to the integrated command of the Atlantic Alliance.⁸ With a strong army by European standards and substantial participation in NATO missions (a major financial donor and the fourth largest contributor in 2009 to NATO overseas operations with more than 4,500 troops), France’s promotion of its preferences in EU foreign policy was pretty successful.⁹ And in dealing with regions where the EU, NATO or France alone is militarily engaged (mainly the Balkans and Africa), French influence is even greater.¹⁰

The role of France in the EU’s common positions and responses to the breakup of Yugoslavia provides a good example of the linkage between France’s capacity to make military contributions, and the political clout derived from such capacities. While French influence remained relatively high during the early phase of the Balkan tragedy in the 1990s, Paris took a more assertive lead in envisaging a military response. France did not always dispatch more troops to the ground than its European partners did, but its *military habitus* made it a critical actor in military planning, intervention and peace building, mainly in Bosnia and Kosovo.¹¹ Similarly, in the 2003 EU-led intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, France acted as the “framework nation” and supported the operation from its aircraft bases at N’Djamena and Entebbe. France alone provided 80 per cent of the 2,200 troops in the operation (drawn from 18 participating countries). Indeed, Paris had manoeuvred in the United Nations to initiate the operation in the first place. The nature of France’s influence then consists of: (a) taking the lead in formulating the “European” position in response to a given international event; (b) centralizing most of the information and decision networks relevant to that event; and (c) personifying a European response in the eyes of the international community.

A second way for France to wield influence on the CFSP process is to employ both its specific (and historical) knowledge of a given region and its diplomatic networks there. With a substantial diplomatic and cultural presence in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and (to a lesser extent) the Middle East, France can and often does work energetically to influence the European approach. Many European diplomats acknowledge that most EU positions on the Israel-Palestine issue, for instance, are initiated or actively prepared by France and/or Britain,

considered the two leaders within the EU on the subject.¹² Since the Venice declaration of 1980, the balanced position of Europe on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been heavily influenced by these two national policies whose historical links with the Levant are acknowledged and valued (Charillon 2007).¹³ In the case of Lebanon, other EU capitals have usually let Paris take the lead in managing the successive crisis situations (instead of forging common positions), as was the case in 2006 after the 33-day war with Israel.¹⁴

The former League of Nations mandate (1920–43) and the fact that Lebanon remains a partially French-speaking country invokes in France a strong interest in Lebanese affairs. Paris, alongside the US, was at the origin of Resolution 1559,¹⁵ and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner travelled to Lebanon almost monthly during his first few months in office in order to broker a solution to the Lebanese political and institutional stalemate.

France's prioritization of Lebanon is reflected in various EU policies since the country is one of the main Mediterranean beneficiaries of community assistance. The EU has channelled considerable financial support to Lebanon since 2007, through initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Lebanon Country Strategy Paper (2007–13), the National Indicative Programme (2007–10), and the EU-Lebanon action plan (January 2007). Each of these EU plans is consistent with both France's insistence on the need to help Lebanon, and its other international initiatives on the issue.¹⁶ At the time, Jacques Chirac even publicly lamented that Europe was not able to play a more important role in the Lebanese crisis:

The future of the European project is today predicated on Europe's ability to be a leading political player. It must be a player able to contribute to a constructive dialogue with the major world powers. The Europeans must, to this end, overcome their inhibitions and negotiate with their partners on the basis of the objective interests of our continent. ... It must be a player that can mobilize its power to serve peace. Europe was insufficiently active in the Lebanese crisis, although France had recommended on a number of occasions that the High Representative be given a mandate to speak and act on behalf of the Twenty-Five, as he is doing in the Iranian issue. The fact that Europe is proving its ability to engage – in Macedonia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Aceh and in the Democratic Republic of Congo – gives us all the more grounds for nurturing this ambition.

(Chirac 2006)

But there is also a more negative side to French influence on the CFSP, mostly in regions that have been traditional backyards of French diplomacy. By reacting quickly, unilaterally and in favour of one of its close friends in the Mediterranean or in Africa, France can prevent Europe (sometimes on purpose, some suspect) from arriving at a common and balanced response to a given situation. France's strong support for Morocco against Spain (an EU member) in the Perejil Island crisis of 2002, paralysed any coherent European response to the situation, such

that it was only resolved by US mediation.¹⁷ Similarly, French support for Morocco in its row with Algeria over West Sahara also makes it difficult for the EU to develop a well-defined position.

This pattern of privileging special bilateral relationships is reflected in French discourses on North Africa, which often start with a mention of the EU neighbourhood only to end up with a stress on bilateral ties only:

On our doorstep, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are striving ... to meet the aspirations of their many young people Europe must help them ... On our southern borders, we need a united and stable Maghreb constituting an area of democracy, freedom and prosperity for its populations. ... Let us help them in their development-related efforts by effectively implementing the forms of enhanced cooperation established at Naples in principle in December of last year. Our relations with the Maghreb will remain more than ever before a political and strategic priority of our external action ... France ... is united with those countries by exceptionally close-knit bilateral ties. She has overhauled her partnership with Morocco and vigorously supports the modernization and development process in Tunisia. The signing of a friendship treaty with Algeria in 2005 will lay the foundations of a sound, ambitious and forward-looking relationship.

(Chirac 2004)

On such issues in the Mediterranean and North Africa, it is thus debatable whether France helps to forge a European approach or acts instead as an obstructionist, selfish power. It probably does both, depending on the issue and according to France's relationship with the country or region concerned. This is illustrative of the CFSP process, which remains heavily dependent on the member states' willingness to abide (or not) by the collective rules and decisions. Only on common goods, global governance or other consensual issues do CFSP mechanisms work better, on the basis of members' capacities to contribute rather than on their ulterior motives. On these issues, French diplomatic capacities (including its human resources) have often helped the EU (with other "big states") to be a major international actor and to compete with other major powers such as the US or Japan. In the 2000s, European positions on climate change or environmental issues have been strengthened in general when France stood up to stress the importance of the issue. Bringing the environment back into "high" politics was indeed a diplomatic priority during Chirac's presidency. This continued under Nicolas Sarkozy. More generally, the French stance in favour of global diplomacy pleading for global governance (pleading for the reform of the international economic or financial system for instance) or cultural diversity has helped facilitate the emergence of strong European positions.

Europe's position in the face of the Bush administration over climate change and the Kyoto protocol in the 2000s, and in the debate over the reform of capitalism after the financial crisis in 2009, owes something to the clarity of France's position. The EU's relevance as a political actor on the question of Iran's nuclear

proliferation was also strengthened by France's change of tone and its newly toughened stance after 2007. The EU position reflects in great part France's preferences – that is to say, clinging to the terms of the Non Proliferation Treaty and dealing with Iran in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to maintain a “critical dialogue.”¹⁸

Conclusion

How and to what extent is French foreign policy being Europeanized? As argued in this chapter, France and its partners must take into account the new constraints on national and European diplomacy. But instead of a clear-cut “Europeanization” of French foreign policy, in the sense of dramatic shifts and visible changes of positions, one has witnessed a silent revolution. Beneath the obvious Gaullist penchant for national independence and leadership in the EU, the “Brusselsization” of French diplomatic minds and policymaking processes is at work.¹⁹ While still trying to impose their views on their partners, French diplomats are also increasingly accepting the complex and interdependent rules of the CFSP channels and decision processes. Discussing an option with other EU actors (not only the biggest member states, but also with the Commission and smaller member states) and trying to convince them, exploring the various tracks of coalition-building first before expressing national preferences, are now part of daily life in the Quai d'Orsay.

But France's real conversion to Europe's foreign policy mechanisms would involve key developments that remain elusive. First, France (or at least a majority of its decision makers) must accept that Europe is not simply a French-German “engine” automatically followed by other members. Second, France must be ready to adapt its bureaucratic structures, and reorganize its diplomatic tools in the service of European priorities rather than according to its national ambitions. Third, instead of considering the EU as a “natural political environment” and instrument of French foreign policy, Paris could propose new schemes for the CFSP and contribute more to the debate on its development.²⁰ Finally, redefining France's role in the EU also means looking for a leading but acceptable contribution to CFSP, and passing from grand ideological divides (e.g. “Gaullists vs. Europeanists vs. Atlantists”) to more modern issue-oriented cleavages (on the Middle East, Africa or the Balkans, for instance).

Where a Europeanization of French foreign policy has occurred – such as in EU common policies on the Middle East, Asia, or the environment – the key factor has been the recognition that French national capacities are inadequate, and that an appreciable impact can only be made if France acted under the flag and combined weight of Europe. A transition towards accepting EU methods and a more European approach towards French foreign policy has thus gained some traction in Paris, but embracing this as the default mechanism for French diplomacy, remains elusive.

Notes

- 1 For a more global approach to this question (not focused on CFSP), see Drake (2005); Boekle *et al.* (2004); Maclean and Szarka (2008).
- 2 An even more sceptical assessment of French elites' ambivalent thinking about intergovernmentalism as a middle way between the extremes of national autonomy and European integration, can be found in Moreau-Defarges (2003).
- 3 After Brussels, Pierre Sellal was appointed Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2009. In Brussels, the office of Defence Issues under Arnould was given the nickname "the French *direction*" owing to both its authoritative pull and the number of French agents in her entourage.
- 4 Insisting that culture, but also health, education, biodiversity, climate or work cannot be dealt with in the same manner as commercial goods. See N. Sarkozy's speech in Geneva at the International Labour Organization, 15 June 2009 (ILO 2009).
- 5 See <http://www.rpfrance.eu> for a sense of the French representation's size and the expertise of its officials. Organigramme: www.rpfrance.eu/spip.php?rubrique3, and see Figure 2.1.
- 6 Jacques Chirac probably had a majority in a 15-member Union while Tony Blair was more representative of the group of 25 countries the EU was soon to become.
- 7 Especially Operation Artemis in Ituri (Democratic Republic of Congo), carried out in 2003 without the material support of NATO.
- 8 Announced by President Sarkozy before the 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, held to commemorate NATO's sixtieth anniversary.
- 9 The French White Book on Defence (2008) announced the downsizing of the French army in order to reach 225,000 troops by the mid-2010s. France and Britain are the only EU members to dedicate more than 2 per cent of GDP to military expenditures (2.49 and 2.34 per cent in 2007).
- 10 In September 2009, France had 1,500 troops in Kosovo (1,350 in KFOR, 150 in EULEX), around 1,000 in the Ivory Coast; 1,800 in Central Africa (1,200 in Chad, 240 in Central African Republic, 360 in MINURCAT); 1,500 in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In Afghanistan however, France had 3,700 troops in 2009 (but it is worth noting that Britain and Germany had more troops in the country).
- 11 France had 7,000 troops in Kosovo when Germany had 8,500.
- 12 The French and British positions, on this specific problem, are much closer than on European issues. The French and British consulates in Jerusalem play an important role in this process.
- 13 Namely and to put it briefly, that Israel has the right to live in peace, and that the Palestinians have the right to a state. Other member states have a more engaged stance (such as the Netherlands or Greece, which hold opposite positions).
- 14 Although Italy sent more troops than France on the ground (2,500 for Italy, 2,000 for France in 2009 – out of a total of 12,300) and has been assuming charge of the UNIFIL (operation Leonte) since 2007. The German Navy was also the biggest contributor to the maritime task force established in October 2006.
- 15 Adopted on 2 September 2004, and, among other points, calling upon "foreign forces" (that is, Syria) to withdraw from Lebanon.
- 16 Including international conferences hosted by France in Paris (such as "Paris III" conference on 25 January 2007) to rebuild Lebanon after 2006.
- 17 A former French colony, Morocco has maintained an intimate political, economic and cultural relationship with France. The personal relations between Jacques Chirac and the late king Hassan II, and to a lesser extent his son Mohammed VI, were also very close. Morocco and Spain had both tried to assert a claim over Perejil island by landing troops in 2002.

- 18 The June 2006 UN proposal (offering Iran broad cooperation in the technological, economic, political and security fields) worked out by Germany, France and the United Kingdom, together with China, Russia and the USA, was strongly supported by the European Council.
- 19 A similar process can be witnessed in French military circles: see Bagayoko-Penone (2005) and Terpan (2008).
- 20 This would take new official initiatives, but also more informal papers or “non-papers”, and the encouragement of French think tanks devoted to such reflexions.




Figure 2.1: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs organigramme 2008.




Figure 2.1 (continued): French Ministry of Foreign Affairs organigramme 2008.

3 Germany in the European Union

Patricia Daehnhardt

Introduction: the Europeanization of foreign policies

Germany's role as an increasingly self-confident and assertive actor in foreign policy was achieved mostly through its membership of the European Union. Because of a strong congruence between German and European institutions, interests and identities, Germany has been portrayed as a 'Europeanized state'.¹ Yet recently Germany's reputation as a Europeanized state has been challenged by some (Hellmann et al. 2005), raising the question whether it is possible for a state to de-Europeanize, or whether Germany has become more like other states, albeit still Europeanized in nature. Has Germany's increasing self-confidence developed at the cost of its previous European enthusiasm? If Europeanization is understood as a process of 'policy convergence', is German foreign policy becoming immune to it? In contrast, which effects have EU policies produced on domestic elites regarding foreign policy? Have German decision makers attempted to coordinate policies domestically to produce a more effective policy? In the EU's attempts to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor, is there a nascent pan-European conception of interest and identity which is gradually being adapted domestically by the German political elite?

This chapter examines Germany's increasing self-confidence in foreign policy and asks the question if the conventional view of Germany as a 'Europeanized state' needs to be revisited. It assesses patterns of convergence and divergence which can be traced back to the process of Europeanization by analysing both the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' dimensions of Europeanization in German foreign policy.² It examines the impact of EU membership and European institutions such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on German foreign policy and explores how Germany has responded to changes arising from the EU's effect on its domestic institutions and policies.

If initially Europeanization was conceived as the influence of European institutions to overcome cross-national asymmetries and produce change in domestic politics (a top-down process), its scope has widened into a system whereby domestic inputs also feed back onto the European level of policymaking (bottom-up process). Hix and Goetz defined Europeanization as 'a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to

European integration' (Vink and Graziano 2008: 310). Radaelli characterized Europeanization as

processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies
(Radaelli 2000: 4)

Featherstone and Radaelli see Europeanization as an inherently asymmetric process with a dynamic quality: 'its structural effects are not necessarily permanent or irreversible. ...The impact of Europeanization is typically incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and between locations, national and subnational' where 'profound disparities of impact remain' (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 4). More recently, Vink and Graziano broadened the conceptual scope suggesting that Europeanization should be theorized to answer 'how European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems' (Vink and Graziano 2008: 12). Others consider foreign policy Europeanization not to be a vertical process at all, where uploading and downloading occur, but rather a horizontal process (cross-loading) where supranational institutions are weak and Member States remain the key actors, and where Europeanization develops from a 'coordination reflex' between national governments (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005: 345).

As Wong and Hill suggest in the introductory chapter, Europeanization is 'a bi-directional process that leads to a negotiated but limited convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels'. For the editors the Europeanization approach 'attempts to strike a middle path as it accepts that Member States adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same Member States are themselves actively involved in creating/shaping these structures and norms'. Thus Europeanization can be understood as a twofold process by which EU Member States engage in uploading their policy preferences onto the EU polity and policies, and download policy inputs produced within the EU and other Member States onto their domestic polities. Because these two processes are in constant flux a two-way practice of adaptation occurs, where the outcome varies between a good and a bad fit of policy projection, with implications which change the national and European dimensions of policymaking. This *can* produce a tendency towards convergence between national identities and interests, and a European identity, in which both are increasingly constitutive of one another.

Germany in the EU: the path towards Europeanization

The Europeanization of German politics started before the term itself became fashionable in the 1990s and conceptually operational in European studies. As a founding member of the European Communities (EC), the Federal Republic of

Germany (FRG) developed an almost symbiotic relationship with the EC, which served as a vehicle for the FRG to regain international credibility as a valid member of Europe's political community. Europeanization occurred in three areas which characterized Germany as a Europeanized state.

First, Europeanization occurred in the identity dimension. If state identity is understood as the 'self-placement of the polity within specific international contexts' (Banchoff 1999: 268), the Federal Republic developed a Europeanized state identity from the 1950s onwards. While this was not exclusive to Germany, the country had no consolidated international identity to fall back on. The experience with National Socialism and Germany's defeat in the Second World War created an identity vacuum after 1945 which membership in the EC proved suitable to fill. Germany adopted institutional commitments in line with the EC's evolving normative framework for policymaking (Anderson and Goodman 1993) constructing gradually an international role as a 'reflexive multilateralist' through its European policy (Bulmer *et al.* 2000: 52). For decades, this identity synergy between Bonn and Brussels functioned well, considering that the interaction developed mainly within the EC itself, with only a limited foreign policy dimension. Europeanizing one's identity predisposed Germans to accept the Europeanization of foreign policy early on and in a different manner from other Member States, in particular Britain and France. Germany's state identity was thus the first feature of the country to be Europeanized.

Second, Europeanization grew in the domain of institutional congruence. Germany's recovery of a semi-sovereign foreign policy (Katzenstein 1987) and power was facilitated by the institutional congruence which developed between Bonn and the European institutions. Paradoxically, this was a strategy of 'sovereignty gain' through 'sovereignty renouncing' (Haftendorn 2001). By delegating powers to EC institutions – powers which the FRG effectively did not have in a way comparable to that of other members – policymakers were able to recover power, often unintentionally, 'indirectly and in a diffuse manner' (Bulmer 1997: 51). Rather than functioning as limits on the country's margin of manoeuvrability, European institutions thus provided a means for Germany to amplify its voice in European and transatlantic politics. 'German democratization and European integration', notes Katzenstein, 'came to be linked, thus making it possible for German ... political elites to reinforce and exploit an institutional fit that had emerged fortuitously' (1997: 41). European institutions helped shape Germany's domestic institutions, thereby facilitating the interaction of up- and downloading practices. In other words, institutional congruence with the European Community paved the way for Germany gradually to acquire normative power and shape the contours of the European integration process in an active manner (Daehnhardt 2007). Bulmer and Katzenstein argued that this institutional congruence was so significant that Germany managed to mould European institutions and policymaking decisively, thereby reducing the adaptational pressures on domestic institutions (Börzel 2005: 51).

Finally, Europeanization occurred in the realm of policy implementation, if only because EPC was 'not only the main framework for [Germany's] diplomacy

but almost the only one' (Hill 1983b: 185). Conflicting interests between the EU's projection of ideas onto Germany's foreign policymaking, and Germany's exporting of identity factors onto the European level remained remarkably low. This led to a significant degree of Europeanization of German politics, leading one author to argue that

the Europeanization of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to the European interest a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly impossible

(Goetz 1996: 24)

It was uncertain that this remained so after unification, since 'the Federal Republic was not institutionally bound to remain an enthusiastic supporter of deeper integration' (Banchoff 1999: 266). It now had the potential to recover a sovereign national foreign policy, leading many to believe that the country would pursue a less Europeanized path or even disentangle itself from the EU altogether (Waltz 1993).

The end of the Cold War represented a dual challenge for German policymakers. It catapulted Germany into the potential position of becoming one of Europe's key powers. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1993) paved the way for the EU to emerge as a foreign policy actor through a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The simultaneous emergence of these apparently contradictory reflexes have accompanied German policymakers ever since. To assure foreign policy compatibility between the two they followed a 'two-lane policy approach'. In one 'policy lane', Germany sustained its multilateralist diplomacy of institutional continuity in the EU and NATO, promoting the institutional enlargement of both organizations. Thus in the Maastricht Treaty Germany 'projected elements of its domestic model onto Europe' (Anderson 1999: 207) advocating the creation of the CFSP as a pillar of the EU. In a second 'policy lane', policymakers began to accept that the increase of Germany's new position as a potential European power placed new expectations and responsibilities upon it as an individual actor, and as a potential leader of the CFSP. Therefore, amid institutional continuity, Germany's role within these institutions changed, with implications for its foreign policy. This, inevitably, led to contradictions and ambivalence, and the challenge all Chancellors had to face was to balance both policies in such a way that Germany persisted as a Europeanized state. The key question now was 'whether or not national decision makers [were] significantly reconceptualising their notions of interest and identity in European terms' (Hill 1998: 39).

While all governments pursued both policy lanes, there were significant differences. Chancellor Kohl (1982–1998) chose to reinforce the first lane maintaining a policy of continuity and the predictability of existing institutional frameworks, deepening and enlarging European integration, sometimes eschewing more responsibility for Germany foreign policy. Chancellor Schröder

(1998–2005) accelerated down the second policy lane, strengthening the coordinates of a changing German foreign policy, with a new sort of Europeanism. Before the *Bundestag*, on 10 November 1998, Schröder stated what epitomized this new Europeanism: Germans ‘are Europeans not because [they] have to be but because [they] want to be’ (*Bundesregierung* 1998). This touched upon the nature of Germany as a Europeanized state, for it changed its European and transatlantic policies. Berlin’s partners could no longer count on Germany’s hitherto automatic congruent behaviour. Schröder argued for a lessening of Berlin’s financial contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds, a delimitation of the powers of EU institutions, and the recovery of some competences by national institutions better equipped to deal with particular issues.

Thus a less enthusiastic strain of Europeanism, more instrumental and nationally orientated, had entered the German political discourse (Schneider *et al.* 2001), slowing down Germany’s Europeanization path and suggesting a new ‘German-EU incongruence’ (Jeffery and Paterson 2003). Jeffery and Paterson identified this as the ‘shifting of tectonic plates’ indicating that the long-standing ‘virtuous circle’ between Germany and the EU was cracking down because Germany had arrived at a ‘critical juncture for change’ (Jeffery and Paterson 2003). The Grand Coalition government led by Chancellor Merkel (2005–2009) relocated on the centre stage of European and transatlantic politics. The movement of the tectonic plates inside Germany calmed down, while the European plates are still being rearranged. Merkel galvanized European policy to ensure that the EU is capable of action, but not at the price of sidelining Germany’s own interests. The Chancellor has combined both policy lanes, in dealing with changes in Germany’s foreign policy and shaping changes in EU foreign policy. With the new centre-right government after September 2009 led by Chancellor Merkel this trend is likely to continue given that European policy rests mostly in the domain of the Chancellery, leaving the junior partner FDP with little effective room to manoeuvre.

Despite these developments Germany remains a Europeanized state, and elements of convergence between Berlin and the EU persist. German policymakers still are more active supporters of the ‘European-idealist’ conception of a normative-civilian power model for European foreign policy than their French or British colleagues in that both Germany and the EU support the promotion of democracy, human rights and security cooperation as common values shaping international politics while often lacking the necessary means or the political will to do so. Like the EU, Germany still lacks sufficient structural power, underlining the discrepancy between the stated ambition and the absence of material and financial resources allocated to foreign and defence policy (Maull 2006). But congruence between German interests and EU ambitions is not an indicator of policy convergence between EU Member States across the board, and divergences among Member States can rebound to undermine Europeanization in Germany itself.

Germany and foreign policy downloading

This section of the chapter analyses the impact of ‘downloading’ on Germany’s foreign policymaking. It looks at how Europeanization feeds back into Germany’s domestic institutions and policies, and whether this has led to changes in them. It thus studies the transformational effects the EU has on Germany’s policy preferences, and the pressure the country feels to adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and to accommodate EU policies.

The process of downloading policy preferences, when it occurs, tends to promote growing cross-national convergence between the foreign policies of Member States towards the adoption of an increasing number of common positions. Since the ability for Member States to download their policy preferences rests on the intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy process the record of policy downloading in the realm of foreign policy, as opposed to other policy domains, remains rather poor. Thus it is difficult to identify the policy areas where the actual *substance* of national foreign policies has been changed because of downloading. Furthermore conflicting interests abound in relations between Member States themselves and between them and the European Commission. Ultimately, European institutions have only a limited capacity to change domestic structures and policymaking processes because they lack robust institutional structures themselves; thus rather than effectively changing domestic actors they are themselves vulnerable to environmental change (March and Olsen 1998). Still, for the EU to become a credible international actor, the Council has to promote the convergence of European interests (European Council 2003: 1). The chapter will now examine some of the policy domains where this convergence has been attempted.

Downloading and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Eleven years after the institutionalization of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was initiated by France and Britain in December 1998 in St Malo, and six years after the beginning of its missions, ESDP is one of the EU’s foreign policy areas where some modest success has been achieved. The 1999 EU Helsinki summit laid out the EU’s military capabilities for Petersberg tasks and stipulated headline goals for 2003.³ This year was also decisive because the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (European Council 2003). From 2003, the EU sent civilian-military missions to Aceh, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Darfur, Georgia, Guinea Bissau, Kosovo, Macedonia, Rafah and the coast of Somalia.⁴ In December 2006 Germany took over the military command of the EUFOR Bosnia Herzegovina mission Althea, underway since the EU took over the command from NATO forces in December 2004. In March 2008 a year-long EUFOR military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic began, as part of a regional approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Council of the EU, not dated b). The ESDP’s first naval mission, Atalanta, started in December 2008 to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, with German participation in the form of frigates and up to 1,400 military personnel (Deutscher Bundestag 2008).

Some Europeanization has occurred regarding ESDP missions. Member States find it comparatively easier to agree on sporadic missions with a limited timeframe decided through intergovernmental cooperation in the Council than on CFSP positions regarding such strategic issues as Europe's policy on transatlantic relations or on Iraq. They agreed on a European Security Strategy (ESS), but did so for different reasons. Germany wanted to enhance the EU's civilian conflict and crisis management instruments; Britain understood the ESS as a bridging device in transatlantic security issues; and France aimed to strengthen the EU's security and defence autonomy vis-à-vis Washington.

But agreement on joint ESDP missions does not mean that the process of downloading has changed the domestic structures of Germany's security policy. Overall strategic positions and the shape of institutions such as the Bundeswehr continue to be resistant to Europeanization; British and French attempts to push the German government into transforming its armed forces and modernize its weapons and logistic systems continue to be met with some resistance. Furthermore, successive German governments have only half-heartedly adapted to the requirements of the ESDP, such as establishing logistical chains and the implementation of battle groups.

Germany downloaded ESDP inputs when its own security policy was undergoing a process of reform and normalization. ESDP served as an instrument to continue embedding its security policy in a multilateral process, and to act in out-of-area missions under a European heading. Germany's participation in ESDP's civilian and military missions, which has led it to push at the limits of the ban on combat operations, shows that it has been affected by a general EU process which it cannot wholly control, meaning that some degree of Europeanization is at work.

Downloading and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created in 2004 as a response to the EU's big bang enlargement towards the eastern and southern parts of Europe in that same year, and in anticipation of potential conflicts arising in the new areas which would now border with the EU.⁵ As the European Security Strategy states, 'stability on Europe's borders is essential for the EU to pursue an effective foreign policy' (European Council 2003). The European Neighbourhood Policy is considered a geopolitical imperative for the EU's external action to 'consolidate a ring of friends around its rims' (Council of the EU 2007). ENP 'challenges the EU's ability to develop an external policy complementary to enlargement that is effective in promoting transformation and reform' (European Commission 2007a). The EU has done this through two new ENP mechanisms, created in 2008 and 2009, namely the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, both of which aim to promote stability, good governance and economic developments and offer free trade initiatives in exchange for a commitment to democratic reform.

As it is still in its early stages it is difficult to assess the nature of downloading in the policy domain of ENP. But to the extent that Germany was an active shaper of EU enlargement until 2004 when ten countries joined, Berlin remains committed to establishing an effective ENP area to the south and the east of the EU's borders. During the German EU presidency in 2007 the German government put forward a proposal for a new EU partnership policy with Central Asia, which the Council adopted.⁶ Thus while Germany is a beneficiary of the institutionalization of relations with countries with which the EU borders, particularly to the east, Berlin has been a key player in pursuing a proactive EU Neighbourhood Policy for that area. Because of its strong security and energy interests, Germany has revealed more of a tendency towards uploading capabilities than any openness towards adapting its position to a generally agreed ENP. Europeanization, in this respect and in this issue-area, has thus been weak.

Downloading and European policy for the Middle East

The European Union has been persistently concerned over the Middle East, developing different mechanisms for dealing with the region's ongoing conflicts. EU states have, over the years, forged a common position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, providing financial assistance towards both sides, and supporting the creation of a Palestinian state while respecting the sovereignty of Israel. Recognizing that only a cooperative effort by the EU, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region will lead to a resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the EU is a full participant in the Quartet set up to drive forward the Middle East Peace Process. European leaders accept that Europe 'must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved' (European Council 2003: 8). In March 2003, the Brussels European Council approved the 'EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East' to promote peace, prosperity and progress in the region and build on existing institutions such as the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), the European Neighbourhood Policy which includes some Middle Eastern states, and the clustered EU-3 approach towards Iran. On the latter, European action has materialized through a concerted effort among the EU's key members, Britain, France and Germany in an attempt to present a European position against Teheran's nuclear ambitions. While the policy outcomes of such policies have not often proven successful, Europeanization among Member States and the EU has made some acceptable progress, with common positions being agreed and solidarity largely maintained, at least on the Israel-Palestine conflict and on negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program in international forums.

Berlin has only recently developed a comprehensive policy for the Middle East. While it had relations with all countries in the region, and a special one with Israel, it was part of the FRG's moral and diplomatic tradition not to play an active or independent role in the area (Fischer 2007: 409). Thus without a clear definition of German interests for the Middle East, Germany was more likely to rely on

European initiatives in this policy area. Its infant Middle East policy became embedded in a European framework leading it to juggle between an impartial position vis-à-vis all states in the region, and maintaining its special relationship with Israel (Perthes 2004) which it managed to do with success. This was a consequence of Europeanization, as more often than not Germany adapted its foreign policy to the EU position and to other Member States' foreign policies.

While a consensus among the German elite exists that stability in the region is a priority for Germany and Europe, defining how Germany should position itself regarding the conflicting parties often leads to domestic divergences in coalition governments. During the Grand Coalition government, foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, for example, believed Syria needed to be included in peace negotiations, while Chancellor Merkel was more cautious on how to handle Damascus (*Deutsche Welle* 2008). More significantly, Germany's special relationship with Israel, which successive governments have cherished since the 1950s, has undergone change. While Germany remains one of its closest allies, committed to the security and existence of the state of Israel, and to bilateral defence cooperation, it argues that the Israel-Palestinian conflict lies at the root of several unsolved problems in the region, and Berlin's support for a two-state solution regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict demands a more widespread approach towards conflicts in the Middle East. Furthermore, German public opinion has begun to distinguish between Germany's commitment to the existence and security of the state of Israel, which remains undisputed, and the policies of Israeli governments – which have become more susceptible to criticism. Thus Berlin's more comprehensive position towards the various actors in the Middle East is likely to produce increasingly divergent positions domestically, and to make the domestic elite more resistant to downloading in this policy area.

Downloading relations with US, Russia and China

The process of foreign policy convergence remains particularly difficult in relations with the United States, Russia and China. First, Member States endorse a CFSP rhetorically but when it comes to pursuing their interests towards great powers, they often prefer to act unilaterally, in the name of national sovereignty. Given its marginal role in CFSP, strategy papers by the Commission hardly serve as more than guiding lines for Member States to follow in their many individualist approaches (European Commission 2006a, 2007b). Second, to enhance their own international status, 'each of the leading member-states runs after the chimera of a special bilateral relationship, at the expense of supporting common policies' (Grant with Valasek 2007: 27). Third, Member States' interests are often simply too divergent among them or in relation to a third party to allow for a long-term common strategy. Finally, relating to other great powers presupposes a convergent world view.

Whereas, for example, France and Germany shared a multipolar world view with anti-American undertones during the 2003 transatlantic crisis, Britain's position was more protective of its close relationship with Washington, not to

mention its relations with the remaining twenty-four Member States. As a result 'European policy so far originates from a congruence of interests, rather than from a convergence of the foreign policies of the individual EU Member States' (Stumbaum 2007: 58). Policy dissonance is often the result, as neither world views nor material interests are always congruent while strong domestic inputs in countries like Germany, France and the UK reinforce these divisions, as was the case in the crisis over the war in Iraq. All these factors set clear limits to Europeanization over relations with the United States, and with other major powers.

German-Polish tensions in 2005 over how to approach Russia, or the Polish veto regarding the renewal of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007, illustrate this point. The increasing number of recent conflicting issues between Russia and the EU, such as over the status of Kosovo, Russia's energy supply to Europe, bilateral problems between Poland and Russia and the Baltic states and Russia, and the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 makes the adoption of a common European position towards Moscow all the more difficult and has weakened prospects for renewing the PCA. The Russian leadership also remains suspicious regarding the newly created EU Eastern Partnership in May 2009 with countries which Moscow continues to see as part of its regional influence (Schäffer and Tolksdorf 2009; Stelzenmüller 2009).

Regarding China, the EU's second biggest trading partner after the US, the EU has unsuccessfully pressed for years for Beijing to open its markets to fair competition and to engage with reciprocal trading rules. Since 2006 the mood between the EU and China has become tense, with EU governments criticizing Beijing's systematic currency devaluation and unfair trade practices, which rest on obstacles to foreign investments and a lack of reciprocity in complying with international trade rules. This has resulted in many Member States becoming more defensive of their industries and less inclined towards letting EU institutions influence the outcome of the commercial and trade relationship, which in turn has made it more difficult for the EU to apply a joint foreign policy approach and weakened opportunities for policy Europeanization. In addition, it is not only the high volume of Chinese exports to the EU which defines the trade imbalance; it is also the changing composition of the goods which China exports, from labour-intensive ones to capital-intensive ones (Grant with Barysch 2008) that is making it harder for European countries like Germany to maintain a competitive edge in exporting goods such as cars and machinery. In line with this changing mood the European Commission stated in 2006 that when dialogue and negotiation with China failed, it would 'use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve trade issues with China and to ensure compliance with multilaterally agreed rules and obligations' (European Commission 2006b).

It also remains difficult to envisage the substance of partnerships with Moscow and Beijing when the values upon which the EU is built – democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – are not part of Russia's and China's values in foreign

policy (Hughes 2007) and when these countries do not shy away from supporting dictatorships in Central Asia and Africa.

Germany's relationship with great powers is therefore not so much a question of adapting its national foreign policy to the EU and other Member States' foreign policies, since the CFSP's 'strategic partnerships' can only be considered a soft form of downloading. Neither is it a matter of the 'de-Europeanization' of German foreign policy, because no Europeanization of foreign policy preceded it in this area. Berlin predominantly defines Germany's policies regarding relations with Russia, China and the US bilaterally, making the 'big issues' fall outside the area of European foreign policymaking.

It is therefore in the realm of Great Power relationships that Europeanization is weakest and least effective since the substance of relations occurs outside the realm of the CFSP framework. And occasional concerted efforts to adopt common policies towards Moscow, Beijing and Washington are insufficient to forge a true European foreign policy.⁷ Part of the reason is that the European Union 'has not learned to behave like a traditional great power' (Wallace 2007: 7) but so far there is no consensus among the twenty-seven Member States on whether that is the role the EU should play. Rather, most states seem to accept for now a tentative common vision on international action which harmonizes well with that of Germany – as a normative-civilian power with military instruments that serve purposes empowering a rule-based international order through effective multilateralism (European Council 2003: 9). Although power politics is no longer the rule among EU Member States it does not follow that in the realm of its nascent foreign policy the EU can turn a deaf ear to it when dealing with states which define their own interests according to a more realist understanding of foreign policy (Cooper 2003).

Despite the growing number of ESDP missions, and the creation of the ENP, the degree of policy convergence will ultimately depend on how willing Member States are to see their interests converge in a Europeanizing form, at the expense of national sovereignties and their own profiling on the international stage. In addition, an increasing pressure to download foreign policy inputs domestically can lead the bigger states to augment their own attempts to upload preferences to the EU foreign policy level as a way to increase their own international influence. This brings us to the theme of the next section, the uploading dimension of Europeanization.

Uploading Germany's foreign policy preferences

This section of the chapter assesses Germany's impact on EU foreign policy outputs. It examines how Berlin has promoted its preferences in the formulation of EU positions in the four policy areas dealt with in the previous section by looking at the extent to which German domestic positions boomerang back onto the European stage.

In the realm of foreign policy, the lack of policy experience and the EU's infant role as an international actor means that the Member States' room for manoeuvre

is comparatively greater than in other EU policies. Germany's eagerness to upload onto the CFSP level blends well with its interests and its traditional multilateralist approach. Germany has been an active player in seizing the initiative, and has acted as an 'entrepreneur for change' (Jeffery and Hyde-Price 2001) in shaping the EU's foreign policy in the Balkans, for example. Its will to shape CFSP and ESDP also stems from the domestic consensus of the political elite regarding the EU's role as a nascent global player. However, Berlin's crisis management capabilities remain constrained by its inhibitions over military force and out of area activities.

Germany has pursued two sorts of uploading, a normative and a policy uploading. First, there is an uploading of normative content. The most significant input Germany produced is the influence of its normative power in pursuing multilateral cooperation mechanisms, conflict prevention approaches and the use of civilian crisis resolution instruments in European diplomacy. When former German foreign minister Steinmeier (2007) suggested that one of the 'trademarks' of European foreign policy was regional crisis management through civilian instruments in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Kosovo, he was putting a German emphasis on conflict resolution which the EU has adopted through the process of uploading of what has been Germany's traditional post-war anti-militarist stance (Berger 1998). In this sense, Germany's normative power has contributed to the EU's present international identity as a normative (Manners 2002, 2006) or civilian power (Telo 2006).

Second, there is an uploading of policy content. Germany's capabilities to upload its interests and institutional models onto the EU have been effective in other domains, like the European Monetary Union (EMU), the configuration of the European Central Bank (ECB) or EU reform. In the domain of foreign policy uploading Germany decisively shaped the contours of the EU's eastern enlargement, uploading its preferences for successive EU enlargements, and leading other Member States to adopt its enlargement policy, even if this represented a continued source of tension as occurred in the German-French relationship. More recently, Chancellor Merkel has acted as the quiet uploader in helping to make the EU more capable as an international actor. Her role in unblocking the financial deadlock at the Brussels summit in December 2005, and in pushing forward the EU reform treaty in 2007 has strengthened the EU's capacity for action. The outcome for Germany in terms of embedding its preferences in a European context has meant an increase in the country's international influence.

Notwithstanding this influence, Germany's European policy rests on a highly decentralized policymaking system where ministries such as the foreign ministry, the economics and finance ministry, and the agricultural ministry participate, producing 'the most de-concentrated' domestic institutional structure for EU policymaking (Bulmer *et al.* 2000: 22). The plurality of competing EU policy-coordinating ministerial departments where each ministry has its European head of department accountable to the ministry's secretary of state weakens Berlin's negotiating position in Brussels, making policy coordination of foreign policy

preferences difficult (Hüttmann 2007). German representatives in Brussels often fail to agree on a common position, diminishing Berlin's overall capacity effectively to upload national policy preferences.

Uploading German preferences regarding ESDP

Germany's capability to shape European and other Member States' foreign policies towards ESDP and its record in uploading its preferences in ESDP is mixed. In the defence area Germany lagged behind France and Britain. After the British-French St Malo initiative for a common defence took off in December 1998 without Germany's participation, Berlin was eager to insert itself into the process. The German government managed to translate the St Malo initiative into an EU policy during its EU Council presidency in the first half of 1999 and prepare the EU for the 'Headline Goals' adopted half a year later at the Helsinki European Council. It successfully argued that an ESDP combining both military and civilian dimensions would best equip the EU for its international operations and give it a profile abroad congruent with the normative framework applied within the EU space itself. During that time the Bundeswehr participated for the first time in a non-UN sanctioned NATO combat mission in Kosovo. The uploading of German preferences for ending the Kosovo war with the proposal for the Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe as a civilian instrument for post-conflict reconstruction helped shape the EU's nascent security policy.

The European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 has a German imprint in Berlin's preference for effective multilateralism, civilian crisis management instruments and the use of military force as a mechanism of last resort. At Germany's insistence the initial wording of 'pre-emptive engagement' was substituted by 'preventive engagement' (Irlenkäufer 2004) thus differentiating the European from the American response to international threats. In the absence of a security strategy of its own it is rather surprising that Germany managed to have an influence at all. The publication of a German White Paper for Defence three years later, presenting a comprehensive security concept for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building suggests that after the modest advances in a European strategy for security and defence, the German government was willing to develop its own national security strategy, on the basis of compatibility with the ESS.⁸ This can be seen as a case of cross-loading, in that European and German interests have converged in the definition of security strategies.

Political constraints in increasing defence expenditures to provide the necessary resources, and the scrutiny each mandate or change in existing mandates undergoes in lengthy Bundestag debates about the scope of the mission, continue to limit Berlin's capacity for action - as do the discrepancies between the potential for engagement and existing capabilities to deliver troops and material to act in dangerous military zones like southern Afghanistan.⁹ In addition Germany's security engagement in Afghanistan often rests more on an accumulation of reactions towards US pressure for stronger engagement than on a German strategy

itself. The government's refusal in 2008 to send German soldiers on combat missions in the south of Afghanistan in support of NATO's mission only exposes the dilemma German security policy is facing (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2008a). All this diminishes Berlin's capacity to upload its policy preferences for ESDP missions.

Thus despite its imprint on the EU's general philosophy of foreign policy in the realm of policymaking such as crisis management, Germany's position has been without much effect in Iraq, Afghanistan or Palestine given the usual constraints imposed by Berlin's inhibition over the use of military force and out-of-area combat missions. Germany's contribution thus mostly takes the form of its cheque-book diplomacy, which the EU as a whole tends to emulate, but this cannot be termed uploading, in the sense of influencing the general pattern of European foreign policy.

Uploading German preferences regarding ENP

One of the primary goals of German security policy is 'the strengthening of the European area of stability through the development of European integration and the European Union's active neighbourhood policy with the states of Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region' (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006: 7). Germany's interest in shaping CFSP towards the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood can be seen as a successor policy to its enlargement policy, even though the ENP does not envision EU accession for ENP members. During the German EU presidency the Brussels European Council in June 2007 adopted the new strategy for a partnership with Central Asia (European Council 2007b). The initiative for a new Ostpolitik for Central Asia was put forward by foreign minister Steinmeier as a way to export stability and ensure energy security after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 had revealed Europe's energy vulnerability. However, Steinmeier's additional proposal for an ENP Plus was rejected (Kempe 2007). ENP Plus would have opened up a distant perspective of future membership negotiations for Europe's Eastern neighbourhood. Other EU members saw this as an attempt by Germany to increase its influence in the region and upload its policy preferences onto the ENP.

Because the ENP is a new area for Member States to profile their interests, it is yet another area where their motivations diverge. French president Sarkozy's proposal for a EU Mediterranean Union, presented in June 2007, can be seen as a response meant to emphasize France's leading role in the geographical area of the Mediterranean. Unsurprisingly, Chancellor Merkel initially opposed the idea, arguing it would fragment the Union, while seeing it as a challenge to Berlin's own position in the Union (*Deutsche Welle* 2007). In March 2008 Merkel agreed to Sarkozy's initiative for a Mediterranean Union, but only after the French initial plan to include only the southern coastal states had been abandoned and integrated into the ENP framework with all twenty-seven Member States (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2008b).¹⁰

The French plan produced another side-effect. The recently created Eastern Partnership between the twenty-seven EU Member States and six former Soviet Republics in May 2009 falls back on an initiative put forward by Poland and Sweden a year earlier but which only went ahead once it received the backing of Chancellor Merkel.¹¹ Berlin was successful in building bilateral alliances with Poland and Sweden and helped decisively to set the agenda in order to move ahead with the Eastern Partnership. This has been clearly a diplomatic victory for Berlin for three reasons. First, it has enhanced Germany's role in ENP and European foreign policy in that region. Second, whereas the overall motivations were the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 over the separatist Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and another gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine in January 2009, it seems that Berlin gave a decisive push towards the establishment of such a new partnership as a way to counter the perceived new French influence in the Mediterranean Union. Finally, the Eastern Partnership serves as an institutionalized mechanism which follows a different logic of EU enlargement since it does not envisage future EU membership, something German policymakers have been critically concerned with in that the majority of them believes that the EU, except for ongoing membership negotiations has reached the limits of institutional enlargement for the near future.¹² From the German perspective one could argue that grouping these countries together sets the stage for multilateral negotiations with six countries which do not share the same interest in joining the EU, such as Azerbaijan and Armenia, and allows the EU to eschew the deepening of bilateral talks on their possible future EU accession, which are in the interests of the Ukraine and Georgia, but not necessarily of Germany. Thus Berlin has been successful in building coalitions with willing partners to help forge an institutional context which aims to advance a more secure European neighbourhood without making commitments on enlargement.¹³

Uploading German preferences regarding the Middle East

The Middle East is the region where both Germany and the EU are building up a political presence, and it has become a vital testing ground for the seriousness and efficiency of an evolving CFSP and ESDP, and for the EU's assertion as a global security actor. While Germany fosters its relationship with Israel and attempts to influence EU positions towards Tel Aviv, it has become more outspoken about the Palestinians' right to establish their own state. Former foreign minister Fischer tried to play an active role in mediating the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2001–2002, and after 11 September 2001 put forward proposals for a global strategic perspective for the Middle East which did not, however, bear fruit (Federal Foreign Office 2004).

In the aftermath of the transatlantic crisis over Iraq in 2002–2003 Germany, together with Britain and France, became part of the ongoing EU-3 initiative, and then the UNSC P5+1 (in cooperation with the United States, Russia and China, and the EU High Representative, Javier Solana), in diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This is one of the few policy

areas where the EU's big three have cooperated in expressing a common position, which, however, may not seem too surprising considering how little success negotiations with Teheran have produced so far.

In the summer of 2006 Germany participated for the first time in the region in a maritime operation in the realm of UNIFIL Plus mission off the coast of Lebanon. In September 2006 the German government agreed the first armed Bundeswehr mission in the Middle East as part of the UNIFIL mission, for the stabilization of the south of Lebanon.¹⁴ German diplomatic efforts towards the region have also led to its participation in the Middle East Quartet (UN, US, Russia and EU), which Berlin tried to revive during the German EU presidency in 2007. While other powers recognize that Germany has increased its international role it is no indication that Berlin exerts enough power to influence policy on the Middle East, let alone to shape an EU foreign policy for the area.

Given that diplomacy in these multilateral frameworks is still at an early stage it is not certain that they will produce results or that they can work in other domains. There is too much disagreement between the EU-3 regarding the scope and aim of future missions, there is a generalized unease over exerting leadership, and there is some resentment by states like Spain, Italy and Poland as to why they have not been included. While Germany's role as an active player in the region has grown, Berlin's capability to shape European and other Member States' foreign policies towards the Middle East thus remains limited. Because it lacks a tradition of active political engagement in the region, Germany has thus far preferred to adapt to inputs from Brussels and other Member States.

Uploading German preferences towards Great Powers

Relations with great powers are too important for EU members not to pursue their own specific interests and national foreign policies towards them. German Chancellors have pursued divergent approaches regarding Russia. Helmut Kohl recognized Russia's importance as a strategic partner for the EU and the West and played a decisive role in promoting the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia which the European Union signed with Moscow in 1997 for a ten-year period (European Union Official Journal 1997). In contrast, under Gerhard Schröder Germany hardly pursued uploading or downloading reflexes given his attempt to forge a bilateral strategic relationship with Moscow. His repeated overtures towards Russian President Vladimir Putin were mostly unilateral German initiatives which occasionally included France, but which did not succeed in creating a wider European initiative towards fostering a stable relationship with Moscow. On the contrary, they were pursued amidst strong intra-European divisions regarding relations with the United States and its policies for Iraq.

Schröder's pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy produced unwelcome consequences for Germany's stance in transatlantic relations and European policy. The loosening of established alliances and lack of linkage between relations with Paris, Washington and Moscow cost Berlin influence on the international stage,

leaving Germany isolated and weakened in its traditional equidistance between Europe and America (Szabo 2004). Berlin's opposition to the US-led operation against Iraq was also the catalyst for intra-European divisions thus preventing a possible common European position on US policy. Simultaneously, Schröder distanced Germany from the US. All this raised doubts as to whether Berlin's unilateral move was circumstantial or a more fundamental break from its traditional reflexive multilateralism, towards a less Europeanist Germany (Schwarz 2005). Without clear priorities, Germany's influence within the EU as well as the EU's more general attempt at playing an international role diminished, with the German capacity to upload policy preferences severely limited between 2002 and 2005.

With the aim of repairing both German-American relations and Berlin's influence in Europe, Chancellor Merkel has given a major impetus to re-establishing close European-American relations. The Agreement on a trans-Atlantic economic partnership in the spring of 2007 between the European Union and the United States came from an initiative promoted by Berlin, and exemplified the regaining of Germany's influence in transatlantic politics (*Spiegel Online* 2007). In contrast, the harshening of Russia's position towards the West has led to a cooling down of EU-Russia relations. Merkel has taken a tougher stance than her predecessor towards Russian disregard for human rights and democracy values. The EU-Russia meeting in Samara in May 2007 during the German EU presidency raised the stakes but only highlighted the tense relations between both sides and the difficulty in renewing the EU-Russia PCA which expired in November 2007, and which the presidency was unable to unblock (*Financial Times* 2007). In September 2008 talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia were postponed due to Moscow's initially uncooperative behaviour regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory following the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in August. This crisis occurred shortly after the end of the French EU presidency and, given President Sarkozy's ambition to maintain his high profile role, Berlin did little more than follow Paris's lead.

Towards China Germany has pursued its own economic interests often to the detriment of an effective EU China policy. Germany is China's biggest trading partner in the European Union: around 44 per cent of the EU's exports come from Germany and over 20 per cent of what the EU imports from China goes to Germany (Fox and Godement 2009: 69). But a growing trade volume has meant the increase of the bilateral trade imbalance: in 2007 Germany's trade deficit with China was 25 billion euros, the highest of its bilateral relations (Grant with Barysch 2008: 43). In the last decade Germany has pursued two different approaches to its China policy.¹⁴ Former Chancellor Schröder followed bilateral economic interests, where the economic policy dominated and political relations played a secondary role which should not condition commercial and trade relations. Together with French President Chirac, Schröder unsuccessfully attempted to get the EU arms embargo against Beijing lifted, a move which was blocked by Britain and smaller EU member states after pressure from the United

States. Chancellor Merkel, in contrast, not only opposes lifting the embargo but has subjected bilateral trade and commercial relations to political scrutiny, making human rights, democracy and the rule of law a priority of her government's policy. This is in accordance with the Commission's strategy paper, but it does not constitute a sufficiently common basis for all Member States to agree on at the European Council level (European Commission 2006c). When Merkel met the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibet, in Berlin in September 2007 she received little support from her European partners when the Chinese authorities criticized the meeting; this signalled yet again to Beijing that each EU state follows its own interests with respect to China. Not only do individual approaches make a European stance more difficult, the EU's biggest Member States also compete against one another for the strongest relationship with Beijing. Thus 'the persistent desire of the larger member-states to run their own bilateral relationships with Russia and China, rather than to work through the EU, has enabled those powers to divide and rule' (Grant with Barysch 2008: 9) and has made Germany's policy uploading more difficult.

While the grand coalition government thus has pursued policy initiatives to embed Germany's approach in a general European policy towards great powers, it still remains an area where Germany as much as other states pursues an active national foreign policy. With the new centre-right government after September 2009, Berlin's position regarding relations with great powers will continue to remain within the national policymaking domain; while with the recent election of the EU's first Council President and first High Representative for Foreign Affairs, in November 2009, Member States will be pressed to adapt more common positions regarding specific issues. It is unlikely that in the near future Germany, and France and Britain, will weaken their national channels of handling bilateral relations with Russia, China, but also the US.

Germany and the pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat

To make the case that the process of Europeanization is not always linear and irreversible Germany's pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat will now be examined to illustrate a persistent situation of EU-German incongruence. Germany's support for both UNSC reform and its own claim for a permanent seat have been pursued consistently across party lines by Kohl's foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, and by Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel. While the aim of a European seat is repeatedly stated in German government coalition agreements, Berlin sustains its claim for a German seat on the basis of being the third largest contributor to the UN's budget.¹⁶ Considering that within the EU, Germany is an advocate of enlarging the CFSP domain and of decisions by QMV (Qualified Majority Voting), it is incongruous that it continues to insist on a national seat. Rather it suggests that German policymakers have been using the second policy lane (German interests and role as a key player in global politics) while discarding the first (Germany as a Europeanized state with multilateral interests towards CFSP).

The continuous pursuit of such a seat highlights the contradictions of Berlin's foreign policy (Hellmann and Roos 2007). While policymakers of all political colours emphasize the virtues of the Europeanization of German foreign policy, they do not shun the pursuit of this national objective in global diplomacy. Ultimately, German policy undermines the possibility of an EU seat and therefore does not promote European foreign policy at the global level of the UN. Finally, this affects the inner cohesion of the EU itself since states like Italy and Spain criticize Germany's claim, and view Berlin's goal as incompatible with the CFSP, a view shared by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The dilemma for German foreign policy may grow stronger as Germany's refusal to participate in combat missions in southern Afghanistan with other NATO partners only highlights the contradictions between its actions and its wish to become a power with global responsibility.

Thus the aim of a permanent seat falls outside the uploading-downloading problematic, since Germany has not seriously pursued the idea of a European seat, which is in any case only hypothetical at present, given the British and French opposition to surrendering their own privileged positions. Yet there is still a considerable difference between not pursuing a strategy for a European seat at all, and retreating into a national strategy aiming for a *German* seat. The latter reveals a unilateralist reflex which goes against Germany's modern tradition of institutionalized multilateralism, and suggests a path more inclined towards more nationally orientated policies thus diminishing Europeanization.

Conclusion

Germany's increasing foreign policy self-confidence and assertiveness in international politics remains anchored in its international identity as a 'Europeanized state'. But Germany has become a different sort of Europeanized state. First, while it continues to be more 'Euro-enthusiastic' than France and Britain, with a nascent pan-European conception of interest and identity, its Europeanism is now pursued foremost for Germany's own political and economic interests. Policymakers have increasingly moved towards a logic of consequentialism (Olsen 2007) more in tune with the new German foreign policy of international assertiveness. Second, the Europeanization dynamic reveals a stronger tendency for Germany to upload than the other way round. Germany has decisively shaped the contours of European Monetary Union and Eastern enlargement in 2004. In CFSP and ESDP Germany has managed to successfully upload its normative and some institutional preferences. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the EU will have adopted Berlin's preference for a double majority voting system thus strengthening Germany's position since population is now an important factor in EU decision making. This will make the EU fit to assert its role as an international actor, and reveal the imprint of Germany's preference for a normative-civilian foreign policy.

Germany's position regarding European foreign and security policy will simultaneously progress through continuous Europeanization, in Europe's

strategic periphery through ESDP operations, and the ENP in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, and through a more clustered approach, where multilateral groupings decide on concerted action for a specific policy purpose. Initiatives such as the EU-3 on Iran have been a more effective way for Germany to translate its increased power into international assertiveness than have attempts to pursue a unilateral position outside the European framework as in the case of its claim for a permanent German UN Security Council seat. But it has effectively joined the P5 (as the 'P5 [+1]') on Iran and some other issues, partly because it is so often elected to a two-year temporary seat.

Member States are likely to agree when their interests coincide – which is not the same as saying that there is an overall policy convergence. The Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the intergovernmental dimension of EU foreign policymaking, reinforcing the role of the Member States and stipulating a partial transfer of competences back to national governments, while keeping the rule of unanimity for key decisions. It states that CFSP and CSDP provisions 'do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations'; neither do they 'prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States' or 'the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its members for the maintenance of international peace and security' (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Although the functional borders between the competences of the national governments and the European Commission and the Council are becoming increasingly blurred, Member States tend to hold on to what they perceive as their sovereign domains. Power, institutions and ideas are thus not only subject to Europeanization, they are also 'permeated by strong residual claims of freedom of action particularly by the larger Member States' (Smith 2007: 440). And in the domain of CFSP the larger Member States continue to dominate.

Thus the more the EU moves towards closer CFSP and ESDP integration, and the stronger the institutional mechanisms for the EU to become an effective foreign policy actor, the more the complexities of convergence and divergence will emerge in Member States' attitudes regarding international politics, with the EU's big three and others striving to retain elements of state sovereignty and upload their own national preferences onto the EU level. Paradoxically, success in ESDP missions can also increase the uploading reflexes of the EU's leading states. Thus despite the tendency towards increasing Europeanization, particularly in the fields of ESDP and joint military operations, there is no automaticity in the degree of Europeanizing convergence since an effective European foreign policy is still very dependent on the strength most Member States are willing to bestow on it. Since the TEU in 1993 Germany has tended to move closer to Britain and France in this respect, having come face to face with the contradiction between its own previous commitment to collective solidarity, and its desire to shape European foreign policy in the German image. To judge by the German case, therefore, one should conclude that there is nothing unidirectional about Europeanization – it can easily go into reverse.

Notes

- 1 On Germany as a Europeanized state see Anderson 2005; Bulmer 1997; Bulmer *et al.* 2000; Dyson and Goetz 2003; Goetz 1996; Katzenstein 1997.
- 2 On the growing literature on Europeanization, see Anderson 2003; Börzel 2005; Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002; Graziano and Vink 2006. More recently, on Europeanization as part of a research design on European integration see Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009.
- 3 The headline goal was to create a rapidly deployable force of 60,000 soldiers by 2003 to enable a more flexible force with military and civilian crisis management capabilities capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty (European Council 1999).
- 4 Germany has participated in civilian, police and military ESDP operations since 2003, namely in the Western Balkans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, in the Middle East in the Palestinian Territories and in Iraq, in Asia in Afghanistan, and in Africa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However the two biggest Bundeswehr operations are NATO led missions: on 28 January 2011 the Bundestag voted for an extension of the Bundeswehr mandate for another year of up to 5,350 troops in Afghanistan in operation ISAF to assist the Afghan government in providing security (http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1264/Content/DE/Artikel/2011/01/2011-01-11-kabinett-mandatsverlaengerung-isaf.html). And it has 1,535 troops in Kosovo in operation KFOR to establish and maintain security in Kosovo (IISS 2008: 428; <http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/einsaetze>).
- 5 The ENP includes sixteen non-EU states: ten from the Mediterranean basin (grouped in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia, and six to the East of the EU, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (European Commission 2009).
- 6 This strategy 'defines the EU's priorities for its cooperation with the region as a whole, but implementation will be tailored to the specific requirements and performance of each Central Asian state' (European Council 2007b: 12).
- 7 At the European Council summit in Brussels on 14 December 2007 no reference was made regarding a EU policy on Russia or China. Whereas the section on external relations deals with issues such as European Neighbourhood Policy, Kosovo, Iran and Lebanon, climate change, regional crises in Congo or Myanmar, no common strategy is mentioned with regard to Moscow or Beijing (European Council 2007a).
- 8 The White Paper states that 'the ESS is in accord with the goals and interests of German security policy' (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006: 34).
- 9 In 2004–2005 Germany spent 1.4 per cent of its GDP on defence expenditures, less than France (2.5 per cent), Britain (2.7 per cent), Denmark (1.8 per cent) (Redaktion Weltalmanach 2007: 534).
- 10 On the French allegiance towards a European foreign policy, see Irondelle 2008.
- 11 The Eastern Partnership was initiated at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009 and includes Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and, despite its authoritarian regime, Belarus (Council of the EU 2009).
- 12 Whereas Berlin favours membership negotiations with the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the potential candidate countries Iceland, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, it remains critical of Turkey's EU membership negotiations which continue to be dealt with as 'open-ended' with the possibility of a 'privileged partnership', as stated in the coalition agreement of the newly formed centre-right government in October 2009 (CDU 2009: 167).
- 13 On Germany's role as a coalition builder, see Maull 2008.

- 14 Germany has participated in the UN's first maritime stabilization operation UNIFIL off the coast of Lebanon since September 2006. The Bundestag has extended the Bundeswehr's mission on a yearly basis. On 17 June 2010 the Bundestag extended the mandate and Germany's participation in UNIFIL mission to 30 June 2011. In these years the number of German soldiers has been reduced from an original of up to 2,400 in 2006 to 300 in 2011 (Bundeswehr 2010).
- 15 Fox and Godement 2009. Fox and Godement distinguish between an 'accommodating mercantilist' and an 'assertive industrialist' approach in Germany's China policy. The first one means that 'good political relations with China will lead to commercial benefit' and states 'compensate for their readiness to resort to protectionist measures by shunning confrontation with China on political questions.' For the authors Schröder's approach to China fitted this category. The 'assertive industrialist' approach, which according to the authors is Merkel's policy, is characterized by a willingness 'to stand up to China vigorously on both political and economic issues' and 'to criticise China's politics and to defend industrial interests or protect jobs at home from Chinese competition.' However, whereas Schröder and Merkel have dealt with the political issues differently, in the economic realm both have pursued attitudes which are protective of the German industry, revealing more a difference of degree than of policy in their economic approach towards China.
- 16 With a share of 8 per cent Germany is the third largest contributor followed by other EU partners – e.g. the United Kingdom (6.6 per cent), France (6.1 per cent) and Italy (5 per cent). Together, the twenty-seven Member States of the EU contribute over a third of the overall UN budget (Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations New York, '26 January 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/StrukturVN/Finanzen/Finanzbeitrag-D_node.html).

4 Resisting Europe?

The case of Italy's foreign policy

Elisabetta Brighi

For all the received wisdom and numerous expert analyses invariably depicting Italy as one of the member states most devoted to the European cause, this paper will argue that Italy's relationship with Europe and its institutions is actually not only more complex, but significantly less reassuring than usually granted. If one raises the question of the extent to which the EU has shaped Italian foreign policy and the extent to which Italy has shaped EU foreign policy, as this book does, one is confronted with conflicting evidence.

On the one hand, it is not uncommon to find claims that corroborate a 'mythical' European narrative: 'For over half a century, Italy has looked at European integration as a fundamental objective and a privileged instrument of its external relations ... Among the "big states" of Europe, Italy has been traditionally the most persuaded of the potential of the European project as an economic, political and security project'.¹ Yet, the problems and quirks that accompany Italy's participation in EU's foreign policy become apparent as soon as one looks closely at the phrasing of such claims.

The opening statement of the *Rapporto 2020* – recently published and the first comprehensive, strategic review of Italian foreign policy since at least the end of the Cold War, a review which lays great claim to innovation and creativity – betrays a rather literal, instrumental outlook vis-à-vis 'Europe':² Europe is an *opportunity* not to be missed, from defence integration to economic and political governance; Europe is an *instrument* of Italy's external action; finally, Europe is a *venue* in which Italy can be reassured of its status among the 'big states' of the continent. Of course, Europe is also recognized as a common objective (as such implying involvement and contribution on the side of Italy), but one should note how vague and lofty here the language becomes – as if it were sufficient to be 'persuaded of the potential' (i.e. the ideal) of a 'project' to be automatically and actively part of it. Rather tellingly, this chapter bears the title of 'Europe *for* Italy' (emphasis added), not 'Italy for Europe'.

So what is the real degree of Europeanization of Italian foreign policy? If Europeanization lies in a two-way, negotiated process of convergence over time of policy goals, preferences and identity in an EU context, Italy seems to be far from having reached the endpoint – but also, and precisely because, in some sense, it has already arrived there. Since 1991, the traditional and absolute (and most of

the time rather passive) reliance on the EC/EU, combined with the accustomed ability to use European institutions as both a *shelter* and an *instrument* of foreign policy, has paradoxically produced ever stronger incentives to free ride, and an increasingly opportunistic and instrumental attitude vis-à-vis the EU, which is all too easy to read between the lines of the *Rapporto*.

After decades of relative passivity during the Cold War, national projection in foreign policy has thus become an option – and indeed a frequent reality over the last few years – even on those occasions in which this meant straying from the European way, or contributing to the divisions within the EU. The interaction between the EU and Italy in the realm of foreign policy is thus much more complex than a superficial reading of the subject might allow. It reflects not just a harmonious and progressive idea of a ‘closer and closer’ integration, but also a strategic and dialectic process, often conflictual in nature.

In what follows, I explore the hypothesis that since 1991 the degree of Europeanization of Italian foreign policy has varied, in rather erratic ways, due to a number of factors, among which party politics plays a key role. This is a change from the previous, Cold War domestic consensus and solidity on foreign policy. The swings that have characterized Italy’s domestic political scene, with an alternation of centre-right and centre-left governments, have determined some changes in the foreign policy discourse, style and choices of Italy in the realm of foreign policy. This has affected the degree of Europeanization of Italian foreign policy via changes in Italy’s propensity both to adapt its foreign policy to that of the EU (on the ‘downloading’ side) and to project national ambitions (‘on the uploading side’) within, rather than without, the EU.

Impacting on the degree of Europeanization of Italian foreign policy have been two general, background factors: one is the changing strategic scenario of the last two decades, and what Italian foreign-policy makers have made of it; another is the crises that have invested the EU itself from the late 1990s, which have impacted on the calculations of Italian foreign policy and changed the balance of incentives and constraints, or at least their perception thereof.

Further, the degree of Europeanization also shows some variance across issue-areas, with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) being the policy most ‘Europeanized’, and relations with external powers being the least. This can be read in various ways. For instance, the continuity of Italy’s involvement in issues such as ESDP can be ascribed to, inter alia, the presence of strong lobby groups in the defence industry pushing for further integration. More generally, the paper will consider the argument of whether Italy’s foreign policy in specific fields such as defence and energy is no longer guided (if it indeed has ever been) by a genuine political design, but rather by the strategies and preferences of big economic actors such as FINMECCANICA and ENI. This economic motive has tied in with European foreign policy only on an ad hoc, intermittent basis.

The paper will conclude by looking at the overall process of interaction between the EU and Italy in the field of foreign policy, arguing that this is a fully strategic and dialectic process rather than a simple, top-down or bottom-up set of

developments, whose end results are by no means predetermined. Given the traditional recalcitrance towards change in the land of the *Gattopardo*, and this includes change brought about by Europe, maybe all that can be expected of Italy is the skilful attempt to negotiate margins of autonomy while not upsetting an 'order', be it European or international, which continues to be perceived as 'falling from the sky', as Altiero Spinelli often put it, referring to Italy's attitude to Europe (Spinelli 1960).³

The turning point of 1989–1991: Italy between two eras

The years 1989–1991 no doubt represented a critical juncture for Italian foreign policy and, more generally, Italian politics (Andreatta and Hill 2000; Guzzini 1994). The foreign policy trajectories pursued by Italy today derive, implicitly or explicitly, from the consequences of that dramatic passage of the end of the Cold War. In fact, one could well argue that the problem with the Italian politics of today, domestic and foreign – its stagnant yet equally volatile disposition – is that of being still stuck in the 'unfinished transition' of the post-Cold War system, not having dealt conclusively with the end of one era, and the beginning of another.⁴

What was Italian foreign policy before these dramatic years? And, in particular, what was Italy's attitude towards Europe? While a detailed answer to these questions is beyond the scope of the paper, it is essential to give at least a broad account of Italy's Cold War foreign policy 'paradigm', not least because its ghost still haunts the buildings and the minds of Italy's foreign policy establishment today (see, amongst others, Santoro 1991; Varsori 1998; Coralluzzo 2000).

Italy's Cold War foreign policy was predicated on a skilful and for the most part successful balancing act. This was set in motion in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War by its Christian Democratic leadership and revolved around a set of commitments to the US and NATO, the EC and the UN – commitments which most of the time turned out to be congenially complementary, but which also involved much tiptoeing, squaring of circles and, characteristically, verbal fudging at times of crisis.

In terms of Italy's post-war attitude towards European integration, this is usually described in rather mythical terms. The traditional reading of Italian historians is that Italy enthusiastically embraced the integration project from its inception. From that point, Europe progressively came to be internalized in Italy's domestic political debate as a given, and a largely positive one at that. Beside the normative motive of federalism, to which large sections of the post-war political spectrum adhered, it was the political, economic and security rationale of the process of European integration which appealed to Italian policymakers. The incentives were apparent: regaining a high political status after the disastrous 'parenthesis' of fascism, strengthening a nascent democracy, modernizing the country by anchoring its economy to Europe's continental 'engine' and, finally, benefiting from the security umbrella that the US was willing to offer to Western Europe.

A few elements of this traditional reading, however, need to be substantially qualified. First, one should note the uncertainty which in fact surrounded Rome's participation in the very first phases of integration – suffice it here to mention Italy's serious reservations concerning the Brussels Pact of 1948, the laborious ratifications of both the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1953. Second, Italy's decision to join European integration, culminating in the Rome treaties of 1957 instituting the EC, did not always translate into an active, let alone entrepreneurial, role in the process. On the contrary, throughout the post-war decades, the lack of information and relative apathy which accompanied Italy's engagement with European institutions was notorious; note also the stark contrast between the chronically high level of infringements of European regulations, on the one hand, and the launching of grand proposals for further integration in the 1980s, on the other; or, lastly, the delaying tactic used in the face of stringent measures, fiscal and otherwise, decided by Brussels.

Be that as it may, Italy's balancing act between the US, Europe and the more than symbolic allegiance to the UN came to a halt in 1989, when the Iron Curtain fell. Most of all, this event meant a threat to Italy's geopolitical status and the end of that confrontation between East and West which had enhanced Italy's strategic value, and hence had paradoxically suited the country very well. The reconfiguring of the continent's geopolitical landscape, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of Eastern Europe, the waves of instability which spread across the Balkans through to Central Asia and North Africa, and the political process of reform triggered inside the EC and NATO were met with great nervousness in Rome. Indicative of the danger of marginalization in a post-Cold War environment was Italy's exclusion from the negotiations leading to the '2+4' treaty of 1990 in which German reunification was decided, or the uncertainty with which Italy approached the IGC on Economic and Monetary Union, which was to lead to the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.

To complicate things further, the end of the post-Cold War period also coincided with a phase of domestic upheaval.⁵ The political system which had governed Italy during the Cold War collapsed under the combined weight of the judicial inquiries of *Tangentopoli* and the demands for change coming from civil society. After a phase of great uncertainty, and the dissolution of the old cleavage between Christian Democrats and Communists, the political system restructured itself around a confrontation between the centre-right parties, among which was Silvio Berlusconi's new *Forza Italia*, and the centre-left parties, led by Romano Prodi.⁶ This new political elite was called to deal with the end of the post-war order and the beginning of a new one. Such a reassessment not only involved Italy's attitude vis-à-vis European integration but, as the next section will illustrate, progressively eroded the post-war consensus on Italy's European policy, including its foreign and security policy.

The uneven impact of Europeanization on Italian foreign policy since 1991

What results did the process of interaction between foreign policy at the European and national level yield in the case of Italy after 1991? How did Italy adapt its foreign policy to the positions taken in Brussels and what contributions did Rome make to the creation of such positions? Finally, did this interaction produce anything resembling a transformation of the preferences, goals and identity in Italian foreign policy? In what follows I shall look at these questions as they have emerged in particular issue-areas, such as Italy's relations with external powers and the issue of human rights, the country's participation in ESDP, and its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. As I shall argue, Italy's foreign policy positions on all of these themes, relative to those of the EU, have been affected by a certain degree of volatility caused by domestic political changes, in particular changes in the governing coalitions. The style, discourse and choices of the centre-right and centre-left governments have differed at the level of concepts and paradigms. In practice, however, this difference has been often less marked than in theory, with the policies of the two coalitions blurred together on more than one occasion. The puzzle with which this leaves us, and which I will deal with in the next section, is to identify whether the underlying aspects of continuity can be ascribed to the pressures coming from Europe and its foreign policy, or must be interpreted as the result of other processes at work.

Italy's relations with external powers and organizations: the US and Russia

The end of the Cold War did not change Italy's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. In the eyes of Italy's foreign-policy makers the hegemonic position of the United States has not lessened the appeal of a transatlantic security alliance – quite the contrary. Atlanticism has informed Italian foreign policy to a varying degree, however, and has not been the only principle guiding Italy's external actions. Just as in the days of the Cold War, this principle has had to be squared with Italy's other commitments: to the EU but also, increasingly, to the country's emerging nationalism.

As a very general pattern, and at the level of discourse and style, the centre-right governments of Silvio Berlusconi (I: 1994–1995; II: 2001–2006; III: 2008–) have advanced a position of closer cooperation with the United States than those governments led by a centre-left coalition – the Prodi governments of 1996–1999 (I) and 2006–2008 (II) and the D'Alema government of 1999–2000 (Brighi 2007a). This has been apparent in general trends such as Berlusconi's overall stronger endorsement of the US response to the 9/11 attacks, and of the military interventions in the Middle East; but also in specific decisions, such as the appointment of one of Berlusconi's closest aides (Giovanni Castellaneta) to the ambassadorship in Washington. Bilateral ties between Rome and Washington

have thus thrived under the centre-right government, despite instances which provided much potential for tension (Brighi 2007b).⁷

If this has been the general trend, however, it must also be said that in practice differences have been often less than marked between the courses of action pursued by the centre-right and the centre-left (Bonvicini 2007; Croci 2007). For instance, on more than a few occasions, and despite their own verbal commitments, centre-left governments have opted for policy choices that one would have expected from more conservative and pro-Atlanticist governments. Foreign Minister D'Alema's determination to show all his American credentials during the Kosovo war of 1999 is a case in point; the Prodi government's unflagging support of the US decision to enlarge its airbase in Vicenza and ready acceptance of the request that Italy 'should do more' in Afghanistan were also particularly indicative.⁸

How has this overall pattern interacted with EU's foreign policy vis-à-vis the US? As a general rule, it seems that EU's foreign policy positions on transatlantic issues have found less resonance with the centre-right governments of Silvio Berlusconi than with the governments of the centre-left. Indeed, under the centre-right coalition Italy has not only strayed from the European line (when there was one) but, on occasions, effectively contributed to furthering the divisions within the EU, sacrificing European solidarity (or what was left of it) at the altar of Atlanticism. After all, Berlusconi was probably the European leader who most strongly endorsed the talk of 'old' versus 'new' Europe coming from Washington, which was typified by the 'United we Stand' open letter of the eight leaders, including Berlusconi, from the self-proclaimed 'new' Europe (*The Wall Street Journal* 2003). Most significantly, in the case of military operations in Iraq, the centre-right government of Silvio Berlusconi did not show much patience with the predicaments of some European states – and sided clearly with the US's policy of invasion, despite then contributing only in symbolic terms to it.

Both the centre-left and centre-right believe that the US plays an indispensable role in guaranteeing world order: Italy's Atlanticist reflex is alive and well, and it is only strengthened by the US's long-standing presence inside Italy, bringing wealth and jobs via its bases and transnational corporations. As the next section will illustrate, however, Italy is also committed to a 'stronger' Europe in the field of defence and security. Thus, and very simply, there is no solution for Italian foreign-policy makers other than to consider the two commitments complementary – as has been the case during the Cold War and after.

It is worth noting that this rather static picture stands already in stark contrast with expectations of the progressive convergence, or transformation, of the Italian foreign policy objectives due to an increasing process of Europeanization. If one looks at relations with the US, Italian foreign policy seems to have changed very little – despite the end of the Cold War, on the one hand, and the strengthening of European foreign policy, on the other.

However, the two governing coalitions have demonstrated different degrees of tolerance when faced with a divergence of interests between the US and the EU. While the centre-left has tried to bridge gaps and mend cracks, the centre-right has

been more inclined to take sides, usually that of the US, provided that this did not come at too high a price. In doing so it deliberately tried to avoid the pressure coming from Brussels, either by ignoring it or diluting it by simply reinforcing divisions within Europe.

Italy's relations with Russia show a slightly different trend. Russia did not figure very prominently on the radar of Italian foreign policy for most of the 1990s, except in the sense that for quite some time Rome opposed NATO enlargement for fear of provoking resentment in Moscow and simultaneously gave great weight to Russian positions during the Balkan crises (Dassù and Menotti 1997). This considerate yet relatively disengaged attitude towards Russia, mirroring the European attitude of the time, changed considerably with the advent of Berlusconi and his centre-right government in 2001. In only a few years, Italy's bilateral relations with Russia improved so much that Rome became Moscow's most important commercial European partner after Germany. Berlusconi also enthusiastically sponsored the rapprochement between Russia and NATO which climaxed in the NATO-Russia summit at Pratica di Mare, Rome, on 28 May 2002 (*La Repubblica* 2002). Personal ties between Putin and Berlusconi grew particularly strong, as the two leaders exchanged frequent visits to their personal or holiday houses.

On various occasions, Berlusconi's eccentric policy of close cooperation with Russia flew right in the face of EU's attempts to coordinate common positions. In terms of the EU's growing concerns for human rights, Berlusconi famously defended Russia's policy in Chechnya in public – and not just in his capacity of Italy's Prime Minister but as President of the EU during Italy's semester in November 2003. Berlusconi showed little concern for coordinated European attempts to put pressure on Russia over its systematic violations of human rights, sympathetic as he claims to be with Putin's fight against 'terrorists'. Rather, he adopted a course of action closer to that of Germany under Gerard Schröder, privileging bilateral concerns and economic issues.

Paradoxically, however, one should note that this did not change much once Berlusconi left power in 2005. Under the centre-left government of Prodi, Italian organizations reached important economic agreements with their Russian counterparts, such as the cooperation between ENI-Gazprom on the *South Stream* pipeline designed to bring relief to Italy's chronic energy dependence, or the agreement between Alenia (a defence company of the FINMECCANICA group) and Russia's Sukhoi for development of the a new series of aircraft. For the pragmatic and business-oriented Vladimir Putin, the transition from 'Dear Silvio' to 'Dear Romano' was a fairly smooth one.⁹

Though Prodi certainly never went so far as to defend Russia's policy in Chechnya, European unity has been undermined by some of the policies that his government has pursued or supported. Thus, for instance, ENI's activism in Russia, which received the blessing of the Prodi government, effectively creates problems for European initiatives such as the Nabucco pipeline, sponsored by the European Commission with the aim of reducing Europe's dependence on Russian oil. This cannot but increase the divisions within the EU in terms of energy policy and, more generally, foreign policy towards Russia.

In itself, this already seems to demonstrate that in the case of Italy's relations with Russia, a certain continuity is discernible between centre-right and centre-left governments in terms of their disregard for EU positions. However, the following qualifications apply: first, centre-right governments have been more inclined to break the European unity on politically sensitive issues, such as human rights, than centre-left governments. It may be argued that this does not amount to a difference in substance, but merely of preferences, but it is doubtful that Prodi could (or would be willing to) go as far as Berlusconi did, in words and deeds, to please Russia and upset his European partners. Second, Italy's resistance to Europeanization in relation to Russia can at least in part be explained by the strength of industrial groups such as FINMECCANICA and ENI, both of whom have built on the historic economic ties between Italy and the former Soviet Union and boast strong links with the political-economic establishment that cuts across the right-left cleavage in Italian domestic politics.

Italy and the ESDP: Europe, after all?

As some commentators have argued, security and defence represent the two areas in which Italy's policy has been most influenced by the EU. Since the turning point of the Saint Malô summit of 1998, Italy has backed the process of acceleration in integrating defence and security across Europe, under the twin umbrellas of CFSP and ESDP. In fact, throughout the 1990s Italy had constantly shown a high propensity for further integration in the field of security and defence – only to be caught off guard when cooperation actually accelerated and the process of ESDP was finally set in motion by the UK and France (Andreatta and Hill 1997). From then on, and despite occasional hesitations, Rome has been supporting concerted European efforts at building common institutions for ESDP and a common European defence industry.

Unlike in other areas, governments of the centre-right and centre-left have displayed exactly the same preferences on the defence component of European foreign policy. Thus, the Prodi and Berlusconi governments both committed themselves to making considerable contributions to the military and civilian Headline Goals; to supporting Italy's participation in the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), and then in the European Defence Agency (EDA); to promoting the launch of and then sustaining Italy's participation in the European gendarmerie force (EurGendFor). Most military operations pursued under the umbrella of ESDP have been attended by Italian forces: from Albania to Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Gaza to Macedonia, excluding the French-led operation *Artemis* in Congo and that in Indonesia (Aceh).

The Berlusconi government's performance in ESDP was particularly surprising, given the Atlanticist and supposedly Euro-sceptic credentials of its leader. Despite the bad start made with the government's withdrawal from the Airbus A-400 European project, during the 2003 EU Presidency semester, the centre-right government demonstrated a thoroughly cooperative attitude towards Europe, supporting the process which led to the creation of the European Security Strategy

(ESS) and brokering a number of important agreements and positions – such as the compromise on the delicate issue of the EU military headquarters, the ‘Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management’ between the EU and the UN, the ‘Declaration of the European Council concerning transatlantic relations’ on US–EU relations. The selection of Gen. Mosca Moschini to head the Military Committee (MC) in 2004 was seen as a reward for the energy and efforts put into this process. The centre-left government which followed, under the leadership of Prodi, continued this trend of close involvement in ESDP, including its open support for the institutional innovations included in the Lisbon Treaty in terms of CFSP/ESDP.

Despite this encouraging picture, however, there are also elements which inevitably put in Italy’s commitment to a common European defence in doubt in the long run. The first is the state of the defence budget, which has been subject to constant cuts over the last 20 years, and is currently estimated to be just below a meagre 1 per cent of GDP. More generally, given Italy’s laborious legislative processes, it is often difficult to approve and mobilize funding speedily, and to turn verbal commitments to projects such as the FREMM frigates into a reality (*Il sole 24 Ore* 2004). The composition of Italy’s defence spending is also not in line with the most advanced ESDP states: suffice it here to mention that spending for personnel still represents between 70 and 80 per cent of the total, and that investments in R&D are an underdeveloped 8 per cent of the GDP. This last figure is particularly worrying if one thinks of how much R&D is central to the kind of collaborative, European projects to which Italy is committing itself. The last element of (potential) weakness is constituted by Italy’s ‘other’ defence commitments, especially in the field of procurement: namely, Italy’s collaboration with the US, which has intensified considerably over the last five to ten years. As it has been recently announced, Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica will be providing the US Army and Air Force with its air-lift plane C-27J, and this follows the successful bid of AugustaWestland, another company of the FINMECCANICA group, to provide the US Presidents with EH101 helicopters. The two sets of commitments have been perceived as alternative, rather than complementary, on numerous occasions.

Notwithstanding these limits, Italy’s cooperation in European defence has been on the whole solid and stable, an objective shared between parties and coalitions for more than a decade now. Part of this stability comes from a simple realization, common to all of Italy’s political forces. Italian policymakers, of both the centre-right and centre-left, have increasingly acknowledged that integration is in the country’s interest, and not only because of the virtuous economies of scale that it would produce. After all, Italy is finding it increasingly difficult to sustain the military effort necessary to back its foreign policy commitments on the basis of a constantly shrinking defence budget.¹⁰ As international commitments grow in number, it becomes more and more clear that just as with any other middle-sized European country, Italy cannot simply afford to ‘go it alone’ in defence and security. Integration *and* specialization of the defence sector in Europe are objectives which it is in Italy’s interest to support in tandem. High-ranking military

officials in Rome and now in Brussels have increasingly pushed for this objective – as have big industrial groups such as FINMECCANICA, not without their own axes to grind.

Italy, the Middle East and Europe

Throughout the post-war period, Italy has claimed to have ‘special interests’ in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, often pursuing a foreign policy of activism in the region (Coralluzzo 2006). This was one of the few channels through which Italy’s residual nationalism could be legitimately expressed – though it often led to confrontations with other actors present in the region, most notably the US, as in the Achille Lauro affair. Italian foreign policy since 1991 has partially continued this trend. How has this interacted with EU’s foreign policy in the region? And how has this interaction been influenced by the changing strategic scenario in the region?

Iran provides a particularly interesting case in point. Against the backdrop of Italy’s ‘historic’ ties with pre-revolution Iran, and significant economic interests, the centre-left governments of the 1990s were among the first to embark on a policy of ‘constructive dialogue’ with the moderate government of Mohammad Khatami, and lobbied for such a policy in Brussels. Despite much economic and cultural cooperation, however, the policy of ‘constructive dialogue’ never quite delivered what it had promised, and was cut short by the change in strategic climate following the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent election in 2005 of the conservative Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the Presidency in Iran.

Despite the EU’s continued interest in dialogue with Iran, the centre-right governments quickly replaced the policy of engagement with a hard line, following Washington’s strategic preferences. In fact, as has been recently revealed, during Italy’s EU Presidency the Berlusconi government turned down the possibility of joining the diplomatic initiative of the ‘Big Three’ to Tehran, in spite of the invitation coming from Iranian officials (*La Repubblica* 2005). As it has transpired, Berlusconi showed no interest in following the EU lead on this issue and decided to let this opportunity pass by – possibly for fear of upsetting Washington, though in fact wholly misunderstanding the US position on the matter, which was relatively favourable to a European diplomatic mission.

It is thus deeply ironic that over the last five years Italy has tried in every possible way to be re-admitted to the club, voicing criticisms of European ‘*directoires*’. It is difficult to say how much of this effort was determined simply by calculations of relative power (namely, avoiding exclusion) and how much dictated by a real interest in the contents of the negotiations – but is this not precisely Italy’s perennial problem? In any case, it is doubtful that this rather complex trajectory can be associated simply with a straightforward ‘adjustment’ and ‘convergence’ of Italy around a common European policy, itself constantly in flux (cf. Alcaro 2008).

The case of Italy’s policy in Afghanistan and Iraq presents fewer complications. Since 9/11 it has been clear which side Italy has opted for, joining US-led military

interventions – though in symbolic and political terms, rather than military ones. The recent withdrawal from Iraq has come only after a gradual disengagement negotiated under the Prodi government – when, however, Berlusconi himself had already announced a similar exit strategy, no doubt with electoral considerations in mind. Despite differences in the discourse, the governments of centre-right and centre-left have not substantially differed over Italy's Afghanistan policy, which has featured an increasing commitment of Italian troops and resources and a higher profile for Italian diplomats and military officials in the area.¹¹ Despite strong internal opposition, the centre-left governments of Prodi have acceded to the requests coming from Washington (and other Atlanticist states),¹² and stepped up the country's presence – all of this without converging around a European foreign policy, for there has not been the consensus to make one possible.

Lastly, Italian foreign relations with the Middle East were once again under the spotlight during the crisis in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. For a variety of reasons – some historic, given Italy's prominent involvement in the war in Lebanon of 1982, some more short term, given Prodi's desire to reassure the US that the withdrawal from Iraq did not mean withdrawal from the Middle East – Italy was keen to contribute to the resolution of the crisis. This was to be done, first, by sponsoring a peace conference in Rome which, however, did not achieve its objective and, second, by leading the UN-sponsored mission 'UNIFIL-II' in Lebanon (see Ronzitti 2007). Presented as a foreign policy success in Italy, the mission suffered from the fundamental ambiguity with which the troops on the ground had to deal, namely the lack of a clear and strong political mandate to restrain, if not completely disarm, Hezbollah. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Berlusconi government formed in 2008 announced precisely a change of the 'rules of engagement' in Lebanon – a direct result of a request from Washington which expressed American worries over the increased influence of Iran and Syria on Hezbollah, and its re-arming.

What needs to be noted, however and most of all, is that the EU was remarkably absent from Lebanon. Single European states like Italy or Spain are there, but no European mission, nor special envoys. Despite the regular attempts to talk up an 'EU presence' in Lebanon, no ESDP mission could be agreed. Naturally, this tells of the selective reach of CFSP/ESDP operations, but also about Italy's willingness to go ahead alone when the EU lags behind. Just as in the case of Albania in 1997, faced with hesitation, paralysis or veto in Brussels, Italy has taken the lead – not so much in trying to build the necessary consensus within the EU, but in projecting the country's influence in an area of perceived strategic interest.

Italian foreign policy and the EU: a re-assessment

The picture emerging from the account of Italian foreign policy in its relation with the EU is a rather complex one, and one that fits uneasily with the more simplistic accounts of Europeanization. As argued in the Introduction to this book, the process of Europeanization that emerges from what has been illustrated here can only be understood as genuinely dialectic and strategic, multilevel and issue-specific.

Thus, the EU and its foreign policy institutions have encountered and interacted with Italy in a variety of foreign policy areas and issues – in some this encounter has led to a confrontation of preferences and goals, in others to a rather natural blending of objectives. All of this has been negotiated, even calculated and managed through the political will of the different actors involved. The first finding to be noted, thus, is that the more benign accounts of Europeanization as a progressive, inevitable and predetermined transformation of not only the objectives, but the identities of the actors involved, simply do not apply to Italy. Despite embracing the European ideal verbally for more than half a century, this country has also shown some remarkable resistance to the changes effectively brought about by European integration (Quaglia and Radaelli 2007; see also Della Porta and Caiani 2007). Despite having displayed greater volatility over the last 15 years, Italian foreign policy seems resistant to substantial change in terms of its objectives and identity.

Concerning the degree of Europeanization of Italian foreign policy, there is a lot of variance that needs to be accounted for, beneath its rather static appearance. First of all, there is variance brought about by changes in the domestic political arena. As illustrated throughout the paper, the alternation of centre-right and centre-left coalitions has led to a considerable fluctuation in the discourse and style, if not always in the actual choices, concerning Europe. There has been discontinuity, but only in the sense that the oscillations of Italian foreign policy have been wider, with different governments showing different appetites for exploring options traditionally outside of Italy's diplomatic radar (e.g. Berlusconi's 'radical' Atlanticism). There is no doubt, however, that despite these oscillations, the pendulum of Italian foreign policy still gravitates heavily around that 'middle ground' formed by the intersection of Italy's two traditional commitments – to the US and to the EU. In other words, the squaring of circles and verbal fudging remain Rome's preferred diplomatic assets, just as in the Cold War. Hence, even Berlusconi's Atlanticism was arguably pursued successfully only thanks to the divisions existing within the EU – and the lack of a strong European constraint – which he then marginally exacerbated. At the same time he had no desire to do without the European theatre entirely.

There is, however, a serious implication of this. In choosing the 'line of least resistance', Italy also accepts that its foreign policy will always be more reactive than proactive, guided by laborious strategic calculations necessary to keep the circles squared, rather than by genuine contributions to the cause. The implications for Italy's position in Europe are obvious: what has Italy genuinely contributed to the strengthening of European foreign policy – aside from the various holiday venues where treaties are signed and declarations issued, to paraphrase Spinelli's provocative remarks (Spinelli 1967)? Given its increasingly overstretched foreign policy, it seems that Italy is structurally unable to do more.

Even granted this modicum of 'Europeanization', one still needs to investigate its different meanings or uses in Italian foreign policy. ESDP is a case in point. As illustrated above, this seems to be possibly the area most affected by Europeanization, given Italy's commitment and close involvement in the process.

Yet a fairly instrumental attitude seems to underlie this commitment: given the difficulties of the defence sector, the European option seems not only the most viable but the most economically sensible for Italy. The objective seems to be to 'Europeanize' a problematic domestic issue and hope for a 'European rescue' of Italian defence. There is nothing bad or unprecedented in that, of course. It is just that it raises the question of whether from this instrumental calculus a genuine transformative process can ensue.

The case of Italy's policy vis-à-vis Iran, and its relation to that of Europe, is another indicative example. While in the 1990s Rome successfully exported its policy of dialogue to Europe, and thus multiplied the policy's impact on the process, its greatest concern over the last five years has been simply over the exclusion from the negotiations between the 'Big Three' and Tehran. More than evidence of the convergence around the EU, this seems to indicate a pure strategic calculus, especially in the context of a similar, threatened exclusion from a reformed UN Security Council. Italy's traditional concerns over rank and exclusion, in other words, are still alive and kicking. Note that this concern has animated Berlusconi's second and third mandates as well as Prodi's third – despite these two governments having different policies over Iran.

The predominant mode of Italy's 'Europeanization' thus seems rather opportunistic and instrumental, despite the country's abstract commitment to federalism. Italian foreign policy seems to be most Europeanized when most convenient for the country. Failing this condition, Italy cautiously yet determinedly turns to other options. The example of Italo-Russian relations is a case in point, and probably the most significant in terms of demonstrating how far Italy is determined to go to pursue its own interests when these do not happen to coincide with those of the EU.

If this is the rather complex picture emerging from the interaction between Italy, the EU and their foreign policies, what remains to be assessed are the factors influencing the outcomes of such an interaction. One has already been mentioned, and suitably qualified: as other analysts have found with respect to Europeanization in the field of economic and monetary policy, party politics is an important variable in the Italian case, and one usually underestimated in the Europeanization literature (Quaglia and Radaelli 2007: 925). Although arguably less decisive in the area of foreign policy than in economic matters, party politics does account for much of the variation and oscillations in the Italian foreign policy of the last two decades. However, this is hardly the only factor at play.

The EU and its member states do not interact in a vacuum: international relations do matter. The wave of instability affecting the Balkans in the 1990s, the Twin Tower attacks of 11 September 2001, the ensuing neoconservative and unilateralist turn in American foreign policy, the changing strategic scenario in regions such as the Middle East – all of these events have changed the range of options and limits for Italian foreign policy (as well as for the EU, of course). Thus, for instance, the hegemonic and unilateralist policies of the US have offered a tempting and, for some, irresistible incentive to bandwagon – hence, Berlusconi's Atlanticism. For a reactive country such as Italy, changes in the external constraint

are bound to affect foreign policy – once these changes are filtered through the operating paradigms and mindsets of the policymakers. Even keeping all other factors constant, Europeanization would still be influenced by what goes on in the world of international relations.

Another factor of significance, as demonstrated by the Italian case, is the strength of European foreign policy itself. It is not accidental that Italy's foreign policy has most strayed from EU positions when the Union has been most divided. Thus, its foreign policy over the Iraq crisis, or its bilateral relations with Russia. As the case of EMU demonstrated in the 1990s, unless the impulse coming from Europe is strong, consensual and involves effective sanctions, Italy will most likely find a crack in which to hide until the storm has passed. Occasionally, it will also try to widen the cracks more or less surreptitiously, so as to dilute even more pressure coming from Europe.

But aside from these background factors, at least two other sources of influence should be mentioned. Though the paper has offered limited evidence to substantiate this claim, Europeanization is more likely to happen when the Italian foreign policy/security establishment pushes for it. The case of ESDP is perhaps a good example of this: contrary to expectations, military officials both in Rome and Brussels have been rather vocal in supporting a common policy over defence and security. Not much can be said about Italian diplomats in Rome or Brussels, apart from the vague and perhaps a little outdated consideration that the Foreign Ministry has been traditionally considered the more pro-European of the two ministries. No study of the values, preferences and attitudes of Italy's diplomats vis-à-vis the world, let alone Europe, exists.

Lastly, this paper has suggested that an increasing influence on Italian foreign policy, including in its relations with the EU, is being exerted not so much by political actors but, rather, by big industrial groups such as ENI or FINMECCANICA. The former is effectively determining Italy's energy policy in Russia, while the latter has signed a number of important deals with other big European partners in the area of defence procurement, as part of ESDP. Given the dysfunctional state of Italy's current political system, it was to be expected that dynamic economic actors would soon build links with a wide range of political actors in power to secure support in the pursuit of their particular interests. The contradictory effect that this may have on Europeanization, let alone on an increasingly 'corporatist' Italian foreign policy, remains to be seen.

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Notes

- 1 Gruppo di Riflessione Strategica (2008: 4), my translation. The *Rapporto* is not so much representative of public opinion, but rather indicative of the strategic preferences and overall attitudes of the foreign policy elites.
- 2 Interestingly, in the public debate as well as in some literature 'Europe' is frequently used to mean 'the EU'. In the domestic political discourse especially, the former is widely preferred because of its normative/political cachet as well as, one should perhaps add, of its vagueness. Every effort has been made in this paper to avoid any such ambiguities.
- 3 *Il Gattopardo* is a reference to the eponymous novel by Giuseppe di Lampedusa in which the main character famously advises that 'if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change'.
- 4 For instance, see the views of Italy's President, in Napolitano (2006).
- 5 See Andreatta and Hill (2000) and Guzzini (1994), as well as the series of volumes published in the 1990s by Berghon Books entitled *Italian Politics*.
- 6 Here I follow the common practice of referring to the two coalitions as 'centre-right' and 'centre-left', though of course this distinction is vulnerable to various objections. One could legitimately question, for instance, to what extent Berlusconi's coalition is really centrist, instead of wholly right-wing. On the other hand, the centrist, post-Christian Democratic constituency still represents a 'middle ground' which is electorally vital to both coalitions.
- 7 For an account of two crises involving Italy's secret services and their relations with Washington (the so-called Calipari affair and the Nigergate issue) see Brighi (2007b).
- 8 *La Repubblica* (2007a, b); *Quotidiano Nazionale* (2007).
- 9 Prodi's past and extensive involvement with ENI, and with Eastern Europe, only facilitated things further. See Nicchia (2007), also *Corriere della Sera* (2006) and Galluzzo (2006).
- 10 For an overview of the military operations involving the 8,500 plus Italian soldiers now serving overseas, see Ministero della Difesa <http://www.difesa.it/Operazioni+Militari/> (accessed 4 February 2011).
- 11 *Corriere della Sera* (2008). See also the recent appointment of Ettore Sequi as the EU's Special Representative for Afghanistan.
- 12 See the controversial letter published in *La Repubblica*, signed by eight ambassadors, pushing Rome to 'do more' in Afghanistan (La Repubblica 2007c). For a comment, see Silvestri (2007).

5 Europeanization and British foreign policy

Michael Aktipis and Tim Oliver

Britain's participation in European integration has long been fraught with difficulties, not least in relation to attempts to form common foreign, security and defence policies. It is worth recalling that concerns Britain would push an American approach to Europe's role in the world were behind French President de Gaulle's two vetoes on UK entry before 1973. De Gaulle's fear might well have been valid, for even after gaining membership the UK has appeared to place relations with the USA above those with her fellow Europeans, as evidenced most recently by the 2003 Iraq War.

Developments in European foreign, security and defence policy nevertheless owe much to the UK, far more perhaps than most of the British electorate and political class might be aware of, or prepared to acknowledge. Britain's membership coincided with the birth of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which the UK soon embraced. More recently, the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), matched by a gradual development of a European security and defence capability, has been driven in large part by the UK. For there can be no European foreign or defence policy without the UK; it is one area where the UK clearly leads in both capabilities and experience.

Why is it then that the UK regularly appears ambivalent – or 'Janus faced' – about furthering cooperation in foreign and defence policy? On the one face we see commitments such as the St Malo initiative – leading to the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – and the development of a cooperative reflex with the rest of the European Union (EU) which has slowly emerged as a key aspect of the UK's foreign-policy making. On the other, Britain's political narrative stresses a commitment to independence, national sovereignty, alignment with the United States and an unease about any appearance of dependence upon the rest of the EU.

In this chapter we will outline and explain this tension. We begin with an historical overview of the UK's contribution to Europe's role in the world from 1945 to New Labour, with particular attention to developments after New Labour's election victory in 1997. The rest of the chapter is then divided into three sections. The first examines the institutional links in the area of foreign and defence policy as seen through an examination of the core executive. The second section examines the operational side of the UK's European foreign policy cooperation. We then

turn to the politics of Britain's relations with Europe in order to explore the domestic political and parliamentary debates that have often been the single biggest constraint on British governments' ability to pursue – at least more openly – a more pro-European approach to foreign policy cooperation. Here we make some mention of the dilemmas facing the current British government. Finally, we turn to the key conceptual questions set out in the introductory chapter about conceptualizing Europeanization and British foreign policy.

British foreign policy and Europe from the Second World War to Blair

Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson neatly summarized the dilemma facing British foreign policy in the post-war period in 1962. Great Britain, he opined,

has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role – that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role based on being the head of a 'Commonwealth' ... this role is about to be played out.

(Brinkley 1990)

Yet for the UK, the situation never appeared that simple given its victory in the Second World War thanks, in the first instance at least, to its ability to stand alone. Cooperation with the French and the Germans in the face of the Soviet Union was viewed with scepticism. Instead the UK increasingly turned to the USA for assistance. More than a few commentators (including Acheson himself) saw the whole policy as based on a pretence that stopped Britain thinking seriously about its position within a changing world order.

London could not, however, ignore the reality of the international political situation for very long. The 1956 debacle of the Suez invasion demonstrated that Britain – and France – were no longer global powers. The success of the European Economic Community (EEC), spurned by Britain at its inception, and the relative failure of the British-led European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), pointed to the growing economic necessity for British accession to the EEC. The draw-down of Britain's global military commitments after 1968 left them concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic. Successive British governments soon came to agree, albeit ambivalently, that closer engagement with Europe was a good idea, with the UK formally joining the EEC just a decade after Acheson's speech. British membership likewise coincided with the start of EPC. The UK, therefore, experienced both the end of the Vietnam War and strained relations with the USA over the Middle East to some degree within this nascent framework for European foreign policy cooperation.

Despite these growing European connections, whenever confronted with a hard choice between Europe and the US, Britain – excepting Edward Heath's government in the early 1970s – always seemed to privilege Washington over its

European partners. In this view, the best strategic choice for Britain was an unwavering commitment to NATO alongside its powerful (and English-speaking) imperial successor across the Atlantic. This view was strengthened by the unique intelligence sharing arrangement between the UK and the USA, drawn up immediately after the Second World War. The agreement, the wording of which remains secret, provides the UK with significant access to the capabilities and information of the US intelligence community. It extends to Australia, Canada and New Zealand with the five countries together operating the Echelon network of worldwide signals intelligence collection and analysis. Successive British governments have been loath to jeopardize access to this capability, which the UK could not afford on its own or expect to emerge through EU cooperation. This approach reached new heights under Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980s, with her close relationship with President Reagan, her distrust of the growing European 'super-state' and her hostility to German reunification.

British ambivalence about relations with the EU did not end with the Cold War or the passing of the Thatcher premiership. On the one hand, the changing European political and strategic environment saw EU Member States keen to establish new forms of foreign and defence cooperation. John Major's government supported the establishment of a more formalized, yet fully intergovernmental, framework for EU foreign policy cooperation – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in 1992. A combination of British frustration at America's initial unwillingness to become involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Europe's inability to act there and American pressure for improvements in Europe's contribution to NATO together pushed the UK forward in realizing the value of some form of increased foreign and defence cooperation within the EU. Despite these developments, the UK's working relationship with the USA remained close and intimate in a way that remained a distant hope for its EU partners. As the Major years drew to a close, Britain was still imposing a strict veto on any development of the CFSP which, in its view, might represent a threat to NATO's monopoly on European defence policy.

New Labour and Europe's foreign and defence policy

When the Labour Party regained office in May 1997 it had been out of power for eighteen years. Tony Blair and many of those around him were marked by recollections of the early 1980s: an unelectable Labour Party – partly due to its ideologically anti-American, anti-European, and pro-unilateral nuclear disarmament foreign policy – dominated by unbiddable party activists and unable to reach out to a wider electorate. 'New Labour' was a self-conscious break with Labour's past and included Blair's adoption of a style in both domestic and foreign policy that tolerated no dissent and sometimes pitched him explicitly against the language and instincts of his own party members (Jones 2001). Although Blair made little direct mention of foreign policy while in opposition, the New Labour lexicon was stocked with terms such as globalization, interdependence and the network economy. Compared to the Conservatives, New Labour seemed more

comfortable with the international arena, enthusiastic to work with Europe and keen to project a positive image of the UK in the world.

In the run up to the 1997 General Election, New Labour proclaimed its commitment to 'constructive engagement' in Europe. Blair declared his intention to assume 'leadership in Europe' as prime minister, which to him meant 'to be involved, to be constructive, to be capable of getting our own way [in Europe]' (Labour Party 1997). Immediately after Labour's landslide election victory the new government's European strategy was put to the test by the ongoing Amsterdam Treaty negotiations. In these it soon became clear that there were definite limits to Blair's commitment to British engagement in the EU, particularly on borders, immigration and defence (Stephens 1997). While Blair signalled a willingness to consider EU defence issues through the incorporation of the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks' into the EU's sphere of responsibility, he insisted on leaving the implementation of these crisis management tasks to the Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental organization of limited membership which had been revived from the 1980s on to provide a bridge between NATO and the EC/EU.

In the aftermath of Amsterdam, however, Blair was looking for a policy initiative that would allow him to fulfil Labour's electoral pledge to put Britain at the heart of Europe (see Dover 2005; Howorth 2000: 34; Smith 2005). With too many political obstacles preventing adhesion to the single currency, Blair turned to defence: an area in which the UK was strong, where a gap existed at the European level and where the British believed they could make significant progress (Dover 2005). At the same time, Blair was very conscious of Europe's earlier failures in the Balkans and, as Stephen Wall, his former EU advisor, noted, 'the politics of doing more became blindingly obvious' to Blair in light of American reluctance to intervene in Kosovo in 1997 and 1998 (Aktipis 2007: 68). Blair and other senior government officials therefore became increasingly convinced of the necessity of strengthening collective military capability across Europe, fearing that the UK (alone perhaps with France) would be left to shoulder the European security burden in the absence of continued American interest.

The first public indication of this strategy came in October 1998 when Blair publicly recognized the need for 'fresh thinking' in European defence and the importance 'for Britain to be part of that thinking and not ... simply to stand there and say we are not' (see Rutten 2001: 1–3). While Blair made it clear that his government remained firmly committed to the transatlantic alliance, his announcement came as a shock to policymakers in Europe and the US who had not anticipated this volte-face.¹ Shortly thereafter, the British and French began a series of intense discussions culminating in a meeting in the Breton port of St Malo in December 1998 where they issued a bilateral political declaration outlining the main parameters of a new European defence initiative (Wighton and Buckley 1998; BBC News 1998).

St Malo represented an agreement between the two most powerful European military powers to make the EU a more effective international actor. Some

inherent Franco-British differences, however, lay beneath the surface. France sought to ensure that the declaration was not seen as a capitulation to the US and would represent a genuine EU attempt to develop a defence dimension. The British, on the other hand, were concerned with putting together a package that did not question their commitment to NATO (Howorth 2000: 36). They were also not averse to creating a rival bilateral relationship to the famous Franco-German tandem. The nature of the bargain struck has, therefore, been described by some as 'constructive ambiguity', providing both the British and the French with leeway to interpret the text in a way that was politically acceptable (Heisbourg 2000). Nevertheless, the UK's decision to support efforts to develop a stronger, more coherent and potentially autonomous EU defence capacity represented a significant departure from its traditional NATO-centric approach.

St Malo's original 'constructive ambiguity' remained problematic as the specific parameters of the future relationship between the EU and NATO were worked out; a situation compounded by the organizations' differing memberships. Turkey, in particular, quickly signalled its concerns about non-EU NATO allies such as itself being granted equal status in ESDP operations. Countering this were French concerns that 'the monolithic strength of NATO would steamroller the infant CESDP into adopting structures, procedures and policies which would unduly be influenced by Washington' (Howorth 2000: 56; Andreani 2000: 91). For the UK, the main concern was the reinforcement by ESDP of the close link between the two organizations. The final conclusion of these negotiations in December 2002, led primarily by FCO Political Director Emyr Jones Parry, marked a fundamental turning point in the development of the ESDP/NATO relationship. While the concluding agreement by no means signalled the end to the institutional, political and operational bickering between these two European security actors, it represented the *sine qua non* for British willingness to operationalize the hitherto purely institutional ESDP. The subsequent operationalization of ESDP has resulted in an increasing division of responsibility between the EU and NATO in the provision of European and international security and has had a significant Europeanizing effect on British foreign and security policy. To judge by the changed attitudes evident even before the end of the Bush presidency, it seems also to have enabled the USA itself to accept the value of European defence cooperation.

The development of ESDP and CFSP, like European integration in general, has been advanced and formalized through a series of formal and informal agreements, a process that by 2002 had produced a series of convoluted treaty documents. By late 2003, even in the midst of the political tensions of the Iraq conflict, the parameters of the ESDP's political and institutional framework were further clarified following the informal conclusion of the 2003 EU Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) security and defence negotiations. Although a number of other EU Member States played important roles in influencing the outcome of this agreement, the relevant Treaty provisions were shaped largely by the British, French and German governments at a series of meetings taking place outside the formal framework of the IGC, leading some observers to label this trilateral

cooperation a European defence '*ménage à trois*' (Blitz and Parker 2004; Benoit and Graham 2004; *The Economist* 2004).

The British government wielded considerable influence over the direction of these defence discussions during both the Convention and the subsequent IGC debates, successfully Europeanizing a number of its key ESDP policy preferences by uploading them in the context of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiations. While the British government had actively supported a number of these changes, most of the institutional innovations including the EU battle group initiative, the European Defence Agency, and the EU Operational Headquarters originally derived from Franco-German initiatives (Aktipis 2007: 161–86). With the two traditional motors of European integration, France and Germany, approaching these negotiations with a shared EU foreign policy agenda that threatened NATO's exclusive security and defence prerogative in Europe, British negotiators at times found themselves on the defensive, seeking to steer ESDP away from this potential collision course with the transatlantic alliance.

In the context of broader EU foreign policy structures, Britain came to support the establishment of the post of EU 'Foreign Minister', the creation of a more permanent President of the Council and proposals for an External Action Service (EAS). A key British aim was ensuring that any EU foreign minister or EAS came under the firm control of the intergovernmental European Council and not the European Commission. Proposals to extend the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP were viewed warily, but at the same time the UK recognized that a move away from unanimity, perhaps towards constructive abstention, was needed to strengthen the EU's ability to act and react on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the overall result was to keep CFSP as an intergovernmental process distinct from other policy areas with consensus remaining the norm, a situation that met with approval from London.

Despite the abandonment of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005 following its rejection by French and Dutch voters in national referenda, a range of CFSP and ESDP provisions contained within it have managed to survive through their adoption by the European Council outside of any formal treaty ratification process.² The Convention and IGC negotiations therefore provided the context for several major institutional and political innovations within ESDP, and the UK contributed to these developments in a way that would have been difficult to imagine five years earlier.

Throughout, as we have seen, the UK has displayed a degree of unease at the idea of moving beyond any intergovernmental framework or for advancing the EU through formal changes such as extending QMV; changes that would require parliamentary scrutiny and provoke Euro-sceptic attacks about the emergence of a 'Federal Europe'. At the same time, however, the UK has been aware of the need for practical changes to make CFSP and ESDP work more effectively for both the EU and the UK. Attempts therefore to bring back some of the Constitution in the Lisbon Treaty, particularly the foreign policy aspects, have caused political tensions for Blair's successor, Prime Minister Gordon Brown (see below). If the Treaty can be adopted, the UK hopes that it will allow the EU to cease its incessant

institutional navel-gazing and focus more on 'outward looking' agendas, furthering enlargement and improving the EU's ability to act on the world stage.

Several themes run through the history of Britain's approach to EU foreign and defence cooperation, most clearly the UK's slow and ambivalent engagement. This has varied according to the political will of the actors involved and the international pressures facing the UK. While the UK remains central to attempts to expand Europe's role in the world, the extent to which this is accepted or embraced domestically is another matter. Before turning to this political debate we turn to examine the way the centre of British government itself has approached these developments.

Institutionalization of European foreign and defence cooperation

It is one of the conundrums of Britain's relations with Europe that while its political relationship is often difficult, the institutional links between the 'core executive' and Brussels are often held up as a model for other states to follow.³ For example, the 'Step Change' programme introduced in 1999 to ensure that departments and civil servants were more proactive in their working contacts at the EU and Member States level proved so successful that evaluations were stopped early (Bulmer and Burch 2006). To examine the core executive's adaptation to Europe we will examine some of the key departments and actors involved in foreign, security and defence policy formulation and implementation.

The prime minister and the Cabinet Office

On significant European matters such as treaties or discussions on common European positions, the office of the prime minister (PM) is the most important in government, albeit one that should not be considered all powerful or presidential (Heffernan 2003). The PM is limited by time, knowledge and his small staff in ensuring coherence across the whole of government with its vast departments, each with increasing interaction with the EU. He is assisted in this by the Cabinet Office with its system of committees and secretariats, particularly those dealing with Europe, 'overseas' and national security, which are made up of civil servants and diplomats from across Whitehall. The decision by Blair in 2005 to move the heads of these secretariats from the Cabinet Office into Downing Street to serve him directly provoked complaints about a centralization of power that would undermine the collegiate nature of foreign and European policymaking (Owen 2007). While departments continue to have considerable autonomy, moving the heads of secretariats into Downing Street has ratcheted up the role played by the PM. This in part reflects the interest shown by Blair in foreign affairs and his 'presidential style'. At the same time it stems from the growing number and importance of EU summits in giving direction to the Union, the growing political links between European political parties and the need to address European issues at a national and party level.

We also need to reflect on how Blair or Thatcher, while perhaps appearing powerful in the corridors of Westminster, were less significant on the world stage compared to Churchill or Atlee. Contemporary prime ministers have had to adapt not only to what Rose calls 'a shrinking world' caused by globalization but also to the shrinking role played in it by Britain and its PM (Rose 2001). The same extends to the European Council where the PM is one of only twenty-seven heads of government (albeit of one of the largest Member States). Nevertheless, the role of the PM – as the main voice of Britain in the world – has become more central to British foreign policy and to directing the UK's relations with the EU.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

At the time of the UK's accession to the then EEC in 1973, the FCO was the lead department in European matters, a role that has declined as other departments have become increasingly involved in EU matters and European affairs have moved from foreign to 'domestic' policy. This reflects a broader blurring between the domestic and the foreign at all levels of government (Hocking 1999, 2002). However, the development of EPC and then CFSP, have given the FCO an exclusive area of competence.

Europeanization has changed the FCO's institutional structure. The emergence of EU foreign policy cooperation along with government-wide management reforms led to the creation of the post of Political Director. This official has become the main diplomat who advises on foreign policy and who travels with the foreign secretary or the PM, leaving behind the Permanent Under Secretary (the traditional head of the FCO) to manage the FCO. While geographical desks have regularly been in and out of favour, the bilateral links between the FCO and posts within other Member States remain important, highlighting how policymaking in the EU, especially CFSP, is not confined to links with Brussels but also involves diplomacy between the Member States (Smith 2001).

The FCO has actively encouraged diplomats to have experience working in the EU in order to improve its usefulness to other departments and the UK's contribution to shaping the EU. The 2005 EU Security Strategy Document largely reflected key British concerns because it was, in part, written by the former advisor to the PM Robert Cooper – someone who could well be described as a Europeanized British diplomat. This cadre of 'Europeanists' may have come to displace the 'Arabists' who were traditionally seen to dominate the FCO, although this may be changing once again as priorities shift back to areas such as the Middle East. Overseas posts have also been influenced through regular coordination work undertaken with other EU Member States posts (Laatikainen and Smith 2006). Finally, the cost of the diplomatic service may be eased through shared posts and facilities. The growth of such cooperation and the prospect of more, including the European External Action Service, however, provoke a degree of political unease at home. For this reason, together with the practical obstacles of such matters as staffing and means of reporting, the national level of diplomacy remains both central and powerful.

UKRep⁴

The growth of the EU in British government has placed the Permanent Representation in Brussels (UKRep) at the heart of the core executive. Although officially part of the FCO and headed by one of its ambassadors, the composition of UKRep has changed to reflect the Europeanization of British government such that by 1998 a majority of its desk officers were civil servants from home departments (Bulmer and Burch 1998: 615). It is telling that one of the last major departments to become involved was the Ministry of Defence. It was not until after the establishment of the ESDP institutional machinery at Nice in 2000 that the MoD established a presence, a development addressed in the next section.

That UKRep remains an official diplomatic post might seem anomalous considering the changes in its work and personnel. UKRep's vital link is to the Cabinet Office with its European and Global Issues Secretariat and, like the Cabinet Office, neutrality is in its working interest. Any pressure to move UKRep away from FCO oversight, however, risks political tensions with those uneasy with the idea that business inside the EU no longer entails 'foreign policy', but rather a political union whose business is now the daily work of the heart of British government.

MoD⁵

Before the emergence of the ESDP, the MoD was largely detached from EU business. In recent years, however, the MoD has significantly increased its EU engagement. The proliferation of ESDP institutional and capabilities initiatives after Nice have led to growing demands on the MoD with several new posts being created to deal directly with ESDP, and the responsibilities of other positions changing to incorporate an EU dimension.

At the macro-level, the portfolio of the Director for the United Nations at the MoD was expanded in 2003 to include responsibility for EU matters and a new permanent position, Assistant Director for the EU, was created with responsibility to directly oversee ESDP matters. Ongoing plans point towards uniting the EU, NATO and UN strands by appointing a single Director responsible for them all and fully integrating the military and policy teams working on both EU and NATO matters.

At the micro-level, the MoD's involvement in EU policymaking until the Nice Treaty was limited to the highest political levels, in contrast to the large number of personnel embedded within the UK's Permanent Delegation to NATO. Post-Nice demands for improved involvement of military expertise and their integration with the existing foreign policy machinery led the MoD to establish a military staff within UKRep consisting exclusively of MoD personnel. Tasked with operating alongside the rest of UKRep and supporting the UK's Military Representative within the then newly established EU Military Committee, its workload has grown such that by 2006 it included over a dozen officers, representing nearly 10 per cent of all UKRep personnel. The result has been an increasing number of MoD officials becoming exposed to ESDP, with an early

assignment to UKRep now a regular part of the MoD career plan. Furthermore, the UKRep's entire ESDP team includes several desk officers seconded from both the MoD as well as the FCO. This relatively small nucleus of a team has now grown considerably in terms of personnel and, in the words of a former British Representative to the PSC, represents an 'enormous institutional change' that has contributed to an exponential growth in UKRep's ESDP activities over the course of the past few years.

MoD officials and military officers based in London have also become increasingly involved in ESDP. For example, the same MoD planning team responsible for coordinating the capabilities development process within NATO was utilized to support the EU's Headline Goal process, thereby ensuring full coordination and integration between British efforts across both organizations as well as ensuring continued NATO influence over the EU capabilities process. Furthermore, the MoD modified its own existing Permanent Joint Headquarters – a multinational operational headquarters in Northwood – to serve as a multinational headquarters for the conduct of ESDP military operations thus creating the possibility for a large number of British military officers to become involved in the planning and conduct of EU military operations, while accustoming them to this role through regular training exercises. It is worth recounting, however, that the MoD ensured that ESDP operations would be run out of the same military headquarters where one of NATO's three major commanders, the Commander Naval Forces North, resides and from which all British-led multinational operations are based, irrespective of their institutional affiliation.

What emerges from this institutional picture is the gradual adaptation of the MoD to the demands of EU security and defence policymaking, yet a continued reluctance to establish institutional machinery or pathways completely independent of existing NATO ones. On the one hand, the increasing demands of planning and conducting autonomous (non-NATO) EU military operations has led to a significant degree of institutional adaptation of the MoD's planning and operational staff. On the other hand, Britain's transatlantic reflex remains strong, and NATO remains at the heart of the UK's international security vision. What is remarkable is the way in which the EU has nevertheless emerged gradually over the course of the last decade as a respected complement to NATO, even amongst previously sceptical MoD policymakers and military officials.

The Home Office and HM Treasury

The Home Office and the Treasury are the two great offices of the British state traditionally concerned with domestic matters. But their orientation has also changed in recent years.

The Home Office along with the policing and intelligence services had weak links with the EU until the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Third Pillar of the EU in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, drawing them into the core group of departments with strong links to Brussels and other Member States (Bulmer and Burch 2006: 40). The growth in European cooperation on international

terrorism, immigration, asylum and organized crime has created further impetus with, for example, the UK and Home Office pushing hard for an EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy Action Plan. This in part reflects international as much as European developments. Political sensitivities remain, especially over border controls, immigration and policing with the UK's opt-outs from Schengen reflecting these domestic sensitivities. Between the implementation of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and 2007, the UK opted into roughly the same number of JHA measures as it opted out of (House of Commons Library 2008: 31).

The Treasury has not changed its lukewarm approach to the EU and the euro under New Labour. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown exercised considerable autonomy over economic policy, including Britain's approach to the euro and international economic issues. He did not allow the FCO's political arguments for membership to intrude upon the Treasury's prerogative to decide upon its economic prerequisites. Brown, not known for enjoying ECOFIN Councils, seemed to prefer to spend time in the USA or at international financial meetings. Arguably, the Treasury made greater efforts to work with the EU under the previous Conservative Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke. Thus despite strong economic links with the EU, a lack of political drive from the top has limited the Treasury's involvement with the EU. As Bulmer and Burch note (2006: 47), this is the result partly of Brown's preferences, organizational weaknesses and the prioritization given to global economic institutions.

In short, the core executive's involvement with the EU's foreign, security and defence policies has involved fine tuning in line with general patterns of evolution in the core executive (Bulmer and Burch 2006). Such evolution can be driven by reactive needs such as the need to improve European defence capabilities, leading to some uploading of the British approach; or by exogenous changes, either in the wider world or within the UK itself. Coordination – although difficult – is effectively managed, often generating a unity of purpose in terms of objectives that serve to ensure a rapid and unified position. But political determination to push forward links with the EU is also important. As Bulmer and Burch ask of the 'Step Change' programme, 'so, has all this amounted to a step change? In procedures – yes. In endurance – not yet clear. In outcome – mixed' (Bulmer and Burch 2005: 887).

Operationalizing British European policy

There is evidence of a degree of Europeanization in the implementation of British foreign and defence policy. To examine what this means we will look into three areas that provide a broad overview of Britain's relations with the outside world. First, we examine the area of security and defence in which the UK has played a significant role in planning and conducting crisis management operations with its EU partners. Second, we turn to foreign economic policy, particularly relating to development. We then turn to the way the UK has conducted some of its key bilateral and multilateral relationships such as with Russia and the United Nations. Finally, we examine the domestic debate in the UK about EU foreign policy,

providing some pointers as to where British foreign policy is headed and the prospects for further Europeanization.

Europe in Britain's security and defence policies

Early in 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the aforementioned IGC defence compromise, ESDP began its transformation from political rhetoric into operational reality. By the end of the British EU Presidency in 2005, just seven years after St Malo, EU Member States had achieved significant institutional, political and operational progress within ESDP, with the British government playing an instrumental role throughout this process. By providing crucial political and military support to proposals for the EU's takeover of NATO's existing peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 2004, the British government enabled the EU to undertake its most demanding crisis management operation to date. Furthermore, ESDP has expanded its horizons both operationally and geographically, engaging in a total of twenty-two civilian and military crisis management operations stretching from Bosnia to Indonesia by 2009. This sudden proliferation of ESDP operations was not the result of long-term planning by the UK or other Member States. Rather, as the EU gradually demonstrated its operational effectiveness in both military and civilian crisis management through increasingly demanding operations across the globe, Member States reciprocated by demonstrating a growing willingness to turn to the EU to address emerging international security crises. This change was perhaps the most dramatic in the case of the UK, the Member State most reluctant to allow the EU to develop as an autonomous international crisis management actor.

Between the informal conclusion of the IGC defence negotiations in December 2003 and the end of the UK's EU Presidency in 2005, the British government's policy approach to ESDP underwent significant change along several dimensions. On the one hand, as we have seen, the British government's institutional engagement with ESDP grew considerably. This top-down Europeanization dynamic – resulting from the increased engagement of EU Member States governments with ESDP's increasingly dense EU-level institutional framework – was responsible for hastening ESDP's transformation from a policy area dictated by summit diplomacy to one shaped on a more routine basis by a larger cross-section of domestic policy actors. At the same time, the EU's gradual assumption of political and operational responsibility for a number of increasingly demanding and diverse military and civilian crisis management operations triggered the emergence of another related Europeanization dynamic. As a result of the increasing engagement of British defence officials in the conduct of these successful ESDP operations, many previously sceptical officials began to recognize the EU's value-added as an international security actor, thereby leading them to support a more extensive and robust EU role in European and international security crisis management.

Whereas British policymakers originally conceived of ESDP as a means to reinforce NATO, and one thing they could guide – as one of the two European

members of the UN Security Council – by the end of 2005 a growing number of policymakers had fundamentally revised this vision. Instead, ESDP increasingly emerged in the eyes of the British government and defence officials not only as a means for transatlantic burden sharing, but also – and more importantly – as a useful policy tool in its own right able to effectively confront a number of international security challenges that NATO itself remained ill-designed to address. As the PM's erstwhile foreign policy adviser, and then ambassador in Washington, David Manning, succinctly concluded in early 2006, with the emergence and maturation of ESDP over the course of the previous seven years, 'Now there is an extra club in the bag of European security ... [although ESDP still] is not a driver' (Aktipis 2007: 211). While NATO remained – and for the foreseeable future will continue to remain – at the heart of British security and defence policy, it is clear that the EU is nonetheless increasingly proving its own worth as a distinct and capable international security actor. This significant change in British security and defence policy preferences since ESDP's inception in December 1998 can be explained, at least in part, as resulting from the UK's political and institutional engagement in ESDP over time.

While the gap in capabilities, in both defence and foreign policy, between the largest and smallest Member States has led to tensions, the UK – like France and Germany – is not blind to the equally vast gap between itself and the capabilities of other major military powers in the world. Acting as the USA's partner comes at a high cost to the British military at a time when it is already severely overstretched. There are, as policymakers are aware, real limits to the UK's unilateral powers; partnership and support with other European actors is used to overcome such limitations. The UK thus often looks to the other 'large states' of France and Germany in advancing EU foreign policy. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a series of trilateral Franco-German-British meetings exacerbated feelings of division in the EU between the big and smaller states, but for the UK and Blair it was the most effective way to act quickly. Despite criticisms, the trilateral format has grown in use, both for ESDP matters and for tackling sensitive matters such as Iran (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 58).

Europe in British foreign economic policy

The recent financial crises that led to the deepest recession since the interwar years, and which was sparked by the near-collapse of the international financial system, have hit London and the UK hard. The UK's public debt could reach one hundred per cent of GDP over the next five years with some dire predictions that the UK could follow Iceland into bankruptcy. At the same time North Sea oil has been in decline with Britain increasingly dependent on imported oil, weakening the income of government and increasing the UK's vulnerability to energy producers. While the UK has not reached the position of 'sick man of Europe' that it held in the 1970s – a situation which added to the angst of imperial decline and set the background to the start of Britain's European membership – financial circumstances have again raised questions about what Britain can afford with question marks

hanging over large military and foreign policy spending commitments. The knock-on effects of Britain cutting defence spending could undermine already shaky commitments within NATO, further support of military operations in Afghanistan, or wider foreign policy initiatives in regions such as the Middle East. The outcome of the economic crisis will overshadow the behaviour of governments for the foreseeable future, with successive prime ministers facing – like their predecessors – the prospect of redefining Britain's role in the world and relations with an EU increasingly central to its financial and economic well-being.

The causes of the crisis can be traced to a myriad of factors, most notably the operation of the global financial system. Its near collapse in early 2008 left Britain, and London, dangerously exposed. Successive British governments had pursued an approach of ensuring the British economy was open to international investment and finance with the City of London placed at the heart of the UK's economy. This was aided by government deregulation, much to the financial markets' satisfaction. The gain for the British government was a financial sector located in the British capital that held significant influence in global finance and politics, in turn boosting Britain's global significance. The fall-out from the crisis has shown the risks inherent in being the home country to large financial institutions that hold the potential to paralyse the host state.

The response by the British government has been to emphasize the global and European nature of the crisis, something its critics argue is merely an attempt to deflect attention from failures in the government's own spending record that may have worsened and even aided the situation. At the European and global level the government has pushed for the need for coordination of stimulus packages and other measures designed to combat the recession. At the same time London has been fighting a larger political battle; long-running Franco-German unease at the 'Anglo-Saxon' model has manifested itself in attempts to impose a stricter regulatory approach, especially in areas such as hedge funds which some blame for the crisis and are largely concentrated in London. The British government, while acknowledging the need for regulatory reform and tempering the zeal with which the British economic model has been trumpeted, has nevertheless fiercely resisted a more strict regulatory approach. The problem for Britain is that its position is weakened by its non-membership of the Eurozone, reducing its influence over any new regulatory regime that might emerge from the crisis.⁶ Beyond Europe there is also a wider struggle taking place over economic models, with the relative success of China and other developing economies in the recession offering alternatives to US, UK or European models for economic development and operation of the global economy.

Europe in Britain's bilateral and multilateral relations

Britain maintains relations with a myriad of international organizations and despite cutbacks it maintains 260 posts in 145 countries (FCO 2008: 16). The EU increasingly plays a part in these relations, although to varying degrees of success. Relations with Zimbabwe, for example, have in part been driven by a desire to

engage the EU to bring collective pressure to bear on the regime of Robert Mugabe and neighbouring states such as South Africa that are in a better place to effect change. This has had limited success as evidenced by French and Italian refusals to obstruct invitations to Mr Mugabe to attend international conferences in EU member states, thereby exposing weaknesses in the EU's attempt to provide a collective approach. The situations in Sudan, Iran, Burma and Georgia have also shown UK foreign policy reacting with a quasi-EU reflex, albeit one that tends more towards working with larger member states such as Germany, France and Italy than the EU as a collective entity. This arises in part from a perception that decisions will be reached more quickly and effectively in a smaller group. It also, however, arises from a shared – or developing – strategic outlook on international relations that extends in part to the rest of the EU. But any such shared strategic outlook has its limits.

A unifying theme in these examples is the EU's links with China, and Britain's attempts – along with the EU – to deal with the seemingly inevitable future challenge of Chinese economic and political power. Britain did not strenuously object to the 2004 EU decision to review the arms embargo on China. This was despite the anger it provoked in the USA, endangering attempts to provide an exemption for the UK from the USA's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that restricts the export of defence-related technology. The issue, however, did raise questions about how the EU – and its Member States – thinks of Europe's strategic priorities. There was some realization that the EU lacks a coherent China policy. Such a policy, however, would need to overcome the distinct and varied interests each Member State still has in their bilateral relations with Beijing, let alone those of other major powers such as the USA.

When it comes to multilateral relations such as the UN, IMF or the World Bank, the UK – like France – jealously guards its independent position. Neither EU Member State, for example, is prepared to countenance giving up its permanent seat on the Security Council for a permanent collective 'EU seat'. It is also notable that while the EU often votes together in the UN, the two countries that tend to diverge slightly from the EU majority are the UK (84 per cent) and France (89 per cent) (Laatikainen and Smith 2006: 12). The same problems of divisions applies to the IMF or World Bank, where despite collectively holding the largest aggregate voting power in both organizations, Europe has been unable to mimic the USA's success in using its weight to advance its foreign policy priorities.

British domestic politics and foreign policy

Europe, as we have seen throughout, has long been a volatile issue in British politics, with the UK's involvement often appearing paralysed by a highly Euro-sceptic debate. Tensions have regularly split governments. For example, Prime Minister Harold Wilson went so far as to dispense with collective Cabinet responsibility during the 1975 referendum on Britain's membership to allow members of his cabinet to campaign on opposite sides of the membership debate. The European issue also played a key part in the downfall of Mrs Thatcher, and

Euro-sceptic ministers famously dogged the premiership of John Major who was driven to term them 'bastards' in an unguarded moment (Ludlam and Smith 1996). For New Labour, so long in opposition, commitments such as to the euro or the European Constitution have been viewed through the lens of electoral politics. Gordon Brown's decision not to hold a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon was in part because of his fear that it would serve as a referendum on his own premiership. Such is 'the propensity of European integration to turn into a high salience issue of British politics' (Oppermann 2008). The result has often been delay or obscurity.

This domestic unease fuels the appearance of Britain as 'an awkward partner' in the EU (George 1998). This characterization certainly matches the view commonly held by the British people of the European integration process, one that has largely been left to fester by a political elite unwilling to promote the advantages of integration. In their place a largely hostile media has highlighted the weaknesses of the EU and the costs it places upon Britain, and played up the national stereotypes of other member states. In doing so, the media has deepened the degree of this British Euro-scepticism. Britain, it has been argued, has rarely felt comfortable in EU institutions because its late membership ensured that the rules and ethos of integration had already been set. The view from Britain has therefore too often been portrayed as one of successive governments struggling to gain benefits from EU membership. This could be in the form of Harold Wilson 'renegotiating' Britain's membership before the 1975 referendum, Mrs Thatcher 'handbagging' her way to securing a British budgetary rebate, John Major working to ensure that Britain's brand of market economics and international competitiveness was not weakened by the EU's social laws or Tony Blair's 'red lines' in drawing up the European constitution. Too often Britain has been portrayed at home as at loggerheads with the EU.

This is not to say that scepticism of European integration is confined to the UK; the rejections of the EU Constitution by France and the Netherlands showed that Britain should not be considered *the* 'awkward partner' but perhaps a member of an 'awkward squad' (Bache and Jordan 2006: 10). Nevertheless, with the exception of the Liberal Democrats and regional parties such as the Scottish National Party, the political parties have failed to persuade the public of the benefits of the EU. Stephen George noted that 'not even the Health Government made any real effort to convert the British people to Europeanization' (George 1998: 275). What is perhaps frustrating about this situation is that, as we noted above, the mechanics of British government work well with the EU with British politicians and policymakers willingly advancing policy areas such as foreign and defence cooperation. Their unwillingness has been limited to communicating this to the British people. As David Allen noted of New Labour 'a Europeanized government has been forced to cut its cloth to suit a non-Europeanized polity' (Allen 2005: 130). Such an approach has not been consciously set down by successive governments, but is the outcome of a 'strong institutional logic, permeating the political system, economic markets, and public administration' (Bulmer 1992).

Therefore, the idea that the EU should further develop some form of autonomous foreign and defence capability or a mutual defence clause provokes the wrath of the media, disquiet in government and a political opportunity for opposition parties keen to take advantage of British Euro-scepticism. This was evidenced during recent Parliamentary debates about the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty where concerns were raised about the negative impact the treaty would have on the UK's position in international institutions such as the UN Security Council. It is either forgotten, ignored or genuinely unknown to many that Britain has been involved in European cooperation over foreign policy for some thirty years and is now constructively and actively engaged in building some form of EU defence capability. This scepticism contrasts with the more positive view afforded to developments such as globalization, relations with the USA or Britain's continuing role on the world political and economic stage. International investment and sovereign wealth funds were not widely viewed, at least before the credit crash of 2008, as dangerous external influences. Instead, discussion about losing 'national sovereignty' is more often associated with Europe than globalization or relations with the USA.

Beyond New Labour

Tony Blair's approach to Europe has received mixed reviews. Julie Smith (2005) summed it up as a series of 'missed opportunities' while former European Commissioner Peter Sutherland (2008) lamented how Blair did not go as far as many would have hoped, largely reflecting business as usual in Britain's approach. At the same time, the Blair premiership can be seen as one of the most pro-European since Edward Heath succeeded in taking Britain into Europe. To realize this one only need compare Blair's European engagement with the European difficulties John Major faced before 1997 and the stormy waters Gordon Brown had to navigate with the Treaty of Lisbon, the international financial crisis and Labour's collapsing opinion poll ratings as Britain approached a general election.

The 2008 National Security Strategy perhaps encapsulates the challenges the current British government faces in determining the future of British foreign policy and the UK's relations with the EU. Heralded as a break from the more personalized foreign policy of the Blair years, the strategy took several months to draft and was finally published only after protracted negotiations within government. For the PM, it was an attempt to grapple with the need for the UK to act coherently externally and internally. As the strategy noted, 'the complex interdependence of the threats, risks and drives of insecurity, in an increasingly interconnected world, is in itself a powerful argument for a single overarching strategy for national security' (NSS 2008: 24). The document did succeed in demonstrating the full range of dangers and demands that the UK faced – and how the domestic and the foreign could not be seen as separate – but, in doing so, the 61-page document turned out to be overly long and difficult to digest (Hennessy 2008). In short, it lacked any prioritization, particularly on the issue of relations with the EU and the USA, where the document said little other than offering the

usual platitudes about the importance of both relationships. Its relevance has been further thrown into question given the spiralling economic problems that have brought increasing pressure on defence spending and the need for a re-evaluation of the role Britain can afford to play in the world; painful debates that some might prefer to avoid in the run-up to a general election.

With New Labour's poll rating reaching record lows and an impending general election, questions were raised about how a Conservative or coalition government would approach foreign policy and, particularly, the issue of European cooperation in foreign and defence policy. That even the Liberal Democrats had difficulties over the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon – due to the electoral danger that lay in appearing to be too pro-European and not granting the British people a referendum – demonstrated Britain's continued ambivalence about its role in the EU. The Conservative Party remains weary with the EU, in part because the issue remains a 'ticking time bomb' within the party as Foreign Secretary William Hague once admitted. Further, formal progress on EU defence and foreign policy is thus highly unlikely to figure as a significant commitment of the Coalition installed at the general election of 2010. This is not to say, however, that Britain will not continue its long-standing approach of quietly building up the processes and institutions of EU foreign and defence policy, especially if financial and global political pressures make them increasingly necessary.

Europeanization theory and British foreign policy

This book seeks to understand how national foreign policies in the EU can shape and disrupt common EU positions. At the same time it asks how these national foreign policies are becoming 'Europeanized' into more convergent, coordinated policies. At its simplest this process comes about through 'uploading' or 'downloading'. As Wong and Hill note, this is often a bidirectional process that leads to negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels. In the case of the UK we need to remember that we are dealing with one of the most powerful and influential Member States with distinct global interests. Through sheer size and experience we would expect that, at the least, the UK will manage to balance any downloading with an uploading of some policy preferences. After all, without the UK the EU would struggle to have an effective foreign and defence policy. It is Britain's 'ace of spades' in European integration, where the UK is able actively to shape the direction of any Europeanization. As we have seen, through its EU efforts, the UK has ensured the centrality of the transatlantic alliance, the intergovernmental nature of a CFSP driven forward by the large powers and a continued focus on improving capabilities and operational effectiveness through ESDP. We shall here briefly explore Europeanization theory in terms of these three priorities.

The importance of the transatlantic link to UK foreign policy remains in place, but it is increasingly balanced by Europe. In European defence, the UK has continued to work towards ensuring that NATO, and the link with the USA,

remains a central concern. At the same time, however, the EU has become the primary source of consultation and point of departure in Britain's dealing with the rest of the world. The broadening links between the UK and the rest of the EU have moved beyond bilateralism, thereby offering new opportunities and mechanisms through which Britain can pursue its links with the USA and its broader foreign policy aims. CFSP, for the UK, need not be played as a 'zero sum game' (Forster 2000).

Maintaining the intergovernmental nature of CFSP/ESDP has been another key British preference. British political debate is very uneasy with the idea of any 'top down' Europeanization if this means following perceived directions from the supranational institutions in Brussels. At the same time the UK has, as with the European Constitution and QMV in CFSP, accepted that a more integrated approach is necessary in limited circumstances. Here we must appreciate that the imagery of British involvement can sometimes be just as important as the reality. The starting point for Europeanization in foreign policy has, as Ginsberg notes, been the 'process by which CFSP, and EPC before it, moved closer to EC norms, policies and habits without the EPC/CFSP becoming supranationalised' (Ginsberg 2001: 37). Such advances as have been made have essentially been at the behest of the major players involved who are able to control the extent, sequences and pace of the uploading dimension to Europeanization. The Anglo-French St Malo declaration that launched ESDP was an example of this phenomenon, representing an uploading of British and French foreign policy concerns. One of its key aims was further to engage Germany on foreign and defence issues by using the EU framework to 'cross-load' foreign policy concerns (see below).

A key UK aim at St Malo was to improve the EU's capabilities to project itself abroad. Once again we can see the contradictory tendencies in UK foreign policy. While special efforts are made to create a 'step change' in Britain's working relations with the EU, there is a degree of unwillingness to be bound by the commitments or realize a shared strategic outlook. More fundamentally, there might be a domestic political problem in admitting to the degree of Europeanization. This desire for greater capabilities, however, is also the product of international pressures from the USA, the Commonwealth, the UN and other external third parties. They have increasingly looked, at times with a degree of frustration, for an EU that can carry its weight in the world. This is reinforced through pressure on the Member States themselves; indeed such pressure from the USA helped take Britain into the EU in the first place. These outside pressures are at times contradictory, however, with the USA sometimes expressing concerns over the EU's development as a strategic competitor to NATO.

It might also be helpful to apply three other ideas of what Europeanization is. First, with the CFSP and ESDP still largely intergovernmental we should also think of any Europeanization as being brought about through 'cross-loading' of new concepts and policies between states. Such transfers may involve the EU, without being directly caused by it, with the EU providing the arena for interstate communication. This might also be understood as 'policy transfer' as we saw above with St Malo and efforts to bring about change to German defence policy.

Second, the EU is also a form of 'lodestar': a reference point for actors at both the national and international level that cannot be ignored. As the EU's powers have grown, national and international actors have adjusted their expectations and activities, dealing with Brussels or national capitals as seems appropriate. Brussels is clearly far more than just a lodestar when it comes to international trade negotiations. But in foreign and defence policy, Member States remain the centre of attention, particularly those with the capabilities and record of the United Kingdom. In the long run, the question is whether EU foreign policy will become a lodestar not just for Member States to look towards, but also for others such as those in Moscow, Washington, the UN, or in organizations such as Amnesty International to take into account.

Finally, Europeanization can be offered, as Bache and Jordan term it, as 'a discursive frame of reference for national actors' (2006: 22). In short, the pressure for change 'coming down' from the EU should not be treated as an objectively defined reality. Instead, it is a discursively constructed constraint behind which domestic actors can hide their real intentions. Through invoking 'Europe', national politicians and policymakers legitimize financially costly and politically controversial measures such as labour market reform or steps taken towards the EU working together on common foreign and security problems. For Eurosceptics, invoking 'Europe' is an excuse that hides the real intentions of policymakers who are using 'Europe' to legitimize politically controversial measures that need not be taken and that only serve to surrender Britain's sovereignty, abdicate her role in the world and succumb to a decline hastened by EU membership. While such an analysis is a cynical interpretation of developments, it should remind us of how 'Europeanization' is not always received or viewed as a favourable development.

Conclusion

Britain's preoccupation with maintaining its role at the top table of international relations, together with the path dependence of events in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, might lead many to believe that the UK will continue to prioritize its 'special relationship' with the USA over its relationship with the EU. But this only serves to further obscure the UK's contribution to the EU's foreign and defence capabilities. While this contribution is arguably less than might be desired in some places, it is more than might be credited in domestic debate. Here lies one of the tensions in UK-EU relations: the misalignment between the domestic debate on Europeanization of British foreign and defence policy and the developments in the institutions and operationalization of those policy areas. Acknowledgments of the progress made remain elusive at the highest levels of British politics, as evidenced by Gordon Brown's declaration on his first trip as prime minister to the USA where he recognized the USA as Britain's most important bilateral partner; neatly avoiding the relationship the UK has with the rest of the EU which long ago moved beyond the realms of bilateral relations.

Below the political rhetoric, efforts have been made to improve the links

between the core executive and the EU's foreign and defence policy machinery. Links at a range of levels have changed some of the internal arrangements of British government, albeit not radically, thus contributing to a growing coordination reflex towards the EU. The underlying drivers have been the UK's own need to see an improvement in the EU's capabilities combined with international pressures. Change has been achieved by the UK uploading and cross-loading certain policy initiatives.

Tension remains, however, as to whether the UK will come to accept further Europeanization. The UK is apprehensive about the EU becoming some form of lodestar to which allies and international organizations turn while ignoring Member States themselves. This may seem implausible for a Member State that, along with France and Germany, drives forward and largely defines the EU's foreign and defence policies. It must not be overlooked, however, that the ever-present spectre haunting British decision makers is that of the country's former independent greatness, maintained in the last century by standing shoulder to shoulder with American presidents.

Notes

- 1 According to French, British and EU officials closely involved with European defence planning at the time, Blair's announcement at Portschäch came as a complete surprise both to EU officials in Brussels, senior officials in other EU Member States and the US administration. (Aktipis 2007: 70).
- 2 The European Defence Agency (EDA) proposal was formally approved by the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 outside of the context of the Constitutional Treaty discussions. The compromise proposal for the establishment of an EU Operational Headquarters was likewise adopted by the European Council outside of the formal Treaty process in December 2003. Furthermore, the battle group initiative was taken forward by the British and French governments outside of the Treaty ratification process and approved by the European Council in February 2004. Finally, a mutual solidarity clause – in the spirit of the solidarity clause laid down in Article 42 of the draft Treaty was adopted by the European Council in March 2004 following the terrorist bombings in Madrid (Blitz and Dempsey 2004; Dempsey 2004; EU-ISS 2005).
- 3 The term 'core executive' refers to all those organizations and procedures which coordinate British central government, and act as final arbiters of conflict between parts of the government machine. The term has emerged as a replacement for the terms 'cabinet government' or 'prime ministerial government' which have been seen as inadequate and misleading (Smith 1999).
- 4 While UKRep – the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU – is technically an agency of the FCO with a degree of autonomy rather than an independent Whitehall department, here it is considered a separate actor within the core executive.
- 5 This section draws significantly on Aktipis (2007: 198–200).
- 6 For example, Member States in the Eurozone will exclusively oversee the appointment of Europe's new Systemic Risk Board which will have oversight powers that will include the City of London.

6 Denmark

A committed member – with opt-outs!¹

Henrik Larsen

Denmark is, in many accounts, presented as a member state with serious reservations in relation to European foreign policy due to a sceptical view towards political integration in Europe (Larsen 1999). The four Danish exemptions, including one in the field of defence, are seen as central markers of a distant and sceptical attitude. It is the main argument of this chapter that this does not mean that Denmark is an outlier in most areas of European foreign policy. The dominant Danish understanding is that the EU is a central framework for the country's foreign policy, and Denmark has supported the organizational strengthening of the EU foreign policy framework at the intergovernmental conferences after the Cold War. Although the defence opt-out has constrained the way Denmark has participated in the build-up of the ESDP, Copenhagen has supported the development of the EU as an actor in the field of security, albeit in a low-key manner. The degree of Europeanization of Danish foreign policy varies across policy areas, but the EU is undoubtedly the most important multilateral forum for Danish foreign policy

Europe in Danish foreign policy

The dominant understanding of the EC/EU in Denmark has been an instrumental one, presenting the EC/EU in terms of the concrete interests it could fulfil for the country (Østergaard 2000). The development of Europe was primarily legitimized by its perceived utility for Denmark. Europe has been presented in non-mythical terms – the development of 'Europe' was not seen as something natural and organic, and certainly not something that Denmark was naturally a part of. Some analysts have seen this understanding as based on a feeling of indifference towards Europe (Hedetoft 1995: 254) whereas others identify a Danish hostility to Europe linked to fear of Germans and Germany (Hansen 2002: 54–5). Only a few Danish political actors have since 1945 argued for 'Europe' primarily in cultural terms. Even political actors who may be inclined to draw on arguments of a cultural kind, have found themselves constrained to arguing along instrumental lines. The main question in the traditional Danish debate on Europe has not been what Denmark should do in the EU given the possibilities for taking part in shaping a European project, but whether alleged instrumental advantages have significantly affected

national sovereignty (Larsen 1999: 456). Political differences have been played out within this understanding.

At a deeper level it can be argued that the reticence towards Europe and fear of abrogating sovereignty lies in the particular Danish construction of the relationship between the state, the nation and the people. The core of the nation is the 'people'. The dominant Danish discourse strongly links the state and the nation politically so that the state is seen as acting on behalf of the nation. At the same time the nation is also attributed strong cultural and ethnic features which go together with a high degree of overlap between state, nation and society (Østergaard 2000). The Danish state has since 1945 been seen as inherently a welfare state. A central reason why European integration has been seen as a threat by many is that it challenges the presumed organic discursive relationship between people and (welfare) state (Hansen 2002; Larsen 1999: 460–1).

In the dominant understanding of Danish foreign policy during the Cold War the former was seen as being based on four functionally separate cornerstones: the EC, NATO, the UN and Nordic Cooperation. The EC was about 'market' policy, NATO about security, the UN about promoting universal values and development. Nordic cooperation was a strong identity base for Denmark, where values and the global foreign policy issues were discussed. The point was that each cornerstone fulfilled particular functions and could not be merged with one another (Larsen 2000a; Hækkerup 1965).

Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of the EU in Danish foreign policy has grown. In the post-Cold War period the functions of these cornerstones have increasingly been understood as coming together in the EU (Heurlin 1996; Larsen 2005). The instrumental language is still dominant. But the dominant discourse also articulates the EU as a 'project of peace' and comes closer to a cultural and mythical description of Europe (Larsen 2000a). The Danish Prime Minister in the period 2001–2009 Anders Fogh Rasmussen called the EU 'the greatest peace-keeping project in world history' (Rasmussen 2007).

The transatlantic link with the US and NATO, however, also remains important (Larsen 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2005). The way in which the dominant discourse reads the stronger post-Cold War role for the EU *and* the continued importance of the US is as interlinked parts of an all-embracing, European-Atlantic structure (Heurlin 2001: 48). However, the dominant discourse does not give equal weight to the Atlantic and the European components of this structure: while the crucial role of the Atlantic structures is stressed in relation to hard security in order to protect common values, the EU is described as 'the cornerstone of Danish foreign policy' (Petersen 2001: 13). In spite of the strong Atlantic emphasis, the role of the EU is thus, within the dominant discourse, presented in terms which suggest that the EU is the primary framework for Danish foreign policy identity. This is a considerable change from the four cornerstone understanding during the Cold War where the EU was only one of the four, with the Nordic setting, the UN and NATO just as important.

Since the coming to power of the Liberal-Conservative government in November 2001, however, the role of the US in Danish foreign and security policy

has been presented as more important (Petersen 2004, 2006; Rynning 2006; Mouritzen 2006). Yet at the same time, the dominant discourse in official documents has continued to attribute a central role to the EU in Danish foreign policy in formulations such as ‘The EU is the key to Denmark’s ability to influence the world around us’ in a 2003 government paper on priorities in Danish foreign policy (Regeringen 2003). In an article on ‘Danish Foreign Policy between the EU and the US’ on 14 August 2007, the Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller stressed that the ‘EU is our most important alliance and in by far the most cases we conduct our policies together with our partners in the EU’ (Møller 2007). Thus although the importance of the US in Danish foreign policy has clearly increased since 2001, the EU continues to be understood as ‘the key to influenc[ing] the world around us’ in official documents. The 2006 Cartoon Crisis in Danish foreign policy, for example, does not appear to have fundamentally altered the way the balance between the EU and the US is presented (Larsen 2007).

Denmark and European foreign policy²

Danish policy towards the EPC as a forum in the Cold War period was characterized by efforts to maintain the specific character of the EPC. First, the intergovernmental character had to be maintained. Second, the dividing line between the EPC and the (rest of the) Community method had to be kept in place. At the same time, Denmark was active in the field of pragmatic, administrative solutions to procedural problems within the EPC (Haagerup and Thune 1983: 110). Yet these measures were not aimed at changing the fundamental intergovernmental features of the EPC. Third, in the EPC, only the economic and political aspects of security could be discussed: military aspects could not be dealt with. On that basis there was a positive attitude towards the EPC from Danish foreign ministers and civil servants from 1973 onwards (Thune 1983: 129; Dyvig 1983).

As far as policy within the EPC was concerned, there were examples of Denmark adapting to the EPC, as in the case of the Middle East. Here Denmark went from unequivocal support for Israel to accepting the PLO as an interlocutor, and support for a two-state solution (Thune 1983; Tonra 2001). There were also examples of Denmark playing an active role, for example in relation to South Africa, or to the CSCE (Haagerup and Thune 1983: 109). Copenhagen mostly followed the EPC line in the UN General Assembly, but its voting pattern was more in line with the Nordic Neutral Group than with the EU (Strömvik 1998: 186–8).

After the Cold War there were significant changes in the Danish approach to European foreign policy cooperation, in line with the general understanding of the EU as a political actor in Europe. The basic structure in EU foreign policy was still to be intergovernmental, but politics and economics should be coordinated and the EU was now accepted as an actor in the field of security (if still not defence). The limited introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) was accepted, while the post of High Representative (as with its extended powers in the Lisbon Treaty) was strongly supported.

The Danish approach to European foreign policy cooperation after the Cold War has been based on a dominant discourse which presents cooperation in this field as being essential for Denmark. The EU is seen as an actor for European security, with the CFSP making one contribution to this. The EU helped Denmark's voice to be heard in the world and provided benefits at many levels for its foreign policy. However, within this discourse the institutional approach was still clearly intergovernmental. Unlike many of the other smaller member states, the Communitarization of European foreign policy was something that Copenhagen was strongly against. This was based on a crucial point in the discourse: states were the basic units in European foreign policy cooperation, although cooperation was essential for these same states. So although Copenhagen could agree to many of the endeavours in successive treaty revisions to make EU foreign policy cooperation more efficient, better coordinated between economics and politics and more visible and coherent at the executive level, QMV (as the normal decision-making procedure in the CFSP, in line with pillar 1) was a borderline that should not be crossed.

There has been little domestic opposition to European foreign policy in the Folketing (the Danish parliament) on a daily basis, as the majority of the political parties share the dominant discourse outlined above. Increasingly the Folketing is taking an interest in the making of EU foreign policy. However, when European foreign policy has been discussed in referenda campaigns the opposition has emphasized the restraints on Danish foreign policy and – in particular – the dangers of European defence. And the strength of this opposition contributes to the government's hesitation towards a new referendum on the defence opt-out.

The role of the defence opt-out and the balance between the EU and the US

Since 1973 Denmark had, together with Greece and Ireland, been strongly against the inclusion of military aspects of security in the EPC, as shown in its opposition to the 1981 Genscher-Colombo Plan and its lack of desire for membership of the WEU. However, after the Cold War the EU was understood as an important actor in European security, and Copenhagen supported the inclusion of all aspects of security in the Maastricht Treaty.

Denmark is now both deeply engaged in EU foreign policy and a relatively active member (Larsen 2000a). This is despite the Danish defence opt-out, which is sometimes said to prevent full Danish participation in the EU's foreign policy. This is correct insofar as the defence exemption is interpreted by Copenhagen to mean that Denmark cannot take part in the concrete implementation of EU military actions, and the planning and political discussions associated with them. So far Denmark has opted out of all of the EU's military operations and sent no troops (Macedonia, Congo, Bosnia, Chad), in spite of voicing general support for the aims of the operations.³ Copenhagen therefore usually has a very low profile in the EU Military Committee and the same is true of the EU Defence Ministers' meetings. Thus the opt-out prevents Denmark from participating in an ESDP that

is becoming more operational and based on firmer administrative and political structures. At the same time Denmark has clearly supported the inclusion of security issues on the agenda of the EU and the EU as an actor in the field of security after the Cold War – including the desirability of the development of the ESDP. A bifurcated Danish line can be detected from 1995–1996 onwards: Denmark does not take part in decisions and operations which have military implications (Larsen 2008; Græger *et al.* 2002: 99–152; Larsen 2000a, 2000b). At the same time Denmark supports the development of all aspects of the defence dimension and the ESDP (from 1999) in general political terms, including the military aspects, which are seen as useful. There is thus a distinction between what Denmark (does not) participate in and what it supports in general political terms, using a language of general support for the military part of the ESDP that is close to that of the other Atlantic-oriented members of the EU.

This tension is based on two competing discourses: the general participation has been based on a discourse of the EU as essential for Danish foreign policy and security. This is adhered to by the governments and the mainstream political parties. The exemptions, established through a referendum in 1993 on the terms of the 1992 Edinburgh Decision, are based on another discourse according to which EU foreign policy cooperation is potentially infringing on the central domains of the state; in that discourse the exemptions mark the limits of the EU's influence on Denmark. The latter discourse is adhered to by the extreme left and right, by the popular movements against the EU, and, indeed, by a substantial part of the population (Larsen 1999).

From 1995, a general support for the development of a defence dimension within the EU could be found in such official government documents as that prepared for the 1996 IGC where the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks was supported. This can be seen as a downloading of EU policy concepts in Danish foreign policy, since the defence exemption, established by referendum in 1993, did not suggest that any such support would be forthcoming. Indeed, in the period 1993–1995 there were no references to an EU defence dimension in official Danish documents. However, it is important to note that there were two Danish readings on the development of the EU defence dimension along the lines of the two discourses above. Within the terms of the dominant discourse which the governments adhered to, the EU was seen as a central actor in security, and a downloading of EU concepts with regard to a defence dimension could therefore be seen as having been promoted by this dominant understanding.

Although an EU defence dimension has become operational and based on firmer administrative and political structures since the St Malo meeting in 1998, the military part of the European Security and Defence Policy (the ESDP also contains civilian parts) still forms a relatively limited part of the foreign policy activities of the EU. Therefore the consequences of the Danish opt-out are also limited to particular areas that have to do with the military aspects of security, in particular concrete operations. The great majority of issues discussed within EU foreign policymaking are not linked to the military aspects of the ESDP. Denmark takes part in policymaking on these EU issues in the same way as other member

states, that is in the making of the approximately 100 EU declarations a year, Common Positions, Joint Actions and Common Strategies. Copenhagen has joined the EU against the US on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the setting-up of an international criminal court (ICC). According to the Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller: 'In by far the most cases, we conduct our foreign policy together with our partners in the EU' (Møller 2007). Across the range of foreign policy areas, cooperation with the EU is clearly the most important multilateral framework for Danish foreign policy in quantitative terms (Larsen 2005). There is an EU dimension in most areas, although there is also foreign policy action with other partners and other organizations, and unilateral action in some areas.

Whether policy is conducted within or outside the EU depends, to a large extent, on whether the EU has a policy in the area and the extent to which Denmark conceives of itself as an actor in this field (Larsen 2005: Chapter 10). If the EU does not have a position in a particular area, as over Iraq in 2003, it does not make sense to ask why Denmark did not side with the EU.

The Danish bilateral relationship with the US, particularly on military issues, is closer than for most other EU countries, excepting the UK. But it does not cover the same broad range of political and economic issues that is dealt with by the EU (Larsen 2005: Chapter 10). It has more of an ad hoc character than the institutionalized cooperation with the EU. There is bilateral foreign policy cooperation with the US on many issues. But in terms of the number of areas dealt with, the connections to the US and NATO across the spectrum are much less significant than to the EU (Larsen 2005: 206); the cooperation with the US is particularly strong on those hard aspects of security which have tended to dominate the international agenda after the Cold War and, in particular, after 11 September 2001 (Iraq, Afghanistan).

EU influence across the foreign policy spectrum

The following section assesses the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy across the foreign policy spectrum. On the basis of the results of the analysis in Larsen (2005), the main assumption is that two elements are particularly important for the question of the uploading and downloading of concepts between Danish and European foreign policy: first, the construction of Danish agency in a policy area and, second, the strength of the area in EU foreign policy. By construction of agency is understood the issue of who the national 'we' are in a particular policy areas and what the content, qualities and aims of this 'we' are. It cannot be taken for granted that the 'we' is necessarily a narrow national 'we'. It is also possible that the national 'we' is constructed together with the EU, thus blurring the national character of the 'we' in particular areas.

The strength of the policy area is understood as its intensity and resourcefulness in relation to other areas in EU foreign policy. EU policies can be seen as falling within a continuum: at the one end, policies are resourceful, detailed, and long term (for example expressed in terms of Common Strategies, Joint Actions, Common Positions, declarations, and trade agreements of various kinds) and with

day-to-day involvement; at the other end, policies are based on few resources, only general policy statements, few CFSP instruments and little day-to-day involvement. The strength/weakness of EU foreign policy in different areas, therefore, has more than just a fluid and temporary ad hoc character. It is a dimension that, at any given moment in time, shapes and constrains national foreign policy, although it is, of course, not static.

Three modes are identified according to the fit between these two elements:⁴

- 1 If there is little Danish agency in an area and an intensive and resourceful EU policy, Danish policy will mainly be conducted within the EU. In this situation, a downloading of EU concepts into Danish foreign policy is likely.
- 2 If there is some Danish agency but EU policy is neither resourceful nor intensive, Danish policy will mainly be conducted outside the EU. In this situation we might expect a possible uploading of Danish concepts to the EU level.
- 3 There is Danish agency *and* an intensive and resourceful EU policy. In this case, Danish policy is both conducted inside and outside the EU. This makes both an uploading and a downloading of foreign policy concepts possible (but not automatic).⁵

The implication of this analytical framework is that uploading and downloading and the role of the EU in national foreign policy vary across policy areas according to the 'mode' that the actors are in.⁶ In what follows we will go through the main areas of Danish foreign policy with respect to the interaction with the EU.⁷ This will be based on a general distinction between geographical and functional areas. It is notable that most areas of Danish foreign policy now have an EU dimension.

Geographical areas

The role of EU foreign policy in Danish foreign policy is very significant with respect to Latin America, Oceania, Asia and North Africa. Danish agency has been relatively weak in these areas. Here, Danish policy has primarily been conducted within the EU as the latter provides policies which can be characterized as medium-intensive or strong within the spectrum of EU external relations. It is therefore in these areas that a downloading of EU concepts is most likely. In relation to Latin America, for example, the way Danish policy has been presented in official sources is very similar to the conceptual structures in the EU's relations with Latin America (political dialogue, trade and development). There are no equivalents to the regional structures at the bilateral level and there is a strong focus on trade promotion (Larsen 2005: 180–2).

Interestingly, in the cases of both Asia and Latin America (as of Africa, see below), the Danish Foreign Ministry published in 2007 strategies for Danish policies in these two parts of the world. In these strategies, principles for distinct Danish policies towards the two large regions are formulated (Udenrigsministeriet 2007; Regeringen 2007a). Distinct bilateral possibilities are envisaged beyond

trade promotion, although bilateral trade promotion plays a prominent role (Udenrigsministeriet 2007: 2, 11). However, the EU is clearly presented as the most important policy instrument and the central concern, particularly over Asia, is how to affect the EU's policy in these areas. The EU is, to a large extent, the focus for more general policy concerns:

Denmark does not stand alone in Asia. In a number of areas we act through the EU, for example in connection with wide-ranging foreign policy issues or in the area of trade agreements ... Where the EU takes care of Denmark's interests, the task is to ensure that Danish interests and views are presented to the best effect in the EU policy conducted

(Udenrigsministeriet 2007: 11)

The frequent association of the EU with Danish agency in these areas suggests that there is a construction of a Danish identity in conjunction *with* an EU identity in these areas even if there are also areas where 'Denmark' is presented as an actor without reference to the EU and Danish agency is presented as pre-existing.

These two official strategies construct a distinct Danish foreign policy identity more than at any time previously since the membership of the EC/EU in 1973. This expression of separate agency could be interpreted in two ways: it could be an expression of the possibilities provided by EU foreign policy cooperation which have given rise to a higher national confidence in the area. Or it could be an expression of the new 'offensive (as opposed to defensive) foreign policy', a term that was part of the post-2001 Danish government's political vocabulary (Larsen 2009a: 219–20).⁸ These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive.

Specifically about China, Denmark has long had diplomatic links with the People's Republic, as it was amongst the first countries to recognize it in 1950. Copenhagen has acted within the general EU line of critical dialogue on human rights and Tibet while attempting to integrate China politically and economically in the international system and engaging in bilateral cooperation (Brødsgaard 2000: 150–3). Denmark belongs to the states within the EU which emphasize human rights most strongly (but by no means exclusively) over strategic concerns and trade in relations with China (Brødsgaard 2000: 155). Following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Denmark was amongst the first to deliver a protest to the Chinese authorities. When, in 1990, the EU member states decided to lift sanctions, Denmark only reluctantly followed suit (Brødsgaard 2000: 149). However, Copenhagen officially broke the ice after Tiananmen Square in 1992 in line with the general upsurge in direct foreign investment in China which took place from 1992 onwards. Denmark took part in the discussions about the new general EU approach of constructive engagement post-Tiananmen Square which was first presented in the Commission's 1995 strategy. The Danish conceptual framework was undergoing change up to the launch of the EU's 'constructive engagement', possibly influenced by the developments in the EU's line. It is interesting that the visit to China by the Danish Foreign Minister in 1996 was seen by observers as marked by the spirit of the new EU-line (Brødsgaard 2000: 150).

But there may also have been elements of Danish uploading in the emphasis on critical dialogue in the EU documents.

A key example of the Danish emphasis on human rights is the episode in 1997 where Denmark as a member of the UN Human Rights Commission put forward a resolution about violations of human rights, fundamental freedoms and Tibet. Every year since 1990 the US and the EU had sponsored a resolution criticizing China's human rights violations. However, in 1997 the US was unwilling to take the initiative as it argued that this would only turn the issue into another great power confrontation. The major EU countries signalled that they would not support another resolution against China. Nonetheless, Copenhagen, encouraged by the US and supported by a number of smaller EU member states, put forward a resolution. It did not follow the major EU countries' preferences for joint EU (non) action and the EU was therefore exposed as split in this field. China reacted strongly against the Danish initiative and stressed that it would harm Danish-Chinese relations (Brødsgaard 2000: 151). Following the session the Commission stated that any steps taken against Denmark would have consequences for China's overall (trade) relationship with the EU. In the year that followed Danish exports to China fell by about 13 per cent whereas Chinese exports to Denmark went up by 5 per cent. The value of total trade actually increased (Brødsgaard 2000: 152).

The next year Denmark did not put forward a new critical resolution in the Human Rights Commission, after the heavy pressure it had come under from China had left it isolated and exposed. Copenhagen claimed that the change was due to an improved human rights situation, but 'critics claimed that Denmark had given priority to economic interests and to following the EU's policy of further engagement which was launched in 1998 rather than human rights' (Brødsgaard 2000: 152).

On the other hand Denmark has far from abandoned its human rights stances. In its 2007 strategy Denmark expresses independent agency in relation to China where the main topics are human rights (mentioned first) followed by effective multilateralism, China's peaceful engagement in regional issues, China's capacity to engage in peacekeeping, the Taiwan Strait and a negotiated solution to Tibet (Udenrigsministeriet 2007: 14). But the EU is attributed a central role in relation to the general political and security aims in the region and thus also to the fulfilment of these goals in relation to China and other major states of the region:

The EU's presence in Asia must be more marked. In recent years steps have been taken to strengthen the EU's dialogues on the security situation ... with a number of key players [such as] China, Japan ... Denmark will work towards ... further strengthening of the bilateral and EU based dialogues with important Asian players, in particular China, Japan

(Udenrigsministeriet 2007: 14)

The EU is thus presented as the other main channel of policy towards China, besides bilateral action. It is the most important multilateral framework for Denmark's policy towards China.

Relations with the European Neighbourhood, with Russia and, in particular, with North Africa are predominantly conducted through the EU with few elements of national policy over and above it. In the case of North Africa/the Mediterranean, the background for this is the weak Danish agency in this area combined with the comprehensive Barcelona Process/MEDA policy framework of the EU. In the words of a prominent MFA civil servant associated with the CFSP, Danish policy towards North Africa compared with the EU's is like 'a bicycle path compared to a six-lane motorway' (Larsen 2005: 204).

The EU is clearly the most important multilateral framework for Denmark's policy towards Russia. There is a bilateral policy, but one which is in many ways complementary to the EU's general line. The bilateral efforts are focused on the northern part of Russia, and the Baltic Sea region. Here Denmark provides aid as part of its own neighbourhood programme (different from the EU's Neighbourhood Policy). According to the Danish Foreign Ministry:

Within the framework of the neighbourhood programme Denmark, since the 1990s, has contributed significant aid to Russia, albeit considerably less in the later years. After the EU enlargement, Russia is the only country around the Baltic Sea which is not a member of the EU. Denmark and the other EU countries in the region have a foreign policy interest in contributing to constructive cooperation between the EU and Russia. Today, the Danish endeavours are particularly concentrated on a major economic development programme in Kaliningrad and the Pskov region

(Udenrigsministeriet 2008a)

Within the EU, Denmark is not a particularly active player on Russia compared with the big three, Finland or the new member states from Eastern Europe (Haukkala 2002). It does not at present receive gas from Russia, as it draws on its own resources in the North Sea. Although bilateral cooperation with Russia has increased very considerably since the Cold War, Denmark has been one of the least compromising EU countries with regard to Russia including in the field of human rights (Petersen 2004: 599). As Copenhagen has been a champion of the Baltic States and their membership of NATO, this has often led to divergences with Russia. During its EU Presidency in autumn 2002, Denmark was in charge of the negotiation of the complex issue of access to and from the Russian Kaliningrad enclave after the accession of Lithuania to the EU in 2004. The Presidency took a hard line, refusing to give in to Russian demands for a special transport corridor through Lithuania while many of the larger member states, Italy in particular, were more willing to accommodate Russia out of concern for a good relationship with Moscow (Ulveman and Lauritzen 2003: 152). The eventual solution did not grant Russia particular territorial rights in Lithuania and therefore was close to the position of the Danish Presidency. At the bilateral level, Denmark also refused a Russian request to hand over the Chechnyan leader Zakajev who was in Denmark for the Chechnyan World Conference in autumn 2002. However, faced with the threat of a Russian boycott of the EU-Russia meeting in Copenhagen

due to the Danish refusal, the Presidency moved the meeting to Brussels. In August 2008 Copenhagen was amongst the most critical EU countries in condemning the Russian invasion of Georgia and the subsequent Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The general structure of the Danish discourse on the relationship with Russia is similar to that of the EU in its emphasis on a constructive relationship and economic help to support economic and political development in selected areas. This can be seen as a case of downloading concepts used in the EU. However, the development of EU policy after the Cold War very much follows the chronological development of Danish policy, which raises the question of whether the EU has affected Copenhagen or whether Denmark has contributed to shaping the EU's policy in this field. As mentioned, Denmark's bilateral relationship with Russia after the Cold War quickly improved, and a cooperation agreement was signed in 1992. Economic support for selected regions was provided under the so-called 'Øststøtte' programme from 1992–1998 (and continued in the framework of the Neighbourhood Programme). So it is arguably less a case of the transformation of Danish attitudes than one of a general EU transformation of the approach to Russia.

There is a Danish bilateral approach to Russia, but it is conceptualized as complementary to that of the EU. Other organizations such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE are also mentioned in Danish policy documents with regard to the policy towards Russia. But the by far most frequent expression of Danish agency vis-à-vis Russia is in the context of the EU. The Danish 'we' with regard to Russia clearly also involves the EU in most general policy contexts. So far as the particular case of the Balkans is concerned, Danish policy has generally been conducted within the EU or complementary to EU policies with the exception of the UN/NATO military deployments in the area. Copenhagen was amongst the first EU countries to grant recognition to Kosovo in 2008.

Danish *policy towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict* is increasingly conducted within the EU with national policy seen as complementary to that of the EU. In the Middle East EU policy has, particularly since the second intifada (2000), become more united, strong and resourceful with fewer bilateral initiatives to confuse the picture for Solana, the presidency and the Commission acting on behalf of the EU. Denmark constructs itself as an actor in this field as the conflict is seen as central to the maintenance of international order. Thus Denmark has become engaged with the Palestinian self-governing authority through the contribution of development aid. Danish agency is, however, often coarticulated with the EU ('Denmark and the EU', 'Denmark has through the EU'). This makes for an active Danish policy within the EU and a weaker, but still identifiable, bilateral policy outside the EU. However, proposals such as *the Danish Wider Middle East Initiative* (a plan for political reform in the Arab world funded through the Danish aid budget) in 2003, which had not been discussed in the EU before its launch show that Danish bilateral policy in the area is not always strictly complementary to the EU's common approach.

The most important example of a Danish downloading of EU policy concepts in this field took place in the 1970s when the status of the PLO as a legitimate

interlocutor was accepted. Previously Denmark had not seen the PLO as an acceptable interlocutor as, together with the Netherlands and Germany, it was one of the strongest supporters of Israel (Thune 1983). Later a two-state solution was also accepted as the long-term aim of the Middle East peace process. Denmark continued to be one of the EU states that was most supportive of Israel, but on a different basis. During its 2002 Presidency Denmark put forward the so-called 'Road Map for Peace' which is still the official EU plan for the region, in the framework of the Annapolis process. The plan was prepared in Copenhagen before the start of the Danish Presidency after the US President's acceptance of a two-state solution on 24 June 2002, which was seen as providing new opportunities for peace in the Middle East. It was subsequently cleared with Berlin, London and Paris to ensure that they would not engage in competing bilateral diplomacy (Ulveman and Lauritzen 2003: Chapter 4). There are, therefore, examples of significant downloading, but also uploading in relation to the launching of the Road Map during the Danish Presidency in 2002. The Danish 'we' with regard to the Middle East also involves the EU in most general policy contexts, although there are also bilateral perspectives, particularly in aid.

As far as the *relationship with the US* is concerned, significant elements of policy are conducted with the EU. In relation to trade, Danish policy has to be conducted within the EU's CCP. In the 2003 *Priorities in Danish Foreign Policy* Danish policy towards the US on non-security issues is presented as increasingly going through the EU (Larsen 2003), so that the Danish 'we' with regard to the US is also an EU 'we'. Denmark is firmly onboard the EU ship concerning issues such as trade disputes, the environment or the ICC. Yet within the EU, Denmark does belong to the wing which attempts to further closer transatlantic cooperation. As the nature of the relationship to the US is one of the most politicized areas of European foreign policy, it is difficult to identify specific Danish influence or uploading, as the relationship with the US is an issue where most EU member states hold strong views. But a good relationship with the US is a key Danish priority – arguably replacing the aim of an Eastern enlargement which was a main concern but has now been broadly accomplished. An Eastern enlargement with as many countries as possible was a Danish key aim in the EU after the Cold War and Copenhagen was the strongest promoter of a broad enlargement. EU enlargement was the central priority of the Danish Presidency in 2002 (Friis 2002). Significantly, however, during the Presidency in 2002 Denmark also put forward a list of 39 concrete proposals for furthering EU cooperation with the US. Denmark also bases its foreign policy on a good bilateral relationship with the US compared with most EU states. Issues such as anti-missile defence, the defence of Greenland or the military aspects of the Iraq war are or were discussed directly with the US (and in the latter case with the UK and Poland) and not the EU partners.

In the Iraq case, Denmark, with the UK and Poland, positioned itself closer to the US than did the other EU countries, not only supporting the invasion of 2003 but also providing military support. Although many of the EU countries also supported the US position strongly, they did not provide military support for the invasion as Denmark did (along with Poland and the UK). Some EU countries

participated in the subsequent ‘stabilization phase’ which was mandated by the UN in May 2003. Spain and Italy provided substantial forces for this, but withdrew after changes of governments in 2004 and 2005. Yet Denmark maintained forces in southern Iraq until 2007, when the Danish government claimed that the stabilizing mission had been accomplished (a small helicopter contingent stayed with the UK forces). Only British and Polish forces stayed for longer (Larsen 2009a: 211).

Outside the northern hemisphere, Denmark’s strong agency in the field of *development* has significant geographical implications. It is the basis of a policy over and above the EU and an active policy within it with regard to particular political relations. The point of departure for the Danish political interest in Africa is the Nine Programme Countries on which Danish policy is focused (Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) plus South Africa which receives so-called transitional aid⁹. There is a general political interest in Africa for its own sake and as a means of constructing Denmark as an actor with independent aims. In the Danish Foreign Ministry’s strategy for Africa, Denmark is also presented as an actor with or through the EU in relation to general trade issues and cooperation with the African continent as a whole – where there is no bilateral equivalent. But on development issues, the UN and its special agencies are also identified as a partner or tool for Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet 2007). In Asia and, in particular, Latin America, where Denmark’s agency is weaker and where policy is, to a large extent, conducted within the EU framework, the Programme Countries (Bolivia and Nicaragua in Latin America and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Vietnam in Asia) are central foci of political interest, giving rise to policies which are not only conducted within the EU. There is also a Danish interest in former Programme Countries such as the Sudan or India. In relation to the Programme Countries there is little if any downloading of EU concepts. Denmark generally has a high profile within the EU with regard to the Programme Countries. In some of them, such as Burkina Faso, Denmark is one of the biggest EU donors and helps to define EU policy in the field (in this case together with France) – which amounts to uploading. The focus on the Programme Countries also leads to an interest in the regional setting of these countries. Discussions on the regional setting (as, for example, West Africa) often take place in the EU. In these cases one can talk about a possible downloading of EU concepts, as the EU framework gives rise to wider discussions of regions within Africa which are beyond the bilateral reach of Danish policies (Larsen 2005: Chapter 7). Some downloading of EU concepts has also taken place with regard to the regional dialogue with Africa or the Latin American continent as a whole. Although Denmark was an active supporter of the EU-Africa meetings, there had been no conceptual equivalent in Danish policy beforehand.

Functional areas

The impact of the EU on Danish foreign policy is strongest in trade, agriculture and external fishing where there is no policy outside the EU due to the legal

establishment of the Community as the international negotiator in these fields. Even in areas of trade where the EU does not have exclusive legal competence, Danish policy is conducted with the EU. In related areas with an economic dimension, Danish policy is primarily conducted through the EU in other multilateral forums, notably on environmental and general development questions. Surprisingly, substantial elements of downloading cannot be found in the field of trade. Although Denmark has to live with elements of EU external trade policy it does not favour (such as the slow reform of the CAP), this has not led to a significant internalization of substantial EU concepts over time. This can be understood on the basis of the strong Danish agency in this area historically linked to a heavy involvement in international trade. Danish views in this field are so entrenched that substantial understandings are not affected significantly by the substantial concepts of the CCP – even if Denmark has not negotiated on its own behalf outside the EU for more than 35 years! But the procedural Danish concepts surrounding the making and implementation of trade policies are EU-derived – the concepts and time frames of the trade policy decision making in the EU (‘full competence’, ‘mixed agreements’, ‘art. 133 committee’ etc.) (Larsen 2005: Chapter 9).

In the field of *human rights* there are no examples of the downloading of EU concepts. Human rights and democracy together with gender and the environment made their entry into Danish development strategies in 1987–1988 i.e. before they entered the EU’s development policies after the Cold War (Larsen 2005: 142). This chronological element points to a possible Danish contribution to EU thinking on human rights, not least within the area of development policy. Denmark was prominent in shaping the formulations about development in the TEU in 1991 and EU concepts in this field more generally, such as the central aim of fighting poverty (Olsen 1995). Conversely, the language of Danish development thinking has been affected by concepts emanating from various sources, including the UN, but there are few indications of the incorporation of concepts unique to the EU (Larsen 2005: Chapter 6).

Denmark spends about 0.85 per cent of its GNP on development aid, which ranks it as one of the most generous donor countries in the world, at the time of writing second only to Norway as the highest contributor in relative terms. Its aid has for a long time been divided equally between bilateral aid and aid given via multilateral organizations (Larsen 2005: Chapter 6). Ten per cent of the latter goes via the EU (and hence about 5 per cent of total Danish development resources). Copenhagen is strongly in favour of complementarity between national aid and Community aid and opposes any centralized control of all EU aid. But if the efficiency of Community aid, in the eyes of Copenhagen, were greater, Denmark would support a substantial increase in Community aid as a means of pushing other member states closer to the 0.7 per cent of GNP to development which is the UN goal it supports (Larsen 2005: 138–9).

In relation to *the non-military aspects of security*, the EU is the most salient operational framework for Danish policy in Europe and in many cases outside Europe, where the UN also plays a role. The Nordic member states have together

contributed significantly to shaping the concepts of the civilian parts of the ESDP (Jakobsen 2009; Græger *et al.* 2002). This is then, a case of the uploading of Danish policy concepts to the EU level, although it is difficult to identify the specific Danish imprint due to the considerable overlap between the policies of the Nordic member states and, to some extent, the Netherlands in this area. However, the police element of the ESDP can be traced back to a Danish-Dutch proposal from 1999 (Larsen 2000b). It should be added that the active Danish role in this field also has a compensatory character due to the restrictions imposed by the defence exemption. The role of the EU, however, is weak compared with NATO in relation to the military aspects of security and peace supporting operations, in particular, although it has taken on a more concrete form since 2003. Danish policy is not conducted via the EU because of the Danish defence exemption. Denmark's international military engagement is through the UN, NATO or bilaterally with the US, as in Iraq.

In relation to *Danish policy within international organizations*, the EU is often the primary framework of coordination for Danish participation. The more economic and trade-related the organization, the more important is the EU in Danish foreign policy (with the WTO as the strongest example due to the exclusive competence of the Community in most fields of trade). It is also the case in relation to UN summits on environmental issues, the link between trade and development, and in more political contexts. Danish policy within the UN General Assembly (Strömvik 1998), the UN Human Rights Council and the OSCE is primarily coordinated within the EU. Nordic cooperation plays a minor role, although there are still many informal contacts. When Denmark articulates itself as an actor in these contexts, the strength of the EU framework makes for an active Danish policy *within* the EU, but sometimes also outside. For example, in the UN's specialized development forums where Danish agency is strong and Community policy is not so prominent, there is little in the way of uploading EU concepts. In the policy towards international organizations there is thus both uploading and downloading, depending on the area. An important exception to this is Danish policy within NATO where the EU does not have a coordinated line (and Denmark would, in any case, be exempted from EU stances).

A particularly important issue in Danish foreign policy was the January-March 2006 Cartoon Crisis. The Cartoon Crisis had its roots in the publication on 30 September 2005 of 12 cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in the Danish broadsheet Daily Newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. From the end of January, when the Danish government started to see the situation as a crisis, it attempted to stop the political and economic threats to Denmark in two ways: first of all, by making verbal concessions to Muslim concerns and entering into dialogue with the governments of Islamic states. Second, by seeking political support from the US and the EU, the EU providing immediate support on the consequences of the crisis economically and politically in spite of significant differences between the member states on the principles of the crisis. The Commission stated that an embargo against Danish goods would be considered an embargo against the EU. Concern over threats to Danish (and other) citizens was expressed at the General

Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting on 30 January 2006 followed by condemnation of the burning of the Danish (and other) missions, as in Syria and the Lebanon. Many EU countries offered consular assistance to Danish citizens in countries where the Danish Foreign Service ran into difficulties during the crisis. Moreover, one month after the outbreak of the crisis the EU expressed support for Denmark on the principle at stake in the crisis, namely freedom of expression over respect for religion. In a declaration issued by the GAERC on 27 February 2006 the emphasis was more strongly on freedom of expression. The support went further than the lowest common EU denominator as it appeared at the onset of the crisis: in the declaration from the first GAERC meeting on 30 January 2006 the Union did not express any view as to the right balance between freedom of expression and respect for religion, as there were considerable differences between the member states on this issue (Larsen 2007). The Danish government's general evaluation after the crisis was that both the US and the EU had been essential in stabilizing the situation (Larsen 2009a: 222). With respect to the specific evaluation of the role of the EU for Denmark during the crisis foreign minister Per Stig Møller stated in a speech on 7 April 2006 that:

in what was probably the most serious foreign policy crisis for Denmark since the Second World War, the entire toolbox of the EU was put to use. ... The crucial show of support from the 24 other Member States constituted a lot more than just ... 'A little help from my friends'. It demonstrated to the Muslim world that freedom of expression weighed up against religious beliefs was not just a Danish issue, but a common European concern
(quoted in Larsen 2009a: 222)

Official Danish evaluations of the role of the US have been shorter and more general (Larsen 2009a: 222). In analytical terms it is very difficult to judge whether the support from the EU or the US was the more important in bringing an end to the crisis, in terms of lowering tensions and reducing the threats to Danish citizens and economic interests (Larsen 2007).

Concluding remarks

EU foreign policy has become a key dimension of Danish foreign policy. It is the most functional multilateral forum for Danish foreign policy in most policy areas, if not always the only one. There are two important exceptions to this: on development issues, the UN is the key framework, and on the defence issues NATO is central. As we have seen, with regard to the military aspects of the ESDP, Denmark does not take part due to its defence exemption, and its international engagements in the military field take place in the UN and NATO. However, Denmark is generally supportive of the ESDP process, as the dominant view is that the EU is a useful actor in the field of military security.

The contexts in which the bilateral perspective trumps that of the EU are few. The main contexts in which this is the case are those of practical development

policy, the relationship with the Programme Countries, and the relationship with the US on certain aspects of security policy, including Greenland. With regard to areas such as China, the Middle East, Russia and even the US the EU dimension is central for day-to-day policy. There are expressions of independent Danish agency in these areas. But Danish agency here is frequently formulated with the EU in the form of 'Denmark and the EU' or 'Denmark through the EU' in official Danish documents (and less frequently in terms of cooperation with other actors). In this sense Danish foreign policy identity is constructed jointly with other EU members. In these areas substantial concepts in Danish foreign policy are close to the dominant EU discourse. In some cases this can be interpreted as downloading, but often it is as much a case of the EU as a whole adapting to changes within a broad common framework of meaning.

If Europeanization is seen as national downloading of policies and concepts from the EU level, the picture in Danish foreign policy across the foreign policy spectrum is mixed. In most policy areas there are signs of downloading. But EU policies and concepts rarely provide the full picture. There are a few, but important areas, where virtually no Europeanization is evident. A central area is the field of development where the influence of the EU on basic Danish policy concepts is very limited. In this field there has been an uploading of Danish development concepts to the EU.

Closely related to this, there is limited downloading of EU concepts in relation to the policy towards the Danish Programme Countries or other countries which receive Danish aid many of which are in Africa. This is also the main field where Denmark has contributed to EU policy.

If the four cornerstone discourse which dominated Danish foreign policy during the Cold War was ever reflected in policy practices, this is certainly not an appropriate description of Danish foreign policy today, when we scan the full policy spectrum. The EU is closely interwoven with Danish foreign policy in most non-military policy areas. Other forums do not have the same independent institutional status, and bilateral action is often the most common alternative to EU action. In this sense Denmark can be characterized as a committed participant in EU foreign policy. The Danish defence exemption restricts Danish participation in the military parts of the ESDP. But the dominant discourse attributes a central role to the EU in most areas of Danish foreign policy. The role of the EU in Danish foreign policy has thus increased very significantly compared with the Cold War period. From being one out of four cornerstones, it is now 'the key to Denmark's ability to influence the world around us' (Regeringen 2003).

Notes

- 1 Generally throughout the chapter, quotes from official documents are from the official English version when one exists. Otherwise the quotes are translated by the author. The references indicate whether the document quoted is in English or in Danish.
- 2 This section is based on Larsen (2000a).

- 3 Since 1996 when the Danish defence exemption was first invoked, Denmark has opted out of EU decisions on 17 occasions.
- 4 The last mode, no construction of agency, no strong EU policy, is likely to lead to little policy altogether.
- 5 The framework does not look at 'crossloading' from other member states.
- 6 A general framework for analysing the national foreign policies of EU member states is presented in Larsen (2009b).
- 7 This is, to a large extent, based on the analysis of the seven policy areas in Larsen (2005) and the implications drawn from this (Larsen 2005: Chapter 10).
- 8 After November 2001 the Danish government frequently used the term 'en offensiv udenrigspolitik'. Part of the reason for the use of the term 'offensive' foreign policy was that the previous governments after the Cold War had used the terms 'active' foreign policy or 'active internationalism'. The use of a new term served to signal a break with the former governments.
- 9 Danish development aid has for a long time been focused on the limited number of so-called Programme Countries, which benefit most, rather than being spread evenly amongst all the potential recipients. At present the total number of countries that receive Programme aid is 13. The choice of countries to focus on is based on the level of poverty of the country together with the potential for a democratic development.

7 Greece

From special case to limited Europeanization

Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis¹

Introduction

Greece is often seen as a special case in the European Union because of its history, geography and culture, which all provide for ‘a very fragile security environment’ (Kavakas 2000: 144). Its foreign policy does not escape from such a context either. Moreover, it has been argued that it ‘hardly conforms to any known models of making foreign policy. It is an idiosyncratic model peculiar to Greece’s political, cultural and historic environment’ (Ioakimidis 1999a: 141).

From the first few years of Greek membership within the EPC (European Political Cooperation) during the early 1980s, to the violent collapse of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, Greece came to be described either as a ‘footnote’ state, with an ‘asterisk’-approach to common European policies in the years 1981–1985,² or as an ‘irrational’ state during the period 1990–1995 (Ioakimidis 1999a: 140). Greece stuck to long-held national positions at the expense of Community solidarity (Nuttall 1992: 28), often due to an emotional and incomprehensible support of rather unsavoury regimes, such as the ‘Unholy Alliance’ with Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic (Michas 2002), or the pursuit of confrontational politics towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Tziampiris 2000a: 414–5). Although it is true that Greece did not help European coherence, it is also true that it was not the main cause of the lack of cohesion, especially at the United Nations (Stavridis and Pruett 1996). That is to say there have been plenty of other states, especially the ‘big ones’, that have impeded cohesion. But this chapter deals with Greece. Moreover, to be isolated does not imply by definition that one’s view does not have *any* good arguments, especially when many of Greece’s preoccupations (for instance Turkey’s aggressive policy³) have never fully been dealt with satisfactorily. As it has been observed, Europe has shown an inexcusable inability, or even unwillingness, to comprehend Greece’s security concerns, interests and anxieties (Ioakimidis 2000: 360–1).

However, the orthodox view of Greek foreign policy (Economides 2005; Ioakimidis 2001) contends that a ‘completed process of Europeanization, both in form and in substance has occurred’. It argues that, as a result of a forceful transposition of national interests onto the European agenda, Greece now deals with its main national concerns (*ethnika themata*) through a multilateral and denationalized process. Such an approach also claims that it is the conscious and systematic efforts

of Greek political leaders that have produced such a result, and in particular those of Costas Simitis and George Papandreou (respectively Prime Minister 1995–2004, and Foreign Minister 1999–2004). Other factors have also contributed, such as the economic benefits that Greece has drawn from the EU, the dissolution of the Soviet empire, which eliminated any prospect of Greece building up close relationships outside the West, the ambition to become an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member, and the prospective enlargement to Eastern European countries (Ioakimidis 2000: 368–9). As Andreas Kazamias notices, Simitis’ Europeanism was so crude and uncritical that the European Union was perceived as a solution to problems that clearly fell outside the scope of its capabilities (Kazamias 1997: 79). Some even argue that such a development represents in fact a re-Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, as such a process had already begun with the country’s efforts to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s. Only the stridently anti-European policy of Socialist leader and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou had actually broken with that tradition, and indeed only for a short period, that is to say particularly during the first Papandreou government (1981–1985).⁴ The Greek government’s choice to differ from its Western allies had given some of EC member states an excuse to display their unwillingness to support European Community (EC) involvement in the Cyprus dispute (Stefanou and Tsardanidis 1991: 224). From 1985, however, the Socialist government accepted the Single European Act (SEA), showed itself in favour of strengthening the role of the European Parliament (EP), and gradually became a champion of the CFSP (Tsakaloyannis 1996: 192). Europe, rather than being an obstacle to the ‘just’ solution of the problems in the Aegean and Cyprus, has now become the basic mechanism of Greek foreign policy (Moschonas 2001: 13).

Nonetheless, others argue that the very importance of personalities confirms that the process has not yet been Europeanized, because it highlights the absence of an institutionalized collective decision-making process. This ‘absence’ does not refer of course to formal constitutionally or legally defined structures for making policy, which makes the situation even worse (Ioakimidis 1999a: 142; see also pp. 149–54 for specific examples for the period 1974–1999). Thus, the positive roles of individuals as reformers, or their negative roles as populists, are of great importance.

In the field of foreign policy, the European integration process allows small states to refocus their foreign policy priorities. It seems that there is a consensus among scholars ‘that small states generally favor the adaptation of a strictly rule-based European foreign policy’ (Sepos 2008: 121). According to Laurent Goetschel, European integration aggravates the dilemma which small states face: choosing between abandoning autonomy (which would lead to more dependency) and preserving it (which would increase the risk of abandonment) (Goetschel 1998: 26). This chapter disputes the basis of this dilemma, and argues that, as the Greek case proves, a relatively small member state of the EU can exert influence without risking any isolation by its partners.

In a previous piece we argued that, contrary to the dominant view in the existing literature, it was not possible to claim that Greek foreign policy had really become

Europeanized, for the following reasons: although some Europeanization had taken place, what really matters is that it mainly amounted to a formal process and not a substantive one; that 'national issues' continued to dominate Greece's foreign policy agenda; and that obstructing the emergence of a consensual EU stance in the CFSP made it difficult to talk of a Europeanization process. This was particularly true over the questions of Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans, the last best epitomized by the so-called 'Macedonian Question' (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005).⁵

At that time, we also stressed how important it was to engage in more empirically-based analysis. Since then, there has been surprisingly little work on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, even though there has been a proliferation of specific case-studies, mainly as part of doctoral theses.⁶ Thus, the current chapter will take a more empirically-based approach, focusing on a number of specific examples in order to examine further the findings of our earlier work. This follows the editors' (Wong and Hill in this volume) conceptualization of the Europeanization process as one of successive or simultaneous 'downloading', 'up-loading', and 'cross-loading', which fits well with the three 'dimensions' approach in our 2005 piece.

Downloading

The traditional approach to Europeanization has to do with the impact of membership on national policies, including foreign affairs. One can associate downloading with two different types of foreign policy issues.

First, during the early years of EC membership, there were issues on which Athens had conducted a policy of differentiation from the general EPC stances. It then began to pursue a slow but stable process of downloading after 1985. The result is that today Greece deals with some issues exclusively through the Union. Mostly they relate to the Middle East conflict, the Balkans and relations with Turkey, because Athens came to consider it more fruitful to pursue those interests through the EU framework.

Second, there are issues for which, prior to EC membership, Greece did not have a clear policy, and was obliged to develop one because of accession. Those issues refer mainly to EC/EU relations with southern Mediterranean countries, Asia, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and Latin America.

The Middle East conflict

Greece has traditionally had a pro-Arab policy, especially over the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Although it is true that the EEC/EU stance since the Venice Declaration of 1980 has always been more critical of Israel than has US foreign policy, the Europeans have always tried to present a balanced approach to the conflict. In order to do so, most EU states have had good relations with the state of Israel. There were two clear exceptions: Greece and Spain. But, whereas Spain established diplomatic relations with Israel as soon as it joined the EEC in 1986,

Greece did not do the same when it joined the EEC in 1981. It only recognized Israel *de jure* in 1990, almost ten years after becoming a full member state.

When the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came to power in October 1981, Greece's sympathy for the Palestinians became much more pronounced. It granted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) a diplomatic status equal to that maintained by Israel in Athens; it developed strong ties with 'radical' Arab states, such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria; and it declared its full support for the Palestinian cause, treating Yassir Arafat with excessive warmth, making it clear that it would use Greece's membership to press EPC to adopt a more pro-Arab position. PASOK hoped to make inroads in the Arab states in order to win their support on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, as well as to attract Arab investments into Greece (Ioannides 1991: 145).

Yet the new Socialist government very soon realized, as Panayotis Tsakaloyannis points out, that 'the Greek policy in the region could have more leverage and carry more weight with the Arabs if Athens played its full role inside the political machinery of the EC, instead of just going it alone' (Tsakaloyannis 1984: 114). In the early 1990s it became clear that it was in Greece's interest to normalize its relations with Israel in order first to harmonize its Middle East policy with the EC and second to improve its relations with the powerful Israeli lobby in the US. The *de jure* recognition of Israel took place in 1990 under the newly elected conservative government of New Democracy, although the previous government of PASOK had decided in 1987 to recognize Israel (Athanasopoulou 2003: 111). Therefore, PASOK's new government position on the Arab-Israeli conflict after taking office again in 1993 was not in substance that different from that of the previous conservative governments or from positions held by some other member states such as France, Italy and Spain (Coulombis 1993: 121).

Since 1990, Greek-Israeli relations have been characterized by a substantial improvement on all fronts. The volume of bilateral trade has expanded enormously and the two countries have signed numerous agreements, including a military concordat in 1994. This new policy permeated attitudes in Athens even to the point of an attempt to mediate between the two parties by organizing a series of meetings between senior Israeli and Palestinian politicians, academics and journalists in the so-called 'Athens dialogue' (Agnatopoulos 2007: 361).

It is thus possible to argue that EU membership has led to a fundamental shift in Greek foreign policy on the Middle East. On the other hand it could also be argued that Greek membership has equally facilitated the emergence of a more evenly balanced EU policy, thanks in part to Greece's continued good relations with Arab states.

The Balkans

The change of government in 1981 led to a significant development in Greece's Balkans policy. For the first time, Greece accepted the old Romanian proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans. Indeed, it engaged in active

diplomatic action in order to promote it. NATO and most other EC member states considered the Greek initiative to be an activity that undermined Western policy towards the Balkan Peninsula (Iatrides 1992: 141). However, the nuclear-free zone proposal quickly lost its impetus due to Turkey's constant opposition, Yugoslavia's objections, a weakening in trans-Balkan cooperation (with a turn towards low politics), and – not least – Greece's increasingly pro-European stance after 1985 (Tsardanidis and Alifantis 1988: 301–5).

It was, however, the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, and the Declaration of Independence made by the Federal Republic of Macedonia on 8 September 1991 that created a new situation for Greece. For the first time since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949, the country found itself faced with the prospect of instability in the Balkans, at a time when it still had serious problems with Turkey. Up to 1995, Greek foreign policy had attempted (as we will see below) to deal with this problem by transferring the question of FYROM's recognition to the EU context.

Greek policy toward the Balkans since 1995 can be summed up as trying to avoid becoming a part of the problem, and joining instead those who wished to be part of the solution. This change of policy was due to many factors, the most important of which were:

- First, the realization that, in order to avoid the isolation of the first five years of the post-Cold War, due mainly to its Balkan policy (Constas and Papatotiriou 1999: 230; Ioakimidis 1999b: 175), Greece should develop the deepening and widening of its ties with NATO and the European Union. The consequences of the previous policy had been serious for Greece. The country's credibility had suffered both in the EU and with the United States. A great deal of political capital had been lost in pursuit of conflicting objectives in the Macedonian Question. This, in turn, had led Greece's critics to allege that it was pursuing revisionist objectives in the region, which was unfortunate at a time when the main objective of Greek foreign policy was to achieve its participation in the EMU.
- Second, from the perspective of Greece, the economic problems of the Balkans, the renewed ethnic conflict and political decay, and the influx of illegal migrants were posing novel challenges, leading to the urgent necessity of contributing to the stabilization of the Balkan states' economies and political systems. During the first stage of the Cold War in the late 1940s Greece had been threatened by the ambitions of powerful Balkan states such as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 'Ironically, Greece in the 1990s was facing the opposite problem, that is, that its Balkan neighbors had become too weak' (Constas and Papatotiriou 1999: 225).
- Third, Greece recognized that the future of the Balkans lay in the development of regional cooperation schemes. Greece's opportunity as an EU member located in the Balkans is to bring the countries of this region into trans-European networks and projects which will facilitate economic change and development.

- Fourth, Greece's foreign trade, and above all its exports to other Balkan countries, increased fourfold between 1990 and 1996. Furthermore, Greek investment in the Balkans also increased spectacularly. It was becoming clear that Greece had major economic interests in the Balkans and that a new political approach reflecting them had become necessary.
- Fifth, Greece recognized the fact, if not the desirability, that its national interests were compatible with the existence on its northern border of a new state – FYROM – which was relatively stable, consisting mostly of Slav Macedonians and Albanians, despite the continuing political disputes between the two countries.

This new Greek policy toward south-east Europe can be summarized as having as its strategic objective the gradual integration of south-east Europe into the new European architecture and the Euro-Atlantic institutions. This in turn could contribute decisively to the consolidation of stability, democracy and market economy in the region. The policy is also a possible example of uploading, and will be examined as such in the later part of this chapter.

Greek-Turkish relations

Most observers refer to the change in Greece's policy towards Turkey and on EU-Turkey relations, including the question of Turkey's EU membership, as the most significant example of Europeanization in Greek foreign policy.

During the 1980s and until the middle of the 1990s, Athens' policy had three main characteristics: first, its opposition to any possible strengthening of Turkey's relations with the EC/EU, including negotiations on the content of a Customs Union. Second, its keeping the above issues linked to the Cyprus Problem and to bilateral Greek-Turkish relations (Yannas 1994: 215). Third, its opposition to any prospect of Turkish accession. In reality, such a policy not only added new problems to the existing tensions with Turkey, but it also obstructed a more constructive general EU policy towards Turkey. Furthermore, many EU member states with substantial economic and strategic interests in the creation of an EU Customs Union with Turkey considered Greek policy towards the issue of the development of EU-Turkish relations (which, for example, prevented EU aid to Turkey under the Fourth Financial Protocol) to be catastrophic.

From the mid-1990s, Greece began to shift its stance and strategy. It first accepted a Customs Union with Turkey and eventually the possibility of its membership. This was especially the case after 1999 when it was assumed that such a stance would contribute to a mutually acceptable and functional solution to the Cyprus Problem and that it would mean an end to the threat of war in the Aegean (e.g. Turkey's *casus belli* approach, see Endnote 3).

Theodore Couloumbis observes that by opting for a European option, Greece was moving away gradually from a strategy of conditional sanctions to one of conditional rewards (Couloumbis 2003: 36). Many analysts consider such a shift

as the best evidence of a Europeanized Greek foreign policy, because Athens had decided to accept the main lines of EU policy on the matter and to relinquish its potential veto power – which could be exercised on the basis of a concrete vital interest.

Some downloading from the collective level has therefore clearly taken place. A fundamental reason for the shift in policy had to do with the fact that Greece did not want to be constantly characterized as the country that represented the major obstacle to the conduct of the Union's external relations, and in particular of its CFSP. Greece's new approach to its relations with Turkey was best illustrated in its Europeanized version when almost all Greek MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) voted in favour of granting a date for accession negotiations to begin (i.e. sometime during 2005) after a lively debate in the European Parliament in December 2004 (Soler i Lecha 2005). On the other hand, the situation was more complex than that of a simple acceptance of the virtues of solidarity. Greece was well aware that there were other EU member states that had conveniently hidden behind its old position. They did not want any strengthening of EU-Turkey relations, let alone Turkish accession to the Union. Whatever the real motivations of Greece's shift on that particular issue, there is no doubt that it facilitated the development of a common EU policy towards Turkey. Furthermore, Greece's bilateral problems with Turkey have been forced onto the European agenda as the price to pay for the start of EU accession negotiations with Cyprus, an EU decision taken in late 1995. This was a traditional 'Greek national priority' that Athens has tried to achieve not only through EU membership but also through NATO (Axt 2005: 366). Lastly, Greece's new strategy did not result from a self-conscious Europeanization of its foreign policy. Rather, it was directed towards an eventual Europeanization of Turkey itself. Indeed, Athens considered, and continues to consider, that Turkey's EU accession under the required conditions of accession would gradually lead to the Europeanization of the Turkish political system and society. As a result, it is expected that Turkish claims in the Aegean will diminish and that Ankara will stop threatening Greece (Ifantis 2004: 257).

Irrespective of whether or not such a policy is based on realistic assumptions, the fact remains that it has contributed to a lessening of tension between the two countries. It has also fostered the realization within Greece that the Union does not only represent a means of achieving a European policy towards Turkey, based on common interests: it is also a place where one can simultaneously promote national interests. Of course, it remains a different matter as to whether Turkey's accession with all its consequences will indeed foster European unification. This is an issue which has not, to date, been discussed at all in Greece. That begs the question of whether a policy of political opposition to Turkey's EU membership cannot also be considered as Europeanized if it is based on wider European interests, including those of Greece. In other words, on both principled and realistic grounds, one could consider Turkey's membership as negative for the Union's policies, process and overall integration.⁷

Relations with other parts of the world

Membership of a Community (later Union) that has developed at a furious rate in its relations with all countries in the world, economically but more importantly in diplomatic terms, has given Greece the possibility of strengthening its own international position and capabilities. Greece's presence in the EC/EU has allowed, on the one hand, for a Greek participation – albeit limited – in the formulation of a common European stance on almost all international issues; on the other, it has provided Greece with a different context and perspectives for its relations with third countries: it has substantially strengthened its own international position, as it is a small state which does not possess the objective means to act on its own.

Furthermore, as Panayiotis Ioakimidis points out, by enlarging the scope of its own foreign policy, Greece has come 'to realize that it should shed its parochialism and primitive, narrow minded, Hellenocentric view of the world that puts Greece at the centre of the international system, in favor of a more balanced and pragmatic approach' (Ioakimidis 1993: 412–13).

Thus, whereas one can identify a *gradual* Europeanization process on issues that were of great immediate concern (for instance on the Balkans, Turkey or the Cyprus Problem), with regard to other EU external relations, Greece did not object to being aligned with the EU stances that have developed over the years – on such matters as the ASEAN dialogue; ASEM; the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements with the ACP countries, and the EU-MERCOSUR dialogue. Yet there is no doubt that its contribution remains marginal in all these cases, with one major exception: relations with the southern Mediterranean countries.

Whereas prior to membership Greece's interests in the Mediterranean were exclusively geared towards its eastern shore, thanks to the setting up in 1995 of the institutionalized framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, also known as the Barcelona Process, Athens also has now to look towards the western Mediterranean. This is not a critique that is only applicable to Greece. Other countries (some of them large) such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and even France have tended to concentrate more on their immediate neighbourhoods. Arguably, however, Greek foreign policy has acquired a much wider Mediterranean perspective than in the past simply by having to take part in the numerous EMP (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) meetings, events and associations. Greece also participated actively in the formulation of the Union for Mediterranean launched in July 2008 by proposing the development of 'motorways on the sea', including the interconnection of ports, throughout the Mediterranean basin.

Uploading

There are two categories where one can identify examples of Europeanization via uploading in Greek foreign policy. The first concerns foreign policy issues where Greece was able to influence the positions of other member states and thus foster a common European stance of its own. Two clear examples can be identified: the

Cyprus Problem/EU Accession and the Macedonian issue, particularly during the period 1991–1995 and again in the late 1990s.⁸ That is to say, that while successive Greek governments continued to view them as issues of national interest, ‘they have been translated not only into the European consciousness but also the EU policy-making agenda in a particular fashion. As such they are expressions of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy from the national perspective’ (Economides 2005: 485). We disagree with the claim that this necessarily represents Europeanization, but the case is important to examine (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). Indeed, any uploading of national interests to the EU level cannot automatically be considered successful Europeanization. Because if all it does is to shift levels (from the national level to that of the EU), it does not mean that it has become a European interest, or that it has added value to the Europeanization process. Thus, the FYROM case shows that while Greece’s uploading of a national interest did create a common European position – therefore a successful uploading for Athens – it did not create Europeanization in the sense of redefining other member states’ attitudes or preferences.

A second category concerns those issues where Greek foreign policy positively contributed to the shaping of an existing common European stance, thereby contributing to strengthening the overall influence of the Union. One clear example has to do with the Western Balkans. What follows considers in turn the first category (focusing on the cases of Cyprus accession to the EU and the Macedonian Question), and the second (focusing on the case of the Western Balkans).

The Cyprus problem and the accession of Cyprus to the EU

The uncertainty of the political situation on the island and the preference of almost all other member states to avoid entanglement in its political disputes have always troubled Cyprus’ relations with Brussels. Throughout the long years of the division of the island, the EC’s policy was to deal with the Republic government as the sole legal authority, but at the same time to state that the benefits of the Association Agreement must extend to the entire island and its population (Tsardanidis and Nicolau 1999: 184).

In spite of all those difficulties, successive Greek governments – in a rare case of a long-term, planned and bipartisan policy – succeeded in shifting the stance of other member states. The main tool used was that of Association Policy. Thus, EC-Cyprus negotiations on the content of a customs union (within the wider context of the EC-Cyprus Association Agreement) were successfully concluded in 1987, in spite of the many serious objections that several member states had. This was after having linked the question of a Customs Union to the wider problem of revising existing bilateral agreements within the context of the ‘Renovated Mediterranean Policy’ (Ifestos and Tsardanidis 1991: 195; Tsardanidis 1992).

Greece also has succeeded in bringing the Cyprus issue to the EU level by successfully defending the view that the island’s division should not be an obstacle to its accession. Many member states in the early 1990s were of the opinion that

its admission to the EU would make a settlement of the Cyprus dispute more difficult. The real fear was that the impact of Cypriot accession might well be the final straw that would drive the Turks to renew open conflict with Greece and to curtail their pro-European line (Redmond 1993: 35). Athens persuaded the other member states that the conflict should not be considered as an obstacle to accession for Cyprus. Both the Greek and the Cypriot governments argued that the accession negotiations should not be linked to a solution to the Cyprus problem. This did not mean that they were not eager to enter into a fair, functional and mutually acceptable settlement at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, the prospect of Cyprus' membership was probably the only strong and persuasive pressure that has been exerted upon Turkey with regard to Cyprus since 1974. The application could, therefore, also be seen as a tactical move intended to give new momentum and new incentives to the Turkish side to achieve progress in talks.

Yet it would hardly have served Nicosia's purpose to have the solution to the problem considered a prerequisite for accession. It would have encouraged the intransigent elements in Turkey, and would have made Cyprus a hostage to Turkish mainland politics. The Greek and Cypriot governments argued that Cyprus should not be punished simply through having been the victim of Turkish military occupation. Whenever voices from within the EU suggested that Cyprus' membership should be conditional on a previous settlement, Greek and Cypriot officials countered with the argument that this would give Turkey a veto over Cypriot membership, thereby threatening the autonomy of Cypriot and European decision-making, denying Cyprus its 'natural' place, and justifying Greece's counter-threat to veto the Eastern enlargement (Diez 2002: 148). The key question of a 'solution before accession' was thus put aside in the subsequent Cyprus accession process.

The EU was somewhat complicit in this politicization of accession. On 6 March 1995, the Greek Cypriots and Greece obtained a substantial breakthrough when, in return for Greece's renunciation of its objections to the establishment of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, it was agreed that accession negotiations with Cyprus would start six months after the commencement of the Intergovernmental Conference (Amsterdam Treaty). This decision was reconfirmed several times at later European Council meetings. Subsequently, at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, EU member states accepted the lifting of conditionality on the Greek Cypriot side so that the conflict would not be an obstacle to accession for Cyprus (Sepos 2008: 44). This was not unconnected to the fact that the Greek government had threatened to impede further enlargement if Cyprus was not allowed to join (Richmond 2005: 152).

Cyprus finally achieved membership in May 2004. But there was a price to pay: the 'application of the *acquis* shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control' (Protocol 10, Article 1). Thus, if the conflict over the island has clearly become a European question, it has as much to do with Cyprus' accession as it has with Greek foreign policy. Where there might be some truth in claiming Europeanization relates to the Greek government's (unenthusiastic) support of the

2004 Annan Plan for a solution of the Cyprus problem. This did indeed represent a shift in Greek foreign policy. But we still harbour reservations about even this example, as it can just as easily be interpreted as a tactical move to avoid endangering improving Greek-Turkish relations.

The Macedonian Issue

On the so-called Macedonian Question, during the period 1991–1995 and to a certain extent up to the end of 2007 Greece followed a policy that found no positive reception among many EU member states. Their main objection has to do with Athens' insistence on its opposition to negotiating with the FYROM over any name that would include the term 'Macedonia'. Despite these difficulties, successive Greek governments managed to promote their stance within the Union, especially during the 1991–1995 period that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Their approach can be considered a success in the short term at least, even if it also meant postponing a durable solution while also incurring some diplomatic costs.

The reasons for the December 1991 Maastricht European Council decision to accept the Greek position, that is, by not accepting the new state should be called the 'Republic of Macedonia', were as follows:

- First, the Greek government linked the question of FYROM's recognition to the recognitions of Croatia and Slovenia, which had been sought by other EU states, in particular Germany.
- Second, the Greek government took advantage of the fact that while at the time it only had a majority of one in the parliament it enjoyed the support of other parties, especially that of the Socialists (PASOK), who were even more critical than the government of the name of the new state.
- Third, by calling for Community solidarity, Athens framed the issue as a matter of national security. At that time of change from the EPC to the CFSP (via the EU Maastricht Treaty), the Europeans needed to show a common stance on Yugoslavia. As Aristotle Tziampiris observes, without the principle of solidarity, Greek concerns might have received a summary, and perhaps not even polite, dismissal (Tziampiris 2000b: 174). European solidarity had come under pressure with Germany's early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and it would have been very difficult for the Union to have managed successfully a second crisis over Yugoslavia. Yet, later, in 1992, the then Portuguese Presidency did try without success to broker a solution to the problem.

An evaluation of Greek foreign policy towards the 'Macedonian Question' demonstrates how Greece tried to use the EC/EU in order to pursue its national interests.⁹ Although it managed to put its case in a European context, its EU partners found this policy hard to understand, and more importantly impossible to follow after 1995 (Kouveliotis 2001: 37). However, no EU-15 member state has recognized so far the new state as 'Republic of Macedonia' and from the EU-27

only Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have done so when they were still not member states.¹⁰

Uploading does not only mean that Greek foreign policy positions were adopted by the EU – which, in our view, scarcely qualifies anyway as Europeanization. There are other examples where Greece positively contributed to the adoption of a common European stance: towards the Western Balkans after 2000 (see below), and in EU relations with the Black Sea countries.¹¹ Now that we have dealt in detail with the first category, we look at this second one, via the case of the Western Balkans.

The Western Balkans

Since 2000, Greek foreign-policy makers have claimed that the EU framework alone could provide the means for cementing peaceful relations in the region of the Western Balkans, mainly through an integration process that could bring about the same reconciliation as in the case of relations between France and Germany after the Second World War. For Greece, the option of leaving even part of the Balkans permanently outside the European institutional structures was considered destabilizing. It could even lead to a new round of violent conflicts. Greece's national interests in the Balkans were seen as better served via multilateral efforts within the EU framework, rather than via unilateral or bilateral ones. Not only was the nationalistic and opportunistic policy of the early 1990s abandoned, but the bilateral or the regional frameworks were even considered secondary to the multilateral possibilities. And 'multilateral' came almost exclusively to mean 'integration into the European Union' (Huliaras and Tsardanidis 2006: 477). Thus, Greece saw itself as a European country in a Balkan context, a country which was in a position to 'Europeanize' its northern neighbours. In the final analysis, the 'Europeanization' discourse adopted by Greek foreign-policy makers was an effort to offer a solution to the perpetual question of Greek identity: if the Balkan countries become EU members, then the question of whether the country is Balkan or European will become less polarized, less antithetical (Huliaras and Tsardanidis 2006: 479). In this context, Greece provided considerable assistance to all the countries in the area by initiating cooperation agreements with the Union and by assisting their integration into the European family and institutions. It also played a vital role within the EU in convincing its partners of the need to examine positively the candidacies of Bulgaria and Romania. Now that they have joined the Union (in 2007), it means that for the first time Greece is not isolated geographically from another EU member state. Athens also contributed to the setting up of the Stability Pact for Reconstruction in South Eastern Europe; it played a leading role during its 2003 Presidency in reformulating, with other member states, the Stabilization and Association Process, the main EU policy towards the Western Balkans (Bunse 2004: 251), which precisely promotes intra-regional cooperation as a precondition for closer ties between the Western Balkan states and Brussels (Aleçu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005: 323).

A great challenge for Greek foreign policy in the near future is to ensure that Athens, in its pursuit of close interactions with states in the region, will keep a safe distance from the labyrinths of Balkan ethnic politics. While the regional Balkan balance of power today creates a major opportunity for Greek policy, ethnic conflicts still simmer in Bosnia, Kosovo and the FYROM, where the greatest locus of potential ethnic conflict is the large Albanian population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, contrary to the 'atavistic' reactions of the early 1990s, Greece has now learned how to approach the Western Balkans through a European 'prism'. With the specific exception of the Macedonian Issue (Economides 2005: 480; Agnantopoulos 2006; Bunse 2004: 251), it is indeed possible to argue that the Greek foreign policy in the Balkans has been finally Europeanized.

As a result, it is not surprising to see Greece tabling initiatives for greater EU involvement in the Western Balkans. Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis presented a five-part proposal to the 19 November 2007 General Affairs (Foreign Ministers) Council Brussels meeting, covering Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro and the FYROM. It included the following elements: first, an immediate Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, and another as soon as possible with Bosnia-Herzegovina;¹² second, Serbia, no less than any other country in the region that has not yet done so, should apply formally to join the Union; third, as soon as basic criteria are met, negotiations should start with all the countries concerned; fourth, a gradual loosening of the existing restrictions on the movement of people between the countries of the region and the EU (the 'visa' issue); fifth, an increase in overall funding towards the region (Kallergi 2007).

Crossloading

The concept of crossloading presents particular problems in the case of Greece, not only because it is difficult to find good examples of such a phenomenon, but also because there is a clear and growing discrepancy between the views of the elites and public opinion in the country. Thus, the question goes beyond the mere Europeanization of foreign-policy making practice. It goes to the heart of the Greek psyche. National issues like those of Macedonia, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations do not show any clear sign of embedded Europeanization in the wider polity.

It must be stressed that contrary to what is often assumed or implied (but never fully elaborated) in the existing literature, if all that is meant by Europeanization is the selective projection and adoption of national interests at the EU level, a very simple question remains: whose interests? Furthermore, why have these particular interests, rather than others, been pursued? If it only means that powerful states or coalitions of states manage to impose their views exclusively based on their respective national interests, can we really seriously talk about Europeanization? Is this not more akin to traditional 'power politics' instead, following the insight of E.H. Carr who noted that solidarity often conceals the self-assertion of dominant nations (Carr 1981: 79). Thus, we argue that the real test for effective Europeanization has to do with European values and principles.¹³ This is where

we use Christopher Hill's seminal claim that *principles are not a luxury but a necessity* in European foreign policy (Hill 1991: 192).

Assuming that this substantial obstacle is overcome, is it possible to find signs of crossloading in the Greek case? We have identified one that contains two contradictory dimensions: one direction appears to show signs of crossloading, whereas the other seems to show that it is not going in that direction at all, but rather is making such a process more difficult and unlikely.

This particular example refers to the Greek foreign policy decision-making process¹⁴ and more particularly to a growing discrepancy between decision makers/elites and public opinion.¹⁵ It is revealing beyond the Greek case because it refers to European values and norms and to the Union's actual behaviour in foreign policy, although we will limit ourselves to the Greek example.

Discrepancy between decision makers and public opinion

There is a growing gap between decision makers' perceptions and public views. This is an extremely important issue not only because of the wider problem of the democratic control of Greek foreign and security policy (unless one takes a strictly 'democratic-incompatibilist'¹⁶ view, this is a serious problem for all democratic states due to the existence of huge democratic deficits at the national, but also the EU, levels).¹⁷

In Greece, foreign policy-decision makers and in particular the Foreign Ministry's bureaucratic elite appear to have become Europeanized to a large extent. They increasingly promote common EU stances whenever they exist (Ioakimidis 2000: 366–7). This is one of the main reasons why in the past few years Greece has ceased to be an awkward partner. The question goes beyond the role and personalities of Greek prime ministers. But, whereas decision makers and elites show clear signs of Europeanization, especially through the benefits that Athens gets out of this process, Greek public opinion represents a paradox: all opinion polls show the Greek public to be overwhelmingly in favour of a common European foreign policy and a common European defence policy in principle, while at the same time, it disagrees with the rest of European public opinion on many foreign policy issues, and, more importantly, often with the views of its own government. We illustrate the above with three specific examples:

- First, during the 1999 Kosovo War, Greek public opinion – along with those of France, Italy and Spain – was opposed to the Union's policy, in contrast to European public opinion at large (*The Economist* 1999). Thus, on the one hand, as *The New York Times* noted on 6 April 1999,

[t]he television images of refugees staggering out of Kosovo are having a powerful effect on public opinion across Europe, turning pacifists and anti-NATO activists of decades ago and NATO critics of just a week ago into supporters of sustained bombing.

Hoge (1999)

Some figures, like in the UK, reached 76 per cent of support¹⁸ while in the Netherlands they reached 78 per cent (Everts 2000: 186–7, 191–3). But in Greece the figures were totally distinct: one poll said 96 per cent of the Greeks *opposed* the bombings, whereas another one put the figure at 98.6%.¹⁹ As Takis Michas points out, the editorial positions taken by the overwhelming majority of Greek newspapers had little, if anything, in common with those of their Western counterparts (Michas 2002: 82).

- Second, there is some discrepancy between the now ‘Europeanized’ Greek approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Greek public opinion which remains much more forthright in blaming Israel for the current stalemate in the ‘peace talks’. This is due to a large extent to an ‘embedded anti-Americanism’, which is largely encouraged by Greek elites as a ‘cheap’ means, if not to win votes, at least not to lose them (Stavridis 2007). As the question of Europeanization is directly linked to the emergence of a common European voice in the world, and as anti-Americanism is often deemed to be a starting point for such a development, it is important to demystify the phenomenon of why Greece’s discourse is still ‘anti-US’ when in practice it acts as a loyal US ally (and not only because of its NATO membership and other bilateral agreements). For instance, during the invasion phase in Iraq in 2003, Greece did not impede the US use of Greek military bases. Such a stance should be contrasted with those of Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg, which had collectively prevented NATO from guaranteeing the security of Turkey’s airspace at that time (Tzogopoulos 2005: 36–7).
- Third, there is a clear discrepancy between Greek elites and decision makers and public opinion on the question of Turkey’s EU membership (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 74). Greek public opinion does not agree with any positive attitude: 79 per cent declare their opposition to Turkey’s accession. Although the EU average in the same time period (late 2005) is equally high, it is much lower (55 per cent) in comparison with Greece.²⁰ Another opinion poll shows that 70 per cent of Greeks considered that the Cyprus problem has an impact on their daily lives: 36.4 per cent thought it did so in a significant manner, whereas 32.8 per cent said ‘rather so’. As for Turkey’s impact on the daily lives of the Greeks, it amounts to 68 per cent (34 per cent and 33.6 percent respectively). Other surveys offer lower figures but confirm the overall opposition in Greece to Turkey’s membership: about half are against Turkey’s accession with only slightly more than 40 per cent in favour. As for the younger generation, the 18–34 year-old group opposed Turkey’s EU accession even more (60 per cent). Finally, nearly 55 per cent think that even if Turkey joins the Union, bilateral Greek-Turkish relations will not improve, as against 37 per cent who think that they will.²¹

One should also mention here that Nicos Yannis argues that:

[t]he paradox of [Greek public opinion] being in favor of both federal power arrangements and a common foreign and defense policy [at the EU level] at

the same time as exhibiting a pro-veto attitude could eventually be explained by the historical top-down progress of European unification (a Europe, in other words, built by diplomats)

(Yannis 2004: 134)

In addition to disagreeing with the ‘top-down’ alone approach to European integration, we take exception to Yannis’ argument because there is a simpler alternative explanation. Namely, the poor quality of information and debate on EU issues in Greece. Although even Yannis himself shows that Greek public support for European integration varies according to domestic and international conditions,²² thus not showing such an irresistible show of support, our argument is different: there is no public support on fundamental issues, such as the obvious contradiction between a veto right and majority voting of a federal type. That is to say, Greek elites have maintained a dangerous game with their own electorate by arguing that a stronger federal EU would necessarily be more positive for Greek interests. This is because of the inherent contradiction that exists in the claim that as long as Greece retains its right of veto everything will be kept under control.

Conclusions

There seems to be an overall consensus about the date of the Europeanization shift in Greek foreign policy.²³ In particular, the rethink in its Balkans policy from 1995, and the so-called ‘earthquake’ diplomacy move towards improving Greek-Turkish relations in the autumn of 1999 were critical. It is only by stretching it to the first time Costas Simitis became prime minister that it is possible to extend it back to 1995. Either way, Europeanization represents a recent phenomenon of the last thirteen years, despite the fact that Greece joined the EEC/EU over a quarter of a century ago (but all analyses of Europeanization agree that the impact of membership is usually only felt in the longer term).

There is also the need to point out that some assessments are, in our view, slightly over-zealous. For instance, during the 2003 Greek Presidency of the European Council, the Greek media, and a number of prominent foreign leaders (Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schröder, etc.) expressed their satisfaction about the way that Presidency had been conducted. Similarly, Simone Bunsé argues that ‘[r]ather than prioritizing the pursuit of national interests, the 2003 Greek Presidency chose a balanced approach demonstrating constructive leadership, *particularly in the Iraq crisis*’ (Bunsé 2004: 249, emphasis added). However, as we have already noted elsewhere (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005), if the Greek Presidency objectives (as spelt out explicitly by Costas Simitis himself in the European Parliament in January 2003) were indeed to avoid war in Iraq, and to keep the EU together, how is it possible to claim that the Presidency was a success, since neither objective was achieved? Moreover, it is not clear why a successful Presidency would necessarily be a clear sign of Europeanization, especially in light of past ‘disasters’ during similar periods of Greek Presidency. In our view, the 2003 debacle over Iraq had more to do with the lack of a common CFSP,

rather than claiming that there was evidence of a Europeanized Greece (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005: 233).

Many observers have argued that the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy means a shift: ‘between a “nationalistic”, “pessimistic”, “confrontational” and “defensive” ethnocentrism and a “realistic”, “optimistic”, “cautious” and “pro-active” Europeanism’ (Coulombis and Dalis 1997, cited in Agnantopoulos 2006: 26). Similarly, Dimitris Keridis defined the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy in terms of ‘moving away from a certain nationalist, inward-looking, traditionalist, xenophobic, reactionary, reactive, siege-mentality, zero-sum game, stuck hard-core realist discourse to a more liberal, positive-sum game, post-nationalist, sovereignty pooling, interests/values/identities overlapping, cosmopolitan, outward looking, pro-active, much more confident foreign policy’ (Keridis in Stavridis 2003: 9). Tziampiris argued that ‘Europeanisation has now gone well above and beyond mere socialization. It is a different strategy altogether. Greece’s national interests are better served via multilateral efforts, mainly in the EU, rather than unilateral orbilateral ones’ (Tziampiris in Stavridis 2003: 11).

This may be so, but such enthusiastic views about Europeanization fail in our view to address two key issues that are additional to the specific points and examples presented in our study above.

First, was such a shift imposed by new circumstances (i.e. the changing international context) as much as it was a result of Europeanization? It is, after all, easier to develop more open-minded policies if other states are more willing to cooperate because of the appearance of new challenges due to the end of the Cold War (Ifantis 2005: 381) and the emergence of ‘globalization’. There are also other actors and factors at work, such as US policy (Ifantis 2005: 386–9) and NATO (Axt 2005: 371). That is to say, Europeanization is only one in many important changes in the way the international system works in the twenty-first century. For instance with regard to Greece’s participation in ESDP operations (5 out of 14 ongoing ones to date), they mainly concentrate on the Balkans, Palestine and Caucasus, three geographical areas that Athens has always considered to be priorities in its foreign policy.²⁴ One might also question the claim that Greece would have been dragged into new Balkans wars in the 1990s had it not been in the EU. Some observers have used that argument as evidence of the positive impact of Europeanization: ‘historical evidence suggests that without such a curtailment Greece could have been drawn into regional conflicts’ (Kavakas 2000: 147). Yet no other non-Yugoslav state became directly and militarily involved in those conflicts either. So perhaps the historical analogy is just that: an analogy, and not a very good one.

Second, if Greece’s stance on numerous international issues is based (at least in part) on a general belief in what could be described as a clear international injustice (often imposed by the ‘Great Powers’) and in the existence of ‘double standards’ (Agnantopoulos 2006: 16; Stavridis 1999), amounting to the world’s lack of understanding of or sympathy for Greece’s position (Nicolaidis 1997: 10), what happens to this self-image as the underdog once Europeanization takes over? Historically, but still nowadays at the level of public opinion, serious doubts have

been raised about the legitimacy of EU foreign policy, including the positions of other member states such as the UK who seemed more closely tied to the US and/or NATO. The fundamental question then becomes one of the basis for a Europeanized foreign policy – what can and should it be? The importance of European values and principles cannot be underestimated. As the EU is trying to develop a common voice in international affairs, it needs to base such a new policy on a solid basis. It needs to transcend ‘petty’ national interests and to be seen to be doing so.

We have argued elsewhere that Europeanization should also mean a ‘moralisation’ of foreign policy, something that is to be welcomed, however difficult it might be to carry it out in practice (Stavridis and Tsardanidis 2009: 156). It becomes clear that if any ‘Europeanized’ stance is to be based on the lowest common denominator, then it is going to vary according to changing circumstances. A more resilient, just and Europeanized foreign policy must be based on common European values and principles, and not only on the various national interests of the EU member states, occasionally and conveniently patched together.

For the EU to use foreign policy to support values and principles such as peace, human dignity/rights, freedom, democracy, equality, justice, solidarity and ecological sensitivity, is not a luxury but a necessity. It is a necessity because a principled foreign policy is ‘not simply the external actions of a consolidated polity, but in the case of the EU [it] is part of constituting the political and international identity of the Union itself’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 212).

Any assessment of whether Greek foreign policy has Europeanized should not, therefore limit itself to analysing how close it has come to a median European stance. It should also consider its wider implications, over whether the Union’s policy is one that follows, defends and promotes the very principles the EU has set out in numerous treaties, declarations and other documents as its international *raison d’être*, that is to say not just principles drawn out of air, but those to which the EU itself formally subscribes.

It follows from our study that there is a need for a more systematic and comprehensive empirical work on the various national foreign policies of EU member states. This book’s contents will add to such an understanding. We would also like to call for a comprehensive study of the Europeanization of EU institutions, starting with the European Parliament. Building on our previous work (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005), we have also argued here that one should not *simply* take it for granted that EU institutions are ‘Europeanized’ because they are EU-wide forums. What is presented as Europeanization could instead be the dominant ‘national interests’ of (usually ‘dominant’) EU states. Therefore, specific research should be carried out on whether Europeanization has had an impact on EU institutions as well, from the perspective of clearly announced European values and principles. We have done so on the issue of Cyprus (Stavridis and Tsardanidis 2009). But there are many more conflictual situations that could shed some useful light to the subject. After all, the early literature on the Europeanization of national foreign policies identified conflict situations which

are particularly relevant for such an exercise (Manners and Whitman 2000b: 243–73). In addition, comparative studies of a specific foreign policy issue across countries could also be useful. There is no doubt that on the whole the Europeanization approach does offer useful insights in foreign policy analysis. It is hoped that this chapter has shed further light on the Greek case.

Notes

- 1 Dr Tsardanidis is Director, Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER), Athens. Dr Stavridis is ARAID/Aragon R+D Foundation Senior Research Fellow, University of Zaragoza, and IIER Associate Senior Fellow.
- 2 A model of dissent hopefully not to be followed by other new incoming members (Barbé 1996b, in her study of the then newcomer Spain).
- 3 For instance, Turkey's announcement that it would consider it a *casus belli* if there were to be any extension of Greek territorial waters even if within internationally agreed limits, a threat that was repeated in the Turkish parliament in late October 2005, that is to say even after the beginning of EU accession negotiations in early October 2005. Other examples are Turkish claims over the Aegean Sea continental shelf delimitation, and Turkish air force violations of Greek airspace almost on a daily basis. It should also be noted that Turkey regularly comes up with new 'grey areas' of more potential disputes. As recently as 1996, it almost led to war between the two countries over the islet of Imia. What remains problematic (if not more in terms of the Europeanization approach) is the EU's limited recognition of this problem. For instance there was a call by the EU for disputes to be solved by 2004 in particular, the one over the continental shelf 'dispute'. But without a solution, the EU position has been to call for the case to be brought to the International Court of Justice. Even today, there has been no such move by the EU, nor by the Greek government which preferred to adopt a more conciliatory approach to Turkey.
- 4 For details see Economides (2005); Agnantopoulos (2006).
- 5 For more on Greek foreign policy towards the Macedonia Question, see Zachariadis (2005) and Kofos (2001).
- 6 In particular, since 2003 the LSE Hellenic Observatory has been organizing a yearly PhD symposium where doctoral students present on a regular basis papers on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, via panels dedicated either to 'Greek FP' or to 'Europeanization'; for details, see: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/Events/phd_Symposia/PhDSymposia_main.htm.
- 7 On principles, one could mention democratic values; based on more down-to-earth practical reasons, the list is longer: the CAP, the budget, integration policies, geopolitical arguments, etc. For the issue of Turkey's candidacy to the EU see Ugur (1999); Arıkan (2003); Ugur and Canefe (2004).
- 8 In both cases Greece was able to persuade its fellow member states to adopt a position that was undoubtedly favourable to its 'national interests'. Athens achieved this by linking (i) in the first case, the agreement over the 1995 Customs Union with Turkey to the opening of Cyprus EU membership negotiations later on; and (ii), in the second case, in the very Maastricht European Council meeting Conclusions, the non-recognition of Croatia and Slovenia to the non-acceptance (among other additional conditions) of even the mere use of the name 'Macedonia' in the FYROM saga.
- 9 For details, see Tziampiris (2000b).
- 10 Austria, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK use in bilateral relations only the 'constitutional name', but they have officially recognized it as FYROM.
- 11 For details, see Tsardanidis (2005: 382-3); ICBSS (2007).

- 12 In April 2008, the SAA between the European Union and Serbia was signed. The SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in June 2008.
- 13 Others talk about identity reconstruction 'so that "European" interests and a European identity begin to take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them'. See Wong (2005: 141).
- 14 For a thorough analysis, see Tsardanidis (2006).
- 15 As Reuben Wong correctly observes, the Europeanization process contrary to intergovernmentalism acknowledges the important roles played by non-state actors and Europeanized elites in formulating national foreign policy. See Wong (2007a: 331).
- 16 For a critique of the democratic incompatibility thesis, see Goldmann (1986).
- 17 See *inter alia*, Schmitter (2000); Stavridis and Verdun (2001); Costa et al. (2003); Warleigh (2003).
- 18 *Mail on Sunday* – Kosovo Poll, 2 April 1999.
- 19 *Eleftherotypia* 19 April 1999 [in Greek].
- 20 From a BBC survey, 30 September 2005.
- 21 From the TV programme 'Proskinio' [in Greek], *ERT Satellite TV*, 8 May 2006. For the full data on public opinion opposition to Turkish membership throughout Europe, and in particular the fact that even the little public support there is in some cases is declining over time, see Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2007: 8–9).
- 22 Support dropping especially when the Greeks could not understand EU policy towards former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
- 23 For instance see Economides (2005); Ioakimidis (2000); Bunse (2004: 250). Ker-Lindsay also argues that it began in the mid-1990s with Simitis, although it did not become effective in practice until Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos was removed from his post in 1999 (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 73).
- 24 For Greece participation in ESDP operations, see www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy.

8 Spain and Europe

Mutual reinforcement in foreign policy

Esther Barbé

Democratic Spain has in the last two decades experienced a dramatic transformation in terms of economic, political and social modernization. The changes in its foreign policy have been astonishing, in a process that ranks the democratization and Europeanization of the country alongside the country's interests, identity and policies. The main argument of this chapter is that EU membership has been the main determining factor explaining changes in Spanish foreign policy (Torreblanca 2001; Barbé 2007). Accession, in 1986, was a turning point for Spain in international terms. It has been said that EU membership operated as a catalyst that has turned Spain into a quite prestigious middle power (Kennedy 2000: 125).

In Spain, "the name of the game is Europe" when it comes to the process of foreign policymaking and agenda setting. It has been the same for 20 years now. First, when Spain sought to become a middle power anchored in European structures, and later when it wanted to overcome its "peripheral status" in the EU-27 by boosting European policies. Two assumptions, ideational and material, underpin the assessment of how and to what extent Spanish foreign policy has been Europeanized. First, it is necessary to take into account the idea that "Europe is the solution for Spain". This has deeply marked the evolution of Spanish democracy. Second, Spain started to defend its national interest in the European foreign policy domain at the same time that the changing international context had created a fear in Spain of "marginalization" in the new Europe, which seemed to be turning towards the East. On both grounds, Spanish governments have considered over the years that Spain's national interests are better defended if the EU consolidates its role as a global actor. This approach has generated a dual track process whereby Spain has simultaneously worked to facilitate European actorhood in the international arena, while at the same time it has been seeking greater national influence within EU structures. For Spanish prime ministers, except for Aznar in his last years in government, Europe is the only way to upgrade the Spanish role in the world.

The Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy is a process that combines three dimensions: identity reconstruction, adaptation to EU policies and the projection of national concerns on the European agenda. This chapter starts by analysing the dramatic Europeanization of both the Spanish diplomatic elite and its bureaucratic structures. Once the substantial level of Europeanization of the political and administrative structures has been established, the text surveys Spanish preferences at the inception of the CFSP, emphasizing three issues: the Europeanist approach to security and the relevance of two key concerns on Spain's agenda (Latin America

and the Mediterranean). Next, the chapter assesses the high level of adaptation of Spanish policy to European standards in some areas (e.g. ESDP operations), at the same time that it emphasizes how Spanish diplomacy accommodated itself to the policies of certain Member States, mostly France and Germany. Europeanization is seen as a projection of Spanish national interests onto the EU agenda and a way of increasing the international influence of the country. The last two parts of this chapter will therefore stress how Spain has projected its priorities onto the European agenda, becoming a norm-maker (e.g. the struggle against terrorism) and, above all, a leader (jointly with other states) of the launching and consolidation of two European regional policies: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Euro-Latin American Bi-Regional Association. The chapter finishes by pointing out how the active role of Spain in the EU foreign policy framework has faded since the beginning of the current decade, along with its position as a prestigious middle power, which is intimately related to its pro-active policy within the EU.

Europe as a way of life for foreign-policy makers

For the Spanish executive and administrative structure EU membership meant an important change, especially in the case of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, MAE). Since Spain joined the EC, the MAE has become the horizontal coordinator for European Affairs in Spain, through the Secretariat of State for the European Union (SEUE), as well as the vertical coordinator between the Spanish foreign-policy making mechanism and the European foreign policy level, through the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs. The level of change of the Spanish foreign policy mechanisms in adapting to European requirements is quite impressive. Mechanisms of change, such as elite socialization and bureaucratic reorganization (Smith 2000: 614), can help to explain the substantial level of Europeanization which Spanish diplomats and Spanish diplomatic structures have undergone.

The socialization of the Spanish diplomatic elite during the late Franco-era and the first years of the transition to democracy emerged from two different ideational approaches: “Castiellismo” (named after one of Franco’s foreign ministers) and Europeanism. “Castiellismo” was a mix of nationalism, neutralism and Third World-orientations in foreign affairs, and was characterized by a notable anti-Americanism. However, once Spain joined the EC and the acute debate over security had been concluded by the referendum for membership in NATO in March 1986, the Spanish diplomatic elite clearly acquired a pro-European bias. There is a generation of Spanish diplomats whose experience is based first on negotiating the accession and later on staffing the SEUE, who share a vocational commitment towards the EU and whose presence in the Ministry has even created a distinctive SEUE ethos (Closa and Heywood 2004: 64).

In the constitutive moments of the CFSP in the early 1990s Spain therefore had a diplomatic community which was well disposed to take on European norms and to adapt to European requirements (Kavakas 2001: 99), as well as a government ready to support the political dimension of the European integration process.

There was such a perfect resonance between European political integration and Felipe Gonzalez's policies that Spain became one of the advocates of the Franco-German CFSP project. Spanish pro-activism during the first years of the CFSP, plus its performance in NATO, then led to the appointment of several Spaniards to prominent positions in EU foreign policy: former foreign minister Carlos Westendorp (1995–1996) became the EU High Representative in Bosnia, the Socialist mayor of Valencia, Pérez Casado, was administrator of Mostar, the career diplomat Miguel Angel Moratinos was appointed the EU special envoy to the Middle East Peace Process and, above all, former foreign minister Javier Solana (1992–1995) became the CFSP High Representative (Barbé 2001: 60). Spain has played the Brussels game well, and notably better than, say, Italy.

Regarding institutions and practices, Spain has been willing to Europeanize its foreign policy mechanisms concerning information-sharing and representation. The early pro-activism and identification with European foreign policy has been maintained over the years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The socialization of a new generation of Spanish diplomats in the European institutions has created a two-way relationship between Madrid and Brussels that has reinforced the Europeanization of the Spanish executive and administrative structure. One can talk, in general terms, of a Europeanized diplomatic elite that was uncomfortable with Aznar's policies (2000–2004) in relation to European alliances, that is in their departure from the Franco-German core, and in such disruptive policy practices as leading a pro-American group in the Union during the Iraq crisis, instead of facilitating convergence among EU Member States. On the other hand, the Spanish diplomatic elite has also been uncomfortable with Zapatero's bias in foreign policy, due to the prominent role played by the Socialist Party in shaping both the Ministry's structure and the international agenda. Decisions such as the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Kosovo (see below), that upset many diplomats, were even taken without the knowledge of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The bureaucratic reorganization of the Spanish administrative and executive structure to match European institutional needs (EPC, first, and then the CFSP) has reinforced the Europeanized dimension of the diplomatic elite. The overhaul of the Spanish Ministry which began in 1986 entailed the creation of a General Directorate to fulfil the Political Director role and a Deputy General Directorate to fulfil that of the European Correspondent (Saba 1986). A high level officer has traditionally been appointed as Political Director, thus upgrading European foreign policy in the framework of Spanish policymaking, unlike some other countries that opt for lower level appointments. The Political Director is also the coordinator of all the geographic and thematic directorates in the Ministry, excepting Latin America and international cooperation (Molina and Rodrigo 2002). It is also noteworthy that Spain appoints senior diplomats to fulfil the equivalent posts in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, showing in this case both the will to reinforce European policies and the desire to project national preferences onto the European agenda (uploading), a matter we shall return to below.

Spanish preferences: a medium size power anchored in Europe

The inception of the CFSP coincided with a constitutive moment for Spanish foreign policy. In the early years following the end of the Cold War, the Spanish government set a clear set of preferences that would determine its identity in the framework of the evolving CFSP. This chapter distinguishes between a major driving preference and three subordinate ones. Spanish participation in European foreign policy is driven by its need to become a middle range power anchored in Europe (Barbé 1996a: 121). Once the old “isolation syndrome” was overcome, as a consequence of EU membership, members of the Spanish government would be struck by a new “periphery syndrome” as a consequence of the EU’s burgeoning Eastern orientation after the end of the Cold War (Barbé 1994: 59). In this new context the Spanish government focused its diplomatic action on the reinforcement of European foreign policy and its institutions, as a way to fight political marginalization, to upgrade the Spanish international presence and prestige and to gain a power position in the European structure. Europe became the key motivation for Spanish foreign policy, at the same time as the country pursued an active diplomacy in the framework of the United Nations (as a member of the UNSC for the period 1992–1993) or vis-à-vis Latin America (the launching of the Ibero-American Summits in 1991). For Gonzalez’s government the inception of the CFSP was an opportunity to establish a model in foreign policy based on ideas deriving from the projects of both European Political Union and Spanish Socialism. Later Conservative governments found it difficult to change or reverse these policies (Torreblanca 2001: 2).

One of the main preferences of Spain at the inception of the CFSP was the Europeanist approach to security, supporting the development of a European defence policy and even an EU defence institution through the incorporation of the Western European Union in the European Union structures. The Gulf War, in 1991, was a turning point, because Spanish vessels participated in a WEU operation in the region, an action which enjoyed the support of Spanish public opinion. This historical decision (Alonso Zaldívar 1992) was the end of the “reluctant partner” phase of Spain’s identity, based on its differentiated participation in NATO. It was also an important step towards the recognition of Spain as a full and loyal member of the western democratic community of nations. Thus, the setting of European security as one of the main priorities of the Spanish governments is a good example of the convergence between Spanish needs (i.e. the normalization of Spain’s place in the western security architecture) and the European integration process.

Relations with Latin America are by definition always a priority of Spanish foreign policy. The Spanish Constitution defines this region as “nations belonging to (Spain’s) historical community” (Art. 56) and Spanish authorities describe those relations using terms such as “family” or “brotherhood”. Several examples from before the start of the CFSP show that Latin America is one of the main priorities for Spain when it comes to setting the European agenda: the Spanish participation in the San José Dialogue with the Contadora countries (1984) even

before EC membership; the Spanish Accession Treaty incorporating two symbolic declarations mentioning the reinforcement of European relations with Latin America; and the first Spanish EC Presidency in 1989, which set as a priority the institutionalization of political and economic relations between Europe and Latin America. The launching in 1991 of regular Ibero-American Summits reinforced this priority of the Spanish foreign policy in multilateral terms, converging in this case with the EU's normative bias towards regionalization in international relations.

Finally, the Mediterranean neighbourhood is another important priority for Spanish foreign policy. In essence there are two outstanding issues on the Spanish Mediterranean agenda: the Middle East conflict and the Maghreb. Concern over the Middle East conflict was part of the traditional pro-Arab policy during the Franco-era and is related to the sympathy in the Spanish society for the Palestinian people. In the Maghreb, Spain has long had a set of important political and economic interests (stability, fishing in Morocco waters, energy imports from Algeria) as well as a complicated common history (the last international war fought by Spain was against Morocco's forces at the beginning of the twentieth century). As the CFSP was launched, the international and European changes (the end of the Cold War, and the reorientation towards the East) flowed together so that Spanish interests in the Mediterranean, with an accent on the Maghreb, came quickly to the top of Madrid's foreign policy agenda. By the beginning of the 1990s, it was obvious that Spain was going to be an important actor within the Union when it came to EU-Mediterranean relations.

Adaptation to European policies: security and identity building

Spain is a clear case of a Member State willing to adapt its foreign policy to the EU's policies. As we have seen above, the strategy of democratic Spain has been based on enhancing its status in the international arena by aligning with the EU and collaborating to strengthen the international actorness of the Union. There was an ample consensus among the political parties in Spain that the normalization of foreign relations after Franco's dictatorship could only come through Europeanizing Spanish foreign policy, in the sense of aligning and transforming it (both processes, and preferences) according to EU requirements. In fact, EU membership removed Spain's perceived freedom of choice in such areas as disarmament and non-proliferation, multilateral trade and investment, international financial cooperation, human rights, and so forth (Torreblanca 2001). In other areas such as security and defence, the Middle East conflict or relations with the external powers (United States, Russia and China) the adaptation of Spanish foreign policy to European policies, where they exist, reveals a more complex situation.

The area of security and defence is an important case in terms of the transformation of Spanish policy. Spain has, in essence, built a new security and defence identity in the last two decades. Its convergence with European policies (and alliances) has played a significant role in the dramatic change that has turned

the Spanish army into a post-modern one (Juliana 2008). The Europeanization of security and defence was part of the Spanish approach towards the European integration process. In this sense, Spain converged in the mid-1990s with the group of Europeanist countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Italy) either on the position defended in the IGCs, in favour of incorporating the WEU in the EU, or on the creation of new European multinational forces (Eurocorps, Eurofor and Euromarfor). Convergence with this group of southern and/or continental countries, favouring the reinforcement of the EU in the defence area and eager to create multinational forces, was seen as a first step in terms of joint capabilities. The participation of Spain in the 1997 Italian-led Operation Alba, designed to respond to the flow of Albanians arriving in Italy, showed the structural Spanish disposition in a crisis situation to participate in European operations together with some other EU partners.

Once the ESDP was unblocked, after the Saint Malo agreements between Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, the Spanish government, with José María Aznar at the helm, supported the development of this new policy. Despite not having been invited to the initial summit, Aznar made clear the country's willingness to form part of the hard core of countries ready to develop the ESDP, with the final objective of increasing the credibility and actorness of the EU. Hence it is worth noting the constant Spanish contribution to all the ESDP political initiatives, even at the height of the Atlanticist, Conservative government of Aznar (Barbé and Mestres 2007).

The convergence with European security principles has been further reinforced by Zapatero's government in recent years. An example of the Socialist government's European norm-taker vocation is the all but verbatim inclusion of the main principles of the European Security Strategy in the Organic Law on National Defence (2005). Furthermore, Spain's National Defence Directive 1/2004, presented on 30 December 2004 by Zapatero's government, says that

Spain will promote and support an authentic European Security and Defence Policy, [Spain] will back initiatives designed to achieve a common defence, and [it] will contribute to providing the European Union with the civil and military capabilities required for active and independent intervention to prevent and resolve conflicts and to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(National Defence Directive 2004: 5)

In other words, European security principles have become the key principles of Spanish security and the ESDP is considered an integral part of Spanish defence policy.

As far as the military organization is concerned, Europeanization has been the driving force in the development of military matters in Spain. In recent years, the institutional and military structures have suffered from a substantive reorganization

in order to adapt themselves to the new ESDP requirements and developments (Barbé and Mestres 2007). The most notable reforms have encompassed an important legislative process to modernize the armed forces and make the interministerial coordination and military structures more flexible in view of the abolition of compulsory military service and the participation in various peace missions. Furthermore, the structure of the armed forces has also been modified through the already mentioned Organic Law on National Defence. This law establishes for the first time that the Spanish armed forces are a single body, subordinating the army, the navy and the air force to the common operating command JEMAD. The former division of the armed forces into three autonomous bodies was a relic of the traditional southern European model. Thus, this restructuring of the Spanish armed forces brings them in line with the general tendency in Europe.

The restructuring of the Spanish armed forces has been done in parallel with its deployment in multinational operations, beginning in the early 1990s with UN operations in Southern Africa and Central America. Since then, the process followed by Spain has coincided with the other EU Members' experience in the Balkans. The level of commitment and amount of deployment of the Spanish forces in the Balkans (e.g. Operation Althea in Bosnia) ranks Spain as one of the major contributors to the ESDP. According to ministerial sources, Spain can be considered the "fifth partner" in the ESDP (Barbé and Mestres 2007).

Two comments can be made here. First, the Spanish adaptation to ESDP priorities in the Balkans is a remarkable case of the top-down Europeanization of the Spanish preferences given that this part of Europe did not figure noticeably on the Spanish agenda at the end of the Cold War. Spain's divergence from the EU mainstream in relation to the independence of Kosovo (i.e. no recognition of the State, plus no participation in the ESDP operation – EULEX) can be considered an exception due to domestic sensitivities; the recognition of Kosovo could encourage Catalan and Basque separatism.

Second, Spain has tried to be an active member in launching and implementing ESDP-related missions and structures (e.g. the presence of Spanish personnel in sensitive operations such as EUFOR RD Congo, their participation in three battle groups, and the creation of the European Gendarmerie). The most recent example is Operation Atalanta, launched to fight piracy off the coasts of Somalia, and commanded by Spain between April and August 2009. However limited military capabilities (defence spending) prevent Spain's convergence with the envisaged "first speed" group (i.e. via permanent structured cooperation). Moreover, another substantial obstacle for any further expansion of the Spanish role in peace missions is the traditional "dovish" attitude of Spanish public opinion (Asmus *et al.* 2003). Spaniards are not keen on overseas military peace operations and there would be vocal opposition if the Spanish government were to further increase investment in the development of military capabilities. For example, in 2009 the deployment of Spanish troops in military operations (the Somali coast, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Congo, Chad and Lebanon) was approved by less than 50 per cent of the population (Real Instituto Elcano 2009). Operation Atalanta attained the highest level of

approval, at 48 per cent, which can be explained by the fact that 56 per cent believe that Spanish interests (i.e. fishing vessels) are at stake in the Indian Ocean.

Zapatero has been very attentive to domestic public opinion regarding decisions on military operations abroad. The sudden decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Kosovo (KFOR), announced in March 2009, was approved by a large majority of Spaniards (71 per cent) (Real Instituto Elcano 2009). However, the unilateral withdrawals from both Iraq (2004) and Kosovo (2009) have turned Spain into an unreliable partner according to many external critics (for example, the State Department expressed the disappointment of the Obama administration with the unilateral Spanish announcement to withdraw from Kosovo).

Adaptation and mutual reinforcement: the Middle East and relations with the great powers

The Middle East conflict was a litmus test for the Spanish will and capacity to adapt to the common European stance inherent in the Venice Declaration by the time Spain joined the EC. Before accession, Spain had a strongly pro-Arab policy and had not recognized the state of Israel diplomatically. In Brussels many were therefore afraid that Spain would become a “new Greece” (Barbé 1996a) and a threat to the already fragile EPC collective action on the Middle East. However, such fears would be proved wrong by Spain’s diplomatic recognition of Israel, simultaneous with EC membership, and by a clear Spanish convergence with the European common positions on a wide range of issues related to the Middle East conflict. During the Spanish Presidency of EPC in 1989, Spain would even show leadership in terms of upgrading European common objectives. The Presidency lobbied in favour of a new Declaration to renew the collective European position regarding the Middle East conflict. As a result, in 1991 the European Council adopted the Madrid Declaration reaffirming the European common position vis-à-vis the region, which had not been articulated as such since the Venice Declaration, in 1980. Moreover, the Spanish Presidency worked to upgrade existing procedures when it assisted the launch of regular visits by the troika to the region, thus attempting to reinforce the EU’s role in the Middle East (Weltner 2004).

Spain’s policy was clearly to try to increase the salience of the Mediterranean on the European political agenda as well as the Twelve’s presence in the Middle East. This early behaviour became the pattern over the years in such a way that Spain’s harmonization with European positions can be seen as a mutual reinforcement. Spain has reinforced its diplomacy by Europeanizing its Middle East policy while it has also been working to heighten European actorness towards the region. The strengthening of the Spanish position was evident when Madrid was chosen to host the Middle East Peace Conference. Underpinning this (effectively American) decision was a clear acceptance by the Spanish government of the US’s primacy in the Middle East Peace Process. In this way Spain joined the European mainstream, at the same time as maintaining its concerns regarding the rights of the Palestinian people. Spain has always supported a solution based

on the creation of two viable states and the resolution of the refugee question, refusing usually to criticize the Palestinians (Grant 2009).

When the violence restarted in 1996, and again in 2000 with the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Spanish policy attempted to boost the common European stance, facilitating the launch of European instruments, such as the ESDP missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah) with Spanish participation. In general terms, this Europeanist attitude has been assumed by all Spanish governments, whether socialist or conservative. The European dimension is crucial when making sense of Spain's position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, as during the Spanish EU Presidency in 2002. In this case, José María Aznar managed to unite the EU, the US, Russia and the UN in the Quartet, which met for the first time in Madrid. This represented a mutual EU-Spanish reinforcement: it upgraded both the European machinery – Javier Solana became a member of the Quartet – and Spain's international position. Solana's very person, of course, embodied the identification of Spanish with European diplomacy.

Relations with external powers (the US, Russia and China) tend to be disruptive for the common European foreign policy. In general terms, Spain has facilitated collective policies in relations with external powers, where they exist. Relations with the United States are a clear case of convergence with the European mainstream, which is especially noteworthy given the strong anti-American sentiment in Spain in the mid-1980s. In principle Spain has favoured European actorness, advocating the existence of a strong CFSP, complemented by collaboration with the United States in the wider world. The complementary approach between EU policies and American diplomacy is the path followed by Spain on the most delicate issues, such as security. The pro-Europeanist options in security have been reinforced through building an identity based on being a reliable partner to Washington (via committed participation in NATO operations, such as Kosovo in 1999 or ISAF-Afganistan, to which Spain supplies a large number of troops¹). Yet the unilateral withdrawals from Iraq and Kosovo have hampered Spain's image as a reliable partner, following on from Madrid's dramatic move away from its usual pragmatic even-handedness between American and European policies in 2003, when Aznar adopted an assertive and prominent pro-Bush position during the Iraq crisis.

Regarding relations with Russia, Spain had no policy at all when it joined the EC. Indeed Spain established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union only in 1977, after Franco's death. Even today Spain does not have strong political or economic bilateral relations with Russia. The two countries account for approximately 1 per cent of each other's trade. Russia supplies 13 per cent of Spanish oil needs, but no gas. Yet Russia has developed an intense dialogue with Spain's gas suppliers, principally Algeria, where Gazprom is now making inroads (Pérez and Vaquer i Fanés 2008: 4). Due to the wide divergences among EU Member States regarding relations with Russia, Spain has opted for a pragmatic profile. Indeed Spain has been described as a strategic partner (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 31), in the same way as France, Germany and Italy, with regard to EU relations with Russia. Even if Spain does not share the level of material

interests of these three countries, its position regarding the formulation of common objectives towards Russia has been to avoid irritating the Kremlin when it comes, for instance, to the Russian policies vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics (Moldova, Georgia). In this case, Spain is clearly aligning its policies with this group of strategic partners (under German leadership). The Spanish position, which can be explained largely as a consequence of Zapatero's alliances within the EU (Franco-German axis), is becoming more and more related to the same energy concerns of the other strategic partners. Relations with China have become another sensitive topic for the European foreign policy agenda. As in the Russian case, Spain aligns itself with those EU members which favour a position of pragmatism and constructive engagement, such as Germany and France. Such a position was relevant during the Iraq crisis when Spain joined the Franco-German proposal for lifting the arms embargo on China, in opposition to the UK (Barbé *et al.* 2006). As in the case of Russia, Spain's material interests in China are very low. Spanish diplomats consider that Spain has been a relatively late arrival on the Chinese business scene (Bregolat 2007). At present only 500 out of 600,000 foreign companies operating in China are Spanish, translating into a mere 0.3 per cent of foreign investment in China. Furthermore, unlike other European societies (e.g. Germany), in Spain there is no widespread pro-Tibetan sympathy. It is fair to say that in contrast to some of the former Soviet or the Scandinavian countries' principled human rights approach to China, Spanish foreign policy in this respect is more one of *realpolitik*. Spain, in other words, aligns with the most pragmatic positions in the Union when it comes to relations with both China and Russia.

Defending interests and increasing influence

Spain is a willing norm-taker when the Union pursues collective action on the international scene. At the same time, Madrid sees Europe as a way to influence the world, to shape the international milieu or to defend interests vis-à-vis its neighbours. Spain's own concerns have had a clear influence on a number of intergovernmental mechanisms and EU policies. In the case of the second and third pillars, the EU has created an enlarged arena for Spanish national interests, which are increasingly tending to merge with those of the Union itself (Closa and Heywood 2004: 215). The projection of Spanish interests onto the European level in order to impact the formulation of EU policies can be explained at three different levels: domestic, European and global.

At the domestic level, the EU can be used as a cover in cases when the decisions made by the government produce dissonance at home. A case in point is the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, occupied by Morocco in 1975 and claimed as part of its national territory. The Western Sahara conflict is a divisive issue in the EU that, after three decades, has produced a limited common ground among Europeans allowing for the emergence of a number of modest joint initiatives (Vaquer i Fanés 2007). The European consensus, established in 1988 as a generic support for UN diplomacy to get an agreement between the parties (Morocco and Western Sahara), has provided an alibi for Spanish governments

when faced with the exigencies of a public opinion predominantly committed to Western Saharan independence.

At the European level, Spain has learnt how to project its interests by acting as a norm-maker in the second and third pillar. Counterterrorism is a good example. During the Spanish EU presidency in 2002, and in a sensitive context (a few months after 9/11), the Aznar government projected its main priority in politics, the struggle against terrorism, onto the ESDP domain (Johansson-Nogués 2004). In 2002 this was, of course, a matter of pushing against an open door, but we can still talk of the Europeanization of a domestic problem, since for Aznar ETA was no different from any other terrorist problem in the world. Aznar took advantage of the EU Presidency to show that Spain was not the only state facing a terrorist threat. He succeeded in having the fight against terrorism included as a field of action in the framework of the second pillar of the Union. The Seville European Council, in June 2002, adopted a Declaration establishing that both the ESDP and the CFSP were to play an important role in the fight against terrorism. The Seville mandate, so-called by the Spanish representative in the European Convention, was the first step in the process undertaken by the Conservative government to try to convince its EU partners to have the fight against terrorism, even through military means, included as part of the Petersberg missions – once they were redefined in the framework of the European Constitution (Miralles 2004: 2). In the area of the struggle against terrorism there is no doubt that Spain has become a norm-maker, influencing the policy of other Member States and the formulation of EU positions, no doubt in part because of Spain's considerable experience in the area. That was the case during the second EU-Latin American summit (Madrid, 2002) when Spain achieved one of its national priorities for the summit, by including a reference in the summit's final document to the decision of the signatory countries to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Moreover, the joint Spanish-Colombian pressure during the summit managed to overcome the reluctance of some European countries over including the FARC (i.e. the violent insurgency movement in Colombia) on the EU's list of terrorist organizations (Bermúdez 2004: 2). The change in government, with Zapatero taking over from Aznar in 2004, has not altered anything in the counterterrorism area, where analysts stress the continuity of Spain's bottom-up approach (Collantes 2008).

At the global level, Spain has found its EU membership useful to increase its influence in the world and to attempt to shape the milieu in line with its ideas. According to Zapatero (2008), Spain is "a nation destined to play a growing role in the international community" using "its position as a bridge between regions and cultures, between rich and poor". The "Alliance of Civilizations", put forward by Zapatero in 2004, has become the most prominent proposal of Spain at the global level in recent years. Nonetheless Spain has been much less active in regard with shaping the diplomatic agenda of the Union than in the early years of the current decade, except with respect to the Middle East, where Spain has been active in projecting its ideas as regards the peace process. Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and former European representative for

the Peace Process, was responsible in 2006 (in alliance with his French and Italian counterparts) for the course followed by the Union in divisive issues such as the Lebanon crisis and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Regarding the Lebanon crisis, Spain was at the forefront of those countries arguing in favour of an ample international deployment to reinforce UNIFIL on the ground and to support the Lebanese government (Sabiote and Soler i Lecha 2008). The outcome – the redeployment of UNIFIL with a new mandate and drawing largely on EU Member State troops – constitutes an example of the Spanish impact on the formation of EU positions and, at the same time, how Madrid looks for a distinctive role in the Middle East. Spain, together with France and Italy, has been among the countries which have committed the largest number of soldiers for deployment on Lebanese territory in support of this (European) UN operation – 1,100 in the case of Spain. Concerning the Peace Process, analysts emphasize the innovative role played by the Spanish minister in regard to the necessity of including Syria as part of the solution, as opposed to part of the problem, and they also note how this policy has permitted the Spanish government to build its own profile on this conflict without contradicting EU policies (Sabiote and Soler i Lecha 2008).

Uploading: security in the Mediterranean

There are two issues where the impact of Spain on the European foreign policy output is remarkable: the Euro-Mediterranean policy and EU-Latin American relations. In both cases, Spain has worked to transfer its policies to the European level with the intention of both upgrading the EU's relations with those areas and playing a leading role in the Union concerning them. The aim has been to become a privileged spokesman for the two regions within the EU. Since both are fundamental for Spanish interests, the result needs to be a dynamic equilibrium between national and collective tendencies. This chapter stems from the position defended by Hill (1997: 96), namely that the

CFSP should be seen as a collaborative framework of increasing solidarity, whose strength partly derives from the very fact that it permits national policies to continue in parallel. In the long run, by virtue of the fact that there are few rivals to its structuration capability, it may lead to those national positions being so redefined in common terms that they fade almost to nothing. For the present, the national and collective tendencies exist in a condition of more or less dynamic equilibrium.

The redefinition of Spanish interests in common terms is much more advanced in the case of relations with the Mediterranean, than it is with the Latin American countries. The high level of common interests between Spain and other EU partners has played in favour of the Spanish ambition to transfer its Mediterranean objectives to the European framework, whereas the low level of common interests in Latin America has, on the contrary, hindered a successful Spanish bottom-up Europeanization in this case (Barbé 2001).

The Mediterranean is perceived as a risk area in Spain (Barbé 2001). The main reason is the problematic relationship with Morocco that affects the material (the fishing sector) and territorial (Spanish enclaves on North African coast) interests of Spain. Diluting the Moroccan problem by uploading it to the European level is one of the main objectives for Spain. More than a policy transfer, Spain is looking for a problem transfer (Torreblanca 2001: 14). However, the Spanish way of dealing with this bilateral problem, plagued by tensions and security concerns, was to dilute it into a collaborative and regional approach with a large Mediterranean scope.

As a first step, Spain took advantage of the structure of opportunities in the first half of the 1990s (civil war in Algeria, jihadist Islamism, high migration) to press for reinforcing the Union's relations with the Maghreb countries on the grounds that this would prevent future security problems for all Europeans. Spain, together with France, Italy and the Commission, formed a Mediterranean lobby in the Union and were responsible for many of the subsequent EC/EU initiatives. The 1992 Lisbon European Council endorsed the idea promoted by Spain of a Euro-Maghreb partnership, and also defined, following Spain's Dezcallar² Report, the Western Mediterranean and the Middle East as priority areas for CFSP joint actions (Baixeras 1996: 155). Since then securitization has characterized the development of the European agenda for the Mediterranean.

The Oslo Peace Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, in 1993, also created new opportunities for Spain. Madrid began to press in Brussels to expand the Euro-Maghreb project into a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, a "genuinely European exercise" according to Moratinos (1995). In short, Madrid abandoned the Maghreb approach for a Mediterranean one (Gillespie 2000). This shift in foreign policy focus resonated better with Spain's European partners and helped it to project interests at the European level, in the sense that the EU had to balance better its Eastern (pre-enlargement strategy) and Southern (Euro-Mediterranean partnership) dimensions. The Cannes European Council, in 1995, where Spain negotiated with the other partners (mostly with Germany) to get a balanced treatment between the Eastern (Phare Programme) and Southern partners (MEDA Programme) is, in this sense, the best example of how Spain has managed to upload successfully its ideas (with financial effects) to the EU level (Barbé 1998). The Spanish fear of marginalization in an Eastern-oriented Union translated into its pursuit of an upgraded Euro-Mediterranean policy, both as the best approach to its problems in the Mediterranean, and as a way to win political leverage in Brussels.

The organization of the first ministerial Euro-Mediterranean in Barcelona, during the Spanish Presidency in 1995, was a success for Spain in terms of diplomatic capacity. Israel, Syria and Lebanon got together with the Union and other southern Mediterranean partners to adopt a Declaration (Barcelona Declaration) and launch a process consisting of multiple and interdependent layers of interests (free trade area, MEDA programme) and with a normative bias (exporting norms to the neighbours). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, started as a way to dilute the bilateral Moroccan problem (Barbé 1993), has turned into a

major priority for Spanish diplomacy, becoming the main European framework for dealing with Mediterranean matters. Over the years many northern countries in the Union (Germany, Sweden and Finland) have come to subscribe to this idea, although Spain has discovered that the bilateral territorial problems with Morocco cannot be transferred to the EU, as the confrontation in 2002 with Morocco over the islet of Perejil proved. Spain did not get the support of the EU in condemning the deployment of Morocco gendarmes on the uninhabited islet claimed by both countries.

The Barcelona Process has become part of the Spanish identity in the diplomatic arena, at the same time as it is a European policy. Since 1995, Spanish diplomacy has developed a substantial commitment to it and has consistently acted to protect it from too radical reforms, even if the Spanish reasons for doing so are much different today compared to those of 1995. At present stability in Morocco depends mostly on EU-Moroccan bilateral relations, such as the Advanced Statute accorded in October 2008. Still, Spain shows notable commitment to the Barcelona Process and during its 2002 Presidency it supported several innovations, such as the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. In 2005, during the British Presidency, which showed much reluctance on the issue, Spain proposed and later acted as co-host of the Euro-Mediterranean summit held in Barcelona to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Process. Nonetheless, Spain has been forced to download some policies which undermine the Barcelona Process, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). After its initial reluctance, Spain pressed successfully in 2003, together with Italy and the Commission, to have the Mediterranean countries incorporated into the new ENP to avoid the rationale of first (East) and second class (Mediterranean) neighbours. More recently and in terms of the proposal of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 for a UfM, Madrid showed alarm over the presumed winding up, or just downgrading, of the Barcelona Process. Spain got Germany's support in defending the existing European instruments inherent in the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean relationship (Barbé *et al.* 2007). For the choice of Barcelona to host the secretariat of the UfM was thus a small victory. Moreover despite its adaptation to the ENP and UfM, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains the best example of how Europeanization as uploading has worked to harness Spanish interests to collective European stances, thus contributing to the creation of a "European policy for the South" (Gillespie 2000).

More uploading: identity in Latin America

If to Spain the Mediterranean is an area associated with risk, Latin America is an area linked to national prestige (Barbé 2001). Identity, not security, is the driving factor in Spanish relations with this region. The case of Spain is, therefore, only comparable to that of the United Kingdom and France, who have had to make the EU membership compatible with their belonging to, their leadership of, and their commitment to, a different "community": in the Spanish case, the Ibero-American

Community of Nations (Torreblanca 2001: 13). Spain is the only country in the Union that has a regional policy for Latin America. Even if Portugal is also a member of the Ibero-American summits, membership does not play the same central role in its foreign policy as it does for Spain.

Relations with Latin America are fundamental for the Spanish role (and influence) at the European and at the international levels. When Spain became a global actor, as a financial investor, in the second half of the 1990s, its relations with Latin America acted to enhance its international status, thanks to the common language and the potential for a Hispanic lobby in the UN. Once it joined the EC, Spanish governments began to conceive of Spain as the spokesman for Latin American interests. Sentences such as “Spain pretends to be the Latin American conscience in Europe” (*El País* 1998) or the “Ibero-American policy is one of the Spanish brand images in the European Union” (De Miguel 1999) are good examples of the elite discourse in relation to the ambition to upload Spain’s Latin American priorities to the EU agenda where, in contrast, Latin America has never been a priority (Grugel 1996). In any case, González opted first to align Spain’s relations with the region to those of other EU Member States, and then to seek the leadership over the overall management of relations between the EU and Latin America (Grugel 1996). Europeanizing relations with Latin America was a strategic option of the Spanish government, in order to increase its weight in the Union (Malamud 2005).

Successive Spanish governments, whether socialist or conservative, have tried to influence the other EU members in favour of stronger relations between Europe and Latin America. In terms of agenda setting, during the Spanish Presidency in 1995 the Union endorsed a Communication from the Commission which aimed to launch a “Strategy to Strengthen Association between Europe and Latin America”. The Strategy proposed, for example, the signing of association and trade agreements, the opening up of EU markets and a substantial increase in development aid. The structure of opportunities – many European partners were worried about the NAFTA agreements – helped to attract support for the Spanish initiative. The reinforcement of relations with Latin America was thus perceived by many EU members as a way to counterbalance the United States in the area of international trade. Spain counted on the support of some key EU members (France, Italy) but, above all, on the Commission, which played a fundamental role in supporting the Spanish position. Among those responsible for the elaboration of the Communication that launched the Association process was Manuel Marín, a Spanish Commissioner. The first output of the new Strategy was to be the signature of a Partnership Agreement with Mexico in 1997.

By the time the agreement with Mexico was signed, the Aznar government had already taken a further step in proposing (with French support) the convening of a Euro-Latin American summit. The Amsterdam European Council, in 1997, accepted the principle of such a summit. Spain then got heavily involved in preparing for the meeting, with the Latin American countries. The Spanish government was responsible for the Brazilian agreement to host the first EU-

Latin American Summit in 1999 and the Bi-Regional Strategic Association adopted at the Summit was considered, by the Spanish foreign minister, to be a success in itself (Matutes 1999). In 2002, during the Spanish EU Presidency, Spain was entrusted with organizing a second Summit in Madrid. The holding of these Summits, tying the relations between the EU and the Latin-American region together at the highest level, was of great symbolic value for Spanish diplomacy. However, the international context hindered the development of the Bi-Regional Strategic Association further. Several facts would stand in the way: the Common Agriculture Policy and the WTO negotiations hindered progress in the trade area; the coming enlargement focused EU interest on the neighbourhood instead of far-off regions such as Latin America; and, above all, 9/11 changed international priorities. The Madrid Summit, in 2002, therefore produced a mixed output: the signature of an Association Agreement with Chile, but not with MERCOSUR. In fact, according to some analysts Spain has been using the EU more as a scapegoat than as an driver in the relations with some Latin American countries, with regard to such sensitive issues as agriculture, trade and immigration) (Malamud 2005).

After Madrid the EU-Latin American summits lost relevance, even for Spain. If previously the organization of those summits was important to Madrid for reasons of political prestige, today Spain has consolidated a relevant position of its own in Latin America as a consequence of its economic power; it has been the leading European investor in the region since 2005. The high level of Spanish material interests goes far beyond the low level of general European interest in the region. In multilateral terms, the Ibero-American framework is today much more important to Spain for managing its interests than are the Euro-Latin American Summits (Del Arenal 2007). This can also be partly explained as a result of the fact that on certain political matters which are highly relevant to Spanish foreign policy such as Cuba, the majority European position has increasingly diverged from that of Spain and has consequently reduced the margin of manoeuvre of successive Spanish governments. Aznar was, in this sense, inhibited from modifying the constructive dialogue built by the Union under González's leadership, because of the reluctance of some European countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and others) (Bayo 2006), just as Zapatero had problems with some EU members (Poland, Czech Republic) over his proposals to intensify the EU's cooperation with Cuba after Fidel Castro's resignation (Bermúdez 2008). Moratino's official visit to Cuba in April 2007, contravening the collective European sanctions against Castro's regime, demonstrated the will of the Spanish government to follow national policies in Latin America whenever Madrid feels that a compromise with collective positions would harm its interests in the region. In other words, Spain has lost interest in systematically Europeanizing its Latin American policies, given the resistance it is encountering on the part of other EU members over the nature of the EU Latin American agenda. Even on Venezuela, Spain shows no sign of giving a lead, and is correspondingly criticized by specialists for not having a clear policy towards events in the region.

Conclusion

The impressive Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy over the last two decades has combined three dimensions: identity reconstruction, adaptation to EU policies and the projection of national concerns on to the European agenda. In terms of identity reconstruction the change in the Spanish case is quite dramatic due to the socialization process experienced by the diplomatic elite. The elite adopted the “coordination reflex”, in terms of seeking ways to act with the other European partners, as the standard way to do things once Spain had been incorporated into the community of western democracies after the Francoist period of isolation. It is hardly surprising that Aznar’s departure from the European coordination mechanisms during the Iraq crisis created unrest among Spanish diplomats. The emergence of shared norms and values is a fact when dealing with security and defence issues. This is visible in the decision of Zapatero’s government to incorporate the key concepts and principles of the European Security Strategy into the Spanish diplomatic narrative. “Effective multilateralism”, for instance, has become a key norm for the Spanish approach to the international arena.

In terms of adaptation and policy convergence, Spain has been willing to adhere to common objectives even if those were not among its priorities. The most remarkable case is the large Spanish participation in ESDP operations in the Balkans and Africa (Congo). Both areas were irrelevant to the Spanish foreign policy agenda at the time of the inception of the CFSP, but Madrid has converged with the European agenda instead of maintaining its early preferences (UN operations in Latin America) or adopting a minimal participation. In the ESDP field Spain has evolved along the years, beginning to upload national concerns both in the institutional (integrating terrorism in the second pillar) and the operational dimensions (Operation Atalanta).

In terms of projecting national concerns on the European level, Spain’s influence has been notable in shaping the regional EU policies for Latin America and the Mediterranean. Yet the EU-Latin American Bi-Regional Association, born as a result of a Spanish proposal, has not produced substantive outputs due to the limited appeal of Latin America for most of the EU members. Furthermore Spanish diplomacy is encountering difficulties over leading EU collective action as it has been used to doing on sensitive issues, such as Cuba. As a result, Spain might avoid uploading controversial Latin American concerns to the EU level.

Regarding the Mediterranean, the Spanish government has boosted EU-Mediterranean relations within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Madrid’s eagerness to preserve the Barcelona Process, in the face of the ENP or the Sarkozy’s proposal of UfM, most likely stems from a wish to preserve what some perceive as one of the main Spanish contributions to the European foreign policy. The current context – an enlarged Europe along with a strong French leadership in international affairs – hinders the uploading role played by Spain in the 1990s. As a result, Spain has adapted its strategy to the new collective policies (ENP, UfM) while looking for specific compensations, such as the Advanced Statute for

Morocco, or the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona. In other words, one might expect that the Spanish capacity to shape the EU-Mediterranean relations in future will diminish in comparison with the recent past.

Will Spain remain a small country? This question leads a provocative paper written by a British analyst (Grant 2009) who argues that Spain is punching below its weight in the EU. Is this opinion widespread? Will it affect the Europeanization process of Spanish foreign policy? We should not expect a departure from the constitutive ideas of Spanish democracy (namely the mutual reinforcement of European and Spanish foreign policies) but rather some adjustments in the dynamic equilibrium between Spanish interests and the collective tendencies of European foreign policy which has been characteristic of this case of Europeanization thus far. Although the issue of the recognition of Kosovo has marginalized Madrid from the majority, in the longer run Spain has claims to be part of a leadership group of the six biggest countries in the EU. But whether in or out of a “directoire” it will continue to need to balance the attempt to shape European foreign policy according to its own distinctive perspectives, with adaptation to key common positions.

Notes

- 1 In the case of Kosovo between 600 and 1,250 troops were present at the peak. In Afghanistan, in August 2009 there were 780 Spanish troops plus 530 sent to reinforce security during the election period.
- 2 Dezcallar was at that time General Director for North Africa and Middle East at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one of those responsible for establishing the main parameters of Spain’s Mediterranean policy at the start of the 1990s.

9 The Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy

Pendulum swings in slow motion¹

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Introduction

It has been argued that EU membership has changed Finnish foreign and security policy more than was ever anticipated. Some have even characterized the change as a “complete makeover” (Tiilikainen 2006). In this chapter, we want to evaluate this assessment in two major ways. First, we distinguish between the EU’s impact on Finnish policies and Finland’s impact on the CFSP and on the ESDP. Hypothetically at least, one could say that the two are not totally separate, as it is indeed a CFSP already shaped by Finland – as one of the member states – that subsequently shapes Finnish policies. Second, we embark on assessing the degree to which Finland has had a choice, that is, to what extent Europeanization is a matter of the member state picking and choosing, instead of being made to conform to certain patterns.

Following Wong and Hill in their Introduction to this book, we take Europeanization to mean a process of foreign policy convergence between the EU institutions and its member states. That said, it is important to keep in mind the two main facets of Europeanization, as it includes both the “top-down” (downloading) and the “bottom-up” (uploading) dimensions and is therefore far from being a unidirectional process of socialization on the part of the member states alone (cf. Nuttall 1992). In addition, we should also keep an eye on the possibility of crossloading: i.e. the possibility that the process of constant give and take and interaction between the member states within the EU institutions can also result in a more profound identity change.

This chapter argues that the process of Europeanization is uneven. Finland has to a large degree been forced to adapt to the pressures of Europeanization by downloading a set of new issues, questions related to certain geographic areas and even certain controversies in its foreign policy. Despite a series of attempts at uploading its interests to the EU level, Finland has been half-successful at best. In this chapter, we discuss these two issues in turn, ending up with some conclusions concerning the depth and breadth of Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy. What we observe is a pattern of pendulum swings between Europeanization and distinctiveness, or between an emphasis on convergence and an emphasis on divergence. The swings may not have been rapid or very frequent, but at least two swings can already be discerned since Finland’s accession in 1995.

The contours of Finnish foreign policy

The question of Finland's foreign policy Europeanization is an intriguing one. As a candidate country, Finland was clearly quite different from the old member states because of its tradition of neutrality and its geographical location on the northern periphery of Europe. It had to adapt or, put differently, was forced to change in some respects in order to qualify and be admitted as a member. Yet, it arguably changed more than did the other similarly neutral and peripheral new member states of 1995 (Austria and Sweden). Finland assumed something of a policy of assimilation that, at least for the first five to seven years of its membership, set it apart in a category of its own.

During its first years as a new member, Finland consciously sought a firm place in the mainstream of the Union (Antola 1999; Ingebritsen 2006: 46). This meant seeking access to the various political cores in the Union, i.e. subscribing in full to the CFSP and the possible future development of its full security arm, joining the Eurozone at its inception, and seeking a place in the political advance guard of the Union. In terms of actual decision making in the Union, this entailed a strong commitment to, and even an advocacy of, the Community method: a strong Commission and a commitment to EU institutions were seen as the key to securing Finnish interests in the Union (Lipponen 2001; Luoto 2002). As a consequence, Finland acquired a reputation as an easy-going and accommodating member in the EU, at least in contrast to the other newcomers of 1995, Austria and Sweden (Peterson and Bomberg 1998, 51; Ingebritsen 2006: 46).

Finland's commitment to positioning itself close to the core of the Union, and also to the Commission's views, led it to distance itself from its former "reference group", the Nordic countries. Sweden and Denmark were, because of domestic opinion, more resistant to supranational elements within the Union; Denmark notoriously so, having negotiated four opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty (see Chapter 6 in this volume). There had been instances in which Finland went directly against a previously agreed Nordic position, for example in 1997 when the enlargement strategy was to be decided. There, Finland quickly shifted from a Nordic position to be in line with the Commission. The distance taken from the Nordic group was also rooted in the Finnish conception that the EU or old EU member states would take a negative view of blocs forming within the Union or at its outskirts. Nordic cooperation was therefore deliberately downplayed and Finland went on claiming, for at least the first ten years of its membership, that there was no Nordic bloc.

Yet regarding relations with Sweden, it was also true that Finland and Sweden were in a very similar situation, having redefined their policies of neutrality as military non-alignment (later also called non-alliance). Arguably, both also carried a certain "burden of proof" because of suspicions about their ability, as traditionally neutral countries, to fulfil their responsibilities as constructive members in the field of foreign and security policy. In Finland's case, the change was fundamental in the sense that Finnish policy had certainly been one of caution and avoiding political commitments (for a more detailed overview of Finnish

integration policy, see Ojanen 2004). Now, it had to show that it was willing and able to start implementing and further developing a common foreign and security policy, including moves towards a common defence policy and a common defence. What Finland did, and here acting in full cooperation with Sweden, was to seek to position itself in the front row of CFSP developments.

To some extent, Finland did not have a choice. Upon accession it was notably made to accept the CFSP in its totality: there was no possibility of repeating the Danish opt-out.² But Helsinki did make some choices too; for example, it interpreted the Maastricht Treaty formulations on the EMU in a way which ruled out a Swedish-style referendum – and it cast the CFSP as being inherently in the Finnish interests: the stronger the Union in these questions, the better for Finland. In a sense, one could also argue that the Finnish conception of sovereignty was being revised (cf. also Tiilikainen 2003).

It has been argued that in many cases, the Europeanization of foreign and security policy starts well before membership, and is visible during the candidacy period in, for example, increasingly similar positions taken by the candidate country and the EU countries in forums such as the UN General Assembly (Luif 2003). In the Finnish case, however, Europeanization was an almost overnight phenomenon: there was not much time between application and EU membership, less than three years – the shortest accession process in EU history (see the table in Smith 2003a: 111).

Over time the balance has shifted somewhat. Finland has – for geographical reasons alone – remained on the periphery of the Union. Its foreign policy elites remain very conscious of its location and long border with Russia (which also distinguishes it from Sweden and Austria). As a consequence, bilateral relations and, thus, national foreign policy – but also regional links – have always retained some relevance for Finland (Archer 1999). But it seems as if in recent years the importance of a national approach has been again growing due to certain perceived shortcomings in the Union's common policies on these issues.

This backdrop should give us grounds to expect a rather multifaceted process of Europeanization in the case of Finland. First, the eagerness of Finland to act as a constructive and active member of the Union indicates a certain potential impact that Finland could have had on the EU and its other member states (uploading and crossloading). Yet, political and institutional particularities – notably bilateral relations and contradictory attitudes towards NATO and the UN as part of the institutional setting of security and defence policy – also lead us to expect a rather uneven process of Europeanization, especially when it comes to the possibilities for Finland to upload its own interests into the European scene. Second, such activism also gives us reason to assume that there should be a clearly discernible impact of EU-level policies and institutions on Finnish interests and preferences (downloading).

Cases of downloading

As was already mentioned, Finland pursued a policy of political and military neutrality during the Cold War. In essence, this was a defensive strategy in the

face of an overweening and at times even domestically intervening Soviet neighbour. In the shadow of this neutrality, Finland also developed a historical reputation for an impartial and disinterested stance in its foreign policy. Yet it is important to take note that during the Cold War this stance clearly took second place to the policy of neutrality. In essence, Finland sought to steer clear of taking sides on issues and conflicts involving the two Cold War antagonists.

With the end of the Cold War the question of choosing sides lost most of its salience for Finland, for two reasons. First, the post-Cold War era witnessed, or at least seemed to witness, a period of profound normative change, essentially entailing unprecedented cooperation between the former antagonists. In Europe questions of values and moral issues were turned almost overnight from objects of contention to legitimate issues for all concerned; liberal values such as democracy and human rights were seen as the order of the day and any respectable international actor was expected to conform, or at least pay lip-service to the importance of these ideals (Haukkala 2008b). Moreover, especially during the 1990s, these values were also essentially uncontested; they were seen as the only legitimate option for all players, especially those in Europe.

Second, Finland joined the key Western institutions, having become, first, a member of the Council of Europe (in 1989) and then the European Union (in 1995). Finnish foreign, and especially integration, policy had up to the 1980s been a rather carefully constructed attempt at balancing, at the surface level at least, its Western trade relations with bilateral relations to the East. This tailoring took the form of, for instance, opting for a particularistic treaty with EFTA members instead of a full EFTA membership (for more, see Ojanen 2004). That Finland after the end of the Cold War joined the western European community without such tailoring also had to do with the fact that the Eastern side of the division – the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact – no longer existed, and the Soviet Union, with which Finland had signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was dissolved. Finland was quick also to join the new partnership structures of NATO at a very early stage, in 1992. The discussion on NATO membership has since then been constantly ongoing even though public opinion has been quite steadily opposed to membership in the organization. Interestingly, not even the Russo-Georgian conflict in August 2008 managed to change Finnish public opinion on this issue. According to a nationwide poll published in December 2008, willingness to join NATO had in fact decreased, with 60 per cent of respondents opposing membership (MTS 2008: 4). Indeed, the Finns seem to think that recent events only proved their assessment of Russia right, strengthening the view that Finnish defence should be organized around self-sufficient territorial defence based on mass conscription, and non-membership of NATO.

Taken together, the sea-change in Finland's foreign and security environment has resulted in a situation where Finland has not only found it natural but also imperative to adopt certain key issues on its foreign policy agenda. The issue of human rights is instructive in this respect. During the Cold War the issue of human rights was one of the most divisive in East-West relations (Thomas

2001). This meant also that Finland had found it hard to take up the issue internationally (Luoto 1997). But in the 1990s this changed to a large degree. A good illustration of this process is the government programmes in Finland where the issue of international human rights rose noticeably in prominence after EU membership. Between 1991 and 2007, the prominence of human rights issues has grown from being barely noticeable (only one sentence in the programme of 1991) to high visibility in issues ranging from foreign and security policy, to immigration, and justice and home affairs in the latest government programme (see Finnish Government 2007). This seems to indicate that the relevance of human rights issues for Finnish foreign policy has vastly expanded during its EU membership. According to Luoto (1997: 246) one of the effects of membership has been that Finland has indeed been compelled to take a more active stance concerning human rights. Some would argue that Finland has even contributed to the development of the EU's human rights positions, with an emphasis on the rights of women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples (Tiilikainen 2003).

Third, certain geographical issues have been downloaded into Finland's foreign policy coverage. During the Cold War Finland was mainly interested in regional, north European, issues. The major exception to this rule was Finland's attempts from the 1950s at strengthening the UN system and being active in terms of peacekeeping, often in cooperation with its Nordic neighbours. But since joining the Union, new geographical areas, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, have surfaced on the Finnish foreign policy radar. This was reflected in the internal reorganization of the Finnish foreign ministry in 1998 that resulted in a radical shake-up to the structure of the ministry, moving away from purely substance-based sections (such as trade policy or arms control) to a regionally-based division.

Finland took quite an active stand on Mediterranean issues when it organized a ministerial conference during the first Finnish EU presidency in 1999 and the EUROMED Council during the second presidency in 2006 – designed to show interest in other regional dimensions in order to attract reciprocal interest in the North. Finland has also adjusted its traditionally neutral stance towards the Middle East to better suit the overall EU policy line that has become more critical of Israeli policies.

These new cardinal points refocused Finnish foreign policy quite concretely when crises such as East Timor in 1999 and Lebanon in 2006 were on the table during the two Finnish EU presidencies. Helsinki also invested much energy into institutional multilateral relations with the Asian countries in the form of ASEM. This increased national activism in “new” regions has been visible in the proliferation of new Finnish Embassies, with altogether fifteen new missions being established after the Cold War. This is also a process that is now starting to spill over to new regions of concern, with the growing importance of East Asia and Central Asia (Sierla 2009: 8, 19).

Finland has not only had to download new issue-areas and adapt its foreign policy institutions; it has also fundamentally reoriented certain foreign policy

approaches. The abandonment of neutrality, first, then of military non-alignment, is a good illustration of this reorientation (see Ojanen 2008). Another, somewhat more ambiguous change in approach has been over multilateralism and the EU's role in relations with third countries. The case of Russia is obviously the most interesting and will be analysed in detail below. For China and the United States, Finland as a small member state might have been positive towards a common, concerted EU approach, but has in practice not done much towards building EU approaches to either.

On China, Finland ranks among the member states with a “softer” approach (that is, those which place less emphasis on human rights) and thus finds itself in a different group from Sweden and Denmark, which have insisted on a principled human rights stand and, among other things, have postponed the lifting of the arms embargo on Beijing. This is partly due to the important economic interests Finland has in China. For example, in 2008 the trade between the countries totalled €6.4 billion, making Finland China's biggest trading partner among the Nordic countries. This has also been officially acknowledged. The 2009 White Book on Defence contends that “[C]ompared to the other European countries, Finland is slightly more dependent on economic cooperation with China” (Government of Finland 2009a: 68). In this light, Finland is justifiably considered among the “accommodating mercantilist” member states in the EU's China policy (Fox and Godement 2009).

As for the United States, Finland has been motivated by another logic, namely that of security. For Finland, relations with the US are constantly high on the agenda, largely due to the fact that as a non-NATO member it has been forced to look for other, more bilateral ways to talk with Washington. Also, in Helsinki's security thinking NATO and in the last instance the US presence in Northern Europe have been indispensable in both guaranteeing the security of the Baltic states and balancing Russian military preponderance in the region (Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 1998). Interestingly, during and after the run up to the Iraq war in 2003 the President of the Republic Tarja Halonen and Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja chose a different course, openly criticizing the United States for the decision to go to war. This resulted in a period of cooler relations with Washington, and Helsinki having to scramble to improve the soured ties at a later stage. During Obama's administration things seem to have improved markedly. For example, during the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2009 the leading troika of Finnish foreign policy – the President, Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister – all voiced their appreciation of President Obama and his policies (Huhta and Mykkänen 2009).

The EU's inconsistency in having a common voice in foreign policy has also contributed to the unevenness of Finland's own approach. Tiilikainen argues that in foreign policy, Finland has been able to be more courageous and has had greater room for manoeuvre in cases where the EU has had a common voice (Tiilikainen 2006: 222). The case in point is the two Chechen Wars (to be discussed in more detail below).

The impact of Europeanization on the Finnish political system and on the making of foreign/European policy

EU membership has profoundly changed foreign policy decision making in Finland. The new constitution of 2000 codifies an important principle which puts EU affairs, including the CFSP, under the remit of the Council of State. Formerly, the President of the Republic was the primary decision maker in foreign policy. Since 2000, foreign policy is to be “directed by the President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government” (The Constitution of Finland, Chapter 8, Section 93).³ This is taken to mean an increased parliamentarization of foreign policy in Finland, as opposed to the presidentialism or semi-presidentialism of earlier times: the more it is the Council of State that acts, the more the Parliament can exert influence and control over the policy. Yet, the formula has continued to create difficulties in establishing a line between national foreign policy and the CFSP, indeed EU affairs in general (Penttilä 2008). In EU affairs, the President should in principle only be concerned with the EU treaties and international treaties with third states (Tiilikainen 2006: 207; see also Forsberg 2000). But in practice, the President still retains a role in decisions concerning EU-led crisis management and also often takes part in the European Council meetings together with the Prime Minister. There is, indeed, no firm consensus yet on what the proper role of the President should be.⁴

EU membership also brought about institutional changes. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs acquired a special division for Africa and the Middle East, alongside the more traditional foci of interest, such as Northern Europe and the United Nations, and also adopted an Action Plan for Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Furthermore, the EU Secretariat that was first established at the Ministry, was transferred later on to the Prime Minister’s Office (for the impact of the EU on the structures of the Finnish MFA, see Antola 2002).

The fact that Finland is opening new diplomatic representations abroad can also be seen as a sign of emphasizing yet again the distinctiveness of Finland and its need to further its own national interests. Were Finland to think predominantly in terms of the building-up of the new External Action Service (EAS), it might opt for more cooperation with other member states instead. At the same time, the EAS can be assumed to affect the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy in the longer run. In terms of pure numbers, the EAS requires a substantial new insertion of Finnish diplomats into the EU machinery. Thereby, it would create further room and expectations of a growing Europeanization of Finnish officials and consequent foreign policy. Finland has positioned itself officially in favour of the EAS and is indeed gearing up to send some key people to the new structure (Sierla 2009: 14; Torstila 2008).

The issue of potentially uneven internal Europeanization within Finland also merits discussion. In one of the earliest accounts of elite socialization in the case of the predecessor of CFSP, European Political Cooperation (EPC), Simon Nuttall (1992: 313) noted how at the end of the day socialization, or in the case

of this volume, Europeanization and especially its crossloading variant, comes down to sheer numbers: the amount, especially the number, of key politicians, civil servants and even military personnel being in touch with the EU and its institutions. In this respect, one might expect to detect more socialization in some policy fields than in others, and more in some institutions than in others (here, the notion of differential empowerment has been used). Moreover, there might be divergences within a field. For instance, in the realm of foreign and security policies, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would have as a point of reference the EU and its institutions while the Finnish military establishment and the Ministry of Defence were first socialized into NATO structures and its associated mindset through the NACC and PfP, having been subsequently drawn closer to the EU through developments in ESDP. Unfortunately no detailed case-studies of these dynamics exist in the case of Finland. Here scope for further studies clearly exists.⁵

Attempts at uploading

All enlargements invariably spell changes to the Union's external relations (Ginsberg 1998). They always also open up possibilities for the newcomers to try to affect the Union's wider agenda. Often such an input is even expected from the newcomers. Finland was no exception, as there were expectations of new and profound expertise on Russia coming from Helsinki, and an invitation to contribute to the EU's policies in this respect. This was also an invitation that Finland was for all means and purposes willing to accept.

Yet an analysis of Finland's attempts at uploading its own interests and preferences into the European agenda will show that the picture is far from clear cut. Although there seem to be cases where uploading has clearly been attempted, their actual success is far from certain, or remains to be seen. Perhaps more importantly, the cases indicate that in all instances Finland has been forced to adapt its uploading attempts to fit the existing interests and modes of operation within the European Union. In this respect, the Finnish impact on the wider European agenda has been clearly more limited than initially anticipated.

That said, Finland had expected to get something in return for its willingness to adapt. One of the expected benefits of EU membership was that it would help Finland effectively to "multilateralize" its relationship with Russia. In this respect, EU membership was seen as a way to escape the sometimes uncomfortably close relations with the large Eastern neighbour (Pursiainen 2000; Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 1998). At the same time, Finland was hoping to use this new setting to enhance its own interests and security: promoting cooperative security vis-à-vis Russia and drawing the attention of the whole EU to a set of challenges and even (soft) security threats emanating from the north-western parts of Russia. At a later stage, there seems to be an increasing realization that the Union's common Russia policy is problematic or at times entirely lacking. This has brought the question of bilateral relations back onto the Finnish agenda.

The EU's Russia policy

Relations with Russia have traditionally been of utmost importance for Finland. As was already noted, it is the one special relationship Helsinki has been forced to cultivate, at times against its own will, as the Cold War period and the era of so-called Finlandization suggests.⁶ Also when it comes to Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy, the question of Russia and the Union's relations with it loom large. It is plausible to expect Finland to have a commensurate interest in, if not necessarily a major impact on, the Union's approach towards Russia.

Finland's approach towards the Union's Russia policy has been two-fold. In the first instance, there seemed to be a certain worry or apprehension that Finland could be entangled in the problems of the Union's overall relationship with Russia (Hämäläinen 1998: 117). To a degree, this worry was reflected in the fact that when joining the Union, Finland entered into a situation where the table had already been set. The EU and Russia had concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) at the Corfu European Council in June 1994 – the same summit where Finland had signed its own accession documents. In this respect, the main principles had been agreed upon and Finland found itself in a position where it had to subscribe to, in essence to download, a set of pre-agreed objectives and forms of cooperation between the EU and Russia. These included the programme of gradual economic integration, deep political dialogue and cooperation as well as the centrality of ostensibly common European values as the corner stone of the relationship between the EU and Russia – all things that Finland by and large found easy to support.

At first it seemed as if Finland's worst fears had materialized immediately. The First Chechen War erupted in December 1994, resulting in an acute crisis between Russia and its western partners, the European Union included. Interestingly, one of the first political positions Finland was forced to take as a new member was a firm stance on this particular issue. In January 1995 the Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho was the first EU politician to visit Moscow after the beginning of hostilities in Chechnya. Finnish elites realized that the situation presented the country with a serious test vis-à-vis its EU partners: could Finland manage to combine its new role as an EU member state with its traditional bilateral relations with Russia (Hämäläinen 1998: 117)? Once in Moscow, Aho was very careful to voice exactly the same message concerning Chechnya as the Finns had done earlier on in Brussels.⁷ In an ironic twist, this feat was to be repeated four years later during the first Finnish EU presidency when Helsinki was expected to coordinate the various national positions during the run-up to the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, a meeting that ended by adopting a rather harshly-worded declaration concerning the conduct of Russia's second war against the Chechen Republic in the space of five years (for more about the latter events and Finnish policies, see Lintonen 2004).

Yet to Finland's relief these crises did not result in a serious disruption of Russia's ties with the West, the EU or Finland. Instead, even on the Russian side there was a certain appreciation of the essentially constructive nature of EU

reactions, as well as an acceptance of Finland being “forced” to take a more robust stance because of its EU commitments. As such, these events did not inflict any serious or long-lasting damage on Finland’s bilateral relationship with Russia, enabling the leading Finnish commentator on Russia to note that the relations have become “better than ever” (Sutela 2001).

Cultivating a long-term strategy and a coherent joint policy perspective on Russia has been the mainstay of Finnish EU policy during its membership. For example, according to a prominent Finnish diplomat René Nyberg (1999), one of the goals of Finland in the EU has been to make the Union “think Russia” in a more concerted way. But some authors have gone so far as to argue that Finland has elevated the EU level to the highest priority in its dealings with its eastern neighbour, to the detriment of bilateral relations with Moscow (Rytövuori-Apunen 2007). In this respect, of significance are the Finnish attempts at pushing the so-called Common Strategy on Russia in 1999 and onwards. It should be noted that the window of opportunity to foster Russia relations was in fact created by the institutional innovations in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Common Strategies were a new CFSP instrument designed to give the CFSP strategic guidance on issues where the members “have important interests in common” (Treaty on European Union, Article 13.2).

Finland invested a lot of political energy in the first Common Strategy that was drafted on Russia in 1999. This was first done during the German Presidency in the spring when Finland supported Berlin in drafting the document. Then during its Council Presidency in the autumn Finland sought to make good on the new instrument, developing an operational action plan that would act as a useful benchmark for other presidencies to follow. In this regard, the Finnish priority was to focus the EU-Russia agenda on actual projects and deliverables, such as the establishment of a task force on organized crime, instead of the usual declarations of benign future intent.

But for all means and purposes Finland was largely frustrated in its objectives. As was already mentioned, once again Chechnya rose to the top of the agenda in August–September 1999, robbing the Finnish Presidency of the positive momentum concerning Russia. Furthermore the Common Strategy on Russia failed to fly as a useful political instrument in general, resulting in a set of incoherent presidency work plans that proved to be of little strategic worth in the face of steadily deteriorating EU-Russia relations at the beginning of the new millennium (De Spiegeleire 2003).⁸

Since then it seems that EU-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated (for a more detailed discussion, see Haukkala 2010). The negotiations for a new post-PCA agreement have stalled, while the question of a “common neighbourhood” between the two has become increasingly complicated, as exemplified by Russia’s conflict with Georgia in August 2008. The brief “gas war” with Ukraine at the beginning of 2009 put Russia’s reliability as a source of energy into further doubt. What is more, there seems to be a growing feeling post-“Big Bang” enlargement that the EU faces increasing difficulties in developing a common and united stance on Russia. For Finland a certain culmination point was its second EU Presidency

in autumn 2006 when despite its best efforts Helsinki was unable to secure the commencement of negotiations for a new post-PCA agreement due to Warsaw's determination to block it on account of a bilateral Polish-Russian dispute concerning the quality of meat.⁹

In this respect, there seems to be a growing disillusionment in Finland with the prospects of a common Russia policy in the European Union. Finland finds itself in a genuine bind. It does not want to act in a way that would result in a further hollowing out of the common EU policies towards Russia by engaging in extensive bilateral deals with Moscow. At the same time, Finland is facing a situation where it is increasingly forced to engage in damage control in its relations with Russia as the repeated failures of EU policy expose Finland to a set of difficult issues and questions with its large eastern neighbour. The politicized question of the ethnic Russian minority in the Baltic countries – their rights to full citizenship and cultural protection, as well as Russia's interest in "protecting" ethnic Russians in the Baltics – is a case in point. Also, the EU's inability to settle certain economic disputes with Russia, such as the question of export taxes on Russian timber to Finland, creates further impetus to activate bilateral relations with the country. The fate of the Northern Dimension (discussed next) is instructive in highlighting some of these problems in more detail.

The Northern Dimension

The Finnish initiative for the Northern Dimension is often hailed as the most successful aspect of Finnish European policy (Arter 2000; Ingebritsen 2006: 47–8). It has been seen as a prime example of how a member state can seek to "customize" the European Union to meet its own needs and interests (Ojanen 1999). It cannot be denied that Finland did indeed try to upload its interests into the EU with the Northern Dimension. This has also been voiced publicly by Finnish officials (Nyberg 1999). At the same time, it is possible to detect also several other motivations behind the Finnish initiative that make the picture less clear cut. Furthermore the very outcome of the initiative testifies to both a rather mixed record in uploading and an interesting link between uploading and downloading in the case of Finland: the success in the uploading of the Northern Dimension may well have been due to the parallel downloading of the "Southern Dimension" onto the Finnish agenda.

As mentioned earlier, Finland has sought to make the Union think of Russia in a more consistent and strategic manner. In this respect, part of the motivation for the Northern Dimension initiative stemmed from the perceived need to rectify a certain lopsidedness in the Union's external approach. When Finland joined the EU, it felt that most EU activities were aimed at the "southern dimension", leaving the Union with only intermittent political attention and scant actual resources to deal with the Russia challenge. At the same time, around 1996–1997, it looked like the EU was about to enlarge eastwards very rapidly, and thus there was a need to draw attention to the North before this happened. Other motivations were also in play for Finland. First of all, the initiative can be seen as the response

to the expectations concerning the special knowledge, even insight, Finland purportedly had on Russia and the expected positive impact, or perhaps even a leading role, it could have on the Union's relations with Russia. Second, the initiative was an attempt to continue the tradition of acting as a bridge-builder between Russia and the West. The Northern Dimension, with its early emphasis on equal partnership between the EU and Russia, can be seen as an attempt to provide a forum where both partners could meet on equal ground to discuss issues of mutual concern in an unpoliticized setting.

Despite its fairly ambitious aims of uploading Finnish interests to the EU level, the actual development of the initiative highlights the limits of Finland's reach in this respect. In fact, one could say that the Northern Dimension foundered for two reasons. First, the initiative was geared to be maximally EU compatible; it would showcase the Union's interests and logic of operation instead of uploading Finnish concerns. This resulted in an initiative that was carefully timed but which lacked any serious bite: Prime Minister Lipponen floated the Northern Dimension idea in September 1997, giving it time to sail onto the Union's agenda well before the Finnish presidency in 1999, to avoid compromising Finland's reputation as an honest broker by appearing to further initiatives of its own in the six months of its formal responsibility. The wider marketing strategy was also crafted to ensure maximum compatibility with existing policies (including enlargement) and structures while downplaying, even minimizing, features that could jeopardize the political reception and eventual success of the initiative (for a discussion of the Finnish marketing strategy, see Luoto 2002: 87–9; Ojanen 2000). Therefore, the Finns refrained from requesting additional institutional structures or new funds for the North but insisted that a better coordination of the existing resources would suffice. Helsinki also wanted to entrust the European Commission with the further development of the content of the policy, hoping to underline the European credentials of the initiative in the process (for a chronological account of the initiative, see Joenniemi and Sergounin 2003).

Yet it is doubtful if the European Commission allocated the kind of resources or political energy to turn the Northern Dimension into a success, while Finland had a hard time convincing its EU partners that the North really should be a priority. Instead, most EU member states seemed to have their own regional pet projects in the East or the South, with scant attention afforded to the Northern agenda promoted by Finland (the multiplicity and essential incommensurability of these national agendas comes through very clearly in Bonvicini *et al.* 2000).

Subsequent developments witnessed the watering down of certain key innovations of the concept. The key here has been the dilution of the partnership aspect that was central to the initial Finnish blueprint. The Commission found it rather difficult to accommodate outsiders in its internal policymaking processes, preferring vague consultations instead of joint decision making (Ojanen 2000). Unable to make their voice heard in the making of the policy, the Russians felt frustrated and lost interest in the initiative. Further, the absence of significant new resources ensured Moscow's full alienation from the Northern Dimension process (Leshukov 2001).

It is noteworthy that in the end, the Northern Dimension has been in effect *de-Europeanized* or re-regionalized (see Haukkala 2010, Chapter 9). During the second Finnish EU Presidency, new steps were taken to reinvigorate the ailing policy. On the margins of the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki in November 2006, a new framework document for the Northern Dimension was adopted. Instead of being strictly an EU policy, the Northern Dimension has now been turned into a genuine joint undertaking between the European Union and the other partners: Russia, Norway and Iceland. The idea of joint ownership is to be complemented by the notion of cofinancing, which means that in future all the partners, Russia included, will contribute financial resources into making the Northern Dimension a reality. Finally, the actual decision making concerning the Northern Dimension will be brought closer to the region with the adoption of a new institution, the steering group. In the group, all the partners will be present with equal opportunities to shape the agenda. In a sense, and perhaps in the spirit of the subsidiarity principle, the Northern Dimension has been turned into the primary responsibility of the regional stakeholders. The long-term effects of these moves remain, however, to be seen.

CFSP/ESDP

Finland has had a rather paradoxical influence on the development of the CFSP and the ESDP. In a sense, the very fact that several (formerly) neutral countries were joining the EU may have brought about the CFSP's more rapid development than would otherwise have been the case: the possibility that they would hamper its development in the future may have prompted existing members to reach agreements before their accession. As a consequence, the new EU members of 1995 had to accept a more ambitious and consistent CFSP than before (Palosaari 2009: 66–7). As a member, Finland tried from the outset to place itself among the active contributors to the development of the CFSP. It has also been pushing the ESDP forward, even when also trying to set limits to its development.

The basic rationale for Finland to build up the CFSP was twofold. It wished to counter possible suspicions about its willingness to comply, and promoted a solidarity-based conception of security whereby EU membership would, due to the inherent and growing solidarity between its members, enhance Finnish security (Antola 1998). Nor was it concerned by the prospect of elements of supranationalism – such as QMV – entering the equation, as these were seen to strengthen the Union and thus also its security-enhancing capacity (Ojanen 2008: 60).

A substantial part of Finland's activism took place in cooperation with Sweden. In the IGC of 1996–1997, the two countries took a joint initiative with the aim of including the Petersberg tasks on crisis management in the Amsterdam Treaty. This was a compromise, given that the other options would have been either to integrate WEU with the EU (including with the common defence clause), or not to include anything. It took the CFSP forward, and as Finland and Sweden sought a profile among the states seeking to push CFSP forward, they happily took credit for this development. Later on, they displayed activism over capabilities

commitments, including the formation of the Battle Groups, and the setting up of the ESDP organs (Gustav Hägglund from Finland as the first Chair of the EU Military Committee), including the European Defence Agency (EDA). Yet, the two also aimed at limiting crisis management to something clearly short of peace enforcement, thus leaving out the upper-end tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This can be counted as an attempt at uploading which failed. In contrast, the Finnish (and Swedish) emphasis on civilian crisis management can be counted as a success. Another successful instance of uploading would be Finland's work to ensure relatively "low" or easy criteria for taking part in permanent structured cooperation – basically criteria that all countries, including Finland, could fulfil.

As for downloading, the threat perception embodied in the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 quite soon figured in the Finnish government's own report on security and defence in 2004. A broad notion of security had already been evident in the Finnish Defence White Paper of 1995, but the specific ESS language was given a prominent role in the report of 2004 – even though it considerably differed from the traditional Finnish stances. There were voices arguing that the threat perception of the ESS, and notably the salience of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, did not seem so relevant for Finland, where conventional territorial threats were, and are, still central in the national defence planning (Ojanen 2008: 68).

Although Finland has generally supported developing the CFSP and the ESDP, the idea of a common defence has, however, been a step too far for Helsinki. Indeed, when in December 2003 the common defence (or mutual assistance) clause was being included in the draft Constitutional Treaty, Finland actively tried to hamper it. Together with Sweden, Austria and Ireland, it attempted to change the text in a way that would have totally watered down the defence commitment. This attempt led to a compromise whereby the common defence clause is indeed included, but the "specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States" is not to be prejudiced.

While the remnants of neutralism (Ferreira-Pereira 2006) might explain such a stand, an even more plausible reason would be the positive view taken on NATO whereby the political elite and the government avoid losing their "NATO option" by not overemphasizing the "European" defence side as a possible alternative. Yet European security and defence has usually received much more backing in Finnish public opinion than the option of NATO membership.

Another stumbling block is the persistence of traditional defence thinking. As Rieker (2003: 174-5) puts it, while the Finnish security discourse has overall been Europeanized, what has taken place is not much more than instrumental adaptation: basically, traditional security arguments still dominate, and defence is to a large extent still understood in terms of territorial defence against traditional military threats. Accordingly, talk of a common defence is not to be taken lightly but analysed with all its potential implications and problems, such as the prospect that a common defence clause would in practice lead to the need to defend the Baltic states against Russia (see Ojanen 2008).

Interestingly, the increasing EU and NATO focus in Finnish security and defence policy has also meant a decreasing centrality of the UN (Tiilikainen 2003) and a more flexible interpretation of the necessity of UN mandates. Here, we have another example of downloading that takes the form of legislative changes. The Finnish Peacekeeping Act was changed in 2006 into an Act on Military Crisis Management¹⁰ to enable crisis management led by the EU or other organizations without a UN mandate, and with a quicker pace of decision making and more robust forms of the use of force than before. The mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty is seen to require still further changes in Finnish legislation: the security and defence White Book of 2009 mentions the need for Finland “to reassess its capacity to implement the mutual assistance obligation” (Government of Finland 2009a: 65).

While restating the generally beneficial impact of the EU on Finnish security, the same White Book of 2009 (pp. 58–9) also reflects on new developments within the Nordic sphere and in particular on their efforts at intensifying their mutual foreign, security and defence policy cooperation. It mentions the intention of extending common efforts beyond crisis management cooperation to include defence forces’ activities, such as naval and air surveillance, logistics, training, research and analysis as well as defence matériel cooperation. Such proposals were put forward in early 2009 in a report commissioned by the Nordic ministers for foreign affairs from Thorvald Stoltenberg. Interestingly, they also included a proposal for a Nordic mutual defence commitment (Stoltenberg 2009). Politicians in Helsinki would still seem to prefer multilateral commitments, both in the EU and NATO contexts, to any new binding regional initiatives, but at some point these might be combined.

Conclusions

We started this chapter by claiming that when speaking about the impact of the CFSP or the ESDP on Finland (and vice-versa), one needs to take into account that the CFSP that influences Finland is one that has been to some extent shaped by Finland itself. Our second point of departure was the aim of assessing to what extent Europeanization is a matter of picking and choosing. In other words, we were looking at uploading and downloading, and at the degree of choice in both.

The discussion above shows how the Europeanization perspective is clearly helpful in fathoming the momentous changes in Finnish foreign policy after the Cold War. It also reveals that for Finland, by and large, the focus has been on downloading. Arguably, the process of downloading started as soon as Finland decided to apply for membership; this was particularly relevant to the redefinition of security and defence policy, and to changing the policy of neutrality. With EU membership, new geographical issue-areas and policy questions were added to the Finnish agenda, resulting in a foreign policy that has become much more “global” in its outlook.

On the degree of choice in these processes we must note that as a semi-permanent outlier in Europe, and in all likelihood a permanent frontier state,

Finland clearly has a keen interest in the EU's neighbourhood policies, especially with regards to Russia. It is also keen on the preservation and even further development of the CFSP/ESDP. Yet on questions about an eventual common defence, Finland is cautious. For a continued development of the ESDP will mean a continued downloading of certain European interests, concerns and policies.

As for uploading, while Finland has been active it is difficult to pinpoint any undeniable successes. The Northern Dimension initiative can be considered a qualified success since it did get adopted by the EU at the end of the 1990s and continues to be operational today. In practice, however, sub-optimal operations have somewhat taken the gloss off its success. More generally, Finnish attempts at uploading have been largely defensive, seeking to hinder or at least to deflect certain developments especially in the field of ESDP. Finnish behaviour in this respect carries a hint of a difficult member state, although the country usually tries to go out of its way to showcase its constructive and reliable credentials.

If the institutional setting remains more or less fixed, what might change are the fields in which uploading takes place. In the future, it might take the form of inserting Nordic cooperation in the field of security and defence into the EU framework as an example of regional cooperation across the Union's outer borders, perhaps even as an example of structured permanent cooperation. What would be new here is, first, the pragmatic deepening of security and defence cooperation to include, for example, air and maritime surveillance and, second, openings on how to include non-EU countries in cooperation in more ways than just contributing to EU missions. This might then be of interest for the overall development of the ESDP.

If regionalism increases, and if more Nordic countries join the Union, then the Nordic framework might also become more prominent in fields outside of the CFSP. Raunio and Saari (2009), when looking at the divisions inside the Union in other policy fields, such as economy, administration, or social policy, conclude that the most obvious reference group for Finland would indeed be the Nordic countries, together with the Netherlands. To a degree these trends would seem to enhance the Finnish retreat from Brussels towards more regional and even national approaches.

There have also been chronological ups-and-downs in the process of Europeanization. During the early years of Finnish membership, the focus was clearly on the effective downloading of certain key issues and policies in order to qualify as part of the "core" of the Union. Around the adoption of the Nice Treaty in 2000, however, the situation changed somewhat with a growing appreciation of the increasingly competitive nature of the EU – a view that has only been accentuated after the Big Bang enlargement of 2004. To date, the Finnish response has been an increasing emphasis of its national interests combined with attempts at identifying the right internal coalitions of the member states with which they could be best promoted.

The same fluctuation over time can be detected in individual policies. For example, initially the Finns aimed at Europeanizing their Russia policies in full. More recently, however, the pressures for an enhanced bilateral approach have

grown. As a sign of this in April 2009 the Finnish Government adopted a Russia Action Plan to enhance the effectiveness of all Russia-related activities, both in the bilateral and the EU contexts (Government of Finland 2009b). To be sure, this should not be construed as the abandonment of EU level policies – Finland has too much at stake in its relationship with Russia to allow that – but it does mean that we can expect a stronger national role when it comes to Russia and indeed the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood in general in the future.

In conclusion, what we can thus observe are clear pendulum swings between Europeanization and emphasis on continued distinctive national features. The achievement of membership in 1995 meant a swing towards Europeanization, but the pendulum would then swing again five to six years later. It will be interesting to see whether in the future the pendulum of Europeanization will swing back yet again. In April 2009 the Finnish Government adopted a Report on EU Policy (Government of Finland 2009c). The report is striking in its firm emphasis on the Community method and its calls for deeper and further integration at the EU level. In stark contrast to the national emphasis visible in recent years, the Report outlines a vision of the Union’s future up to the year 2020 with a view to turning it into an increasingly effective and, in part, even a supranational international actor. It is too early to tell whether this is a sign of real long-term change. Thus far, however, EU membership has not really led to any profound identity change for Finland – so much has the pendulum swung back and forth in foreign policy that the changes seem almost to cancel each other out.

Notes

- 1 The authors would like to thank Teemu Palosaari for insightful comments and Savino Ruà for excellent research assistance.
- 2 Finland’s accession is discussed in Kuosmanen 2001, Chapter 20.
- 3 Available at www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf, last accessed 26 June 2009.
- 4 A parliamentary committee on the revision of the constitution was set up in 2008 to eventually propose further changes in the constitution on these issues. Its conclusions in 2010 included the proposal to add an explicit mentioning of Prime Minister being the representative of Finland in meetings of the European Council. (See Finnish Ministry of Justice 2010.)
- 5 But see Nokkala 2008 which has studied the perceptions of the Finnish defence establishment concerning Russia.
- 6 To be sure, “Finlandization” was first and foremost a political term, invented to be used in the domestic tussles within the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970s. Analytically perhaps the most useful definition has come from Mouritzen (1988: 2) who defined it as “adaptive acquiescence” where a weaker power endures certain infringements by a larger power in order to preserve a key set of certain values. In the case of Finland, these included independence, market economy and democracy; and the overall ability to seek closer ties and integration with the West, despite the strong presence and interest the Soviet Union had over Finland.
- 7 Later on Aho remarked that the event was far from comfortable, although the reception on the Russian side was understanding and not hostile (Pursiainen 2000: 72–73).

- 8 Some Finnish observers thought that the Common Strategies were a clever political trick to allow for the possibility of qualified majority voting in the second pillar (Haukkala 2008a).
- 9 In essence, Russia had blocked the entry of Polish meat into its market since November 2005, citing quality concerns and uncertainties of the origin of meat products. Poland, however, saw this as a purely political move and sought to put pressure on Russia by blocking the commencement of the post-PCA negotiations on the EU level. The meat ban was lifted only in December 2007. See also Chapter 10 in this volume.
- 10 In Finland, peacekeeping has been subject to special legislation basically due to the political circumstances at its start, in the 1950s, when it was important to keep national defence clearly separate from committing military forces for international operations.

10 Poland

Learning to play the Brussels game

Karolina Pomorska

Introduction

Poland's accession to the EU marked for many Poles a symbolic end to an era of Soviet dominance. It was preceded by efforts to build a democratic, independent state, and served as legitimization for the changes and reforms that were implemented after 1989. This transformation process was often perceived as Poland's 'return to Europe', successfully achieved in 2004, and had a profound impact on the political, economic and social dimensions of public life. Striving for EU membership, Poland had to fulfil a number of entry criteria and adopt a body of EU legislation; here the 'impact of Europe' is most clear. However, there were other, less tangible effects in many spheres of politics, such as foreign policy. This chapter seeks to explore the impact that EU enlargement, and later membership, both generally and through participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has had on Polish foreign policy.

As a prominent Polish intellectual expressed, 'Poland has 1000 years of history, but it does not have a yesterday to which it is possible to refer' (Mieroszewski 1970: 328). Indeed, from the end of the eighteenth century to 1918, the Polish state did not even exist on the map of Europe; it was repeatedly partitioned between Russia, Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Due to the partitions, which lasted for 123 years, Poland's first experience in modern and independent foreign-policy making came only in the 1920s and 1930s. The foreign policy pursued by the government still remains a matter of controversy among Polish historians and political scientists, mostly because of the events that followed in 1939. During the war, the Polish government existed in exile, first in France then from 1940 in London, and was recognized by the Western states (Davies 2005: 361). It also conducted diplomatic relations with third-party states, even with the USSR from July 1941. However, it was excluded from negotiations in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam which decided the post-war order and the future of the Polish state.

Poland regained its formal independence in June 1945. However, Russian troops were still present on Polish territory, the new authorities were the protégés of the USSR and Poland was cast into the Soviet zone of dominance. Polish foreign policy after the war was based on the rejection of the principles of the Second Republic (for more, see Biskupski 2000: 132). Only after 1989 did Poland

regain full sovereignty, both nationally and internationally. After the resolutions of the 'Round Table' and the semi-free elections, central Europe welcomed its first post-Communist Prime Minister when Tadeusz Mazowiecki took office in September 1989. Even though the Communist Party was given the posts of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Internal Affairs in the newly established government, it did not succeed in gaining control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The credit for this belonged to Mazowiecki himself, who considered this sphere of policy as of major importance, 'an instrument to rebuild independence and Poland's image as an independent state' (Vinton 1995: 31).

It is clear that Poland has experienced tremendous change in its domestic and international environments over the past century. More recently, while it went through numerous transformations, government crises and economic ups and downs, its partners were undergoing rapid changes as well. A brief glimpse at the changing map from 1989 reminds us that all of Poland's neighbours would also undergo profound change after the Cold War: the two German states unified, Czechoslovakia splintered into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while to the east the former Soviet Republics gained independence as Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Belarus. At the same time, in the words of Weydenthal (1994), Poland 'suddenly found itself on its own as the alliances and ties were weakened or destroyed'. And the EU itself went through a significant number of changes, to mention only the Treaty of Maastricht and the enlargement of 1995. It soon turned out that Poland was to join an organization quite different from the one it wished to join after 1989.

Like other contributions in this volume, this chapter looks at both the impact of EU membership on Polish foreign policy (national adaptation) and at the impact of Warsaw on EU foreign policy. Because Poland has only been a member for a short time, the study does not only investigate the impact on policy outputs, but also the influence Poland had on the agenda of the EU foreign policy. The timeframe of this study does not start when Poland joined the EU, but from a few years earlier. As changes related to Europeanization did not happen overnight, the chapter includes the period of accession negotiations and active observer status, which Poland obtained in April 2003.

Furthermore, this chapter looks both at the procedures and the substance of Polish foreign policy. In order to understand better not only whether 'Europe matters', but also to analyse *how* it matters, three mechanisms are identified behind the changes: conditionality, learning and socialization. It is important to make a qualification that in conceptual terms none of them equates with Europeanization: they are not necessary conditions for it to take place and not in every case do they lead to or are followed by Europeanization processes. These three mechanisms play an important part in the Europeanization of Polish foreign policy at different times: conditionality works prior to the active observer period and the enlargement, while socialization and learning impinge at a later stage. Following the general structure of the book, the chapter has been divided into two parts: uploading and downloading. Institutional change is discussed in the first part, which focuses on national adaptation to CFSP. Policy substance is then analysed in the section on

uploading, including Polish and EU approaches to the Eastern neighbours (specifically Ukraine, Russia and Belarus), plus transatlantic relations and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).¹

Downloading

National adaptation, or the ‘downloading’ dimension of (top-down) Europeanization has been understood in the literature as the reception of norms and policies at the domestic level (see the Introduction in this volume). Here, it implies a change in the substance or procedures of Polish foreign policy. In fact, it was best observed in the case of the latter. This is probably due to the nature of foreign policy, where there is no automatic convergence among the member states and no legal adaptational pressures. This does not mean there is no effect on policy substance at the national level, but that it is less tangible, especially in the case of newcomers to the CFSP, and it is difficult to detect. It is suggested here that for effective uploading, first a member state has to undergo a process of institutional adaptation (downloading).

The Europeanization of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

EU membership posed an enormous challenge to the Polish MFA, arguably greater than to any other ministry.² Normally, such an organization, faced with an adaptational challenge, would search in its own past for lessons to be learnt. However, the organizational past was very limited in the Polish case. Apart from the substantial lack of tradition in modern foreign-policy making, the participation in CFSP was a complete novelty for the Polish MFA. Therefore, many lessons were drawn either from others or from its own mistakes (learning-by-doing). As a former Polish Permanent Representative to the EU pointed out, EU requirements produced a ‘cultural shock’ in Poland’s public administration, particularly in the following three areas: the decision-making process; the professionalism and the stability of the civil service; and the high standard required of technical and information systems (Grela 2003: 43). Unlike participation in negotiations within other multilateral organizations (such as NATO or the UN), the CFSP affects the whole of national foreign policy and the whole of the MFA through its wide geographical and issue-related spectrum.

The earliest change was organizational; it began even before the active observer period and was caused mainly by conditionality. It involved creating new departments dealing with the EU (DUEiONA, later DUE, Department of the European Union) and the unit responsible for CFSP. Also within the territorial departments of the MFA, the positions of desk officers responsible for CFSP matters were created. Europeanization could similarly be observed in the establishing of new posts (or adding new functions to existing positions), such as those of the European Correspondent, his/her deputy, the Political Director, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassador.

Active participation in the CFSP meetings required teamwork and information-sharing between officials from different units and departments. Both of these processes meant substantial changes in the way the work was organized and information, circulated. As one Polish diplomat noted, the greatest challenge was to convince officials in the MFA that they should start acknowledging the necessity of working in a multilateral rather than a bilateral environment, and their main problem was to learn ‘European thinking’.³ The administration was slowly accepting the new modes of day-to-day work, such as communication via email or informal contacts between experts. The experts themselves were pushed to take greater responsibility, as the dynamics of EU work do not leave time for passing every decision up to the highest ministerial level. Thus, the decision-path was shortened and very often the decisions and responsibilities remained at the lower levels.⁴

Next to the MFA, the role and organization of the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels has changed. Two sub-sections were created in the External Relations section: one dealing with CFSP and one with ESDP issues. When Poland gained the status of active observer, the number of people in the Permanent Representation tripled and new coordination mechanisms were introduced. The rhythm of work changed substantially and was adapted to the work of the EU institutions, particularly the Council of the EU. Furthermore a system of preparing instructions in the capital, getting them authorized, sent on time to Brussels and then punctually reported back to the MFA by the representatives had to be implemented. The coordination system for the EU and CFSP-related issues was established first to manage the accession negotiations and later to facilitate Polish input to European policy process.

Europeanization has also meant modernization in technical issues and everyday work management. Electronic mailing systems were introduced to officials who had never used them before, indeed, the Polish administration was not used to the electronic exchange of documents as such. As one diplomat put it, ‘CFSP made people learn how to use Microsoft Outlook’ (see Pomorska 2007). New communication systems were installed, first the EU-32, then Associated Countries Network (ACN) and finally the COREU Terminal System (CORTESY). Regarding the internal working organization and culture, EU membership and the establishment of DUE resulted in a clear generation gap within the MFA. This gap seemed even more significant than the varying political orientations of the officials. The CFSP was mostly dealt with by young diplomats, who brought some revolutionary changes with them.

The EU has started to be perceived as an institution that the Polish MFA is part of, rather than something ‘alien’. This is mirrored in the language used, for example, in the informal and public discourse, where officials no longer refer to the EU as ‘them’. There is also less calling for action from a position of an outsider, but more pragmatism underpinned by an understanding that Poland has become one of the states responsible for the EU’s policies and their implementation. Finally, Brussels has become a valuable source of information and analysis (both from the EU institutions and other member states), via the CORTESY network.

This development revealed another advantage of CFSP and proved to many MFA officials that European foreign policy was based on expertise that Poland could never possess acting alone. On the other hand, it changed the context in which national foreign policy was formulated, by providing some fundamental information.

National representatives in Brussels as ‘change agents’

A direct result of Poland’s participation in CFSP meetings has been a growing gap between the officials posted to Brussels and those in the capital. This situation also exists in the case of the old member states and is sometimes referred to as national representatives ‘becoming Brusselized’ or ‘going native’. It can lead to them being accused in their capitals of having ‘betrayed’ the national interest (Spence 2002: 24). As one official from the MFA admitted, the most difficult learning process concerned the informal aspects of negotiations in Brussels, as the formal issues were ‘relatively easy to grasp’.⁵

National representatives in Brussels, even at the level of experts, have an impact on the procedures and substance of the national foreign policy and take an active part in the process of Europeanization. They often act as ‘change agents’ in their national capitals, initiating changes at the domestic level. One mechanism fostering their influence is the provision of instructions and advice to the capitals, which may lead to the institutionalization of the lessons learnt. It may take different forms: in some cases it is reporting back from the meeting, providing feedback and contribution to non-papers and other policy documents or assisting the higher ranking officials in the meetings and advising them on the strategy of pursuing national goals.

In the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU, Polish diplomats certainly got to know ‘the rules of the game’. They discovered a certain ‘code of conduct’, which also included informal rules of behaviour. These rules were more difficult to grasp for the officials from the capital, who did not participate in the meetings, or did so less often as Brussels-based officials. It took time before some officials in Warsaw understood that the EU needed to be present *throughout* the MFA. Nowadays, some diplomats in the capital are ready to admit: ‘(w)e are aware that European policy influences the national policy as a whole, so we have to create it together’.⁶

The national representatives in Brussels have undergone intense processes of socialization during the Council meetings and have begun the learning process. Consensus building and the coordination reflex are among the most important behavioural norms. As one Polish representative testified:

This esprit de corps, it really exists. People know each other privately, invite each other to meetings ... talk on various topics and that leads to the emergence of some sort of community, you can call it a community of thinking or common perception of some problems Meanwhile, in the capital it is perceived in a slightly different manner.⁷

The change in their behaviour during the meetings became apparent to the other participants and was reported by officials from the EU institutions, one of whom referred to the new member states in general and their manner of addressing their colleagues in the Council meetings: 'they make things softer, they gained some confidence and friendship with the other colleagues so they feel confident to present things less radically than their capitals might wish, but at the end they get more results'.⁸ They would also often signal to Warsaw how far it could press for a favourable solution and when such actions would endanger the state's credibility among its partners. In this respect, the experts in Brussels had an important impact on the strategies that Poland chose, providing legitimacy to new ideas, based on their newly-gained expertise inside the Council. The consensus-oriented nature of negotiations in the EU was an important lesson for all levels of decision making in Poland.

Downloading and the substance of foreign policy

Thus far, national adaptation in relation to policy substance has been rather limited. It took place mostly before the enlargement and was related to the fact that Poland, like all other candidate states, was obliged to adopt the so-called *acquis politique*. In the CFSP chapter of the accession negotiations, some change was required of Poland, for example in the cases of the legal framework related to the use of EU sanctions, abolishing contacts at high political levels with Belarusian officials, or introducing visas for Ukrainian citizens.

In the active observer period, Poland was often asked by the EU-15 to align with EU declarations on foreign policy. A direct result of the political dialogue and alignment procedure was a broadening of the territorial interest of the MFA. It was made to consider issues and prepare positions regarding regions in which it had no significant involvement, such as Latin America. This was later strengthened after joining the EU and with attendance at the geographical Council Working Groups. Otherwise, a very short period of membership does not allow for identifying any *substantial* change in national interests. There were shifts in strategies and on several occasions the Polish position on certain issues would not be fully disclosed, but rather explained with the use of 'Eurospeak'. But this does not imply that there was a real change at the level of long-term strategic interests. This will be discussed in the next section of the chapter.

Poland and ESDP

One policy where a change of approach after EU accession was visible is ESDP. Polish diplomats have persistently emphasized that ESDP should be strong, as this would allow the EU to become a real partner for the US in the area of defence. It is a widespread view among Polish decision-makers that not only Polish, but also European security is mostly dependent on the United States, as stated by former Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz: 'Europe needs the United States not only as a partner in solving problems and tackling external threats to its security,

but also for stabilising the European system' (Cimoszewicz 2003). This belief in American efficacy creates doubts over whether there is any sense in creating a European force, which would not be able to act without American help. At the same time, some claim there is no contradiction in developing defence capabilities of both organizations so as to improve their efficiency.

Still, it can be argued that the Polish attitude towards ESDP has become more pragmatic. The latest National Security Strategy (MFA 2007) mentions the EU framework, next to NATO and the alliance with the US, as guarantees of Poland's security. Even before accession, in March 2003, the Polish government decided to contribute its troops to the first military operation in the framework of ESDP – operation Concordia in the Republic of Macedonia (17 soldiers). Poland also contributed to Operation Althea (190 soldiers) and EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (6 police officers), EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (131 gendarmes), EU BAM, EUJUST LEX in Iraq [Poland was the only one among the new member states contributing to this mission (Fidos and Pomorska 2007)]. Poland also participated in the EU-coordinated action leading to the reinforcement of UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006 (500 soldiers) and the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (28 staff). In November 2006, Poland formed the so-called battle group – together with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia – that became part of the modern rapid reaction forces of the EU. The Polish government also declared its willingness to form an additional battle group, together with France and Germany, which will become operational in 2013.

For the Polish military, the strategic goal of improving ESDP capabilities also serves as an impulse for the modernization of the Polish army in general and rapid reaction forces in particular (Ziolkowski 2007). When EU Defence Ministers decided to launch the first joint research programme in November 2006, Poland was the second largest contributor, pledging €10 million to the budget of €54 million.⁹ The two decisions prompted positive comments from Javier Solana and other EU officials (Fidos and Pomorska 2007). Finally, CSDP and crisis management are among the priorities of the Polish Presidency in the Council of the EU (scheduled for the second half of 2011). All of the above clearly shows that ESDP has become an important element of Polish perceptions of the European security system and that Poland, despite an occasionally reluctant political discourse, has become an enthusiastic participant.

Uploading Polish foreign policy objectives to the EU's CFSP

In contrast to the record on national adaptation, this section shows that Europeanization occurred more in relation to policy substance than to procedures. This is because there is hardly any current evidence for institutional 'uploading' (perhaps with the exception of the influence the newcomers had on informal norms in the Council). However, procedures are still often mentioned here as it turned out that the key to understanding policy 'uploading' was in the Europeanization of procedures and norms that increased the effectiveness of promoting national foreign policy goals in Brussels. The section deals first and

foremost with the priorities of Polish diplomacy within the EU: that is, policy towards the Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) as well as that towards the US. It is argued that over time there was a shift in Polish strategies of promoting national interests in Brussels and that there is evidence of some successful ‘uploading’, such as in the case of the Orange Revolution. Nonetheless, the change is more visible when it comes to setting the foreign policy agenda – where Poland has successfully managed to insert some issues – than in the actual output of European foreign policy.

Uploading: policy towards the EU’s new Eastern neighbours

Any analysis of uploading efforts undertaken by Polish diplomacy in Brussels must take into account the policy towards Poland’s (and the EU’s) Eastern neighbours. It has been clearly identified as the number one priority for the Polish contribution to the Union’s external relations. Thus far, Poland has undoubtedly managed to put Eastern Europe more often on the Council’s agenda, but in terms of shaping the policy itself, success has been rather limited.

Poland’s attitude towards the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been from the very beginning characterized by a high degree of ambiguity, as it did not reflect the Polish vision of deepening relations with Eastern Europe and the strategic goal of membership for Ukraine. This cautious attitude is present notwithstanding the fact that Poland, even before its formal accession to the EU, had been advocating its views on how the EU should develop a common policy towards the new Eastern neighbours (for more, see e.g. Buras and Pomorska 2006; Natorski 2004, 2007). The Polish stance was underpinned by a general feeling among officials and academics about the need to keep the EU’s doors open. They promoted the idea of creating the so-called ‘Eastern Dimension’, which was primarily explained in the non-paper of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA 2003a). The Polish Foreign Minister later spoke in favour of the EU having ‘a coherent, comprehensive framework of its Eastern Policy that should be flexible enough to enable the individual development of relations with each of the countries concerned without prejudicing their final formula’ (Cimoszewicz 2003).

Undoubtedly, a blueprint for Poland’s Eastern dimension was the Northern Dimension advocated by the Finns since 1997.¹⁰ The latter was mainly aimed at developing closer relations with Russia, but also states like Iceland or Norway (Browning and Joanniemi 2003: 466; and Chapter 9 in this volume). It has also been argued that the Spanish experience in promoting the EU’s Mediterranean policy was analysed in Poland with some lessons being drawn from its example (Natorski 2007). These initiatives were perceived in Poland as very successful, presenting a good opportunity to ‘upload’ the national foreign policy agenda to the European level (Buras and Pomorska 2006). Initially, Poland interpreted the Northern Dimension as a potential competitor for Polish initiatives, but after joining the EU one could observe a pragmatic shift in the strategy.

Table 10.1: Poland and the ENP (comparison of ideas)

	European Neighbourhood Policy	Polish stand towards the ENP based on the 'Eastern Dimension' and subsequent Polish ideas
Participating states	16 (South and East)	Restricted to Eastern neighbours
Membership prospective	Not included (no reference to art. 49)	Granted as soon as the states are ready as a strong incentive, without the EU's internal reform as a prerequisite
Incentives for reform	The major one: 'a stake in the internal market'	Economic but also political, including membership
Granting the aid	Linked to conditionality	Advocating a weaker link to governments' performance
Ukraine	Part of the ENP	'Loses out' and deserves a more privileged treatment; optionally exclude it from the framework (unofficial), reference to art. 49
Belarus	Relations frozen, practically excluded from the ENP	Include in the framework

Nevertheless, these first efforts at uploading by Warsaw resulted in failure. Their ideas were not incorporated into the documents outlining the ENP in 2004 (e.g. European Commission 2004). This may partly be explained by the fact that the Polish decision-makers and diplomats had not yet been given a chance to discover how to play 'the Brussels game'. Such insights may be fully gained only by active participation in the CFSP-making inside the Council of the EU. The Poles could not yet participate in the internal EU negotiations and were highly unaware of the formal and informal proceedings. As a result, lobbying over the Eastern dimension was to a large extent conducted via the formal channels.

After enlargement, Polish diplomats were assigned the goal of pushing the problems of the region up the EU agenda, as the Union was criticized for being ineffective towards Belarus, for its inability to solve the Transdnestrian conflict and for not doing enough to reduce the democratic deficit in Ukraine. Because of the misfit between the ENP and the Polish vision, this policy area provides an excellent testing ground for the 'uploading' capabilities of the Poles. As the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours were developed through the ENP framework, it soon became a central element in the lobbying game over the shape of future policy. The states listed in the Polish non-paper (MFA 2003a) remained the focus of Polish diplomacy, which continued to emphasize that it possessed the necessary expertise, which could be shared with its European partners. This was repeated in the Foreign Minister's *exposé* in Parliament in 2006 (Meller 2006).

The initial idea behind the EU's New Neighbours Initiative (NNI) of November 2002, involving just three states, was much closer to Warsaw's preferences than its successor, the ENP. As reaffirmed by an official from the Polish MFA: 'the ENP is now far from the ideal that was presented in 2002'.¹¹ In spite of that, Poland wished to represent the ENP as an initiative bringing the Eastern neighbours closer to the EU, but instead of stopping there, would lead to future membership. This was a very different perception from the initial assumption behind the ENP, which was supposed to be a policy that did not tackle the membership issue at all and was even perceived by some as a substitute for enlargement. Such a Polish vision was also in stark contrast to the interests of some of the older member states that did not wish to discuss any further enlargement to the East.

Still, the EU's attempt to develop a 'circle of friends' on its Eastern borders was warmly welcomed by Warsaw. Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller (2006) stated in his annual address to the parliament in January 2006:

We will seek to ensure that the emerging Eastern Dimension of the Union's Neighbourhood Policy draws the countries involved closer to the Union. At the same time, they should not be doomed to the role of 'eternal partners'. At least some of them – the ones with a pro-European orientation and advanced internal transformations – should be given the prospect of membership, however distant it may be.

The EU's reluctance to grant some ENP countries the prospect of membership (in line with the principle of differentiation) has been a major point of concern for the Poles. As one Polish official put it: 'the fact that the neighbourhood policy does not tackle the integration aspirations of the respective countries from outside the EU is its weakness' (Cieszkowski 2004: 108).

Polish lobbying led to the Eastern Dimension concept being discussed again in mid-2006. The desirability of using one *common* framework was questioned in the light of the inability to find *common* solutions regarding technical matters on a wide range of issues related to visa facilitation, free trade areas, flow of capital or finally the European perspective. The initiative of creating an Eastern Dimension had been discussed within the Visegrad Group since the summer of 2007. In December, the European Council Conclusions invited the upcoming Presidencies to work on the development of 'both southern and eastern dimensions' of the ENP (European Council 2007a: 21). This was welcomed very warmly by Polish diplomacy as a promising start of a differentiated approach to the Eastern neighbours of the EU.

Finally, the Poles and the Swedes tabled a joint proposal at the GAERC meeting on 26 May 2008 for the creation of the so-called 'Eastern Partnership' (EaP). The initiative was mainly 'cooked' in the two capitals, lobbied from there and benefited from a personal engagement of the two member states' foreign ministers. Such a partnership, according to the proposal, should be based on the ENP, but also on the principle of differentiation. It is aimed at six Eastern neighbours of the EU: Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. In the long term,

the approval for the initiative could serve the Polish goal of opening the door for prospective EU membership for its Eastern neighbours, finally differentiated from the EU's Southern neighbouring states. As emphasized by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, the countries encompassed by the initiative were 'European neighbours', while the countries in the South were just 'neighbours of the EU' (Lobjakas 2008). Additional impetus to the initiative was given by the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 and the EU's response during the Extraordinary European Council in September 2008. In December 2008 the Commission released a communication (European Commission 2008) that eventually led to an Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague in May 2009 (see Council of the EU 2009). As admitted by the Polish officials, their proposals were more modest than revolutionary, with the initiative having a political meaning. As consensus among the member states is needed to change anything on issues related to visas or accession prospects, the 'step by step' approach was preferred, while the main novelty may be seen in encouraging multilateral cooperation between the countries in the region.¹²

Going to the Orange Revolution with the EU: policy towards Ukraine

The EU's engagement in the 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine is often cited as a major success of Polish diplomacy inside the Union and a proof that Poland is able to make a constructive contribution to the EU's foreign policy. At the same time, the aftermath of the events was a disillusioning experience for the Poles, who did not manage to 'upload' their strategic national interests to the EU level.

The governmental non-paper (MFA 2003a) identified an important strategic goal of Polish foreign policy: facilitation of prospective EU membership for Ukraine. For the time being it proposed that the existing agreement with Ukraine be upgraded to Association Agreement. As stated by the former Foreign Minister: 'without such a prospect [Ukrainians] would be devoid of perhaps the strongest possible incentive to pursue further difficult reforms' (Cimoszewicz 2003). This is closely related to 'upgrading' the level of EU-Ukraine relations to the level of EU-Russia contacts. As will be shown later, this goal was first advocated and then, due to lack of consensus among the EU member states, 'shelved' until the right occasion.

The official Polish position states that Ukraine should be allowed to negotiate its entry to the EU 'as soon as it is ready to do so'.¹³ Poland does not consider the condition of the Union's capacity to accommodate new members as necessarily contrary to, for example, the position of France. As Polish diplomats argue, such a condition was not required when the decision on Polish accession was taken, and the internal reforms in Ukraine could always follow the political decision to enlarge the EU. The membership prospective of Ukraine is considered as potentially a very effective incentive for internal reforms.

The unexpected events in Ukraine, prompted by the presidential elections in November 2004, proved to be the first real test of whether Polish decision-makers

would decide to take part in the events on a solely bilateral basis or whether they would go to Ukraine ‘with Europe’. It ought to be recalled that Europeanization is usually least expected in relation to countries or issues of special national importance for the member states. There are examples of ‘ring-fencing’, in other words, retaining the issues as national ‘*domaines réservés*’ (Manners and Whitman 2000a: 11 and 266). This could be expected to happen with Polish-Ukrainian relations and particularly in the way in which Poland dealt with the Orange Revolution. Such ‘ring-fencing’ would be an argument against the Europeanization of Polish foreign policy.

For more than a decade, Poland had established good contacts in Ukraine, including advisors to political parties, and therefore had access to reliable and updated information. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski was asked to facilitate the talks by both sides of the conflict on 23 November 2004 (Kwaśniewski 2004). He went to Ukraine on the request of President Leonid Kuchma and Victor Yuschenko, with a three-fold mandate: find the right formula to repeat the elections, conduct a political dialogue, and achieve a full renunciation of the use of force (Kwaśniewski 2005). Incidentally, Kuchma owed Kwaśniewski a favour, as the latter had continued to talk to him during the infamous Gongadze-gate (Wilson 2005: 138). Later, the Polish President made a famous phone-call to Javier Solana and convinced him to get involved in Ukraine.¹⁴ The High Representative held emergency meetings with the member states to learn about their approach to the situation. Generally, as one official claimed, Solana enjoyed the trust of the member states, so his participation in the mission was an assurance of a balanced approach.¹⁵

The willingness to ‘internationalize’ the events in Ukraine and involve the EU may be understood in different ways. First, the involvement of the EU was perceived as a ‘legitimizing’ factor for Poland’s national foreign policy. As Europe became involved, the Polish action could no longer be perceived as the mere pursuit of Polish geostrategic goals. The Poles used the EU as a means to amplify a policy central to its national security (for other examples of such instrumental use of the EU, see Manners and Whitman 2000a, concluded at pp. 262–3). At the same time, however, they intended to raise their profile within the EU. As Kwaśniewski (2005) explained, even though some member states were irritated that Poland supported the Ukrainian case so strongly, at least they appreciated that Poland was ‘not just one of the new member states that was busy only arranging its offices in Brussels – they also knew how to behave in this new environment’.

Such perceptions were confirmed not only by external observers (e.g. Schneider and Saurenbach 2005: 3) but also by a statement from a much lower level of decision making, the Polish expert from the Council Working Group. This clearly shows that ‘uploading’ was an important matter for the Poles in the case of Ukraine and the Orange Revolution. The EU was perceived by decision makers as an important forum in which to raise the problem, instead of just dealing with it at the national level; such a perception is an important element in the Europeanization process. It also illustrates, once again, Polish ambitions to be an

important 'player' in the Union's policy towards the East. Establishing the working link between the European forum and their own national policy may well have reaffirmed the already prevailing belief among Polish officials that the CFSP should be treated as an opportunity for national foreign policy. In this regard, as asserted by Geoffrey Edwards (2006), 'the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a turning point, leading many CEECs to take the CFSP and the High Representative seriously'.

As a direct aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the Poles and Lithuanians tried to step up their long-term strategic goal and bring the issue of prospective membership for Ukraine to the table. As early as December 2004, Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz called for a clear membership offer to be made to Ukraine (Roth 2007b: 57). However, the idea still had too few supporters within the EU.¹⁶ Even though most reactions to the Polish role were positive, there were those who accused the Poles yet again, of "revanchism in Europe" (Normann 2007: 171) and "acting under the US influence", as the President of the European Parliament put it in private (Wilson 2005: 190).

After the failure to launch a powerful European response to the Orange Revolution, Poland accepted that Ukraine's prospective membership was off the table and it seemed that the strategy of 'small steps' and active promotion of medium-term goals had prevailed. The strategic goal of Ukrainian EU membership still remained unchanged, but the Polish side did not want to irritate its European partners and was waiting for the right moment to bring the issue back to the discussions. Meanwhile, Polish diplomats have focused on the following goals: strengthening the political and security dialogue between the EU and Ukraine; support for granting Ukraine Market Economy Status (MES) as soon as possible; launching the negotiations on the FTA and the new agreement that would in time replace the PCA, and advocating visa-facilitation. The FTA, according to the Polish view, should slowly prepare the Ukrainians for prospective participation in the single market. This proves that there has been a shift in the strategies, caused by unsuccessful previous initiatives and acknowledgment of the prevailing rules of negotiations and lobbying for one's interests in Brussels. Once again, one can observe Europeanization in the domain of negotiating *behaviour* rather than in changes to the strategic goals of national foreign policy.

In sum, Polish participation in the Orange Revolution was one of the biggest successes of its Eastern policy to date. However, the aftermath remains a mixed record for the Poles with a rather disillusioning experience of not being able to convince their partners to grant Ukraine membership prospects. It was also a painful lesson in how foreign policy was made in Brussels – as long as there were states opposing any initiative it would not have any chances of success. At the same time, the events showed how the CFSP was perceived by the Polish elites and how they tried to use it in pursuit of national policy goals. The public discourse reveals the belief that the European platform can provide legitimacy and sometimes also 'weight' to the national policy. Even though, as shown by the example of Ukraine, it comes with the cost of compromising one's own goals, the trade-off was perceived as worth accepting.

The Polish veto and Russia

Despite the fact that EU-Russia relations are considered crucial to Poland's foreign and security policy, Poland has not yet had any considerable, constructive impact on the Union's approach to Russia. Polish efforts inside the EU were predominantly aimed at changing the perceptions of Russia held by some older member states (Kaczmarek and Smolar 2007) or, recently, at activating and improving bilateral relations. Still, probably the most visible aspect of Polish influence on the EU's policy towards Russia was the Polish veto on the mandate for the European Commission to negotiate a new EU-Russia agreement at the end of 2006. It has been often cited as evidence that Polish foreign policy has not been 'Europeanized'. The veto was a reaction to the ban on Polish meat and plant products that Russia introduced in November 2005, and to the failure to reach an agreement with Russia regarding the EU Energy Charter. One Polish official stated that blocking the mandate for EU-Russia negotiations proved that in defence of its national interest, Poland was able and prepared to use any available mechanisms in the EU (Banat-Adamiuk 2007). The veto put a halt to the EU-Russia negotiations for more than a year and was only lifted in early 2008, after a change of government in Poland.

It can be argued that the veto incident was an exception to the rule in the conduct of Polish policy within the EU, and was characteristic of the Jarosław Kaczyński government, in power between 2005–2007. From the Polish perspective, the whole affair was an attempt to invoke solidarity among the member states and the Commission, which is responsible for external trade, in the event that one of the Union's members is mistreated by a third actor. As argued by the Polish Ambassador to the EU, although Russia may want to develop a strategic partnership only with certain member states and not with the whole Union, and tries to split the EU over disputes such as the meat trade, it 'has to treat its EU partners on equal terms and according to commonly agreed rules' (Europolitique 2007).

On the other hand, while recognizing some valid arguments behind the Polish stance, many actors in Brussels perceived going as far as blocking the mandate for the EU-Russia negotiations as proof of Warsaw's complete misunderstanding of 'how things really work' in Brussels. It was seen as a clear breach of the informal 'code of conduct', based predominantly on the culture of consensus and 'keeping everyone on-board' (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). It is often emphasized that the Permanent Representation in Brussels did not have any power, that its diplomats lacked any flexibility, and that there were strong tensions between it and the national capital. This has led directly to losing credibility among the European partners, many of whom admitted that Poland's internal isolation is a 'nightmare scenario' for any member state.¹⁷ Others have pointed to the fact that the decision to use the veto was aimed primarily at the EU, where Poland wanted to be treated as an equal partner (Podolski 2006: 5). Even if so, the strategy chosen was not in line with the generally respected norms in Brussels. This was later also acknowledged by Polish diplomats themselves, who insisted that the cause was

right, but the form was wrong.¹⁸ The situation was resolved as a result of the parliamentary elections in 2007 and the victory of the Civic Platform. In terms of Europeanization, it can be argued that as far as the experts and diplomats in Brussels learnt the ‘ways-of-doing-things’ and became Europeanized, the same cannot be said about the highest levels of decision making in Warsaw. In this sense, the lessons learnt have not yet been institutionalized, that is, translated from the individual to the organizational level.

Reducing the misfit: approach to Belarus

Another example of Polish diplomats trying to upload their policy onto the European level is relations with Belarus. Polish policy prior to accession was divergent from the official EU stance. The Poles have always responded emotionally to the EU’s approach to Belarus, repeatedly criticizing the EU for not doing enough. According to many Polish officials, a crucial factor influencing the Union’s policy towards Belarus is its interconnection with Russia, and many of the EU member states have formulated their policies towards Belarus, as a function of their policies towards Russia (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2005: 91). The Poles see it as a mistake and a constraint on the EU’s policy, which remains very passive. Meanwhile, the perception of security in Poland revolves around the role of Russia in the region. In this respect, the increasing interest of the member states in Belarus is in line with Poland’s security interest, often understood in geopolitical terms as counterbalancing Russia in the region and prompting a more critical approach to Russia by other member states (e.g. see Kaczmarek 2009: 2).

The most important issues that Polish diplomats have attempted to promote in the EU are: providing stronger support for political opposition, including specific persons; introducing more flexible instruments for financing aid programmes; increasing people-to-people contacts, especially through visa facilitation for Belarusians travelling to the EU; expanding the visa ban on the authorities and those responsible for election fraud or repressing the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB). But these goals notwithstanding, there seem to be some clear tensions in the Polish position towards Belarus and on occasions some of the goals are contradictory. On the one hand, the Poles are eager to retain some form of formal contacts and avoid isolating the neighbour, but on the other, there is strong pressure for ‘punishing’ the undemocratic regime and not compromising on human rights. The latter tendency was strengthened especially after the undemocratic conduct of elections in Belarus in 2006.

To explain the motivation behind policy uploading, the reasons for the existing ‘misfit’ are explained first. Some policy adaptation (downloading) took place in the area of formal contacts between the officials. It was EU policy that contacts at the ministerial level would be avoided, whereas this was not respected by the Polish side before joining the EU. Nevertheless, after accession this rule had to be fully implemented as part of the *acquis politique*. Still, Poland retained its view that official contacts were profitable in the case of such a centralized country and especially in the case of a neighbouring state. Therefore, the Poles began a

diplomatic campaign to change the EU's policy and 'soften' its approach. Polish officials clearly saw the practical advantages of retaining formal contacts, but at the lower level, and developing cooperation with mid-level officials and local authorities.¹⁹ The 'uploading' efforts brought results when the Council Conclusions from 22–23 November 2004 (GAERC 2004) were negotiated. Poland argued against abolishing ministerial contacts completely and in favour of merely minimizing them, which was accepted by the other member states.

Polish diplomacy has also played the card of solidarity within the EU in the case of Belarus. Once a member, their expectation was that the other member states and the Commission would provide them with support in the event of conflict with third parties. In practice, this did not seem to come automatically. This may be illustrated with the example of the harassment of the UPB²⁰ and the way the problem was successfully elevated by Polish diplomats to the discussions in the Council of the EU in autumn 2005. The Polish elites saw the necessity of involving the international community in what could be also perceived as a bilateral conflict. Raising the case to the EU level was perceived as a good opportunity to pursue this goal, but some of Poland's European partners did not share the view that bilateral issues should be reflected at the EU level. Therefore, it became a challenge for Polish diplomacy to portray the events and the issue as something important for EU-Belarus relations and for human rights, rather than a bilateral issue over the rights of the Polish minority in Belarus.

In the course of drafting the text of Council Conclusions for that meeting, the Poles wished to have a stronger reference to oppressing civil society and particularly wanted to mention the UPB in the text. In spite of the initially negative response of the Presidency, the Poles subsequently argued in the Council that the case should not be considered by the EU as a minority issue, but should rather be seen in a broader context of human rights violations by Lukashenka's regime. Polish diplomats decided to launch a broad lobbying campaign in support of the case. The final version of the adopted Council Conclusions' text read: 'The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Belarus closely and will revert to it in January 2006. It also underlines its concern at the harassment of civil society organizations, including the Union of Poles in Belarus' (GAERC 2005a).

Regarding the effects of the 'uploading' efforts, the impact of the Poles on the overall policy of the EU towards Belarus is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, some EU officials are quite optimistic about it and one of them stated that 'it is fair to say that we would not have a policy towards Belarus, whatever that could be, if not for the fact that we have the Poles and Lithuanians sitting on this side of the table'.²¹ A similar statement was made by another EU official, who claimed that before the enlargement there was a 'complete stalemate' in relations with Belarus, whereas later the situation started to change.²² Analysing the exact policy output does show that Belarus appeared more often on the political agenda and the EU started to deliver responses to the events taking place in that state. In 2008, a Commission Delegation in Minsk was opened and a series of official visits followed. A Belarusian representative was also invited to attend the Prague Summit in May 2009 to inaugurate the Eastern Partnership.

A 'Trojan horse' in the house? Poland and transatlantic relations.

Prior to enlargement, probably the greatest fear related to Polish membership concerned the future of ESDP and transatlantic relations. This was only amplified by the division of Europe over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Poland was sometimes called a potential US 'Trojan horse' in Europe, which would put halt to the development of European security and defence. Due to the nature of US-Polish relations, considered very sensitive in Poland, Europeanization was not usually expected in this field. However, it is argued here that there has been a notable change in Polish attitudes since accession.

Even in 2000, while still engaged in EU accession negotiations, Poland had sparked irritation among some Western European capitals by speaking its mind on the development of ESDP. The Poles repeatedly insisted on consulting the US and favouring NATO's European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), as being more representative (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003). For Western European commentators such scepticism towards the ESDP was an echo of Washington's approach (Dunn 2003: 150). Poland's military guarantees of security were first and foremost sought in the US and some Poles asked: 'Is it strange that till Europe reaches some potential of guaranteeing its own security we want America to remain engaged in Europe?' (Ostrowski and Safuta 2003).

Such a policy led the French president Jacques Chirac to label Poland 'an American Trojan Horse in Europe, building its independent military capabilities',²³ (Zięba 2001). The Polish president described the criticism as simply 'unjust' (Vincur 2002). In contrast, Poland sees itself as a bridge of understanding between the EU and US. The Polish approach to the US has been analysed often in terms of 'moral commitment' (Rotfeld 2006: 299) or 'instinctive Atlanticism' (Zaborowski 2004: 7). On the other hand, some Brussels-based diplomats referred to the Europe-US dilemma as a Polish 'schizophrenia', which could partially be explained by the blind faith in Poland that it should follow in the steps of the UK's reluctance to use EU channels, when the bilateral US-Polish relations are perceived to be flourishing.

For most of the Polish elite, strong Polish-US relations should automatically translate into better transatlantic relations and as such be appreciated in Europe (MFA 2003b). In a similar tone, it was believed that giving active support to the US in Iraq enhanced Poland's position in Europe (Rotfeld 2003). It was emphasized that Poland had been often ignored in the past by its European partners and perceived as a 'second priority' state that 'has the right to remain silent and makes use of that right'. This was bound to be changed in the light of the Polish contribution to the Iraqi intervention. The political-military involvement with the US was considered as an 'insurance policy', in case of any future threats to Polish national security (Rotfeld 2006). As described by a Polish diplomat in Brussels, by strengthening its 'American' foot, Poland wants to gain a stronger position in Europe, whereas strengthening its European credentials is still not seriously taken into account.²⁴

One more sensitive issue that reinvigorated the debate on Poland's staunch pro-Atlanticism is the US missile shield. The Bush administration wished to place a

military base with interceptor missiles on Polish territory. Kaczyński's government (2005–2007) was very enthusiastic about the idea, in what some observers called 'a slave-like attitude towards the US' (Longhurst 2008), while it was the government of Donald Tusk that has taken a tougher stance and finalized the agreement in 2008. As a result of the conditions voiced by the Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, Poland was to receive a battery of Patriot missiles on its territory. Polish diplomats have often argued that the issue was a matter to be discussed within NATO, rather than the EU.

Overall, regarding transatlantic relations, the admission of Poland did not introduce any new interests to the EU, but simply reinforced the already existing divisions. Therefore, a question of whether Polish policy towards the US became Europeanized is difficult to answer: Europeanized to what? In other words, it is a strenuous task to establish the independent variable in such a process. As regards ESDP, in spite of the very cautious rhetoric, Poland has not undermined or delayed its development, but on the contrary, it has been an active contributor to various initiatives arising from it.

Conclusion: not such an awkward partner after all?

Poland is still searching for its role within the EU, learning from its own mistakes and finding the best ways of promoting its interests in accordance with the 'rules of the game' set by the member states. For some time, its role inside the EU was characterized by what some called a degree of schizophrenia. On one hand, Polish governments were proud of the accession and emphasized its historical significance; on the other hand, suspicious towards Brussels, they would aim at maximizing the material interests and gaining support for their bilateral problems, as in the cases of Russia or Belarus (Kuzniar 2008: 279).

When trying to draw a balance sheet, most of the 'downloading' in foreign policy has been related to institutional change, while in terms of policy substance it concerned mostly the formal alignment with CFSP prior to accession. Regarding the latter, the focus has been on the most sensitive matters for Polish diplomacy: relations with Eastern neighbours and the US and the development of ESDP. There was a shift in the perception of CFSP among Polish officials and diplomats. As explained by one of them, in the beginning it was seen as something that Brussels was using to confront Polish foreign policy. Such a view was especially common among the older diplomats, whereas the younger generation seemed to be more open for change. Slogans like 'from Moscow to Brussels' mirrored some popular fears that state sovereignty in the domain of foreign policy, once lost to Moscow, could again be made subordinate, this time to the EU. Hence, the 'opposition reflex' described by one practitioner was closely linked to the issue of independence in policymaking.

Nonetheless, this situation has been changing with time and now CFSP is perceived as an opportunity rather than a constraint on national foreign policy. There are several reasons behind this shift. First, the discovery of channels and mechanisms of uploading. Even though the Poles were disillusioned that only

some of their ideas were taken on-board, they have experienced an active shaping of the policy of other member states, something they were unsuccessfully trying to influence prior to accession (for example in the case of the Eastern dimension, now the Eastern Partnership). They were also able to ‘internationalize’ some of their national problems and security priorities. An important role in the process of Europeanization was played by those diplomats who were posted to Brussels or at least attended meetings in the Council. They took the responsibility for ‘translating Brussels’ to Warsaw, and often signalled what would be the best strategy or the best moment to accept a compromise. In the analysed cases, the representatives remained in very close contact with the MFA, usually via the European Correspondent, making important suggestions on the conduct of negotiations.

The example of Ukraine has also shown that Poland is not going to ‘ring-fence’ its relationships with the strategic partners. On the contrary, Polish politicians decided to involve Europe and act through Europe, whether in the case of the revolution or providing support for Ukrainian WTO membership. This willingness to ‘go with Europe’ went quite far in the case of Belarus and the UPB. Here, as implicitly suggested by a few diplomats from other member states, Poland went even further than some other member states would usually go. It could be argued that as a result, the bilateral contacts and the minority issue – which would normally not appear on the EU agenda – were included in the European discourse and eventually the Council Conclusions. In the case of the Eastern policy the adaptation process also resulted in a change of discourse from a nationalist, even aggressive stance, to a more compromising tone. This process seems to be ongoing.

Nonetheless, the active position within the EU has not prevented Warsaw from pursuing its own agenda with the above-mentioned neighbours. This is in itself nothing surprising, as CFSP does not ‘override’ national foreign policies, but it is true that at times the two were not fully convergent. For example, the announced policy on the occasions of high-level formal visits to the Ukraine was not fully coherent with what Polish diplomats and experts presented inside the Council. Such situations were, however, quite rare. An interesting idea for further research, stemming from this conclusion, is whether it is possible that a member state acts in a ‘Europeanized’ way in multilateral forums while showing few signs of Europeanization when it comes to bilateral relations?

The actual impact of Poland on the policy of the Union has been a mixed record. Poland has undoubtedly increased interest in the region and ensured its place on the Council’s agenda with formal acknowledgment as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. There have been some examples of managing to convince EU partners to alter their policies, in the case of participating in the Orange Revolution, or maintaining limited contacts with Belarusian officials, or granting Ukraine Market Economy Status. Nonetheless, often the negotiations ended with disappointing results; for example, for a long time the EU did not create an independent Eastern Dimension, it did not make any special offer to Ukraine after the revolution, and the visa-ban list on Belarusian officials was not extended, just to name a few. Arguably, some important lessons were learnt from these failures, so that strategies and expectations were at least partially adjusted.

This chapter has often referred to the concepts of national (Polish) and European interests. For example, one possible effect of the Europeanization process on policy substance would be a possible change in (the perception of) national interest. Even though the empirical evidence does not support such a far-reaching hypothesis, it is apparent that there has been a change of context in which the Polish national interest is now formulated. Hence, in this study the European and Polish national foreign policies are not perceived in zero-sum terms. In practice, the process is much more complex and both policies seem to be complementing each other and exerting mutual influence on each other. In this respect, the findings are in line with the earlier research conducted by Ben Tonra, who concluded that ‘institutional coordination – common work practices and structures, a shared information base and the establishment of a common substantive agenda – set up a truly collective context in which a large proportion of national foreign policy is being formulated and pursued’ (Tonra 2001: 230–1). This involved the adaptation of procedures, caused by EU membership, such as the development of a coordination reflex or consensus-building practices at the EU level.

Finally, the Polish case tells us something about the Europeanization of foreign policy in general. While observed changes took place in matters of both procedure and substance, one should still ask the following questions: Does the Europeanization of one domain ‘spill over’ automatically to other domains? Is the Europeanization of one a precondition of change in the other one? Or does it simply ‘facilitate’ such a change? The empirical evidence gathered here points to the fact that a very basic adaptation of foreign policy procedures is necessary to initiate changes in foreign policy substance. This is because the member state needs certain institutional arrangements in order to be able to interact and participate in the CFSP. This involves, for example, using electronic forms of communication, installing the ACN (later CORTESY) or implementing a system of preparing and sending instructions to national representatives in the Council. Furthermore, the more institutional change follows and the better the member state adjusts (i.e. Europeanizes) its institutions and institutional practices (procedural downloading), the stronger the influence it may have on the substance of EU policies (substance uploading). In other words, the better the state understands the ‘rules of the Brussels game’, the better and more effective a player it usually becomes at the EU level. On the other hand, while the uploading brings some results and the EU policies can be transformed by a member state, its national policy is also being subjected to change at the same time.

While a logical conclusion to draw from the above is that the Europeanization of institutions facilitates policy uploading, it does not necessarily have the same effect for policy downloading. A member state may use its Europeanized institutions to strategically promote its policy goals at the EU level, while national foreign policy at its core remains largely unchanged. Indeed, such a situation may give a state greater confidence to pursue its own national goals in Brussels. In this case a member state would use the EU arena instrumentally, for promotion of its national foreign policy. The uploading in the case of policy substance is possible only after a member state becomes an active observer inside the EU and may be

successful *only* if the procedures were already Europeanized to some extent. This inevitably takes time. In the interesting case of Poland there has already been much interaction between the national and the EU fronts, but it is still too early to judge the long-term trend.

Notes

- 1 The chapter is based on the results of fieldwork conducted by the author in Warsaw and in Brussels (some 50 semi-structured interviews with diplomats and officials from EU institutions; participant observation in the Council), on official documents and speeches, and is complemented by the secondary literature. I thank all those who kindly agreed to talk to me, both in Brussels and in Warsaw.
- 2 This is due to the fact that it endangered the core and traditional function of the MFA as the ‘gatekeeper’ of the state’s external relations (Hocking and Spence 2002). Negotiations in the EU often relate to domestic policies, such as environment, energy or transport, which traditionally fall into the internal policies of the state, but are now coordinated with third countries outside of the state’s institutional structures. Hence, the boundary between what is foreign and what is domestic becomes blurred. The MFAs of EU member states often face the dilemma of either adjusting to the new system or losing their position and influence within the domestic decision-making processes.
- 3 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, May 2005.
- 4 Interview by the author, Brussels, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU, February 2005.
- 5 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, May 2005.
- 6 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, May 2005.
- 7 Interview by the author, Brussels, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU, January 2005.
- 8 Interview by author, Brussels, Council of the EU, January 2006. See also Juncos and Pomorska (2006).
- 9 This data comes from the official website of the European Defence Agency: www.eda.europa.eu.
- 10 One example is the institutional arrangement of the proposal and the use of an Action Plan. This draws from the Action Plan for the Northern Dimension (2000–2003), which was accepted in June 2000.
- 11 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, January 2006.
- 12 Interview by the author, Brussels, July 2009.
- 13 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, January 2006.
- 14 Interview by the author, Brussels, Council of the EU, January 2006.
- 15 Interview by the author, Brussels, Council of the EU, January 2006.
- 16 After the success of the Orange Revolution, the EU welcomed the election of the new president and stressed its ‘full support for President Yushchenko and the Ukrainian people’, claiming it was ‘pleased at the extensive and ambitious political reforms’ (GAERC 2005b). Still, it became apparent that ‘a large part of the EU ... seemed determined that nothing had changed’ (Wilson 2005: 190).
- 17 Interview by the author, Brussels, National Permanent Representation to the EU, January 2008.
- 18 Interview by author, Brussels, July 2009.
- 19 Interview by the author, Warsaw, MFA, January 2006.

- 20 The Union of Poles in Belarus is an organization with around 20,000–25,000 members, comprising all Poles living in Belarus, and was set up in 1990. Since 2005, UPB has been in conflict with the government, which did not recognize its new authorities. It was repressed by the Lukashenka regime and may be listed as one of the few incidents contributing to the worsening of Polish-Belarusian relations for several years.
- 21 Interview by the author, Brussels, European Commission, February 2006.
- 22 Interview by the author, Brussels, European Commission, January 2006.
- 23 This recalls the apprehensive attitude towards Britain when it was trying to join the EC for the first time in the 1960s, a move seen by General de Gaulle as more likely to serve US than European interests.
- 24 Interview by the author, Brussels, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU, February, 2005.

11 Slovenia

Searching for a foreign policy identity via the EU

Sabina Kajnč

Introduction

Slovenian foreign policy underwent significant adaptations in the decade before signing the Accession Treaty in April 2003, and since EU membership on 1 May 2004. This chapter analyses this top-down Europeanization as well as the contributions made by Slovenia (bottom-up Europeanization) in the development of European foreign policies (CFSP, ESDP, external relations) and defining the EU's policies towards the Western Balkans, Russia, China and the Middle East. As a small and new state (having declared independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991), Slovenia had barely established itself as an actor in international relations when the pursuit of the cardinal goal of joining the EU began to penetrate its foreign policy. On numerous issues, especially those beyond Slovenia's immediate concerns, the Europeanization of its foreign policy was not even so much about adaptation, as it was about formulation. Almost from scratch, Slovenia had to build and retain its own identity in the international community and establish itself in several foreign policy relations – beyond its immediate foreign and security concerns as one of the breakaway states of ex-Yugoslavia. This chapter argues that the EU (especially Slovenia's Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008, which kick-started Slovenia's active participation in European foreign policy) offered a unique opportunity for Ljubljana to consolidate its own position in the international community. Slovenia is an interesting case of a small and newly independent post-socialist state with just two million people, a new EU member yet rapidly establishing a post-Balkan identity and exploiting its special foreign policy relationships to shape the European foreign policy agenda.

The chapter is broadly structured to present two dimensions of the Europeanization process (i.e. top-down or downloading; and bottom-up or uploading), while the third, i.e. the socialization dimension, is synthesized in the conclusion. It is broken down into three parts. First, an introduction to the formulation of Slovenian foreign policy up to the signing of the Europe Agreement in 1996 describes Slovenian foreign policy organization and its major orientations prior to the EU accession process. In the second part, the adaptation of Slovenia's international trade and development co-operation policies as well as organizational adaptation and general Slovenian attitudes towards the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

are analysed. The analysis is illustrated by evolving Slovenian foreign policies towards China (where significant ‘mainstreaming’ and adaptations to European foreign policy can be observed) and Russia (showing a ‘Europeanization’ turn in conducting its foreign policy). The last part looks at Slovenian efforts to bring the Western Balkan region back to the top of the EU agenda and to steer European policy in the area, thus projecting its own interests and goals in the region into the European foreign policy-making arena.

Building up a state and its place in the international community

Slovenia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia after an overwhelming majority (88.5 per cent) of the population voted to establish an independent state in a 24 December 1990 referendum. Motivations behind the population’s and elites’ determination to pursue a future outside of Yugoslavia¹ were manifold, but three reasons that influenced its future foreign policy orientations stand out:

- 1 a growing disbelief in the ability of the Yugoslav state to transition out of the socialist political and economic system towards democracy and capitalist ‘prosperity’;
- 2 frustration over the feeling of political subordination in the Yugoslav federation (despite economically being the top-performing republic) and aspiring towards an ‘EC-type’ political system;² and
- 3 a wish to reorient its identity from that of an Eastern European and Balkan nation towards (Central and) Western Europe (cf. Bučar and Brinar 1994: 426–7; Bučar 1995: 282–3).

These reasons point to the most general foreign policy orientation, or ‘identity’ in world politics – that towards Western Europe and European identity. The main goals of the newly established state were to maintain economic relations with other states in the international community and to gain international recognition (Benko 1992: 3–4, Brinar and Kuhnle 1994: 19; Bučar 1995: 283). Guidance for the conduct of these tasks was to a certain extent provided by the foreign policy strategy adopted by the Slovenian parliament in March 1991, thus prior to formal independence (Bulletin of the Assembly 1991). The strategy was based on the presumption of a peaceful disintegration of the Yugoslav state. It called for:

- 1 friendly relations and the maintenance of economic and other ties with the Yugoslav republics;
- 2 issues of succession (of international treaties and other agreements) to be dealt with;
- 3 membership in European regional organizations, including the European Community;
- 4 special attention to be paid to the states of Central Europe; and
- 5 membership and activities in sub-national regional organizations.

The document set out the foreign policy goals in geographic terms and viewed regional and sub-national co-operation as a strategy to achieve these goals. The Law on Foreign Affairs, establishing the foreign policy machinery to manage these tasks, was one of the first laws of the independent country to be passed (Official Journal 1991: 29–36).

The 1991 Law on Foreign Affairs established a ministry in charge of foreign policy, stated its tasks and provided for the basic organizational structure. The initial units set up were geographically based ‘sectors’ in charge of bilateral relations with: neighbouring countries; the Vatican, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Macedonia; European and non-European countries; as well as units for multilateral politics and economic relations. This was soon changed, first by breaking down the ‘European’ sector into the sector for Europe and North America; while the ‘non-European’ sector was renamed the sector for ‘Africa, Asia, Latin America and Pacific’ in 1995. It was not until 1994 that a sector for international co-operation in cultural, educational and scientific matters was added as the first functional (and not geographically conceived) organizational unit (*Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* [henceforth ‘*Annual Report*’] 1992, 1995). A quasi-diplomatic network, crucial in pursuit of recognition, began to develop. Based on the 1991 foreign policy strategy the representative offices of the Republic of Slovenia emerged even prior to international recognition of the state and were later, following the establishment of diplomatic ties, reorganized into proper diplomatic missions (cf. Brglez 1996; Jazbec 1998, 2001: 173–89). By 1995 Slovenia had twenty-eight resident diplomatic missions, four missions to international organizations, and six general consulates (*Annual Report* 1995). The geographic dispersion of diplomatic and consular missions reflected the general orientation towards Western Europe and European regional as well as global organizations, but a close look at the number and rank of personnel does not allow one to draw further conclusions about Slovenia’s focus on regional or global issues (Brglez 1998: 62).

The so-called ‘10-day war’ with the Yugoslav National Army broke out following Slovenia’s declaration of independence on 25 June 1991. With a surprisingly skilled (public) diplomacy and a prompt engagement of the EC, the Brioni Declaration on 7 July, brokered by the EC, established a ceasefire and a three-month moratorium on Slovenian (and Croatian) independence. The 16 December 1991 European Council meeting in Maastricht agreed on the guidelines for recognition of the newly independent former Yugoslav republics, and Slovenian independence slowly gained international recognition.³ It was recognized first by Iceland, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany (the latter’s recognition entering into effect on 15 January 1992), the Vatican on 13 January 1992 and by the EC member states as a whole on 15 January 1992, following a positive report of the ‘Badinter commission’ on Slovenia’s fulfilment of the ‘recognition criteria’ (Genscher 1995: 946–8; Nuttall 2000: 207).⁴ It became a participating state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on 22 March, and a member of the United Nations (UN) Organization on 22 May 1992.

But newly independent Slovenia was not entirely inexperienced in international relations. As a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, it had gained some international experience by taking part in a very active Yugoslav foreign policy and could count on some of its own national diplomats serving in the Yugoslav foreign policy administration to join the new Slovenian diplomatic service (*Official Journal* 1991: 2–4). Slovenia was to some extent already an actor in the international community before being a subject of international law; while still in Yugoslavia it had played an active role in sub-national regional organizations, such as the Alps-Adria Working Community and the Assembly of European Regions (Bučar and Brinar 1994: 431).

Its foreign policy strategy focused on establishing international links in geographic terms and called for regional and sub-national co-operation, but was limited on the universal and issue-related goals in pursuing the national interest (Benko 1992: 4). The constitution of the independent Republic of Slovenia, promulgated on 23 December 1991, filled this void to a certain extent. The main part of the constitution is devoted to the protection of human rights, including the protection of the rights of Slovenian minorities in neighbouring countries, of Slovenian expatriates and migrants, thus setting the issue of human rights promotion as a guiding principle in Slovenia's international politics. The constitution also established the principle of the primacy of international law over the 'supreme law of the land' (Bučar and Brinar 1994: 429), but failed to delimit the competences of the executive and legislative branches of power in the field of foreign policy. This contributed to an uneasy situation in the foreign policy of Slovenia (*ibid.*), after the immediate goals of independence, international recognition and economic survival had been realized.

Given the changed security situation, including a perceived threat from the Western Balkans, where a war kept on waging, the previously adopted strategy could not guide the foreign policy of the state. The Foreign Ministry submitted a new and pragmatic foreign policy strategy to the Parliament in the beginning of 1992. Despite a positive recommendation of the Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee, the Parliament did not endorse the strategy on the grounds that it lacked proper identification of the strategic goals in foreign policy, and because it felt that a foreign policy strategy could not be adopted without a corresponding defence and security strategy (Bučar 1995: 287). In the context of a fragmented and ideologically overstretched Slovenian party system, with a recent armed conflict and a war only 60km from the state border, several options (from permanent neutrality, disarmament, armed neutrality, non-alignment to co-operation in North-Atlantic Co-operation Council, Western European Union and NATO membership) were discussed, but a security concept for the state was not reached (Bebler 1999: 126). Eight political parties won seats in the Parliament after the first democratic elections in 1992, but due to further splits, ten parties were represented in the Parliament by autumn 1993. The result was an ad hoc foreign policy, which sought the continuation of relations with new states that emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, while at the same time trying to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European

Economic Area (EEA) as steps towards EC/EU membership (Brinar and Kuhnle 1994: 19). At the same time the policy itself still focused on the formulation of Slovenia's position in the world, definition of its goals, and establishing bodies that could carry out the desired policies (Bučar and Brinar 1994: 431). Following UN and CSCE membership, Slovenia was admitted to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Regionally it acquired full membership in the Council of Europe and was active in sub-national co-operation schemes such as the Central-European Initiative, the Visegrad Group and Alps-Adria. Its security concept, however, remained unconsolidated. Although it maintained sporadic contacts with NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) at the parliamentary level, it was only in October 1993 that the Slovenian Parliament called for negotiations on NACC (North Atlantic Co-operation Council) membership (Bučar 1995: 290).

However, the 1991 strategy on foreign policy maintained its relevance as the clearest of all its goals – accession to the EC/EU – was closely associated with its flight from the Balkans (Benko 1992: 4; Bučar 1994: 1065). Slovenia first applied for EFTA membership as a step towards EU membership. Upon EFTA's decision not to enlarge (Brinar and Kuhnle 1994: 19), and due to Italy's use of its veto power, Slovenia could not sign a Europe Agreement until 10 June 1996. It submitted its membership application the very same day – the last applicant among the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) which joined the EU in 2004 (Brinar and Svetličič 1999: 819).

This initial period of establishing Slovenia as an international actor and finding its place in the international community resulted in its membership in most of the regional and global organizations, save the NACC and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but without much idea of what to do once a member (Brglez 1996: 62).⁵ Relations with the neighbouring countries were not settled to mutual satisfaction due to 'historical conflicts and complicated legal situations and partly to political problems caused by the newly acquired sovereignty' (Bučar 1995: 293). Absent a strategic vision or document guiding the policy and thus lacking defined goals, vacillation between universalism and regionalism can be observed with foreign policy administratively organized and conceived in geographic terms (Bučar 1992). The only thematic activity mentioned in the Foreign Ministry's annual reports up to 1995 was co-operation in the field of human rights protection, which can be attributed to both external requirements (as member in the Council of Europe, and observer in the Working Party for succession and humanitarian questions at an International Conference of the former Yugoslavia) and to the principled guidance provided by the constitution. Unclear relations between the executive and the legislature resulting from the rudimentary law on foreign relations, and missing guidelines on the recruitment of public servants and diplomats emanating from the conception of a foreign policy as a site for internal political trade-offs, led to a semi-incoherent foreign policy in organizational and conceptual terms. Both of these issues would be addressed by EU membership guidelines.

On the road to Europe: institutional and conceptual (re)formulations

After 1992, the government tried a second time to lay out a foreign policy strategy in 1995, by submitting a proposal for foreign policy guidelines to the Parliament. Though accepted with certain amendments in the first reading, negotiations to form the new government in 1996 prevented the second reading and adoption of the guidelines (Bučar 1997). Signing of the Europe Agreement in June 1996 soon followed and in October 1997 the government adopted a strategy for joining the EU, by means of which a fundamental framework for attainment of its primary foreign policy goal was provided (Government of Republic of Slovenia 1997). The evolving political *acquis* of the EC/EU offered an indirect but important reference for its other foreign policy pursuits (chiefly, boosting its international identity and consolidating a distinctive foreign policy identity).

The first years of Slovenian foreign policy formation ended with a rudimentary organizational structure of the Ministry, an ad hoc approach to bilateral issues, a foreign policy mostly limited to Europe and North America, membership in the major international political and economic organizations, and protection of human rights as the only visible principle in its global identity. The need to comply with the accession criteria, and to function properly as a state capable of representing its own interests in the EU, immediately challenged the state's administrative capacity in external relations, forced adaptations of its contractual foreign trade patterns, and broadened its activities in various functional areas, such as international development co-operation.

The first major change was a re-conceptualization of Slovenia's relations with the EC/EU, which was formally reflected in the organizational structures. The Government Office for European Affairs was founded in December 1997, headed by a European Minister without a portfolio, in charge of a leading role in handling European business and a horizontal inter-ministerial co-ordinative role. It took over the personnel, tasks and facilities from the former Office for European Affairs, which was an integral part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This move depicts an important shift from the conception of European affairs as 'foreign relations', to their systematic *internalization* (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003: 93). The previous (informal) co-ordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was abolished. In early 1998 a new European Integration and Economic Relations Division was established within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as a response to the establishment of the Government Office for European Affairs and a diminished role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in managing European business (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003: 100). The Foreign Minister was formally the chief negotiator in the accession process, but real power lay with the leader of the Negotiating Team, appointed in June 2001 as a ministerial advisor on European Affairs and based in the Office of the Prime Minister. When the then-European Minister, Igor Bavčar, decided to leave politics, the leader of the Negotiating Team, Janez Potočnik, became the European Minister in February 2002 and the post of the ministerial advisor on European Affairs was abolished (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003: 89). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of the

negotiating chapter on CFSP and took part in the chapters on external relations and EU institutions. The Ministry, however, retained a significant influence in the accession process through its diplomatic network and especially through the Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU (turned into the Permanent Representation after accession), which also fell under its jurisdiction.

Signing the Europe Agreement also brought a commencement of a political dialogue between the EU member states and the associated members from Central and Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus. The political dialogue included meetings at the level of working groups, political directors, foreign ministers and prime ministers and envisaged adherence of the associated members to the EU member states' joint declarations, démarches and activities within the UN, as well as co-operation in carrying out CFSP Joint Actions. From the very signing of the Europe Agreement (which entered into force on 1 February 1999), up until joining the EU, Slovenia, together with other associated members, took part in meetings at all levels, dealing with issues ranging from European security architecture and terrorism, to current issues in the UN and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Middle East peace process, the situation in south-east Europe, Kosovo, Russia and Belarus. Slovenia adhered to all but one of the declarations and démarches to which it had been invited; it made an exception with respect to CFSP declarations on the flight ban against Montenegro airlines. This decision was made in the context of Slovenia's general interest in maintaining particular economic relations with Montenegro (European Commission 1999). In autumn 1999 the ACN (Associated Countries Network) was established, a telecommunication network connecting associated countries with the Secretariat-General of the Council, enabling faster and more efficient co-operation in the field of CFSP, especially in aligning Ljubljana with démarches, Common Positions, declarations and Joint Actions.⁶ The number gradually grew from adhering to twenty declarations in 1996 to a peak of 159 declarations and Common Positions in 2001. The meetings were regular at all levels (including the new posts of European correspondent and a Political Director), including discussions on several issues within the scope of CFSP for officials from the accession countries (*Annual Report 1996–2003*).

The positive account of Slovenia's adherence to the EU's CFSP instruments is not surprising. The Commission's screening process in the field of external policies (trade, development and CFSP) resulted in a generally favourable opinion of Slovenia's ability to comply with the Community's and Union's *acquis*. In the field of international trade the necessary steps to be taken were adoption of, and adaptation to, a number of multilateral WTO agreements to which the then EC was a party, with the most pending issue being the adoption of legislation for control on dual-use goods. On development, Slovenia was to adapt its trade rules to those of the EU governing trade with signatories of the Lomé Conventions, and to set up a budget and structures for development policy. On the issue of CFSP, however, no other adaptation was seen to be necessary, apart from the above-mentioned adoption of legislation on export controls of dual-use technology. The State programme for the acceptance of the *acquis* of the European Union, however,

envisaged the need to adopt the new Law on Foreign Affairs to comply with the Union's arrangements in the fields of diplomatic and consular protection, co-operation with third countries and international institutions, the implementation of international sanctions, and the adherence to international treaties (Government of Republic of Slovenia 1999). In preparation of the negotiating positions for development co-operation, the programme acknowledged the need to build the policy virtually from scratch. But the trade issue presented the country with its most significant test. Slovenia's negotiating position was to request a ten-year transition period after joining the EU to adjust its trade agreements with some of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia and BiH).

Slovenia signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 30 October 1994 and in consequence automatically joined the WTO in 1995. By 1996 it had adopted most of the WTO agreements, but had yet to accede to the plurilateral Civil Aircraft Code, Government Procurement Agreement and Agreement on Trade in Information Technology Products. While acceding to these three agreements was not seen as problematic and indeed happened as scheduled, the bigger challenge was presented by the need to apply the Community's Common Customs Tariff and the external trade provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy. Slovenia's average applied tariffs prior to accession talks were 10.6 per cent (EC: 5.3 per cent) on all products, 13.6 per cent (EC: 9.4 per cent) on agricultural products, 7.4 per cent (EC: 12.4 per cent) on fishery products and 10.0 per cent (EC: 4.2 per cent) on industrial products. Further, upon accession Slovenia was to become party to the Community's various preferential agreements, which meant that preferential agreements between Slovenia and third countries, in general, had to be terminated on accession. Slovenia had over thirty bilateral free trade agreements in place by 1997, including agreements with Macedonia and Croatia, and was engaged in trade liberalization talks with BiH, which all allowed for more favourable treatment of these countries in Slovenia's market, than the treatment they had in the member states' markets according to their agreements with the EC.

Adjusting to the *acquis* within the common commercial policy was a matter of gradual alignment, technical expertise and the administration's ability to follow the 'moving target' of the commercial policy by setting up the necessary legislative and technical capabilities to take over the EC's measures upon accession. But applying tighter measures on trade with Croatia, Macedonia and BiH, was a politically and economically painful issue. Imports from these countries represented 15 per cent, and exports 7 per cent, of Slovenia's total international trade, and had been rising steeply since the end of hostilities in 1995. Slovenia defended its demand for the ten-year transition period, beginning with the accession, with economic, political and security arguments. It claimed that the sharply increasing trade would be beneficial for the economies of all the countries, and that this would forge closer ties among nations recently hostile, but with previously interdependent economies. This would enhance security in the area (Government of Slovenia 1998a). Although these arguments were in line with the EU's general aims and its other policies in the region, such exceptions to the

common commercial policy could not have been accepted. Still, Slovenia insisted on the request for the ten-year transition period for another two years. It succeeded, while still a non-member, in presenting its arguments at the EU technical level groups, which were later taken into consideration in the EU's negotiations with Croatia (Government Communication Office 2001). After the start of the Stabilization and Association Process for the new Western Balkan countries, Slovenia finally changed its negotiation position in May 2001. It knew that its voice had been heard and that, once in the EU, it would be able to participate in the negotiations. It gave up its demand for a transitional period and expressed its hope that acceptable solutions would be found within Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the countries in question (Government of Slovenia 2001). Two years of lobbying succeeded in Slovenia being allowed to sign new bilateral trade agreements (which would expire upon accession), with BiH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It provisionally closed the negotiations on the chapter, as the last of the Luxembourg group countries.

As a transition country, Slovenia lacked a fully-fledged development co-operation policy, as it was not a provider of international development aid, but a recipient. The setting up of a development co-operation policy that would allow Slovenia to participate actively in the EU's development co-operation called for a tectonic shift in the state's self-perception of its role and identity in the international community. The first step was only natural in terms of pursuit of its immediate national security interests. Slovenia became a donor to the rebuilding of BiH, shortly after the Stability Pact for South-East Europe (SP SEE) was launched in 1999. Slovenia's joining the Stability Pact was problematic in terms of its efforts 'to escape the Balkans' (cf. Bojinovič 2005: 16; Bučar 2001: 144).⁷ If it was to take part, it necessarily had to be 'on the other side' – as a provider of security, as part of Europe and the rest of the world helping the region – and this necessarily also meant as a donor. Slovenia contributed to rebuilding BiH despite lacking a previously designated budget for such activity (European Commission 2000) which points to a consensus in the government on the importance of this donation in terms of Slovenia's international identity. Thus, it was taking part in the SP SEE that made a crucial change in the (elite's) perception of Slovenia, from that of an aid recipient to that of an aid donor. In the coming years Slovenia's development co-operation was concentrated in the Western Balkans, with small scale co-operation in programmes of international financial institutions and UN multilateral programmes in 2002 (European Commission 2002). The progress, however, was very slow. The Unit for Development Co-operation within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established only in May 2002 and the necessary standards, enabling Slovenia gradually to increase its Official Development Assistance (ODA), were adopted only upon accession to the EU. The main argument for the slow progress during the accession talks was lack of funds, but a more likely reason is the absence of a foreign policy strategy, which would have ensured the allocation of funds in line with a defined and agreed policy.⁸ Following accession to the EU, Slovenia's disbursements were still concentrated in the Western Balkans (through various bilateral, European or other forums), but its

donations to international institutions' programmes diversified (*Annual Report* 2002, 2003, 2004). The Law on International Development Co-operation was finally adopted in June 2006 (*Official Journal* 2006: 7526). It stated the main goals of Slovenia's international development co-operation, which mirrored the Millennium Development Goals in principles, financial provisions and control. The actual working out of priorities and modes of Slovenia's engagement in international development was entrusted to a Resolution to be adopted by the Parliament. The Law, however, stated that the Resolution needs to be in line not only with Slovenia's Strategy for Development, but also with the agreed common goals of the EU's international development co-operation (Government Office for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2005). The Government strategy, which forms the basis of the draft resolution, was prepared in 2007, including a long-term projection of the increase in funding to meet EU targets for new member states of 0.17 per cent by 2010 and 0.33 per cent by 2015 (Mrak *et al.* 2007). The Resolution was finally adopted by the National Assembly in July 2008 (*Official Journal* 2008: 10329). It differentiates between programme and project-type co-operation and it singles out the geographic areas with which Slovenia will co-operate, as well as stating the principles for thematic priorities. Western Balkan states are the first priority area and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the second. Slovenia's engagement in international development will either be in co-operation with other EU member states, or in other multilateral forums (Bučar and Udovič 2007). The guiding principle in choosing a particular issue-area is the need to follow the agreed guidelines within the EU, UN and other international organizations. The focus on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia is understandable following Slovenia's Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2005 and its activities in implementing the Central Asia Strategy of the European Union as President of the Council in the first half of 2008. It is primarily viewed as an area where the states will slowly enter a democratization and transition process that will require similar aid and technical support as that received by Slovenia, and which Slovenia itself has been providing to Western Balkan states since 1999. However, no concrete projects or programmes or strategies to take part in the EU level projects have been made so far.⁹

While it took roughly a decade for Slovenia to frame its development co-operation policy, foreign policy in the wider sense, that is, issues pertaining to CFSP and ESDP on the EU level, took off in the second half of the 1990s. Slovenia took part in SP SEE, it engaged in co-operation on regional security, globally it continued its support for human rights and it engaged in international disarmament talks. After the wars in the Balkans came to a close, the debate over the security concept and strategy of Slovenia emerged again.

In the course of the Balkan wars in the first half of the 1990s other possible security strategies slowly faded away and joining NATO gradually became the top option favoured by Slovenia's political elites. In 1994 Slovenia was included in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and became an associated partner in the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA). In January 1996 it began to participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (succeeded in May 1997 by the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC). Slovenia's desire for NATO membership was clearly expressed in a decision adopted by the National Assembly in April 1996 stating that 'the Republic of Slovenia wishes to ensure its fundamental security interest within the framework of the collective defence system, enabled by NATO membership' (Government of Slovenia 1998b). The issue was not undisputed, especially among the expert community. 'Pro' and 'contra' arguments abounded, the former being focused on joining NATO being a sign of "Europeanness", in terms of taking up the responsibility to co-shape the international system and participating in democratic decisions on the issue (Bučar 1998). Although public support was worryingly low, the political elite decided to pursue NATO membership.¹⁰ After failing to achieve an invitation at the 1997 Madrid NATO summit (when the Alliance decided to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic), Slovenia was finally invited to join at the NATO Summit Meeting in November 2002 in Prague. Slovenia held parallel referenda for joining the EU and NATO and with a rather low turnout of just over 60 per cent, a majority of the voters (66 per cent) voted in favour of joining NATO.

With parallel accession endeavours for the EU and NATO, memberships which were understood as asserting Slovenia's new international identity and giving it a greater say in international politics, while also taking part in the European Convention, it was only natural that Slovenia presented itself as a strong supporter of a more communitarian CFSP/ESDP. In the course of the European Convention Slovenia's support for the CFSP's instruments was extended into advocating its institutional development. It supported proposals for QMV in the CFSP, the post of the European Foreign Minister, and strengthening the ESDP. In the case of the latter the government clearly made its support conditional on two main principles: that the strengthened ESDP did not duplicate NATO structures and that it was inclusive, i.e. based on equality of all members (Government of Slovenia 2003; Kajnič 2003). The prevailing view of the ESDP, however, was that of providing the EU with capabilities to act as a regional security actor, primarily in the Western Balkans. Thus ESDP would take the burden from NATO in the Western Balkans and by doing so, support NATO in its global endeavours. Slovenia expressed support for, and contributed forces and equipment to, Operation Concordia in Macedonia and the European Union Police Mission in BiH (Jazbec 2007: 101–13). After the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a successful carrying out of Operation Concordia and a takeover from the SFOR by the EUFOR-Althea in BiH, Slovenia began to attribute to the CFSP and ESDP a global role in fighting terrorism and preventing nuclear proliferation, and an enhanced EU role in the Mediterranean basin and in the Middle East.

The latter can be understood in the growing sense among some elites that the Mediterranean presents the other part of Slovenia's identity, in addition to being a central European country (Government of Slovenia 2002). The pursuit of a Mediterranean identity, which found its formal expression and recognition among European partners in the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in June 2008 in the Slovenian coastal town of Piran, can also be seen as a subtle gesture to the Southern or Mediterranean members of the EU in terms of building

of coalitions within the EU, but it also has its roots in Slovenia's policy towards the Middle East. The policy towards the Middle East emerged fairly early, as the first policy towards a region not in its immediate neighbourhood. It is a policy based on the principle of a consistently balanced approach towards Israel and the Palestine Authority, as shown by the balanced diplomatic ties and regular official visits to both sides.¹¹

At the same time the decision to pursue membership in NATO shifted a hitherto predominantly European orientation into a Euro-Atlanticist stance. Combined with the non-permanent seat in the UNSC in 1998–1999 and the prospect of OSCE Chairmanship in 2005, Slovenian foreign policy was becoming ever more global, with a growing consideration of the United States in Slovenia's foreign-policy making, but also an awareness of a need for a global positioning with such powers as Russia and China.

Relations with China were established early upon independence. The pursuit of recognition by Beijing had intensified in the search of the UNSC permanent members' support for Slovenia's bid for a non-permanent seat in the SC in 1998–1999. A balance was achieved whereby Slovenia, a fervent promoter of human rights protection, continuously supported a ban on weapons exports to China, but respected the 'one China' policy. The balance, however, came under question soon after joining the EU, as the softening in the discursive tone of Slovenian elites on the question of lifting of the arms embargo can be traced. While Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel stressed at the GAERC in January 2004 that the EU needed to insist on respect for human rights, in April 2005 he conceded that the embargo had been imposed due to a specific historic situation that had changed. In this light he supported the lifting of the embargo, but slowly, with no rush and under certain conditions, namely continued dialogue on human rights, Chinese endorsement of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, elimination of capital punishment, freeing of political prisoners and stabilization of relations with its neighbours, particularly Taiwan (STA 2005a). At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' *Annual Report* for 2004 included EU-China relations and acknowledged that Slovenia's relations with China were henceforth part of the larger EU-China relationship. The *Annual Report* for 2005 talks of human rights and arms embargo in relation to China exclusively in terms of an EU-level foreign policy. One could almost sense a relief that Ljubljana could shuffle off the difficult balancing of relations with China onto the EU level.

A growing impact of the EU can also be seen in Slovenia's relations with Russia. Bilateral relations have historically been very good, with thriving economic ties and no outstanding bilateral issues. But relations with Moscow were put to a test during the Slovenian Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2005. Slovenia took on the OSCE Chairmanship at a time of an ongoing political and budgetary crisis in the OSCE and diverging views between the Western participants (mainly the US) and Russia, on the role and reform of the OSCE (Šabič 2005). In its programme Slovenia declared its goals in the slogan of 'revitalize, reform and rebalance'.¹² The search for consensus, the lowest common denominator that still allows the OSCE to perform its mandate, was recognized as a central focus of the

Slovenian Chairmanship. But while Slovenia started out in the role of mediator between Moscow and Washington, this soon developed into what careful observers described as a growing Russian unease with the Chairmanship.¹³ The mediating role further faded away with an ever bigger engagement of Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel, in the hitherto ignored (or frozen) problems of Central Asia (Kajnc 2005). The search for consensus and the sense of solidarity was diminishing and according to sources within the Slovenian Foreign Ministry, consultations with the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General Javier Solana were not envisaged.¹⁴

On the other hand, the Slovenian EU Presidency performed much better in obtaining a negotiating mandate in the Council for the Commission to replace the outdated Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russian Federation (one of the goals of Slovenia's Presidency). After Poland lifted its veto (see Chapter 10 in this volume), Lithuania's reservations were the last obstacle to granting the mandate and thus launch negotiations at the EU-Russia Summit at the end of the Slovenian Presidency. Slovenia's motivation was extremely high as the Presidency had experienced an uncomfortable turn in its relations with Russia. Prior to the Slovenian Presidency, the Russian administration declared that it was 'psychologically' important for a Slavic government to hold the Presidency (*Die Presse* 2008). Later, on the issue of Kosovo's independence, a Russian diplomatic representative to the EU depicted Slovenia 'as rather a problem' (*Der Standard* 2008). By achieving a mandate, the Slovenian Presidency had a chance to end its term on a very positive note. After failing to persuade Lithuania at the April GAERC meeting, Foreign Minister Rupel embarked on a strong, if not aggressive, diplomatic mission to achieve unity among the twenty-seven member-states or, more accurately, to bring Lithuania closer to the compromise acceptable to the other twenty-six. Rupel met Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vaitekunas and Prime Minister Kirkilas in Vilnius together with his Swedish and Polish counterparts Bildt and Sikorski, and they reached an agreement on the wording of the mandate. Barely two days later, on 13 May 2008, the Council, at the level of Permanent Representatives, again failed to agree on the mandate, with the Lithuanian Representative asking for time to consult with the capital. The agreement was finally reached at the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on the 26 May 2008 and the negotiations were launched at the June EU-Russia Summit. The unusual combination of the three foreign ministers – Swedish, Polish, with a Slovenian in the Presidency role – raised some eyebrows among the EU member states, but as the issue was an EU internal matter and thus did not represent an external representation format (e.g. Troika), it was not considered to be a violation of formal or informal rules.¹⁵ But it showcased Slovenia's multilateral efforts to achieve consensus (Kajnc 2008).

In little less than a decade between 1995 and EU accession, the evolution of Slovenia's foreign policy also influenced the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It gradually evolved into a complex structure, reflecting various trends in Slovenian foreign policy – the process of accession to the EU, the consolidation of the security question by aspiring to enter NATO, and a growing

engagement in global politics, spurred by political dialogue with the EU member states and by the non-permanent seat in the Security Council (1998–1999, and over which Slovenia presided in August 1998 and November 1999). On the eve of accession, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was organized in so-called divisions, which were divided geographically and thematically. There were sectors covering neighbouring countries and South-East Europe; Africa, Asia and Latin America and Pacific; North America, Western, Northern and Central Europe; and Eastern Europe. Issue-related responsibilities were divided into sectors for questions of international law; multilateral politics; international cultural relations; European integration and economic relations; and NATO. A special unit to cover CFSP and ESDP was established within the sector in November 2000. The ESDP sector was later joined with the security policy sector.

This form of organization requires comment. The geographically defined sectors were based on Slovenian foreign policy as it had developed since independence, but did not correspond to EU or CFSP realities: the sector in charge of the neighbouring countries included member states of the EU, candidate states and Croatia and south-east Europe, while the sector covering all of Europe except for Eastern Europe included member states, candidate states and western European states outside the EU (i.e. Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland). The functional or issue-area related sectors indicated two characteristics of Slovenia's foreign policy. First, it revealed a somewhat narrow understanding of what the thematic areas were. The internal organization covered only the issues of international law, cultural and economic (including European integration) relations and multilateral politics. Second, an interesting conception of the organizational approach to European integration and security can be observed. The shared responsibility within the same sector for European integration and economic relations reflects a persistent perception of the nature of the EU – primarily that of an *economically* integrated region, responsibility for which falls under the larger sector of promoting bilateral and global economic relations. Security as an issue-area, though evidently covered in the scope of relations towards neighbouring countries and especially towards South-East Europe, can only be attributed to the Division for relations with NATO (Kajnič 2005).

The organization of the Ministry's work is a reflection of the conception of foreign policy priorities and goals. In the second half of the 1990s, after the path to EU membership seemed irreversible and the wars in the Balkans came to a close, the debate over Slovenia's security strategy emerged again, resulting in an awkwardly managed bid for NATO membership. Failing to receive an invitation to join the Alliance at its summit in Madrid in 1997, the time was ripe finally to adopt a foreign policy strategy. The Parliament adopted a 'Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia' on 17 December 1999 (National Assembly 1999), outlining Slovenian foreign policy goals and strategies, which were reaffirmed in the Government's 'Appropriate foreign policy' document in 2002 (National Assembly 1999; Government of Slovenia 2002). The two documents steered Slovenian foreign policy until accession to the EU and NATO

and officially still do today, as no official Parliamentary or governmental document replacing it has been adopted. The fundamental priorities of Slovenian foreign policy, as proclaimed in the 'Declaration' were accession to the EU and NATO and the settlement of outstanding issues following the establishment of a new state with neighbouring countries. In the two documents the two goals of accession to the EU and NATO do not appear in a hierarchical relation. They are then followed by the strategy on relations with European countries and with the United States of America; South-East Europe; and the rest of the world. A reference to 'global and regional politics' concludes the 'Declaration'. In the 'Appropriate foreign policy' the framework for Slovenian foreign policy is conceived in so-called 'horizons' or (concentric) 'circles'. It differentiates between the horizons of the EU; NATO; South-East Europe; Arab states and Israel; and eventually the horizon including Asian, African and Latin American states. Both documents thus organize foreign policy in concentric circles, understood still in geographic terms. Not only does the scope of Slovenian foreign policy show some limitations but the interest is also shaped by an awareness of the limits of Ljubljana's reach.

Following EU accession, the Ministry's organization changed dramatically, indicating a wholesale adaptation of its work to the frameworks of the EU's external relations and the CFSP in geographic (defying its limited reach) as well as thematic terms. In the geographically based divisions, the direct effect of the CFSP following EU membership is evident. In September 2004 the Ministry re-organized in line with the three big Directorates-General covering European issues and bilateral relations; policy planning and multilateral politics; and international law and the protection of interests (including sectors covering international legal matters and diplomatic and consular affairs).¹⁶ The new geographical divisions in the Ministry after the re-organization, especially the later change, show significant alterations due to EU membership (but also a somewhat belated change). While the previous organizational dispersal of relations with the countries of Europe is now ordered according to the EU's logic, the rest of the world is also more differentiated; i.e. Slovenia previously had no need to cover relations with certain parts of the world, like the Caribbean, or to differentiate Central Asia from the rest of Asia. The new pattern clearly follows the EU's external relations and the new scope of Slovenian foreign policy, conceived as part of the CFSP. The Directorate for policy planning and multilateral politics is subdivided into sectors covering international relations and human security, security politics, the OSCE, international development co-operation and humanitarian aid, economic diplomacy and policy planning and a research sector. Compared to the Ministry's previous organization, the new level of attention paid to security and human security issues is noteworthy. The focus on security and humanitarian aid issues may also be attributed to the EU's identity in world affairs, the general security-related issues in the world after 9/11, and more specifically to the European Security Strategy (ESS), which enjoyed clear support in Ljubljana when adopted (Government of Slovenia 2004). Whereas the Ministry's structures up until joining the EU reflected the limited interests and engagements of a small state (adopted in terms of a 'strategy'), the new organization

of the Ministry is a result of an ad hoc adaptation (in two waves – September 2004 and March 2005) to the realities of functioning within the EU, more narrowly within the CFSP.

Consistent foreign policy concerns: Slovenia and the Western Balkans

Slovenia had made clear during negotiations for EU membership, that its particular interests would lie in the Western Balkans and that it would be most active on such issues, once it became a member. It insisted on the transition period for its trade arrangements with some of the countries of the Western Balkans, and its development policy was built around programmes for reconstruction of the war-stricken region. The only time it did not adhere to the CFSP instruments was related to its particular economic interest in Montenegro.

Slovenia's initial attitude towards the Western Balkan countries was that of a flight away from the Balkans at all costs (Bučar 1994: 1065). As mentioned earlier, the decision to take part in the Stability Pact – disputed then by some as a 're-establishment of the former Yugoslavia' (Bučar and Šterbenc 2002: 150) – created a significant perceptual shift in Slovenia's international identity as well as a shift in policy towards the region. Slovenia slowly began to engage in the region's economic, political and security-related forums. It took part in the South-Eastern Co-operation Initiative (SECI) in 1997, participated in the Royaumont Initiative and it set up an International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance in BiH. It put the region at the top of its foreign policy interests in geographic terms in its 1999 'Declaration on foreign policy' and has been a fervent supporter of the Balkans' importance to the EU since it became an EU member itself. It was also the policy it paid most attention to during its 2008 Council Presidency. However, given Slovenia's ongoing dispute with Croatia, especially over the border demarcation in the Gulf of Piran and the complexity of the region's stabilization, its policy record is mixed.

In the 1999 'Declaration' the Parliament stated that 'Slovenia can offer good offices in solving complicated situations in its neighbourhood and elsewhere' (National Assembly 1999). Thus, the switch in Slovenia's foreign policy was not only from that of neglect or fear to a more cooperative attitude, but it also entailed elements of a strategy towards a positive, active policy of mediation (Bojinovič 2005: 17). Membership in the EU offered an arena for such an active policy, and advocating a larger role for the EU (rather than for larger forums such as the UN or the Contact Group) in stabilizing the region is evident in the Foreign Minister's speeches in 2004 and 2005. In parallel, there were expectations on the part of the EU for Slovenia 'to act as a bridge' between the EU and Western Balkans, and therefore a sense of the country's responsibility for active engagement grew. At the same time, a sort of 'Balkan fatigue' and a drop in the region's importance on the EU's external agenda were acknowledged¹⁷ and worries over the use of the term 'absorption capacity' with regards to the countries in the Western Balkan were expressed (*Delo* 2006). Slovenia set up the tasks of elevating the region's

importance in the EU and ‘bringing each state one step closer to the EU’ as the primary goal of its 2008 Presidency (Kajnič 2008). The first policy papers on the Western Balkan dossier during the Presidency started to develop as early as 2005.¹⁸

Both tasks were put to a test, first by a failure to reach a consensus in the January 2008 GAERC meeting to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and, second, by the split among the member states over the recognition of Kosovo’s independence the following month. Slovenia put all its diplomatic effort into avoiding a stalemate over Serbia and to keep the issue high on the agenda within the EU and thus not leave it in the hands of the Quint, Office of High Representative or Peace Implementation Council Steering Board – all powerful formats, in which, however, Slovenia does not have a seat or a say.¹⁹ It kept the issues of Kosovar independence and Serbia’s SAA separate on the Council agenda. It sought support, first among the Visegrad countries and Austria, as well as from Italy, France and other member states; it used all its diplomatic creativity to keep open the dialogue with Serbia after its government suspended diplomatic ties with Brussels.²⁰ It saturated various meetings at different levels with issues related to South-East Europe, primarily pushing towards the signing of the SAA with BiH and the adoption of the European Council declarations on the Western Balkans, but also with minor, sectoral initiatives, such as progressing a Western Balkan investment framework and the Transport Community Treaty between the EU and Western Balkans. Although often accused of using its Presidency to gain advantage in bilateral problems with Croatia,²¹ the government has shown restraint in this respect in order to build its reputation as an honest broker.²² It showed similar restraint in relation to Macedonia. Getting a date for opening the negotiations during the Slovenian Presidency was one of the Presidency’s goals. However, following the setbacks in Macedonia’s progress in early 2008 and an obvious lack of interest among the EU member states, the Presidency did not insist on giving a date for opening accession negotiations with Macedonia.

Such an attitude differs considerably from Slovenia’s earlier attempts to project its disputes with Croatia onto the EU. The source of most bilateral disputes between Croatia and Slovenia in the early years of Slovenia’s EU membership, was Croatia’s self-proclaimed Ecological-Fishery Zone (EFZ) in the Adriatic Sea, scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2008 (for a history of the issues, see Roter and Bojinovič 2005). As early as 4 June 2004, barely two months after Slovenia became an EU member, a meeting of the State Secretaries of Italy, Croatia and Slovenia held in Brussels under the auspices of the European Commission, reached an understanding that the EFZ would not be applicable to the EU member states (RTV SLO/STA 2008a, 2008b). This understanding was also mentioned by Commissioner Rehn as part of Croatia’s obligations in fulfilling the criteria to begin accession negotiations.²³ The first day of Slovenia’s Presidency was marked by the coming into effect of the controversial EFZ, which the Croatian Parliament had not adapted to exclude the EU member states from applicability. After Slovenia’s protests, Croatian Prime Minister Sanader admitted that the

negotiation process had ground to a halt, and called for further talks on the EFZ issue with Slovenia, Italy and the European Commission (RTV SLO/STA 2008c).

Slovenia's support for Croatian accession to the EU was conditional upon Croatia's respect for the principles applied in previous enlargements. These included fulfilment of the accession criteria and the conditions set by the European Council at its meeting on 16–17 December 2004, urging Croatia to take the necessary steps to ensure full co-operation with the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia (ICTY) and clearly stating that the Council's decision to open EU accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005 would be subject to the country's full co-operation with the ICTY (Government of Slovenia 2005). In March 2005, however, despite the ICTY Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, expressing her dissatisfaction with Croatia's co-operation with the Tribunal, Slovenia supported the opening of accession negotiations in the GAERC vote (STA 2005b).²⁴

Thus, the early record of Slovenia's Western Balkan policy in the EU is marked by strong support of Croatia's accession to the EU, for which Slovenia was ready to bend the principle of human rights.²⁵ At the same time Ljubljana sought to 'project' its bilateral dispute to the European level and use its membership, as well as its Presidency, as leverage. During the Presidency, however, Slovenia recognized the gravity of the Macedonian setback, and given that the EFZ had already been made a European issue, acknowledged as such by Commissioner Rehn as well as by the Croatian Prime Minister Sanader, the government held back from dealing with other bilateral issues with Croatia at the EU level. Instead, it concentrated on building up an awareness for the importance of the Western Balkan countries coming ever closer to the EU, and keeping the region high on the EU's political agenda, without jeopardizing this by promoting its own interests in bilateral disputes or pushing for movement against the majority view.

Conclusion

Slovenia's foreign policy as a new state was in a very early stage of conception when the country set itself on the path towards EU membership. It had managed to establish the basic organizational structures and positioned itself regionally. In the absence of a foreign policy strategy, with the accession to the EU being the undisputed primary goal of its foreign policy, the EU's conditions for the membership provided guidelines for the policies it had not yet devised and the structures it had not yet set up. This is mostly seen in the case of development co-operation policy and in the organizational changes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to a certain extent also in the field of trade policy. Adapting to the conditions of EU membership coincided with a globalization of Slovenia's foreign policy. Initiated primarily by taking part in the political dialogue over CFSP issues with EU member states, the broadening of Slovenian foreign policy in geographic and thematic terms was later marked by four projects, namely: (i) non-permanent membership in the UNSC in 1998–1999; (ii) NATO membership; (iii) Chairmanship of the OSCE; and (iv) the Presidency of the Council of the EU.

These four projects had two significant effects on Slovenia's foreign policy. The pursuit of membership in NATO shifted the country's orientation from that of a 'Europeanist' to a more 'Atlanticist' position, which evolved into a foreign policy characterized by the principle of 'balance'. The UNSC stint, OSCE Chairmanship and the EU Presidency, on the other hand, brought a cyclical quality to Slovenia's foreign policy, in which the 'implementation' of – largely externally conceived – tasks was a priority and everything else more or less stalled. The belated organizational adaptations to the realities of the EU membership in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the continued lack of a foreign policy strategy support this conclusion. The result is a foreign policy system open to external influences. Membership in the EU and the 2008 Presidency offered the strongest impulses. Slovenia's foreign policy conduct during the Presidency has shown that it values the principles of unity, solidarity and balance, all in pursuit of 'European' goals in matters where it lacked its own national goals. The picture was slightly different in its conduct towards the Western Balkans. Slovenia pushed very hard to attain its principal goal – concluding the ring of SAAs, but did not overdo it, when it assessed that this would go against the established principles (in the case of Macedonia) and hurt its credibility. At the same time, it began its membership in the EU by the (successful) projection of its major foreign policy preoccupation – the dispute with Croatia over a border in the Gulf of Piran – to the EU level, but did not use its Presidency to shift the EU's policy towards Croatia.

Up to the start of its Presidency, Slovenia was to a large extent a passive member of the EU in terms of European foreign policy. Yet before it could absorb and adapt to the realities of the EU membership and thus also reconceptualize European and foreign policy after the period of accession preparations and negotiations, it embarked on the 2005 OSCE Chairmanship and then quickly moved to the preparations for the 2008 EU Presidency. The Presidency was thus the first real test for Slovenia in relation to European foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether, after a project has been concluded, Slovenia will (once again) stall and become a passive member, or whether it will again seek to project its bilateral issues to the European level. Slovenia's Presidency was characterized by the role of an honest broker, which many smaller states play. However, with the principle of balance now penetrated into many other aspects of Slovenia's foreign policy, it might be that the socialization into European politics it displayed during the Presidency will survive into the time of 'normal membership'.

Notes

- 1 Following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire after the First World War, a short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was born. This was then replaced by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, embracing the Kingdom of Serbia, soon renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In all its forms, the state excluded about a third of the Slovenian population to the west, which remained in Italy. After the Second World War the Yugoslav border was extended to the West, with only a minority of Slovenians left in the still-Italian regions of Friuli, Venezia and Giulia.

- 2 The Presidencies of the Republic of Slovenia and Croatia proposed a 'Confederate Model among the South Slavic States', and subsequently the Presidency of Croatia proposed a 'Draft Treaty of the Yugoslav Confederation – the Alliance of South Slavic Republics', which were both turned down at the federal level. Both documents were published in the *Review of International Affairs* (ISSN 0486-6096) issue of 20 October 1990 (no. 973: 11–22).
- 3 By that date it had been recognized by Croatia, Lithuania, Georgia, Latvia and Estonia.
- 4 The Commission reported positively on Slovenia and Macedonia and negatively on Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 11 January 1992. But given that Germany had already recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December 1991, the EC had no other option but to recognize the two, plus Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Macedonia's recognition remained hostage to Greek opposition to its constitutional name of Macedonia (Jazbec 2001: 213–214). Canada recognized Slovenia on the same day (15 January 1992) and Australia followed suit a day later. Recognition by the United States came on 7 April 1992.
- 5 Slovenia received an invitation to join the OECD only in May 2007, and began negotiating entry in December 2007. It joined the club on 21 July 2010.
- 6 The ACN network was replaced, upon accession, by the CORTESY and ESDP communication networks.
- 7 Similar was the case when joining the US-led South European Co-operation Initiative (SECI). Slovenia only joined in 1997, after opposition accusations of this being a project to re-establish Yugoslavia were neutralized after the United States expressed that 'the international community expected a more determined involvement of Slovenia in regional affairs' (Bučar and Šterbenc 2002: 105).
- 8 Slovenia also lobbied, together with the other accession states, for a change in the EU's negotiating position concerning the new member states' financial participation in the European Development Fund, resulting in a one year postponement, from 2005 to 2006 (*Annual Report* 2002). It even resulted in the negative annual assessments by the European Commission Regular Report (November 1998, October 1999, November 2000).
- 9 Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, 28 February 2008, 30 May 2008, 5 June 2008.
- 10 The Politbarometer, at the time the Slovenian Government's official poll, showed a support for Slovenia's NATO membership oscillating around 50 per cent in the period between 1997 and 2004.
- 11 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, 29 May 2008. Slovenia opened an Embassy in Israel in 1994, with a resident ambassador in Tel Aviv concurrently accredited to the Palestinian Authority. Foreign Minister Rupel was among the last international diplomats in the Gaza Strip after it was taken over by Hamas in June 2007. When the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the EU was approaching, Slovenia envisaged a growing workload and responsibility and opened a mission in Ramallah, appointing one diplomat to it (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, 29 May 2008).
- 12 OSCE Priority Tasks in 2005, Slovenia's Chairmanship Programme, available at: www.osce.si/docs/prioritete-predsedovanja.pdf.
- 13 Frequent talks with American diplomats and politicians and visits to Washington, as well as interviews and contributions in American press gave rise to a suspicion in Russian diplomatic circles of a Chairman favouring the American approach to OSCE. Russian foreign minister Lavrov as well as Russian representative at the UN, Ambassador Konuzin, diplomatically expressed criticism in February and March. As the situation in Uzbekistan escalated, the Russian foreign ministry press officer, Aleksander Jakovenko, accused the Slovenian prime minister of not representing the Russian view in his public statement on the situation in Uzbekistan (Kajnč 2005).
- 14 Interview, Ljubljana, 4 May 2005.

- 15 Interview, Brussels, 9 June 2008.
- 16 The European and bilateral directorate-general was divided into divisions for the EU; relations with the EU and European Economic Area member states (renamed in March 2005 as the sector for Western, Northern and Central European states); relations with the states of the Western Balkans and the EU candidate states, including the Stability Pact for South-East Europe and regional co-operation (re-arranged in March 2005 into a division for South-East Europe and a project group for Croatia); Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Americas and the Caribbean; Asia, Africa, Australia and Oceania; and the division for international cultural relations. A special division for Croatia was added in September 2007.
- 17 Foreign Minister Rupel in his presentation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly, Ljubljana, 29 November 2004.
- 18 Interview, Brussels, 11 June 2008.
- 19 Interview, Brussels, 11 June 2008.
- 20 For example, Slovenia invited Serbian experts with (formal) links to the Serbian Government, to brief the Council on the situation in Serbia (interview, Brussels, 11 June 2008).
- 21 Croatia did not provisionally close any of the negotiating chapters in the second half of 2007 and feared that this trend might continue during the Slovenian Presidency. Accusations of Slovenia halting the negotiations mainly came from the Croatian political elite, whereas there were voices among the Slovenian political parties that Slovenia did not use its Presidency enough, either to establish itself as a stronger actor in the Western Balkans, or to push for a more favourable solution of its disputes with Croatia. It is worth mentioning that Slovenian political parties in general are relatively uninterested in foreign policy.
- 22 Prime Minister Janša praised Croatia and set it out as a model for other countries in the region in his letter to the European Council in September 2007, in which he urged for a more active European policy in the Western Balkans (reported in the Croatian daily *Jutranji list*, 30 September 2007).
- 23 Government's EU Gateway (6 December 2007), EU, Hrvaška in ekološko-ribolovna cona [EU, *Croatia and Ecological-Fishery Zone*]; available at: <http://evropa.gov.si/novice/7356> (25 January 2008).
- 24 As did Austria, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Ireland and the Slovak Republic.
- 25 The main argument behind the Slovenian vote was that the criteria calling for 'full co-operation' with the ICTY were not well defined. See interviews with Foreign Minister Rupel and a Member of Parliament, Jožef Jerovšek, the Chairman of the parliamentary committee for foreign policy (STA 2005b).

12 Many actors, one path?

The meaning of Europeanization in the context of foreign policy

Christopher Hill and Reuben Wong

European foreign policy-making is a strange process. It entails a structured process of coordination between a wide range of types of state – from micro to major, from new to old, from established member to recent entrant. What is more, while the apparently central focus of foreign policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is still determinedly intergovernmental, many of the EU's most important external actions, such as enlargement and overseas development, involve the Commission and the 'Community method'. The newly ratified Lisbon Treaty pulls all this together under one head, and allows for the possibility that the High Representative and/or the Union President will be able to orchestrate a single set of policies to which all actors have bought in.

Yet national foreign policies persist, in some cases prospering and even expanding their scope. Their executors do not take instructions from anyone in Brussels, and their margin of manoeuvre will continue to benefit from the relatively limited role of legislation (national or European) in relation to external action. Europeanization from the normative perspective, therefore, is about a long-term process of drawing Member States into a common set of procedures, attitudes and policy positions, in the hope that a sense of community, even shared identity, will lead them to stick, and to make defections both rare and insignificant. The starting-point of this book, however, has been less the desirability (or otherwise) of increased Europeanization than a scientific interest in the extent to which, in practice, EU Member States are displaying signs of convergence in their foreign policies, in particular around the formal positions agreed in the Council. This in turn requires an analysis of what Europeanization means in the context of foreign policy. Throughout the book we have observed the varying degrees of downloading, uploading and crossloading evident in behaviour at the national level. The current chapter, in its attempt to provide an overview, will not waste space on the arithmetic of convergence – i.e. what proportion of each kind of behaviour is evident. Rather, it begins with an analysis of such overall pattern as can be delineated, and moves on to consider the nature of the drivers of Europeanization and its limits, before concluding with a discussion of the dialectical relationship between the centripetal and the centrifugal forces on view. The dual aim is to identify the meaning of Europeanization in the context of foreign policy and to assess its significance, for the EU itself and for outsiders.

Patterns of behaviour

If Europeanization is accepted as the yardstick for describing/assessing the foreign policy of a single state, then we need to know at the outset what a Europeanized foreign policy looks like in theoretical terms. On the basis of the analysis in Chapter 1, refined in various ways by the country-studies which followed, we may offer the following definition: a Europeanized foreign policy is one which:

- Takes common EU positions, whether formally or informally established, as its major reference point, despite operating in other multilateral forums.
- Does not generally defect from common positions even when they cause difficulties for the state concerned, whether in its bilateral relations or its domestic politics.
- Attempts to pursue its national priorities principally (but not exclusively) through the means of collective EU action.
- Subscribes positively to the values and principles expressed by the EU in its international activity, to the extent of becoming part of a shared image and identity, in the eyes of both other Europeans and outsiders.

These criteria taken together represent an ideal type. There is no current Member State, with the possible exception of Luxembourg, which conforms to them. Nonetheless they provide an important guide to the direction of travel when assessing states' behaviour, individually or collectively. Also useful in this respect is a continuum of states in terms of the degree to which their foreign policies merit the description 'Europeanized'. Table 12.1 below lists the possible categories, starting from the highest degree of conformity to the criteria just outlined. It should be noted that the descent is not linear or even. The categories represent different ways of responding to Europeanization, more than equal steps down on the path to solipsism and full independence.

Table 12.1: Degrees of Europeanization in foreign policy

1	Significantly Europeanized
2	Willing to Europeanize, but still a partial or slow process
3	Erratic in the degree of Europeanization, either over time or between issue-areas (or both); no cumulative effects visible.
4	Consistently instrumental in the approach to Europeanization
5	Resistant to Europeanization – though may still display some degree of change
6	De-Europeanizing – i.e. positively attempting to rid itself of any perceived restraints imposed by European foreign policy
7	Never significantly Europeanized.

Readers will have their own views as to whether individual states fit into any of these categories. While none of them can do more than suggest a snapshot of

behaviour at any given point in time t , it is clear that it is difficult to change a profile overnight, and that the descriptions amount to historical generalizations about positions taken over a decade or more (except in the case of states recently admitted to the EU). Equally, it should be noted that we have omitted the ‘total Europeanization’ scenario, namely that where all states are so fully signed up that their distinctive national concerns disappear, with the logical endgame being a move into federalism. This does not seem to us to be an imminent outcome.

Insofar as any clear pattern emerges from the ten country-studies contained in this book, it is multifaceted. The generalization which follows is not a covering statement for all 27 Member States but is broken down by types of state. It is largely based on the evidence presented here, but bears in mind the fact that we have not been able to provide detailed data on the following 17 states:

- The Benelux group: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
- The Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
- The three Visegrad states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia
- The micro-states: Cyprus, Malta
- Three states with neutral traditions: Austria, Ireland, Sweden
- Portugal
- Two recent entrants; Bulgaria and Romania.

From this list it will be evident that there are many ways of being distinctive within the family of EU foreign policies. One is tempted to draw conclusions about the overall difficulties of constructing a European diplomacy given such a complex baseline. But the main task of this project is to assess the significance of the processes of Europeanization for national foreign policy.

As pointed out in Chapter 1, the ten countries examined in depth here represent a fair cross-section of the 27, although it must be admitted that there is a bias towards the bigger and more internationally significant states – all six of which (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK) are covered. Yet even that group can be divided differently, for example between the ‘EU-3’ (France, Germany, UK) and the rest, or between founder-states and later entrants. Likewise, the group of ten contains some small states (of different levels of wealth and experience), in Denmark, Finland and Slovenia, as it does a group of relatively recent entrants (Finland, Poland, Slovenia), as well as a division between rich states and those with much developmental progress to make (Greece, Poland). The ten also represent a fair degree of geographical dispersal, with the UK in the north-west, Finland in the east and north, Greece in the south/south-east, and Spain in the south/south-west of the EU.

As we saw in Chapter 1, significant contributions – both theoretical and empirical – have been made to our understanding of Europeanization in foreign policy since Tonra initiated the discussion (Tonra 2001). But this is the first systematic study of a large group of EU Member States. What then, can we discern about their patterns of behaviour? One clear conclusion is that even those states

traditionally resistant to the idea of relinquishing their freedom of foreign policy manoeuvre have moved towards accepting the value of common action. Thus Denmark now sees the EU as its principal framework for multilateralism (admittedly with the significant exceptions of aid and defence) and Poland has quickly come to see the advantages of the EU as a means of amplifying its own voice on such issues as the Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership, even if aspiration and achievement do not always go hand in hand. The chapter on Greece, while arguing vigorously against the conception of the country as now placidly conformist and neglectful of national interests, also shows that Athens is no longer the source of an excessive and unpredictable unilateralism. Indeed, it has come shrewdly to see the advantages of channelling its concerns through EU solidarity on key issues such as Cyprus and Turkey. As for Britain and France, which have always been jealous of their privileges as UN Security Council members, each has begun to come in from the cold in different ways. In fact, it should be acknowledged that neither Paris nor London has historically had problems with either EPC or the CFSP, for two very good reasons; one, that they insisted on it remaining fully intergovernmental, and two, that they intended to use it as a platform for their own leadership of the European contribution to international relations. In the British case this has inevitably meant a degree of schizophrenia, given the generalized suspicion of the EU and its institutions (Hill 1983a). France, on the other hand, has been frustrated when unable to get agreement for its preferred line, as over Iraq in 2003, but thanks to Germany's diffidence and Britain's clinging to the remains of the 'special relationship' with the US, it has generally managed to identify Europe's foreign policy with its own.

The converse of this acceptance of the importance of a common foreign policy by even the most sovereignty-sensitive is the tendency among some of the states previously most keen on the benefits of a shared umbrella to emerge from its shelter. Here the main examples are Germany and Italy, both key players in Europe's politics but also ultra-cautious in external behaviour for many years as a result of their misconduct and eventual defeat between 1939–1945. Although the signs of greater self-confidence were evident before 1989, particularly in the case of Germany, it was the end of the Cold War which had the most liberating effect on Rome and – as the united Germany's capital soon became – Berlin. It was in late 1991 that the German government astonished its colleagues by its disregard for a stated commitment when issuing a sudden and unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Such insouciance over the impact on the embryonic CFSP was not often repeated, but as Patricia Daehnhardt's chapter shows, Germany has increasingly taken a more assertive and instrumental approach to common policy, in principle as in practice. Indeed, it has come to have some of the same capacity as France to harness the EU's external policy to its own image, as with its ability to upload its wish to enlarge the EU to the east and to engage Iran in prolonged diplomacy over the risk of nuclear proliferation. For its part Italy, and not just under the erratic leadership of Silvio Berlusconi, has been far more willing to plough its own furrow, particularly in relation to Russia, Libya and membership of the UN Security Council. Under Berlusconi it has even been willing to risk

accusations of Euro-scepticism, and to make the kind of choice between the EU and Atlantic loyalties which it had previously done everything to avoid.

Thus we have a paradox: some 'difficult' countries seem to become more cooperative and Europeanized, while previously loyal team-players are enjoying the opportunity to assert their own concerns. How can this be explained? In the first place, we should note the variability even within an individual state's profile – there is no simple, linear pattern to change. Yet variance takes place within an increasingly settled common frame of reference. There is no Member State which is hostile to the CFSP (let alone the more Treaty-bound external relations); the bigger states realize that they cannot act alone on major world issues like Iran (Miliband 2009), while even those smaller states concerned at the danger to their identity have found a *modus operandi* in which intergovernmentalism guarantees them a critical space in which to protect vital interests (as constructive abstention did for Greece over FYROM/Macedonia). They have also been able – within limits – to upload important priorities, as Finland and Sweden did with the 'Northern Dimension'.

What is more, although it is clear that some countries have become more assertive about their distinctive concerns and reputations, this has only proved possible because of the security (in a general sense) which participation in European foreign-policy making gives them. Neither Germany nor Italy will risk accusations of reviving nationalism by effectively dispensing with the CFSP. Indeed, their occasional demonstrations of independence are usually followed by longer periods of quiescence. The idea of a 'renationalized' foreign policy in such cases is therefore of theoretical interest but little practical utility. The other side of this conceptual coin is the notion of 'de-Europeanization', discussed above in the chapter on Germany. This is of more relevance in that rather than suggesting a full opt-out from foreign policy cooperation, it simply indicates a change of direction, towards achieving a greater freedom of manoeuvre. On the other hand, it also implies that the national foreign policy had become fully Europeanized at an earlier stage, which was certainly not the case even for integration enthusiasts like Germany and Belgium. Between 1970 and 1991 these countries expressed themselves through EPC, and encouraged its further institutionalization, not through any loss of their own identities but precisely because they saw European diplomacy as the best way of promoting their particular needs, whether security in Europe or post-colonial relationships in Africa.

Thus virtually all Member States, even when instrumental in their approach to collective action, have their foreign policy anchored in a Europeanized sense of their place in the international system and of the instruments available to pursue their aims. Even France, as Charillon and Wong argue, now has no choice but to accept that its foreign policy 'is at least partially Europeanized' (p. 20). All countries set implicit limits as to how far they are willing to allow joint decisions to determine their own positions, and to a greater or lesser extent they all have *domaines réservés*, on issues which they regard as only of concern to themselves. But despite the rhetoric which so often faces both ways, towards the domestic audience as much as the international community, whenever the CFSP seems on

the verge of being redundant (as after the Iraq crisis of 2003) it slowly has life breathed back into it, for the simple reason that the Member States need some way of expressing their distinctive political concerns in world politics, as they decided right back in 1969. If they had no more in common than with other Western states, then European foreign policy would naturally wither away to be replaced by ad hoc multilateralism and coalitions of the willing. But, qua members of the EU, and qua occupants of the same geopolitical and geo-historical space, they do share a great deal (Zielonka 2006).

In terms of the downloading or uploading of particular positions certain questions help us to identify the impact of Europeanization. For example in relation to downloading if we can specify positions which a country would have been unlikely to have adopted if not in the EU, that gives us a measure of the latter's impact. Barbé, for example, argues that Spain only took on ESDP responsibilities in the Balkans and the Congo because of the broadening of its foreign policy horizons in recent years, and Kajnič demonstrates that almost all of Slovenia's international concerns derive from immersion in the CFSP, and in particular from the wish to derive status from representing the EU abroad in its first Presidency, during 2008. On the uploading side, the question is rather which positions might the EU not have developed without the impetus from one or more particular states? This is, in part, a question about leadership. Without Polish pressure the Eastern Partnership might not have come about, at least in its specific form, and without President Sarkozy's decisive interventions during the Georgian war of August 2008 the EU might have remained on the sidelines, as in so many previous crises.

Crossloading is a trickier issue. European states have many opportunities to transfer ideas and procedures between themselves without the EU. Their bilateral embassy network is comprehensive (Rijks and Edwards 2008), and they have many encounters in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the various UN institutions. It would be interesting, if beyond the scope of this book, to look at the non-EU Europeans (e.g. Norway, Switzerland) to see how far they have converged around similar positions to those inside the Union. If they have, then there is a *prima facie* case for crossloading taking place through geographical, cultural and institutional proximities independent of the EU (although it would not be useful to study countries like Croatia, Turkey or Ukraine, whose degree of conformity is bound to be influenced by their pursuit of membership). Yet while it is well-established that Norway, in particular, often associates itself with the CFSP (as, indeed do non-European countries at times) such a stance depends on the existence of a European foreign policy in the first place. Without it, the interplay between European states would be much looser and the balance between the centripetal and the centrifugal forces would shift significantly towards the latter. The existence of the ESDP, for example, has forced states with a neutralist tradition to revise their whole approach to international relations. Thus the growing machinery, and the *acquis*, of the EU in foreign policy has become a major point of reference for all Member States.

At one level this is simply to restate the importance of the ‘coordination reflex’, first noted in the Copenhagen Report of 1973. Yet the situation has changed considerably from those early days of a tiny group of like-minded diplomats, highly dependent on the political impetus provided by key figures like Hans-Dietrich Genscher or Lord Carrington. At the least it is now best described as ‘Brusselsization’, and perhaps as a ‘solidarity default setting’, in that the onus (legal as well as political) is now on a state to explain any defection, rather than to take an initiative of cooperation. The combination of downloading, uploading and crossloading, all of which derive from the existence of the EU, and especially Maastricht’s Pillar II, has created a web of foreign policy interactions, which might not always result in solid collaboration but do steadily entangle the Member States’ objectives with each other. This bears out the far-sighted analysis of Karl Deutsch, in both *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*, and *The Nerves of Government*, even if Deutsch was writing about western networks before the EPC had come into being (Deutsch 1957, 1963).

The two key questions which then arise in the context of Europeanization are: ‘How wide is the pattern of divergence between national positions?’ and ‘How frequent/significant are defections from shared positions?’ On the basis of the research reported in this book, we can give the following abbreviated answers: (1) dramatic divergences, or disagreements, between Member States’ foreign policies are rare, but they always remain possible. (2) Defections from shared positions occur frequently, but not necessarily with damaging effects. These points are developed below.

First, it is clear that in any system of foreign policy coordination between sovereign states not legally obliged to follow a given line, and with the right to be individually represented in international gatherings, occasional sharp differences of view are inevitable. The most visible examples in recent history have been between Greece and most of its partners over the recognition of Macedonia under that name, between Spain and France over the former’s dispute with Morocco in 2002, the wide schism over Iraq in 2003, and over the recognition of Kosovo since February 2008. The divisions on these important issues have reverberated around the world, damaging the image of European foreign policy and providing the excuse for future exercises in non-conformity. On the other hand, the very fact of surprise and irritation reveals that the expectation, both within and outside the EU is now that the 27 should speak with one voice, or at the very least not display their differences in public. Indeed, Spain has been at pains to downplay its unwillingness to recognize Kosovo for this very reason, while significant efforts have been made by all concerned to stitch up the post-Iraq wounds, just as they were after the failure to take a common line in 1991–1992 over the break-up of Yugoslavia. On non-zero-sum issues the extent, or range of disagreements is generally quite narrow, to the point where it is not unreasonable to speak of a general ‘European view’ even if it is not one which is always operationalized effectively. At the level of the values which underlie foreign policy decisions there are few fundamental disagreements between Member States. Left-Right tensions are inherently ephemeral given the regular

changes of government in democracies, and in any case do not translate very obviously into foreign policy positions. Geopolitical differences, including in particular proximity or otherwise to Russia, and dependence on energy supplies, remain as likely sources of future divergence, but France's rejoining of NATO, and the acclimatization of the accession countries to the CFSP has removed some sources of mutual suspicion. In any case, differences over values at one end of the spectrum, and over mere tactics at the other, are the kind of thing which the EU foreign policy system can increasingly handle. The significant uncertainty which remains is over whether Member States are starting to define their interests in ever more similar ways.

Even if the latter is the case, it will not necessarily stop defections from a previously agreed position, which was the second of our key questions about the pattern of divergences. Defections now happen less frequently, partly because it is difficult to reach formal agreement in the first place, and partly because common positions tend towards the lowest, rather than the highest, common denominator. Yet there have been regular demonstrations of disloyalty, particularly on the part of the bigger states, which have less to fear from their partners in terms of consequences. Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, and President Mitterand's flying straight from a Lisbon Council meeting to Sarajevo in 1992, both came as a shock to colleagues who thought they had just agreed something rather different. Tony Blair regularly talked the language of European solidarity only to privilege George Bush over consultations with his European partners, and Silvio Berlusconi has ostentatiously displayed his 'friendship' with President Putin, despite a general consensus over not giving tacit approval to violations of human rights by the Russian government.

Of course nuances in the expression of European views, even explicit differences of opinion, can actually be helpful in the conduct of relations with third countries, in the way that the United States sometimes benefits from arguments between the President and the Congress. It enables the executive to fend off external demands on the grounds that it does not have the freedom to act, just as it makes it possible to launch trial balloons through one or more Member States without taking formal responsibility. Such benefits do not necessarily imply a sophisticated, coordinated intelligence at work – rather, those speaking on behalf of the collective system have to fly by the seat of their pants and adapt to the outputs which often emerge unpredictably from the multiple actors involved. But they can do this to advantage when the actors share important values and are able to define an interest in common. The problems of conducting diplomacy then reduce to tactics rather than strategy.

What judgement, in sum, may be made about Europeanization on the basis of these observed patterns? One way of approaching the question is to construct another table, building on the categories listed in Table 12.1. In Table 12.2 we place the ten Member States surveyed in this book in what we see as the most relevant descriptive category, in terms of the level of the Europeanization of their foreign policy. In some cases a state has been placed in more than one row, as it displays some paradoxical characteristics (e.g. Germany and Italy have become

more nationally assertive in recent years, but still hold EU foreign policy to be of central importance). The summary conclusions which can be drawn from this, and from the foregoing section, are that:

- 1 only the foreign policies of (*some of*) the smallest countries can be regarded as significantly Europeanized – even then, Slovenia is such a new Member State that it may well become more self-assertive with the passage of time;
- 2 all national foreign policies have been meaningfully Europeanized to some degree, or in some particular form;
- 3 none of the ten states covered are strongly resisting involvement in common processes;
- 4 there is much patchiness about the process of Europeanization, either in terms of commitments not proving reliable, or of some issue-areas being reserved for other forums;
- 5 all states like to upload their preferences to the collective level when possible, as it amplifies their voice in international relations, but there is a zero-sum element which sets limits to how far this can be achieved;
- 6 states download in the tautological sense that they agree when they can agree – and often see the pragmatic advantage in so doing. But domestic and other sources of international pressure mean that commitments often waver or remain rhetorical;
- 7 states not infrequently display contradictory elements in their approach to European foreign policy cooperation, as with France which strongly supports a European foreign policy so long as it reflects the French view of the world;
- 8 there is little evidence of a linear process of steady convergence, except in terms of procedures, and to some extent at the level of common values, or what might be called a European ‘philosophy of international relations’.

Table 12.2: The Europeanization of ten Member States

1	Significant Europeanization	Germany, Spain, Slovenia, France
2	Engaged, but a partial/slow process	Italy, Finland, Denmark
3	Erratic/unpredictable	UK, Greece
4	Instrumental	France, Poland, Denmark
5	Resistant, but some change	–
6	De-Europeanizing	Germany, Italy
7	Never Europeanized	–

The drivers of change

If Europeanization does represent one important dimension of change for the foreign policies of Member States, the question arises of its causal status. To what

extent is Europeanization an independent variable, impacting on the national foreign policies? Conversely, should it be regarded as itself the product of other forces, which would make it a dependent, or conceivably an intervening variable in terms of the changes observed? The argument presented here is that membership of the EU, and participation in its common foreign policy processes, has distinctive consequences compared to those excluded from membership. In that sense the Member States, as independent actors, pursue their individual foreign policies – which are as resilient as ever – within a structure consisting of the institutions and *acquis* of the CFSP and the EU's other external relations. This structure, while not the only framework affecting their foreign policies, imposes some significant constraints on their calculations, at the same time as offering useful opportunities. The whole is thus the sum of the parts, and an established phenomenon capable of surviving defections. In that respect it constitutes an independent variable, but one whose effects are not predictable – as we have seen, states can react to, or take advantage of, their mutual entanglement in a range of ways, and the product of their interactions is by no means either cumulative or homogenizing.

At the same time Europeanization is undoubtedly both a dependent variable, reflecting other forces and factors, and an intervening one, in the sense that some international factors affect national foreign policies via the mediation of the EU institutions, or simply through the expectations of outsiders that Member States will behave in a 'European' way. What the term cannot withstand is its use as an umbrella term for the range of myriad processes – institutional, political, national, international – which are implicated in the degree and nature of European cooperation. That is to assume too much homogeneity of causation. We should therefore distinguish between the factors which promote Europeanization in the foreign policy of Member States, and those which merely drive on *change*, some of which may take the form of Europeanization in the broad sense in which we have understood it, but some of which may foster unilateral behaviour, bilateral relations with third states and the use of other international forums for the pursuit of national diplomatic ends. What follows summarizes the evidence of our country-chapters in relation first to the factors which have fostered Europeanization, and then to the currents which affect national foreign policies independently of membership of the EU, in some cases running counter to the influences for Europeanization.

Before embarking on this, however, it is important to enter one further caveat: the empirical analysis of ten countries shows that while it is possible to identify the distinctive processes which we have called 'downloading', 'uploading' and 'crossloading', the differences between them are not sharp. It is useful to see the extent to which states accept general positions which they might not have wished for themselves (downloading), as with the opportunities they take to use European foreign policy for their own purposes (uploading) but in the real world these processes are sometimes difficult to differentiate. They certainly exist in a constantly circular relationship whereby states react individually to propositions discussed collectively, thus contributing to mutations in the positions they might end up downloading. Crossloading, furthermore, is even more difficult to identify.

Member States certainly influence each other through policy transfer and procedural emulation, but it is very difficult to separate this out from the influence of participation in the institutional policymaking process. Membership of the EU, *ipso facto*, puts states into a particular set of horizontal relationships with each other, but one that is not easily distinguishable from 'downloading'. Or perhaps all is really crossloading, and it is the idea of downloading which should be in doubt.

Table 12.3 lists the main factors which seem to have promoted the Europeanization of foreign policy on the basis of the evidence collected in this book. There is inevitably some overlap between them, but their distinctive characteristics are described briefly here.

Table 12.3: Factors promoting the Europeanization of national foreign policies

1	Institutions and treaties
2	Socialization
3	Leadership
4	External federators
5	Politics of scale
6	Legitimization of global role
7	Geo-cultural identity

The *institutions and treaties* of the European Union affect every national foreign policy, albeit to different degrees. The direction of foreign policy in the broad sense is set in the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, but the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht and its successors have increased the coherence between the Community-based external relations and the CFSP. The expertise and resources of the Commission have become more widely recognized in national capitals, which is why a new double-hatted High Representative was created by the Treaty of Lisbon. Equally, the European Parliament has slowly come to acquire significant powers over the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries. Member States have also entered into the new area of defence, after agreeing in 1992 to pool their resources to fulfil the 'Petersberg tasks' of soft security problems (such as rescue missions), in the knowledge that acting singly made little sense. This led in due course to the ESDP, of which Operation Atalanta (2008–), with the aim of interdicting pirates in the Indian Ocean, is a dramatic product, being the first coordination of EU navies. Thus Member States have created an evermore extensive web of institutions, commitments and instruments, which leave them much freedom of manoeuvre but also shape their choices by incentivizing cooperation and creating a degree of path dependency.

One of the phenomena associated with this shared participation is *socialization*. Indeed this could not happen without the prior existence of the Union, and so to that extent is a dependent variable. But it is also true that the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation over the last 40 years has placed a premium on personal relations, informal meetings and a continuity of elites. These things,

as much as the legal structure of law and institutions, have fostered what sense of common purpose and *communauté de vue* exists among European foreign policy decision makers. They operate partly through what we term ‘crossloading’, or the direct interaction of national elites, made possible by common membership, and not just through exposure to the institutional environment. Shared experiences over time can breed common outlooks. The process is hardly inevitable, but the evidence of our country-studies is that even France is becoming accustomed to Brusselsization, by which is meant a degree of centralization in the foreign-policy making process, with the Council Secretariat being the key reference point. Although some issues are still dealt with wholly in Paris, the need to work through intra-EU coalitions is increasingly felt. The British too, observe the ‘coordination reflex’ on procedural matters, while they took the lead in creating the ESDP. It is notable how large parts of the British armed forces, which used to be frankly sceptical of the value of their European counterparts, have come to accept the value of defence cooperation, and to move away from the assumption that NATO is the only serious option for missions such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Some degree of socialization, therefore, has taken place even in the biggest Member States, in the sense that the standard operating procedures of their elites are reflecting the need to work with European partners – even if Paris and London are still more concerned to lead EU foreign policy than to follow a general will (Gross 2009: 159). This brings us to the third driver of Europeanization – *leadership* itself. If the major European states wish to have a decisive influence on the international relations of their region they cannot do it within NATO, which is a US-dominated organization. Equally, they are unable to do it by simple self-assertion, lacking the individual power which led them to be such rivals in the nineteenth century. The only option available – and this is perhaps the main reason for their persistent support of the EPC and CFSP mechanisms – is to lead the Member States of the EU towards the goal of what the French explicitly refer to being a pole in a multipolar world. The British, Germans and Italians are far more ambivalent about the detachment from the USA which this implies, but they too have recognized over the years the need for distinctive European positions on important issues such as the Middle East. By definition few other states are capable of leadership (outside certain narrow issue-areas), but as it is the Big Three/Four/Five which have the most prospects of unilateral action they are the countries subject to this kind of Europeanization, i.e. the temptation to mobilize the EU as a whole behind their initiatives. Even competition between them over leadership validates the point, as it shows up the importance of the Union as a platform for their foreign policies.

The fourth factor encouraging Europeanization refers to the idea originally sketched by Philippe Schmitter of ‘*external federators*’, meaning here the pressure from outsiders on the Europeans to speak with one voice (Schmitter 1969). It is often said that the USA is a positive promoter of European integration, while the Soviet Union/Russia has been the negative promoter (Guérot 2009). Schmitter pointed out that one of the original motives for states coming together in a regional organization is ‘a diffuse desire to increase the collective bargaining power of the

area vis-à-vis other international actors' (Schmitter 1969: 165). Yet effectiveness is not a necessary condition for external actors interested in fostering European solidarity: 'even where joint performance is weak and inconsequential, outsiders may – for policy purposes of their own unrelated to perceived discrimination – decide to treat the embryonic regional organization as if it were already a viable, authoritative policymaking unit' (*ibid*).

Such pressures are not determining, of course. They fall more into the category of what Harold and Margaret Sprout called 'beckoning' factors (Sprout and Sprout 1969: 45), that is, creating possibilities and openings which may or may not be taken advantage of. In the context of European foreign policy we can see that many Member States want to make common purpose so as to be able to operate more effectively in the UN, or in NATO (although in the latter the US long resisted the growing reality of a European caucus). Italy and other states have argued that a single seat for the EU in the UN Security Council would enable Europe to be much more effective there – although it must be admitted that this would actually reduce the size of the European presence in the UNSC. Other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, have encouraged interregional dialogues, along Schmitterian lines, with the EU, but this is a slow and intermittent process.

When it comes to dealing with individual non-Members, moreover, the Member States have signally failed to stick together on strategy towards the major powers. Their Europeanization has been no more than skin-deep, as Moscow and Washington are ambivalent about the idea of a more effective EU foreign policy, and have proved adept at playing on internal divisions. In principle the EU states want to distinguish their approach to international relations from both these major powers but in practice, and in key areas such as defence and energy policy, they have not been able to translate it into effective solidarity.

The demands of outsiders, and of the international system as a whole, represent an independent variable which in some respects promotes Europeanization and in others impedes it, or is neutral. Our fifth factor is the other side of the coin, as it relates to the motives of Member States themselves. This is the *politics of scale*. This idea, launched by Ginsberg (1989), allows us to consider the perceived advantages accruing from the multiplier effect of political cooperation in external relations. That is, the increase in power and leverage which the Union as a whole can derive from acting together, and the associated sense that an individual Member State will have more capacity to influence events through pooling resources than it would do on its own. This form of reasoning is clearly present in the thinking of small states such as Slovenia and Finland. Poland and Denmark are more ambivalent, the former ultra-sensitive over exchanging one form of multilateral anonymity for another and the latter confident in its unilateral effectiveness in areas like development policy (if not in defence, where NATO is the preferred bedrock). Greece is a similar case, increasingly convinced of the benefits of amplifying its voice through the EU but wishing to pick and choose its issues. As for the bigger five, as with the issue of leadership they have come to realize that they will count for far less internationally if they do not have the EU platform to stand on. At the same time they set limits to foreign policy integration,

either through rediscovering a historically suppressed freedom of national action or (in the case of France and the UK) through a determination not to relinquish a historically privileged role. This may not be logical, in some eyes, but it is how things stand. While the politics of scale is thus an incentive to help launch the Europeanization of foreign policy, it is not sufficient to take the process through to the theoretical conclusion of full convergence.

The final two factors driving Europeanization also exist at the level of the motives, or perceptions, of states and thus permit constructivist interpretations – namely, foreign policy is in part what you make of it. Indeed, Member States do choose to frame their national strategies in Europeanist terms much of the time. The first of the two, and the sixth in the list, is the way in which the EU *legitimizes a global role* for Europeans. This may seem a marginal matter, but the fact of European imperialism and the traumatic retreat from it suffered by eight of the current Member States (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK) means that a return to activism beyond the European region is a sensitive matter. Accusations of neocolonialism are quick to surface. Furthermore, three Member States (Cyprus, Ireland and Malta), once colonies themselves, retain a strong suspicion of any sign of interventionism at the global level. The 12 East European states (i.e. including Finland) are equally motivated by sharp memories of subjugation, and wholly lack experience of a global role – as do the remaining four states (Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden).

What this means is that to the extent that acting globally is seen as desirable, the EU context represents a much safer means of doing so than national action, even for the most powerful Member States. This is the reason why the Lomé system of association agreements with 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states (the ACPs) from 1974 (they are now 79, under the Cotonou Agreement) has constantly been presented on the European side as an equal partnership, and as a way of promoting prosperity and good governance. The multilateral character of the agreement helps to disguise the inevitable elements of asymmetry and exploitation in the relationship. Although it is true that the Europeans have become steadily less bashful about asserting themselves, through ‘conditionality’, individual Member States are able to avoid criticism through being immersed in the collective.

It is true that under Tony Blair Britain was willing to act alone in Sierra Leone, but even in West Africa it also sought an unprecedented degree of cooperation with France, while the latter was anxious, after its tragic failure over Rwanda in 1994, to use ESDP missions, such as Operation Artemis in the Congo, to frame its actions. Moreover Member States have various reasons for contemplating a more outward-looking foreign policy. The ex-colonizers wish to continue with their historical links to various parts of the world, but free from the taint of exploitation. All states can see the benefits of widening their commercial ties and cultural influence, while those states previously confined in the range of their foreign policy have been delighted to discover new opportunities, not least to strengthen their image and identity in the United Nations. Ireland and Denmark have been particularly active in this respect since joining the EC. Conversely, if a state has difficulties in its relations with a distant partner, as Portugal did with Indonesia,

Denmark with China and Britain with Zimbabwe, and cannot convince the EU group to close ranks around them, the result is a distinct sense of vulnerability and a much reduced ability to achieve goals.

The last factor which we have observed as fostering the process of Europeanization also exists at the level of perceptions, namely the *sense of geo-cultural identity* which is shared to different degrees in all Member States. What is meant by this is the way in which decision makers and their constituents identify themselves as Europeans, that is as inhabitants of a particular area of the earth's surface with distinctive characteristics deriving from history, geography and the culture accumulated over centuries. This is not a simple matter. There are many elements of contestation and difference in Europeans' sense of identity. But what they have in common is a feeling that Europe has become a zone of peace and prosperity, with a commitment to a liberal understanding of democracy, and that to live within the borders of the EU is to be within a safe harbour, envied by many.

This may not equate to post-modernity, as compared to Westphalian or 'pre-modern' states (Cooper 2004), but it undoubtedly represents a unique historical phenomenon. In the terms of reference of this book its effect has been to encourage the belief in a common set of foundations for external policy. The 'domestic environment' of a Member State's foreign policy is in the first instance its national society, but it now also includes events and actors across the whole EU, given that diplomacy among the 27 themselves can barely be termed 'foreign policy' any longer. This overlapping of experiences creates a degree of foreign policy Europeanization through its influence on the preferences and underlying values of the national strategies. Despite Greece's position as a geographical outlier, for example, it takes pride in its past as the cradle of European civilization, and membership of a group which represents those values. This has set limits to what otherwise would be an even more instrumental approach to the CFSP than is the case, and in particular to the traditional solidarity with Serbia. Similarly, Poland is deeply relieved to have escaped a Russian-dominated organization and to be within the EU. Accordingly it wishes to assist what it sees as the excluded European states to the east to fulfil their natural destiny, and lobbies hard for the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and even the Caucasus countries to be given a membership perspective (Russia, needless to say, despite its own strong sense of a European identity, is not seen by Warsaw in the same light).

One can argue that the Polish strategy here is a matter of interests, not geo-cultural identity, just as Greece's unwillingness to recognize Kosovo demonstrates the divisions over understandings of European identity. But where do definitions of interests come from if not from some sense of one's location, geographically and culturally? Membership of the EU and all that it stands for has radically changed the perceptions of all the central and eastern European states of what they can do with their foreign policies, even if it will never determine a particular stance. Moreover while certain basic interests relating to survival remain fixed, most other conceptions change over time according to a state's circumstances, of which membership of a major regional grouping like the EU, with its historically

unparalleled degree of integration, must be a prime case. To put the matter at its baldest, if you are in Europe you are *not* American, Middle Eastern, Asian and various other things. This makes a difference to your foreign policy, which membership of the EU significantly compounds.

Counter-currents

Our analysis has identified obstacles to the Europeanization of national foreign policies as well as drivers. The confluence of these competing currents produces circumstances which vary from state to state, evident in our ten country-studies. It certainly makes it impossible to identify a clear path of development.

The first of the four factors which impede Europeanization in this context is the *ideological hostility to further integration* which exists in the political culture of some states. In Britain, for example, a significant part of the political elite is deeply suspicious of what it sees as incremental moves towards a European Army. The Treaty of Lisbon's substitution of the title High Representative over 'Foreign Minister' was a gesture towards London, aimed at heading off the pressure on the Brown government for a referendum which would probably have been lost. Given such suspicions it is remarkable how far the UK has moved since the Treaty of Amsterdam in first initiating the ESDP and then favouring its development. But there is still no doubt that the Europeanization of British foreign policy has strict limits, because sovereignty is held to be a fundamental principle and one which finds its main expression in the concept of an independent foreign policy. The same is true for France, even allowing for a more integrationist rhetoric. Europeanization shows no sign, for example, of extending to a willingness in either London or Paris to envisage the surrender of their privileged positions in the UN Security Council.

The attachment to sovereignty is partly a simple consequence of statehood – the state which is willing to be subsumed in a larger entity is a rare thing, although Belgium and Luxembourg probably qualify within the EU. But the degree of concern over derogations of sovereignty varies across the Member States, and while this variation is a function of history, it also derives from *domestic politics* (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Whereas in Italy and Slovenia there exists a broad consensus on the desirability of moving towards a single European foreign policy, in Poland and Denmark debate on the matter would be far more vigorous. In Germany likewise, where there has long been a belief in extending integration to foreign policy, views now hinge more on the direction such a policy might take, and the country's ability to influence it. It can no longer be taken for granted that European unity will trump perceived German interests for parties of either the Left or the Right. Since domestic politics ebb and flow, such constraints are not fixed. But by the same token national foreign policy is always hostage to change on the domestic front, which is capable of derailing Europeanization even if, in a longer perspective, it does progress.

The other side of the coin is the pull away from Europeanization exerted by *international forces*. It is inherently difficult in international relations to

distinguish between the causal impact of regional and global factors (Major 2005: 179, 183). But Member States are not insulated from the world behind an impermeable EU external membrane; they conduct various forms of business directly in other regions, according to their historical (e.g. ex-colonial) ties, and the extent of their wish to participate in the great issues of the day. The United Kingdom, for example, has pursued its special concerns with Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka in recent years more or less independently of the CFSP. Spain attempts to harness the EU as a whole to its concerns with Latin America but its relative failure in that regard has not impeded a continued engagement at the national level. Member States also participate directly in other international organizations, notably the UN system, NATO, *L'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*, the Commonwealth, and the Nordic Council. Although they become increasingly adept at coordinating their positions in other forums, they are still subject to cross-pressures which dilute the solidarity of Europeanism. Security issues in particular lead Member States like Denmark, Greece, Poland and the UK to make the ESDP only their second priority, while terrorism and/or the plight of one's own citizens in far-flung countries always have the potential to make a state pursue its own distinctive concerns – as with the various imbroglios with Libya experienced by Italy and Bulgaria, or Denmark's Cartoon Crisis. Even in foreign economic policy, where the Common Commercial Policy imposes discipline, states are all too easily tempted into unilateral deals with third parties, as in the case of Italian energy diplomacy towards Russia, or the rapid defections from economic sanctions on China after the Tiananmen massacre.

Last among the distinctive obstacles to the Europeanization of national foreign policy is the uneven pattern of *special relationships* which the 27 enjoy with third states. Almost every capital seeks its own access to the White House, for example, and some achieve genuinely privileged relationships, albeit not quite as exclusive as they like to think. Britain in the area of defence and intelligence, Germany and Italy in relation to NATO and US forward bases, Poland as a new ally in eastern Europe, are all anxious not to risk alienating Washington through any given EU initiative. Other states, like France and Spain, are less inhibited, but still careful over transatlantic diplomacy. In any case, the USA is not the only outsider to be cultivated. Spain is ever closer to Brazil, and Italy cultivates Moscow far more than some of its EU partners would like. The same is true of Greece and its relations with Serbia.

Conclusions: the three and a half-level game of European foreign policy

A Member State of the EU, confronting its relationship with European foreign policy, has five choices – although it is not always the case that a conscious choice is perceived.

- 1 To *ignore* what is being done collectively and proceed on the basis of traditional diplomatic independence.
- 2 Actively to *oppose or obstruct* the attempt to create common positions.
- 3 To attempt to use European foreign policy to promote specific national purposes – i.e. *uploading*.
- 4 To take cues from the emergence of a majority consensus through institutional policymaking – i.e. *downloading*.
- 5 To take cues from the interplay with EU partners, whether as a whole or through various groups and bilateral relationships – i.e. *crossloading*.

In practice we have seen that all five paths may be followed. We use the term ‘paths’ rather than ‘strategies’ since it is rare for states to have a view in principle of how to approach European foreign policy, let alone one which is conscious and coherent. Even those enthusiastic in principle, like Germany, sometimes fail to conform, while the more inherently suspicious, like Britain, show no signs of wanting to dispense with what has become an increasingly important forum for their external relations. The pattern of behaviour is thus mixed, both over time and between issue-areas. Even within the latter consistency is by no means the rule. This may be seen clearly in the table and figure which follow on ESDP missions. Tables 12.4a and 12.4b show the variegated pattern of contributions to the particular missions, while Figure 12.1 gives the rate of participation for each Member State, in the missions for which they were eligible, in percentage terms. The recently joined Member States naturally show up less well than their established partners, although they do quite respectably, with only Malta below the 40 per cent participation rate. Of the 15 states in the EU when the ESDP started, the rate varies between 57 per cent (Denmark and Ireland – discounting Luxembourg, at 43 per cent) and 95 per cent (Germany). The states above the 80 per cent mark are Germany, France (91 per cent), Italy and Sweden (87 per cent), the Netherlands, Spain and the UK (all 83 per cent), which shows that the Big Three by no means dominate the missions. States clearly pick and choose what they want, and are able, to do.

Does this variegation, then, mean that the term ‘Europeanization’ is simply inappropriate in relation to foreign policy, whatever its utility in other dimensions of national policymaking? Our answer to this question is an unequivocal ‘no’, but to explain why we need briefly to return to the nature of the system within which EU Member States currently operate, with regard to foreign policy. It can be designated as a ‘three and a half-level game’. This refers in the first instance to the standard ‘two-level’ game whereby a government formulating foreign policy faces both outside, towards the world, and inside towards its own domestic environment (Putnam 1988). Here we need to add a third level, which is that of the collective EU foreign-policy-making process. The final ‘half’ comes from the fact that the latter consists not only of the highly visible CFSP, but also of the Community-based external relations of Pillar I. At least that was the theory until the Treaty of Lisbon, which recognizes the increasing overlaps between all three

Table 12.4a: Ongoing ESDP missions/operations

	<i>Title</i>	<i>Start</i>	<i>Member States involved¹</i>
1	EUPM BiH	1 January 2003	All
2	EUFOR ALTHEA	2 December 2004	NOT: CY, DK, MT
3	EULEX Kosovo	12 April 2006	NOT: CY, ES
4	EU MM Georgia	1 December 2008	NOT: BE, CY, PT
5	EU BAM Mold/Ukr	1 December 2005	NOT: IE, LU, MT, ES, SE
6	EUSEC DR Congo	8 July 2005	BE, FR, DE, IT, PT, UK
7	EUPOL DR Congo	1 July 2007	BE, FR, FI, DE, IT, MT, PT, RO, SE
8	EUFOR Chad/C.A.R	15 March 2008	NOT: DK, EE, LV, MT
9	EUPOL Afghanistan	15 June 2007	CZ, DK, EE, FR, FI, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, NL, PL, RO, ES, SE, UK
10	EU BAM Rafah Palestinian Territories	30 November 2005	NOT: BG, CZ, LV, LT, SK, SI
11	EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories	1 January 2006	NOT: BG, CY, LV, LT, LU, MT, PL, RO, SK, SI
12	EUNAVCO/Atalanta	19 September 2008	BE, CY, FR, DE, GR, FI, IE, IT, NL, MT, ES, SE, UK ²
13	EUSSR Guinea-Bissau	15 June 2008	FR, DE, IT, PT, ES, SE
14	EUJUST-LEX Iraq	1 July 2005	NOT: CY, CZ, EE, FR, GR, LV, LU, MT, SK, SI

Sources: Table constructed with the kind assistance of Miguel Medina Abellan, University of Cambridge; data in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy: the First Ten Years (1999-2009)*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2009.

Note

- 1 Member States' eligibility for participation, and inclusion in this table, is determined by their date of accession.
- 2 The data for Operation Atalanta has been taken from the EU NAVFOR website (www.eunavfor.eu, accessed 9 December 2009) as that given in the EUISS source appears wrong, including land-locked Hungary as a contributor.

Table 12.4b: Completed missions/operations

	<i>Title</i>	<i>Start</i>	<i>Member States involved</i>
15	CONCORDIA FYROM	31 March– 15 December 2003	NOT: DK, IE
16	PROXIMA FYROM	15 December 2003– 14 December 2005	NOT: IE, MT
17	EUPAT FYROM	15 December 2005– 14 June 2006	AT, BE, CY, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, HU, IT, LV, SK, SI, ES, SE, UK
18	EUJUST Themis Georgia	16 July 2004– 14 July 2005	DK, FR, DE, GR, IT, LV, LT, NL, PL, ES, SE
19	ARTEMIS DRC	12 June– 15 September 2003	NOT: DK, FI, LU
20	EUPOL Kinshasha	9 December 2004– 1 July 2007	BE, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES
21	EUFOR DRC	27 April – 30 November 2006	NOT: DK, EE, LV, MT
22	AMIS and AMISOM Sudan/Somalia	18 July 2005– 15 December 2006	For AMIS: 15 Member States (AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK) For AMISOM: 9 Member States (DE, DK, ES, FR, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK)
23	AMM Banda Aceh	15 December 2005– 15 December 2006	All 25 eligible Member States

Sources: as for Table 12.4a.

Pillars, and the fact that the CFSP cannot function without the resources embedded in Pillar I procedures (the converse is not true, however – Pillar I can and does function without the support of the CFSP). The legal changes do not mean, however, that policymaking practices will necessarily follow on.

The European ‘system’ of foreign policy production therefore consists in the perpetual interaction between the complex parts of the EU institutional structure, the strategies of national governments, and the domestic pressures from within Member States (Hill 1993; White 2001). It is difficult to separate out these factors as distinct variables since they are dialectically intertwined as well being in a condition of evolution. What is not clear is the direction of that evolution, although we may be certain that there is no ‘final’ point of arrival. It is the very nature of such a *system*, however, with its dynamic interactions across many levels, that




Figure 12.1: Member States' individual participation levels in ESDP missions (source: as for Table 12.4a).

justifies the use of the term 'Europeanization'. Member States are not able to stand back in some original position of full independence, deciding when and how to opt in. This would not even be a true description of NATO, which is a wholly intergovernmental body, limited to security and defence. Rather, states become embedded in such institutions, with no thought or prospect of exit, and are constantly subject to the demands and opportunities which they represent. And the EU is the most sophisticated and institutionalized form of foreign policy coordination that has ever existed, historically. Participating in it does not exclude other kinds of involvement, but as their default setting it imposes opportunity costs on its members.

Yet this set of interactions does not produce a snowball effect, whereby the EU gradually comes to monopolize national foreign policy. Such learning process as occurs leads some states to see how better to use the EU as a platform or to frame national concerns in European language. Others continue to have important *domaines réservés*. Thus it is important to acknowledge the distinction between *process Europeanization* and *policy Europeanization*. The former has proceeded steadily over 40 years, as the adaptation of foreign ministries to the need for Political Directors, Correspondents and COREU testifies. The regular tide of meetings at GAERC, PSC and working group levels now amounts less to a 'coordination reflex' than to a sophisticated procedural matrix within which national foreign policy has to work. On the other hand, this is far from being the same as consistent cohesion on *policies*.

On the issue of substance, the key questions are about the degree of variance between national foreign policies, and whether there is a discernible trend in a particular direction (i.e. convergence or divergence). If the foreign policies of

Member States do not differ markedly from each other (as compared to differences from non-members), while if the trend is clearly towards greater convergence, then there are good grounds for arguing that significant Europeanization, in the sense we outlined in the Introduction, has occurred.

The answers to these questions, at least as revealed in this collection of studies, begin with the observation that on the *grandes lignes* of policy, the Member States are not far apart. That is, in terms of basic assumptions about purpose and values, there is much consensus. The 27 all want an orderly international system, with surprises kept to a minimum through law and a stable balance of power. For reasons of justice and self-interest, they want to promote multilateralism so as to tackle global problems like climate change, poverty and weapons proliferation. They want security from terrorism, and stability in the states on their borders. They wish to see dangerous conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, resolved and prevented. They mostly hope to encourage the United States to act as a partner in a multipolar world, rather than as a dominant hyperpower. They also want partnerships with the other emerging powers, of which they are becoming nervous.

It is true that these desiderata are also subscribed to by other states in the world system, especially the developed democracies, and therefore cannot be said to be particular to the EU and its Members. On the other hand, the closer such states are to the EU, whether geographically or politically, the more they are likely to share such goals. Norway and Japan, for example, have often shadowed EU foreign policy, and sought to cooperate with it. The real difficulties, and intra-EU differences, arise from debates over how best to implement these broad aims. It must be accepted that there are limits to convergence, deriving from the robust persistence of the nation-state, and its sovereignty principle, within the EU. Although the development of a common foreign policy system has led to some narrowing of the variance between national approaches, by making states wary of isolation or condemnation by their peers, it has not limited their actual freedom of manoeuvre. Indeed, in some cases their profiles have been enhanced, as David Allen indicated with his concept of the 'European rescue of national foreign policy' (Allen 1996). Since the Single European Act of 1987 there has been a legal obligation of sorts not to break ranks, but in practice states do so whenever they deem a vital interest to be at stake, and quite often for lesser reasons. They see this as not incompatible with agreement on the *grandes lignes*, because largely a matter of tactics or the protection of specific national concerns. In this they are, however, sometimes misguided or disingenuous, as the effectiveness and reputation of a common foreign policy are damaged by such embarrassing episodes as the Franco-Spanish dispute over Perejil Island in 2002.

More significant divisions, such as that over Iraq in 2003, would seem to invalidate the argument about a consensus on broad strategy. Paradoxically, however, that major split was quickly healed through recognition of the unusual circumstance of facing a major war, driven on by a neoconservative US Administration. Just as in 1992, after the chaos over recognition of the republics of ex-Yugoslavia, the Member States showed a strong desire to come back together to pick up the pieces, both of their own policy and of the situation on the

ground. Sustained coherence and low-key effectiveness on reconstruction followed in each case. Furthermore, on an issue of equally high salience, Iran, the Member States have shown themselves able to follow a lead set by the EU-3 of Britain, France and Germany. They are aware that without such unity their influence on the issue would be zero. Thus while divergences persist, and indeed are inevitable, the advantages of a 'politics of scale' are increasingly clear on the big issues of world politics. EU foreign policy is the major point of reference for the national positions of the Member States, far more so than NATO, which is barely a political actor. Given the challenges represented by enlargement for any system of collective action (the number of Member States increased by 80 percent between 2004 and 2007), it is reasonable to assume that there is a trend, albeit broad and slow, towards convergence. Even where the effectiveness, or impact, of European foreign policy is limited, as over the Israel/Palestine dispute, it does not mean that unity is not achieved or valued by the Member States. It provides shelter on a difficult, even dangerous, set of issues, and is a precondition of being able to exert influence when circumstances allow.

Europeanization can thus be considered a relevant concept in the area of foreign policy, despite the lack of a restrictive legal regime and the limited scope for initiative by the Commission – although the latter had a big role in 'enlargement-as-foreign policy'. In theoretical terms it represents an independent variable in that the European foreign policy system in which states are embedded has a demonstrable influence on their behaviour. But that impact is stronger at the level of procedure and of general orientation than it is at the level of detailed policy, where domestic and other international factors can generate idiosyncratic national positions. What is more, Europeanization cannot be more than a middle-range theory within the range of approaches used to explain the foreign policies of European states. It needs combining with theories from general International Relations, from Foreign Policy Analysis and from European Integration studies, to provide a full picture (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 167–8). But then how credible is it ever to think that one general theory could explain such an important and complex set of phenomena?

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